Justin Laster v. Georgia Department of Corrections, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13390
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
JUSTIN LASTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
MACON STATE PRISON,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D. C. Docket No. 5:21-cv-00464-TES
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13390
____________________
Before B RASHER , ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Pro se plaintiff Justin Laster’s amended complaint alleged
that his former employer, Georgia’s Macon State Prison, violated a
litany of federal and state laws by engaging in gender discrimina-
tion, disability discrimination, and retaliation. The district court
dismissed that complaint; Laster appealed. We affirm with respect
to the gender and disability discrimination claims, but we reverse
the dismissal of the retaliation claim and remand for further pro-
ceedings in the district court.
Laster was a correctional officer. He had to perform a phys-
ically demanding job assignment for over a year, even though state
prison policy instructed that assignments should be rotated every
three months. The rotations did not occur because prison officials
would not assign female guards to the strenuous roles. Laster con-
sidered this to be unlawful gender discrimination, and he let his su-
pervisors know it. But his protests had no effect on his job assign-
ment. Eventually, Laster suffered an on-the-job injury. After a se-
ries of medical appointments over the span of two months, Laster’s
doctor determined that Laster needed to avoid engaging in strenu-
ous physical activity for several weeks. Laster provided his super-
visors written documentation of those restrictions. Still, Laster con-
tinued to receive assignments that required heavy lifting.
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22-13390 Opinion of the Court 3
About one month after notifying his supervisors of his phys-
ical restrictions, Laster missed four straight days of work. He re-
ceived a letter from the prison warden stating that Macon State
Prison considered Laster to have voluntarily resigned his employ-
ment. Laster responded in writing, explaining that he had not re-
signed his position. In that response, Laster also recounted the de-
tails of his on-the-job injury and restated his doctor’s order to avoid
physical exertion. Although Laster does not explicitly say so, his
point seemed to be that he decided not to go to work those four
days to aid his recovery. Laster does not say what happened next.
The district court inferred that Laster was terminated; neither
party contests that reading of the complaint.
Laster’s operative complaint invokes several federal and
Georgia state laws. He brings gender discrimination claims under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (via 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983), and Georgia’s Fair Employment Practices Act. He says that
the refusal to reassign him after his on-the-job injury was retaliation
for accusing his supervisors of gender discrimination and thus vio-
lated Title VII. Finally, Laster asserts that the refusal to accommo-
date his post-injury physical limitations was disability discrimina-
tion in violation of Titles I and II of the Americans with Disabilities
Act and Georgia’s Equal Employment for the Handicapped Code.
The district court dismissed the operative complaint.
We review the district court’s decision de novo. Boyle v. City
of Pell City, 866 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir. 2017). We apply the same
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13390
standards as the district court, liberally construing Laster’s pro se
complaint and taking as true the factual allegations within that
complaint. Mitchell v. Peoples, 10 F.4th 1226, 1229 (11th Cir. 2021).
For starters, Laster’s ADA, section 1981, section 1983, and
Georgia state law claims fail for lack of jurisdiction. Laster sued the
Georgia Department of Corrections and the Macon State Prison,
both of which are “arm[s] of the State” and thus enjoy Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit in federal court. Manders v. Lee,
338 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc); Myrick v. Fulton
Cnty., 69 F.4th 1277, 1294 (11th Cir. 2023) (“An assertion of Elev-
enth Amendment immunity essentially challenges a court’s subject
matter jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)). Neither Title I of the ADA,
nor section 1981, nor section 1983 abrogate that immunity. Bd. of
Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Will v. Mich. Dep’t
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); Sessions v. Rusk State Hosp., 648
F.2d 1066, 1069 (5th Cir. 1981). Title II of the ADA abrogates Elev-
enth Amendment immunity only if the alleged misconduct consti-
tutes disability discrimination under both Title II and the Four-
teenth Amendment. Black v. Wiginton, 811 F.3d 1259, 1269 (11th
Cir. 2016). But Laster’s ADA theory of liability—that his supervi-
sors did not accommodate his physical limitations—is not a Four-
teenth Amendment violation. See Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island,
544 F.3d 1201, 1212 n.6 (11th Cir. 2008). Finally, nothing in the
Georgia statutes under which Laster sues waives Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity, see Ga. Const. art. I, § II, para. IX, cl. (f) (prohibit-
ing legislative waivers of “any immunity provided . . . by the United
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22-13390 Opinion of the Court 5
States Constitution”), nor have defendants otherwise consented to
suit in federal court.
The district court had jurisdiction over Laster’s Title VII
gender discrimination and retaliation claims because those claims
are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445 (1976); see Wu v. Thomas, 863 F.2d 1543, 1549–50 (11th
Cir. 1989). But a court’s ability to hear the Title VII claims is only
helpful to Laster if he carries his burden of alleging “enough facts
to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, i.e., facts that
will nudge a plaintiff’s claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible.” Holland v. Carnival Corp., 50 F.4th 1088, 1093 (11th Cir.
2022) (cleaned up).
Both Title VII claims require Laster to plausibly allege that
he suffered an adverse action. See Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1056
(11th Cir. 2012) (“In a Title VII case, an adverse employment action
is not only an element of the prima facie case, but also of the claim
itself.” (internal citations omitted)). What constitutes an adverse
action depends on the particular Title VII claim. In the discrimina-
tion context, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that his or her em-
ployer materially and negatively altered the terms or benefits of the
plaintiff’s employment. See Monaghan v. World Pay US, Inc., 955 F.3d
855, 860 (11th Cir. 2020) (stating that adverse employment actions
“consist of things . . . like terminations, demotions, suspensions
without pay, and pay raises or cuts . . . .”). The adverse action stand-
ard for Title VII retaliation claims is “decidedly more relaxed . . . .”
Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 973 (11th Cir. 2008). An action is
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-13390
sufficiently adverse for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim
when that action “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington
N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (internal quo-
tation marks and citation omitted). Thus, the same action could
satisfy the adverse action element of a retaliation claim but not a
discrimination claim.
Laster relies on the same allegation—that he was assigned to
a physically demanding post—for the adverse action element of
both Title VII claims. He says that assignment was always discrim-
inatory because his supervisors allowed female employees to avoid
similar duties. He says that assignment became retaliatory because
his supervisors kept him in that strenuous job, even after he hurt
himself and was told by a doctor to avoid physical exertion, in order
to punish him for accusing them of gender discrimination.
The district court correctly concluded that Laster’s alleged
adverse action was insufficient to maintain a Title VII discrimina-
tion claim. Requiring an employee to perform an undesirable job
is not an adverse employment action for the purposes of a discrim-
ination claim, as long as there is no allegation that the assignment
came with any material change in the terms or benefits of employ-
ment (e.g., a reduced salary). See Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212
F.3d 571, 587–89 (11th Cir. 2000), abrogation on other grounds recog-
nized by Crawford, 529 F.3d at 970–74 & n.14; Kidd v. Mando Am.
Corp., 731 F.3d 1196, 1203 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Work assignment
claims strike at the very heart of an employer’s business judgment
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22-13390 Opinion of the Court 7
and expertise . . . . And it is by now axiomatic that Title VII is not
designed to make federal courts sit as a super-personnel depart-
ment that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.” (internal quo-
tation marks and citations omitted)).
The district court erred, however, in dismissing Laster’s Ti-
tle VII retaliation claim. The sole basis for the dismissal was the
district court’s conclusion that Laster failed to plausibly allege a suf-
ficiently adverse action. The district court read Laster’s complaint
as “only mention[ing] a retaliatory constructive discharge as the
only possible adverse employment action” and then relied on the
Supreme Court’s decision in Green v. Brennan, 578 U.S. 547 (2016),
to conclude that, because Laster never actually quit his job, he did
not sufficiently plead the elements of constructive discharge. See
Green, 578 U.S. at 555 (stating that an employee “actually re-
sign[ing]” is an element of a constructive discharge claim).
We think the district court read Laster’s complaint too nar-
rowly. It is true that Laster’s operative complaint alleged that his
supervisors sought “to force [him] out of [his] employment and
thus constructively discharged” Laster. But Laster alleged that his
supervisors did so “by subjecting [him] to unfair, unsafe working
conditions . . . .” Giving Laster the appropriate amount of leniency
as a pro se litigant, we do not read his complaint as solely and nar-
rowly alleging a claim under the constructive discharge doctrine,
but instead as more broadly attacking his working conditions and
his supervisors’ motivations for creating those conditions. And that
type of Title VII retaliation claim is properly analyzed under the
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-13390
“decidedly more relaxed” standard set forth in Burlington. Crawford,
529 F.3d at 973; see Monaghan, 955 F.3d at 861–63.
Applying the Burlington standard to Laster’s Title VII retalia-
tion claim, we cannot agree with the district court that Laster failed
to plausibly allege an adverse action. Doing so would require us to
hold that, as a matter of law, no reasonable person in Laster’s shoes
would have felt “dissuaded . . . from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). But the reasonableness of an em-
ployee’s fear of reprisal is generally a question of fact for a jury. See
Monaghan, 955 F.3d at 862–63 (acknowledging that the “‘well might
have dissuaded’ standard is contextual and remanding retaliation
claim for trial (quoting Burlington, 548 U.S. at 69)). And we are not
prepared to say that forcing an employee who has complained of
discrimination and suffered an on-the-job injury to continue work-
ing a physically demanding assignment is such a “petty and trivial
action[]” that it can never form the basis of a Title VII retaliation
claim. Crawford, 529 F.3d at 973 n.13. Accordingly, we reverse the
district court’s dismissal of Laster’s Title VII retaliation claim.
Having addressed the claims dismissed by the district court,
we note that throughout his pro se briefing in this Court, Laster re-
fers to other labor laws (e.g., the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, and the Reha-
bilitation Act of 1973). If those references are meant to be separate
legal claims, we do not consider them because those claims were
not raised in the operative complaint or otherwise addressed by the
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22-13390 Opinion of the Court 9
district court. Ramirez v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 686 F.3d 1239,
1249 (11th Cir. 2012) (“It is well-settled that we will generally refuse
to consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal.”).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED IN PART
and REVERSED IN PART. Laster’s Title VII retaliation claim is
REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion.
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