Tristan Michael Hyde v. Sheriff, Walton County, et al

22-13000Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit8 de set. de 2023

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-13000
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
TRISTAN MICHAEL HYDE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SHERIFF, WALTON COUNTY,
JOHN MORING,
Captain,
J. BROWN,
Captain,
GABRIELLE CUTCHENS,
Legal Access Staff Mailroom,
Defendants-Appellees.
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-13000
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 3:22-cv-04904-LC-HTC
____________________
Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and G RANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Tristan Hyde, proceeding pro se, appeals an order
dismissing his § 1983 claim without prejudice for failure to
prosecute, failure to comply with a court order, and failure to
disclose. Hyde failed to pay the initial partial filing fee in his case,
despite the fact that he had access to the requisite funds and had
been given repeated warnings that failure to pay could result in the
dismissal of his case. Because the district court did not abuse its
discretion when it dismissed Hyde’s case for failure to comply with
a court order, we affirm.
I.
When Hyde filed a complaint alleging a variety of
constitutional violations on the part of several local officials in
Walton County, Florida, the district court granted his motion to
proceed in forma pauperis. But the court denied his motion to waive
the initial partial filing fee because Hyde regularly received deposits
of over $300 in his inmate trust account. The court explained that
the “fact that Plaintiff spends these funds on telephone calls,
purchases, or other litigation, does not excuse him from paying a
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22-13000 Opinion of the Court 3
partial filing fee in this case.” Accordingly, it ordered Hyde to pay
an initial partial filing fee of $68.06, as calculated under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(b)(1), within twenty-one days. The April 29, 2022 order
explicitly warned that failure to pay the initial partial filing fee may
result in dismissal of the action for failure to comply with a court
order.
Twenty-one days came and went without payment from
Hyde. This failure prompted the court to issue an order requiring
him to show cause why his case should not be dismissed for failure
to prosecute or comply with an order of the court. Hyde
responded with a motion requesting a thirty-day extension of time
to pay the initial filing fee. He claimed to have spent the entirety
of his funds on improving the infrastructure and operations of his
business, and said that he would soon be receiving new revenues
to satisfy the filing fee. The court granted Hyde an additional
fourteen days to make the payment, and once again warned that
failure to comply may result in dismissal.
Hyde again failed to make the payment. Instead, he
requested yet another extension, this time claiming that he could
not pay because he had been detained after failing to appear for a
court date and had retained counsel at a cost of $800 for his defense
in that case. Perhaps sensing a pattern, the court denied the motion
and ordered Hyde to pay the fee or else have his case dismissed
without prejudice. The district court made it plain that Hyde had
access to the necessary funds but was “choosing to spend his
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-13000
money on things that he apparently deem[ed] to be more
important than this litigation.”
Even so, the court considered one last volley of similar
motions from Hyde to extend time and to request new payment
guidelines, both of which it rejected. After Hyde missed the final
deadline of August 4, 2022, the district court adopted the
magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation, dismissing the
case without prejudice for failure to prosecute, failure to comply
with a court order, and failure to disclose.
II.
We review the district court’s decision to dismiss Hyde’s
case for failure to comply with a court order for abuse of discretion.
Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 483 (11th Cir. 2006). This means
that “we must affirm unless we find that the district court has made
a clear error of judgment, or has applied the wrong legal standard.”
United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004).
Although pro se litigants are generally subject to less stringent
standards than represented parties, Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760
F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014), they are nevertheless required to
conform to procedural rules. Loren v. Sasser, 309 F.3d 1296, 1304
(11th Cir. 2002).
III.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 permits dismissal of an
action if a plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with a court
order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Dismissal for failure to comply with a
court order is appropriate “where there is a clear record of ‘willful’
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22-13000 Opinion of the Court 5
contempt and an implicit or explicit finding that lesser sanctions
would not suffice.” Gratton v. Great Am. Commc’ns, 178 F.3d 1373,
1374 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535
(11th Cir. 1985)). Although dismissal has been described as an
“extraordinary” remedy, “dismissal upon disregard of an order,
especially where the litigant has been forewarned, generally is not
an abuse of discretion.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th
Cir. 1989).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
Hyde’s case for failure to comply with a court order. Hyde was
repeatedly warned that failure to pay the initial partial filing fee
could result in dismissal of his case. Moreover, the district court
unsuccessfully employed lesser sanctions—a show cause order and
an extension of time to pay the initial filing fee. The district court
entertained a series of duplicative motions from Hyde, effectively
giving him nearly four months to make a payment that was initially
due within twenty-one days. There was plenty of evidence for the
district court to conclude that Hyde was willfully defying court
orders and that lesser sanctions would not be sufficient to induce
compliance.
Hyde argues that dismissal was inappropriate because his
failure to comply was the result of simple negligence. McKelvey v.
AT & T Techs., Inc., 789 F.2d 1518, 1519 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding
that dismissal was too harsh a sanction where simple negligence
was the reason underlying inaction). But McKelvey is not enough.
First, the court’s discussion there was limited to cases where
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-13000
dismissal without prejudice would be the equivalent of dismissal
with prejudice because of temporal proximity to the statute of
limitations. Id. at 1520. Second, the district court’s ruling here was
based on evidence of “willful delay,” not “simple negligence.” Id.
The district court found that Hyde had made multiple $250
payments in his state criminal case, an $800 payment for an
attorney, and hired a firm to handle a contract dispute related to
his business. In short, Hyde “had sufficient funds to pay the initial
partial filing fee and, instead, chose to spend those funds on other
matters.”
Hyde also argues that the district court violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by failing to
provide him with a full record on appeal for free. This argument
also fails. To state an equal protection claim, Hyde must show that
he “was discriminated against by establishing that other similarly-
situated individuals outside of his protected class were treated
more favorably.” Amnesty Int’l, USA v. Battle, 559 F.3d 1170, 1180
(11th Cir. 2009). Hyde neither claims to belong to a protected class,
nor does he identify any comparators whom the district court
treated more favorably than him.
* * *
In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing Hyde’s complaint without prejudice for failure to
comply with a court order. As the district court noted, Hyde “can
refile the suit when he is ready to do so.” Accordingly, the district
court order is AFFIRMED.
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