USA v. JoVon Montell Hollowell

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12905
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
USA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOVON MONTELL HOLLOWELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-00239-JPB-JKL-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12905
Before NEWSOM , GRANT, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
JoVon Hollowell, proceeding pro se, appeals his convictions
for dealing firearms without a license and making false statements
to a federally licensed firearms dealer. Hollowell argues that the
court did not have jurisdiction over him because he is a citizen of
the Cherokee Nation rather than the United States, citing the Ma-
jor Crimes Act.1 He also contends that he was not tried by a jury
of his peers, as the jury did not consist of his fellow tribal members.
We hold that the District Court had jurisdiction, and we affirm
Hollowell’s convictions.
I.
On June 15, 2021, a federal grand jury charged Hollowell in
a three-count indictment. Count one charged Hollowell with deal-
ing firearms without a license, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A), 923(a), and 924(a)(1)(D). Counts two and
three charged Hollowell with making false statements to a feder-
ally licensed firearms dealer, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(6)
and 924(a)(2). The indictment alleged that Hollowell violated the
statutes in Clayton County, Georgia, which is in the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia. Following a hearing, the District Court permitted
Hollowell to represent himself pro se with standby counsel.
1 See 18 U.S.C. § 1153.
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22-12905 Opinion of the Court 3
Hollowell later filed a document that the District Court con-
strued as a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. There, he
summarily argued that the court lacked jurisdiction. The District
Court denied the motion, finding that there was jurisdiction based
on the indictment.
During jury selection, Hollowell moved for a mistrial be-
cause the jury did not consist of his peers, as none of the jurors
were Indigenous. The Government argued that there was no legal
basis for a mistrial, and the District Court denied the motion.
At trial, the Government called Benjamin Southall. Southall
testified that he worked for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tabaco, and
Firearms (“ATF”), investigating violations of federal firearms laws.
Southall added that he witnessed Hollowell buy firearms from Ar-
rowhead Pawn in Clayton County, Georgia.
The Government also admitted a receipt for firearms Hol-
lowell bought from Arrowhead Pawn. Additionally, the Govern-
ment admitted an ATF Form 4473 “Firearms Transaction Record”
that Hollowell completed with each firearm that he purchased—
which federal firearms licensees are required to obtain before trans-
ferring a firearm to a purchaser. On the form, Hollowell stated that
he was a U.S. Citizen, lived in Dunwoody, Georgia, and answered
“yes” in the fields asking whether he was the actual transferee or
buyer of the firearm. The Government also admitted text mes-
sages that showed Hollowell had coordinated with potential cus-
tomers about meeting to buy the firearms he had purchased from
Arrowhead Pawn.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12905
Collectively, the evidence demonstrated that Hollowell
made false statements when he purchased sixteen firearms over a
two-month period with intent to resell the firearms for profit. The
jury found Hollowell guilty on all counts.
After the trial, Hollowell filed multiple documents arguing
that the court lacked jurisdiction due to his Indigenous nationality
of the Cherokee Nation. At his sentencing hearing, Hollowell
again objected that the court lacked jurisdiction over him as a citi-
zen of the Cherokee Nation. Further, he contended that the jury
did not consist of his peers. The District Court overruled Hollow-
ell’s objections and it imposed a total sentence of forty-six months’
imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release. Hol-
lowell timely appealed.
II.
We review questions of statutory subject matter jurisdiction
de novo. United States v. Grimon, 923 F.3d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir. 2019).
III.
Although he makes multiple conclusory arguments, all of
Hollowell’s arguments rely on the same premise: the District
Court did not have jurisdiction because he is a citizen of the “Tsa-
lagi Cherokee Nation” and did not commit any offense under the
Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153. Hollowell also asserts that he
was not tried by a jury of his peers because the jury did not consist
of fellow tribal members. We disagree.
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22-12905 Opinion of the Court 5
District courts have jurisdiction to hear cases involving “all
offenses against the laws of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
“[A]n indictment charging that a defendant violated a law of the
United States gives the district court jurisdiction over the case . . . .”
McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1252 (11th Cir. 2001). And
“[a] federal district court has personal jurisdiction to try any defend-
ant brought before it on a federal indictment charging a violation
of federal law” in its district. United States v. Rendon, 354 F.3d 1320,
1326 (11th Cir. 2003).
As to Hollowell’s main contention, the District Court had
both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. The indictment
charged Hollowell with violating federal laws—dealing in firearms
without a license and making false statements to a federally li-
censed firearms dealer—based on his firearm purchases from Ar-
rowhead Pawn in suburban Atlanta. As we have previously noted,
“[s]ubject matter jurisdiction in every federal criminal prosecution
comes from 18 U.S.C. § 3231. . . . That’s the beginning and the end
of the jurisdictional inquiry.” McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1252 n.11 (omis-
sion in original) (quoting Hugi v. United States, 164 F.2d 378, 380
(7th Cir. 1999)). Thus, Hollowell’s status as a Native American is
irrelevant.2
2 Although Hollowell does not explicitly refer to himself as a “sovereign citi-
zen,” he asserts that the District Court lacked jurisdiction because he is a “nat-
ural man.” We have summarily rejected “so called ‘sovereign citizen[]’” the-
ories as frivolous. Cantu v. City of Dothan, 974 F.3d 1217, 1223 n.2 (11th Cir.
2020) (quoting United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 233 n.1 (11th Cir. 2013)).
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12905
Likewise, Hollowell’s invocation of the Major Crimes Act is
immaterial. The Major Crimes Act applies to crimes committed
“within . . . Indian country.” 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). Indian country
includes “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under
the jurisdiction of the United States Government.” Id. § 1151. Sub-
urban Atlanta does not meet that definition. See McGirt v. Okla-
homa, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2459, 207 L. Ed. 2d 985 (2020) (noting that
the “key question” under the Major Crimes Act is whether an of-
fense was committed in Indian country).
Finally, Hollowell has abandoned any argument that he was
not tried by a jury of his peers. Although we construe pro se filings
liberally, “this leniency does not give a court license to serve as de
facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an otherwise deficient plead-
ing in order to sustain an action.” United States v. Padgett,
917 F.3d 1312, 1317 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting GJR Invs., Inc. v.
County of Escambia,132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)). Hollow-
ell’s filing fails to point to any law or supporting authority for this
argument. At best, Hollowell’s assertion is based on his sovereign
citizen argument, which this Court has summarily rejected as friv-
olous. See United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 233 n.1 (11th Cir.
2013). And “simply stating that an issue exists, without further ar-
gument or discussion, constitutes abandonment of that issue and
precludes our considering the issue on appeal.” Singh v. U.S. Att’y
Gen., 561 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); see also Tim-
son v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[I]ssues not
briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.”).
Hollowell, thus, has abandoned this issue.
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22-12905 Opinion of the Court 7
Accordingly, we hold that the District Court had jurisdiction
and we affirm Hollowell’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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