Dianelin Vergara v. Commissioner of Social Security

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11671
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
DIANELIN M. VERGARA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-22964-KMW
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11671
Before NEWSOM , GRANT, and E DMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Dianelin Vergara appeals the district court’s order affirming
the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of her application for
disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and supplemental security in-
come (“SSI”). No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.
I.
When -- as in this case -- an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
denies an application for benefits and the Appeals Council denies
review, we review the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final
decision. See Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001).
Our review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to
whether substantial evidence supports the decision and whether
the correct legal standards were applied. See Buckwalter v. Acting
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5 F.4th 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2021). “Substantial
evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclu-
sion.” Id. We review de novo the ALJ’s application of the law. See
id. “We review de novo the district court’s determination as to
whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.”
Id.
A person who applies for Social Security DIB or for SSI ben-
efits must first prove that she is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1512(a), 416.912(a). The Social Security Regulations outline a
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22-11671 Opinion of the Court 3
five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a
claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
The ALJ must evaluate (1) whether the claimant engaged in sub-
stantial gainful work; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impair-
ment; (3) whether the severe impairment meets or equals an im-
pairment in the Listings of Impairments; (4) whether the claimant
has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform her past
relevant work; and (5) whether, in the light of the claimant’s RFC,
age, education, and work experience, there exist other jobs in the
national economy the claimant can perform. Id.
Vergara filed an application for DIB and for SSI in February
2018. Vergara alleged that she was unable to work due to her disa-
bling mental conditions. Following a hearing, the ALJ denied Ver-
gara’s application.
Applying the five-step evaluation process, the ALJ found that
Vergara suffered from three severe impairments: bipolar disorder,
posttraumatic stress disorder, and anxiety disorder. The ALJ, how-
ever, determined that Vergara had no impairment or combination
of impairments that met or medically equaled an impairment in
the Listing of Impairments.
The ALJ next determined that Vergara had the RFC to “per-
form a full range of work at all exertional levels” and that Vergara
was able to “perform simple, routine tasks,” “make simple work
related decisions,” and interact occasionally with coworkers and su-
pervisors but not with the public. Considering Vergara’s age, edu-
cation, work experience, and RFC -- together with testimony of the
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11671
vocational expert -- the ALJ determined that Vergara could perform
her past relevant work as a cleaner or housekeeper. Accordingly,
the ALJ concluded that Vergara was not disabled.
Vergara administratively appealed the ALJ’s decision to the
Appeals Council. The Appeals Council denied Vergara’s request
for review. The district court affirmed.
II.
On appeal, Vergara argues chiefly that the ALJ erred in con-
sidering the opinion of Vergara’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Jorge.
Vergara contends that the ALJ discounted Dr. Jorge’s medical opin-
ion without articulating adequately the degree to which the ALJ
was persuaded by Dr. Jorge’s opinion. Vergara also argues that --
because Dr. Jorge’s medical opinion was supported by substantial
evidence in the record -- the ALJ failed to establish “good cause” for
discounting Dr. Jorge’s opinion.
As an initial matter, we reject -- as relying on an outdated
standard -- Vergara’s argument that the ALJ failed to demonstrate
“good cause” for discounting Dr. Jorge’s opinion. For claims filed
before 27 March 2017, the ALJ was required to give “substantial or
considerable weight” to the medical opinion of a treating physician
absent a showing of “good cause” and was required to “state with
particularity” the weight given to each medical opinion. See Win-
schel v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d) and 416.927(d)).
In 2017, the Commissioner promulgated new regulations
governing the consideration of medical opinions for purposes of
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22-11671 Opinion of the Court 5
reviewing applications for SSI and for DIB. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520c, 416.920c. Under the new regulations, an ALJ is to give
no deference or “specific evidentiary weight, including controlling
weight,” to a treating physician’s opinion. See id. §§ 404.1520c(a),
416.920c(a). Instead, the ALJ evaluates the persuasiveness of a
medical opinion by considering specified factors, the most im-
portant of which are the supportability of the medical opinion and
the opinion’s consistency with other record evidence. See id. §§
404.1520c(a), (b)(2), 416.920c(a), (b)(2). The ALJ then articulates
how the supportability and consistency of a medical opinion were
considered in making a determination about disability. See id. §§
404.1520c(b), 416.920c(b). Because Vergara filed her application in
February 2018, her claims are governed by the new regulations. See
id. §§ 404.1520c, 416.920c (providing that the new regulations apply
to claims filed on or after 27 March 2017).
Here, the ALJ followed properly the applicable regulations
in evaluating Dr. Jorge’s medical opinion. The ALJ gave no special
deference or controlling weight to Dr. Jorge’s opinion. Instead, the
ALJ evaluated the persuasiveness of Dr. Jorge’s opinion, focusing
on the supportability and consistency of Dr. Jorge’s opinion with
the other record evidence.
The ALJ explained that Dr. Jorge’s opinion about the severity
of Vergara’s mental functional limitations was inconsistent with
the overall record. In particular, the ALJ described the ways in
which Dr. Jorge’s opinion conflicted with this record evidence: (1)
the different opinions of two state agency psychological
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11671
consultants; (2) the kind and intensity of treatment Vergara had re-
ceived; (3) evidence that Vergara’s condition improved with con-
sistent treatment and recommended psychotherapy; (4) Vergara’s
mental status examinations; (5) Vergara’s reported activities of
daily living; and (6) a third-party function report completed by Ver-
gara’s brother. The ALJ explained further that Dr. Jorge’s opinion
was unsupported by her own treatment notes.
The ALJ articulated adequately his reasons for discounting
Dr. Jorge’s opinion. Under the applicable regulations, the ALJ had
no obligation to state the weight given -- or the degree of persua-
siveness assigned -- to Dr. Jorge’s opinion.
Vergara disputes the ALJ’s stated reasons and argues that Dr.
Jorge’s opinion is consistent with other evidence in the record. But
the question before us on appeal is limited to whether the ALJ’s
decision -- not Dr. Jorge’s opinion -- is supported by substantial ev-
idence. That Dr. Jorge’s opinion might be consistent with some
record evidence is not enough to overturn the ALJ’s decision. Un-
der our limited standard of review, “[w]e will affirm the Commis-
sioner’s decision if it is supported by substantial evidence, even if
the preponderance of the evidence weighs against it.” See Buckwal-
ter, 5 F.4th at 1320. We cannot “decide the facts anew, make credi-
bility determinations, or reweigh the evidence.” See id.
Vergara also contends that -- because the ALJ erred in failing
to assess properly Dr. Jorge’s opinion -- the ALJ’s RFC assessment
is unsupported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
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22-11671 Opinion of the Court 7
Contrary to Vergara’s assertion, the ALJ considered Dr.
Jorge’s opinion and articulated adequately the reasons for finding
Dr. Jorge’s opinion unpersuasive. In assessing Vergara’s RFC, the
ALJ considered the entire record, including Vergara’s application
and hearing testimony, the opinions of the state agency consult-
ants, Dr. Jorge’s opinion, Vergara’s mental status examinations and
medical records, and a third-party function report. In the light of
that evidence, the ALJ concluded that Vergara had no exertional
limitations, could perform simple routine tasks, could make simple
work-related decisions, and could interact with coworkers and su-
pervisors but not with the public. The ALJ’s RFC finding is sup-
ported by substantial evidence in the record and comports with
SSR 96-8p. See SSR 96-8p, 61 Fed. Reg. 34,474, 34,477 ( July 2, 1996)
(providing that, in assessing a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must con-
sider all pertinent evidence in the record, including medical history,
medical signs and laboratory findings, effects of treatment, activi-
ties of daily living, lay evidence, recorded observations and medical
source statements, effects of symptoms, evidence from attempts to
work, need for a structured living environment, and work evalua-
tions).
Substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s denial of
DIB and SSI benefits; we affirm.*
* Vergara’s reliance on our decisions in Simon v. Comm’r., Soc. Sec. Admin., 7
F.4th 1094 (11th Cir. 2021), Schink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245 (11th
Cir. 2019), and Castro v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 783 F. App’x 948 (11th Cir.
2019), is misplaced. Most important, each of these decisions involved
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11671
AFFIRMED.
applications for disability benefits filed before 27 March 2017 and, thus, con-
sidered opinion evidence under the treating-physician old rule: a rule inappli-
cable to Vergara’s case. Further -- unlike in Schink, where the ALJ concluded
that the claimant’s bipolar disorder was no severe impairment based on evi-
dence that the claimant’s condition improved with treatment -- the ALJ here
concluded that Vergara’s bipolar disorder constituted a severe impairment.
See Schink, 935 F.3d at 1267-68.
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