USA v. Demetrius Lamar Jackson

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-11977
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DEMETRIUS LAMAR JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket Nos. 4:19-cr-00099-LGW-CLR-1,
4:19-cr-00049-LGW-CLR-1
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11977
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Before WILSON, J ORDAN, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Demetrius Jackson appeals from his convictions for dis-
charging and brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a
crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)–(ii);
conspiracy to use and carry a firearm during and in relation to a
crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o); carjacking, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119; attempted carjacking, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2119; and interference with commerce by robbery, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). He argues that the district court
abused its discretion in denying his motions to substitute counsel
and in denying his motion to continue his sentencing hearing for a
psychological evaluation to determine competency.
The government, in turn, has filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal pursuant to an appeal waiver that a panel of our Court car-
ried with the case. After careful review, we affirm.1
I.
We review the denial of a motion for new counsel under an
abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d
1314, 1343 (11th Cir. 1997). “The district court may be reversed
only if its decision is arbitrary or unreasonable.” United States v.
1 Additionally, the government’s motion to dismiss the appeal pursuant to an
appeal waiver is DENIED as MOOT.
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21-11977 Opinion of the Court 3
Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 471 (11th Cir. 1988). A defendant has a right
to counsel under the Sixth Amendment; however, except for good
cause, he does not have an unqualified right to counsel of his choice
or the right to demand different counsel. United States v. Garey, 540
F.3d 1253, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008) (en banc). “Good cause in this con-
text means a fundamental problem, such as a conflict of interest, a
complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable con-
flict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict.” Id. (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). A “general loss of confidence or trust” in
counsel by itself does not constitute good cause. United States v.
Joyner, 899 F.3d 1199, 1205–06 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, a defendant’s unilateral
refusal to communicate with appointed counsel is not good cause.
United States v. Amede, 977 F.3d 1086, 1106 (11th Cir. 2020).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
ing Jackson’s motions for new counsel. Jackson maintains that his
attorney, Henifin, frequently used inaccessible legal language to
convey important concepts relevant to the proceeding. As a result,
Jackson claims that he had difficulty comprehending critical ele-
ments of the process, such as sentencing procedures. But a review
of the record fails to show an irreconcilable conflict or breakdown
in communication. Henifin and Jackson met twenty times and had
significant discussions during twelve of those meetings. Although
Henifin believed there was a breakdown in communication, any
breakdown was a result of Jackson’s threats and his refusal to speak
to Henifin. We have addressed a defendant’s refusal to speak with
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-11977
counsel before; Jackson’s actions do not constitute good cause. See
id. at 1104–06.
Although Jackson did not think Henifin advocated zeal-
ously, the record shows that Henifin obtained a plea agreement
that dismissed twenty charges, leaving Jackson to plead guilty to 6
counts. Further, Jackson’s lack of confidence in Henifin, by itself,
does not constitute good cause. See Joyner, 899 F.3d at 1205–06.
Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
ing Jackson’s motions for new counsel.
II.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion for a contin-
uance for abuse of discretion. United States v. Chalker, 966 F.3d
1177, 1193 (11th Cir. 2020). A district court’s competency determi-
nation is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Hogan, 986 F.2d
1364, 1372 (11th Cir. 1993). “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous
only when we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.” Id.
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits
the government from proceeding against a defendant while he is
incompetent. United States v. Cometa, 966 F.3d 1285, 1291 (11th Cir.
2020). At any point before sentencing, the defendant may file a
motion for a hearing to determine his mental competency, and
“[t]he court shall grant the motion . . . if there is reasonable cause
to believe that the defendant . . . is unable to understand the nature
and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist
properly in his defense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a). Absent a bona fide
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21-11977 Opinion of the Court 5
doubt as to a defendant’s competency, the motion may be denied.
Cometa, 966 F.3d at 1291.
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
ing Jackson’s motion for a continuance of his sentencing because
there was no bona fide doubt as to his competency. The district
court noted that Jackson assisted in his defense by asking perceptive
questions. Additionally, Jackson’s apology to a victim and verbal
acknowledgement that he was going to prison showed Jackson’s
understanding of the nature and consequences of the proceedings
against him.
Although the district court was informed that Jackson at-
tempted to commit suicide at his sentencing, a paramedic assessed
that Jackson did not show any signs of distress and was alert and
responsive. Additionally, the district court noted that Jackson was
alert and actively interacting in the proceedings before it ruled on
his motions to continue and for a psychological evaluation. Fur-
ther, the record reflects that Jackson previously delayed the case
after slamming his hand in a door before his change of plea hearing.
Jackson does not point to anything in the record that undermines
our confidence in the district court’s decision. Accordingly, we af-
firm the district court’s denial of Jackson’s motion for continuance.
AFFIRMED.
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1 J ORDAN, J., Dissenting 21-11977
J ORDAN, Circuit Judge, Dissenting.
With respect, I dissent. In my view, the district court abused
its discretion in denying a continuance and a psychiatric evaluation
of Mr. Jackson following his suicide attempt on the day of sentenc-
ing.
Right before his sentencing hearing, Mr. Jackson tried to
hang himself. Upon learning of the suicide attempt, Mr. Jackson’s
counsel understandably moved for a continuance of the sentencing
hearing and for a psychiatric evaluation of Mr. Jackson. The district
court denied these motions after hearing from a paramedic and a
deputy U.S. marshal.
The first problem is that the paramedic only saw Mr. Jack-
son—who did not say anything—for just 5 minutes. The para-
medic expressly stated that without Mr. Jackson answering ques-
tions, “it was very hard for him to be able to properly assess him.”
D.E. 66 at 9.
Moreover, no one conducted a mental evaluation or assess-
ment of Mr. Jackson. And although there was a video camera in
Mr. Jackson’s holding cell, the deputy U.S. marshal did not know if
the camera was recording, did not have an opportunity to review
any recording, and did not talk to anyone who may have had an
opportunity to review the camera. See id. at 15–16. This is not
surprising given the quick progression of events—at 12:05 p.m., the
proceedings were called to order; shortly thereafter, a deputy U.S.
marshal advised the district court that deputies and some inmates
had just intervened in Mr. Jackson’s attempted suicide attempt; at
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21-11977 J ORDAN, J., Dissenting 2
12:18 p.m., the district court ordered a recess; and by 1:26 p.m. the
proceedings had resumed.
At the sentencing hearing that followed, Mr. Jackson ex-
pressed remorse for his actions during his allocution. He apolo-
gized to the testifying victim, to her family, and to the district court.
He said that he wished all of the victims were there “because I re-
ally want to tell everybody one by one I apologize.” Id. at 54. Mr.
Jackson explained that it was as if he “was walking around without
a brain, like my brain was empty, that was somebody telling me to
do something. I’m just moving. I just was a body.” Id. He
acknowledged that he “did wrong” and stated he was learning from
this situation that “it’s more [h]onor to do right than do wrong.”
Id.at 53. He also told his mother that it was not her fault, and said
he was not a bad person, not a “throwaway.” Id. at 54, 56–57.
After Mr. Jackson’s allocution, the district court began to
pronounce the sentence. Before the district court could finish,
however, Mr. Jackson “made a rush toward the prosecutor’s table,
and the [deputy U.S.] marshals descended and were able to pin
him” and he was “subdued and taken back to the holding area in
the courthouse.” Id. at 61. The transcript reads like this:
Marshal: Get in here.
Marshal: Stop. Stop.
The Defendant: Kill me.
Marshal: We need help in here.
Marshal: Breathe.
The Defendant: Kill me. (Unintelligible). Kill me.
(Unintelligible).
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3 J ORDAN, J., Dissenting 21-11977
Id. at 59.
The district court then took another recess. That same af-
ternoon, at 4:19 p.m., the district court resumed proceedings, and
Mr. Jackson appeared—according to the district court—“secured in
a chair” and “behaving well.” Id. at 62. As the district court con-
tinued to pronounce the sentence, Mr. Jackson began interrupting
with assertions in stark contrast to his previous statement apologiz-
ing to the victims and the district court:
The Defendant: I ain’t even go hard. So imagine if
ain’t had no safety on my gun.
The Court: Marshal, if you’ll –
The Defendant: Imagine if I really put thought and
tried to hurt people. If you going to kill me, give me
the death penalty. Don’t play with me, bro. Y’all ty-
ing me down, sentence me, kill me.
…
The Defendant: I mean, I could have went a hundred
times harder.
…
The Defendant: I could have went a million times
harder. You lucky – you lucky you wasn’t in that car
wash or something.
Id. at 63–65.
A lot happened on the day of the sentencing hearing. Mr.
Jackson attempted to commit suicide and saw a paramedic for only
5 minutes. His counsel’s motions for a continuance and a psychi-
atric evaluation were denied. The sentencing hearing went for-
ward that day as scheduled, and Mr. Jackson provided a remorseful
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21-11977 J ORDAN, J., Dissenting 4
statement—apologizing to victims, his family, and the district
court. But shortly after hearing his sentence, he made a rush to-
ward the prosecutor’s table, was pinned down, and taken out of the
courtroom after saying “kill me.” He returned to the courtroom
for the remainder of his sentencing hearing, during which he began
to make aggressive statements that contradicted his previous apol-
ogies.
A look at Mr. Jackson’s presentence investigation report pro-
vides a backdrop to the events that transpired that day, confirming
that a continuance of the sentencing hearing was needed. Accord-
ing to the report, Mr. Jackson indicated that he had in the past made
multiple attempts to overdose by ingesting copious amounts of
pills and that, as a child, he was diagnosed with depression, anxiety,
and bipolar disorder. See D.E. 67 at 25. The report also states that
the medical staff at the Emanuel County Jail confirmed that Mr.
Jackson was being treated for the noted mental health conditions.
See id.
A suicide attempt, regardless of its root cause, is a drastic act.
It warrants a serious evaluation of the person who tried to end his
life. Maybe, as the district court believed, Mr. Jackson understood
what he was doing and was able to still participate rationally and
understand the proceedings. See D.E. 66 at 19–22, 61. But maybe
his mind wasn’t right. Only a psychiatric evaluation—performed
after a continuance—could have provided an answer entitled to a
degree of confidence. See Bailey v. Spears, 847 F.2d 695, 696 (11th
Cir. 1988) (finding that the circumstances, including bizarre
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5 J ORDAN, J., Dissenting 21-11977
behavior and a suicide attempt in the jail, “raise[d] sufficient doubts
regarding [the defendant’s] mental capacity as to justify further in-
quiry by a competent medical expert”). See also Wojtowicz v. United
States, 550 F.2d 786, 790 (2d Cir. 1977) (“If the suicide attempt is
found to have occurred, then it will become necessary for the court
to order an examination to determine whether appellant was com-
petent to be sentenced.”).
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