Timothy Eugene Bridges v. Americus Georgia, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-11896
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-00056-WLS
PATRICIA BRIDGES TATUM,
Individually and as Next of Kin and
Administrator of the Estate of Eddie C.
Bridges, Deceased,
Plaintiff,
TIMOTHY EUGENE BRIDGES,
Individually and as Next of Kin, and
Administrator of the Estate of Eddie C.
Bridges, Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
AMERICUS GEORGIA,
The City of,
AMERICUS GEORGIA,
The City of,
d.b.a. Americus Police Department, et al.
Defendants-Appellees,
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________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
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(September 18, 2014)
Before HULL, MARCUS, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff (as next of kin and administrator of Eddie Bridges’s estate)
appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants
Officer Michael Middleton, Police Chief James Green, and the City of Americus,
Georgia (“City”) in Plaintiff’s civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law.1
Plaintiff’s complaint arises from a physical altercation between Bridges and
Officer Middleton, which resulted in Bridges’s arrest. The order granting
summary judgment is a full and detailed order. No reversible error has been
shown; we affirm the judgment.
1 Plaintiff does not appeal the district court’s judgment in favor of the City of Americus Police
Department.
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The facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, are as follows.2 On
the day of the incident, Chief Green’s office received a call from an unidentified
person complaining about people loitering at a shopping center, drinking alcohol,
and asking customers for money. The shopping center had a history of complaints
from store merchants about similar behavior.
When Officer Middleton arrived at the shopping center to investigate the
complaint, he saw Bridges standing on the sidewalk in front of a store and drinking
from a large can. Although Officer Middleton saw other people in the parking lot,
Bridges was the only person he saw standing without an apparent purpose and
holding a drink.
When Officer Middleton asked Bridges whether he was shopping or just
hanging out, Bridges responded that “he was doing what he wanted to do.” Officer
Middleton told Bridges that he could not hang out in that area and that he needed
to leave. Bridges refused. Officer Middleton instructed Bridges again to leave.
When Bridges refused a second time, Officer Middleton took out his handcuffs and
prepared to arrest Bridges for “non-compliance.” Officer Middleton told Bridges
that he was under arrest.
2 We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing the evidence and
all reasonable factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Skop v.
City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 130, 1136 (11th Cir. 2007).
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Before Officer Middleton could handcuff Bridges, however, Bridges hit
Officer Middleton in the face with his drink can. Officer Middleton then took
Bridges down on the ground where the two men struggled. During the struggle,
Officer Middleton’s radio was disconnected from his uniform; and his shirt collar
was torn. At some point in the struggle, Bridges -- who was subject to a seizure
disorder -- allegedly told Officer Middleton that Bridges was about to have a
seizure; still, Bridges continued resisting Officer Middleton’s attempts to subdue
him.3 Officer Middleton then with his fist punched Bridges in the face two or three
times. After that, Bridges stopped resisting. Officer Middleton rolled Bridges onto
his stomach and lay on Bridges’s back until assistance arrived.
When other officers responded to the scene, the officers handcuffed Bridges.
Because Bridges’s eye was swelling and bleeding, the officers called EMS;
Bridges was taken to the hospital. Bridges underwent surgery to reduce the
swelling in his eye and was released several hours later.4
Plaintiff, as next of kin and administrator of Bridges’s estate, filed this
section 1983 civil suit. Briefly stated, the district court construed Plaintiff’s
complaint as purporting to assert these claims: (1) Officer Middleton falsely
3 Nothing evidences that Bridges in fact had a seizure during his encounter with Officer
Middleton.
4 Bridges died less than two months after this incident. Plaintiff contends that the injuries
Bridges sustained as a result of Officer Middleton’s punches contributed to Bridges’s death.
Nothing in the record supports this theory. The autopsy report lists Bridges’s cause of death as a
seizure disorder complicated by hypertensive heart disease.
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arrested and falsely imprisoned Bridges, in violation of the Fourth Amendment;
(2) Officer Middleton used excessive force against Bridges, in violation of the
Fourth Amendment; (3) Chief Green violated the Fourth Amendment by
participating in Officer Middleton’s violations; (4) the City and Chief Green failed
to train Officer Middleton; (5) the City violated the Americans with Disabilities
Act (“ADA”); (6) the City’s loitering ordinance is unconstitutional; and (7) various
violations of state law.
The district court correctly granted Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment. The court determined that no Fourth Amendment or ADA violations
occurred. The district court also concluded that Plaintiff lacked standing to
challenge the City’s loitering ordinance. After granting summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s federal claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims.
False Arrest and False Imprisonment Claims:
“[A]n officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief,
investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. 673, 675 (2000).
“Reasonable suspicion is determined from the totality of circumstances and
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collective knowledge of the officers.” United States v. Nunez, 45 F.3d 1223, 1226
(11th Cir. 2006).
Probable cause to arrest exists “when the facts and circumstances within the
officer’s knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information,
would cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.”
McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003)
(emphasis omitted).
Drawing all inferences and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to Plaintiff, Officer Middleton had reasonable suspicion, when he first approached
Bridges, to believe that Bridges was committing the offense of criminal trespass.5
The record shows that Officer Middleton knew that a complaint had been received
about people loitering, drinking alcohol, and harassing customers at a shopping
center, and that the shopping center had a history of similar complaints from store
merchants. When Officer Middleton arrived at the shopping center, he observed
Bridges standing outside a store, drinking from a can. Given the totality of these
circumstances -- in addition to Bridges’s evasive answer to Officer Middleton’s
investigatory questions -- Officer Middleton could have suspected reasonably that
5 Under Georgia law, “[a] person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he . . .
knowingly and without authority . . . [r]emains upon the land or premises of another person . . .
after receiving notice from the owner, rightful occupant, or, upon proper identification, an
authorized representative of the owner or rightful occupant to depart.” O.C.G.A. § 16-7-
21(b)(3).
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Bridges was not authorized to remain on the property and should be ordered to
leave. See Wardlow, 120 S.Ct. at 676 (evidence of suspect’s evasive behavior and
presence in a “high crime area” are pertinent to determining whether reasonable
suspicion exists). And Bridges was ordered to leave.
Bridges’s refusal to comply with Officer Middleton’s repeated orders to
leave the premises then gave rise to probable cause to arrest Bridges for
obstruction under Georgia law.6 See Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1276-77
(11th Cir. 2004) (“ample probable cause” existed to arrest defendant for
misdemeanor obstruction when he refused to comply with officer’s reasonable
instructions and acted confrontationally); Wilcox v. State, 674 S.E.2d 108, 110
(Ga. Ct. App. 2009) (“Argument, flight, stubborn obstinance, and lying are all
examples of conduct that may satisfy the obstruction element.”).
Given the circumstances, we conclude, as a matter of law, that no violation
of Bridges’s constitutional rights occurred; Officer Middleton and Chief Green are
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s false arrest and false imprisonment
claims. 7
6 “[A] person who knowingly and willfully obstructs or hinders any law enforcement officer in
the lawful discharge of his official duties is guilty of a misdemeanor.” O.C.G.A. § 16-10-24.
7 We reject Plaintiff’s reliance on Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004); it
is too different from this case: for example, (unlike in Kingsland) nothing in this record
evidences that Officer Middleton “fabricated [evidence] in an effort to manufacture probable
cause,” ignored information within his knowledge, or failed to conduct a reasonable
investigation.
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Excessive Force Claim:
In determining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure was
reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, we consider “the facts and
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or
others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.” Graham v. Connor, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1872 (1989) (noting that “the right to
make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some
degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.”). In effecting an arrest,
officers are permitted under the Fourth Amendment to use a level of force that is
“necessary in the situation at hand.” Jean-Baptiste v. Gutierrez, 627 F.3d 816, 821
(11th Cir. 2010).
We judge the reasonableness of the force used based on “the perspective of a
reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”
Graham, 109 S.Ct. at 1872. And we must take into account “that police officers
are often forced to make split-second judgments -- in circumstances that are tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving -- about the amount of force that is necessary in a
particular situation.” Id.
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Given the facts and circumstances of this case, the force used by Officer
Middleton was not excessive and constituted no Fourth Amendment violation. The
record shows that, before Officer Middleton applied any force, Bridges first struck
Officer Middleton in the face with a drink can. Bridges then resisted actively
Officer Middleton’s attempts to detain Bridges, including ripping the officer’s
shirt. An objective reasonable officer in this situation could have concluded that
some amount of physical force was necessary to subdue Bridges, to effectuate the
arrest, and to prevent further injury to the officer. And the amount of force used --
two or three punches with a hand to the face -- was reasonable and proportionate
for Bridges’s level of resistance. The district court determined correctly that
Officer Middleton and Chief Green were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.8
Remaining Claims:
Because we have determined that Bridges suffered no constitutional injury,
Plaintiff’s claims against the City and against Chief Green in his official capacity
8 Because we have determined that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred in this case, we
necessarily conclude that Defendants violated no clearly established constitutional right. Thus,
even to the extent that a constitutional violation in fact occurred (which we reject), Officer
Middleton and Chief Green would still be entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s claims
against them in their individual capacities for false arrest, false imprisonment, and use of
excessive force. See Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (government
officials acting within the scope of their discretionary authority are immune from individual civil
liability if the officials’ conduct violates no “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.”).
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for supervisory liability and for failure to train fail as a matter of law. See Rooney
v. Watson, 101 F.3d 1378, 1381 (11th Cir. 1996) (“a municipality may be held
liable under section 1983 for inadequate training only after determining that the
plaintiff has suffered a constitutional deprivation as a result of the municipal
employee’s conduct”); Vineyard v. Cnty. of Murray, 990 F.2d 1207, 1211 (11th
Cir. 1993) (“Only when it is clear that a violation of specific rights has occurred
can the question of § 1983 municipal liability for the injury arise.”).
About Plaintiff’s ADA claim, nothing evidences that Officer Middleton was
in fact aware of Bridges’s seizure disorder before the pertinent altercation started.
Besides, the assumed facts do not show that Bridges was discriminated against “by
reason of [his] disability”: Plaintiff’s ADA claim must fail. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132
(“no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason by such disability, be
excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs,
or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.”).
The district court decided correctly that Plaintiff lacks standing to challenge
the City’s loitering ordinance. To establish standing, Plaintiff must “provide
evidence of an injury in fact, causation and redressibility.” Dermer v. Miami-Dade
Cnty., 599 F.3d 1217, 1220 (11th Cir. 2010). Even if we assume -- without
deciding -- that Bridges suffered an injury in fact as a result of Defendants’
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enforcement of the loitering ordinance, Plaintiff has not shown that the alleged
injury would be redressed by declaring the ordinance unconstitutional. Bridges
was not actually charged with loitering and faces no threat of future arrest for
loitering. And, because Defendants had a duty “to enforce laws until and unless
they are declared unconstitutional,” a favorable ruling would not render
Defendants liable for attempting to enforce the loitering ordinance. See Cooper v.
Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1220 (11th Cir. 2005).
Because the district court dismissed properly each of Plaintiff’s federal
claims, it abused no discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Plaintiff’s state law claims. See Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086,
1089 (11th Cir. 2004) (“We have encouraged district courts to dismiss any
remaining state claims when . . . the federal claims have been dismissed prior to
trial.”).
AFFIRMED.
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