Nathan DeShawn Faust v. USA

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-12168
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket Nos. 9:11-cv-80918-DTKH,
9:03-cr-80094-DTKH-1
NATHAN DESHAWN FAUST,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(July 24, 2014)
Before TJOFLAT, JORDAN, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Nathan Deshawn Faust, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s denial
of his motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We previously
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granted Faust leave to file a second or successive motion to vacate and remanded
to the district court for an evidentiary hearing, because he made a prima facie
showing that based on his newly discovered evidence, if proven, no reasonable
jury would have found him guilty of his underlying criminal offense. On remand,
the district court found that Faust failed to exercise due diligence in discovering his
newly discovered evidence, and, alternatively, that the witness testimony he
presented at the evidentiary hearing was not credible.
Faust’s underlying conviction was for possession with intent to distribute
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). At trial, the government’s evidence
showed that police officers initially responded to a 911 call at Faust’s home on
Olive Avenue in West Palm Beach, Florida (the “Olive Avenue home”), and
observed “suspicious behavior.” They then searched the Olive Avenue home’s
trash and found 17 aluminum baking pans, a number of which bore scoring marks
and contained a white powder residue that field-tested positive for cocaine. During
the execution of the search warrant at the home, police found a bag of cocaine on
top of a kitchen cabinet and arrested Faust. Police did not find cocaine on Faust’s
person, but at trial experts testified that Faust’s fingerprint was found on one of the
baking pans with the white powder residue and that the scoring marks on the
baking pans were indicative of crack cocaine production. The government also
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introduced under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) the testimony of a witness who
had previously purchased crack cocaine from Faust.
In support of his motion to vacate, Faust submitted the declaration of
Shontia Carnegie, who testified at the evidentiary hearing on remand that she and
Robert Carroll lived with Faust and Faust’s fiancée, Joy Wright, at the Olive
Avenue home at the time of Faust’s arrest. The day before Faust’s arrest, she saw
Carroll with a bag of cocaine that he placed on top of the kitchen cabinet. Wright
did not tell Faust or anyone else that she had seen Carroll with this bag of cocaine
until almost seven years later, when she ran into Wright and learned Faust had
been arrested for cocaine possession.
“In a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding, we review a district court’s legal
conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error.” Devine v. United States,
520 F.3d 1286, 1287 (11th Cir. 2008). A determination of a witness’s credibility is
a factual finding that we review for clear error. See United States v. McPhee, 336
F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003).
Under the clear error standard, we “must affirm the district court unless
review of the entire record leaves us with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been committed.” Id. (quotations omitted). We allot “substantial
deference to the factfinder, in this case, the district court, in reaching credibility
determinations with respect to witness testimony.” Id. (quotation omitted). We
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will not reverse the district court’s plausible fact findings even if we would have
decided the case differently. “Where there are two permissible views of the
evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Id.
(quotations omitted).
We may authorize the filing of a second or successive motion to vacate if the
movant makes a prima facie showing that his application satisfies the requirements
of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C); see In re Moss, 703 F.3d
1301, 1302 (11th Cir. 2013). Under § 2255(h), a second or successive motion
must be certified to contain:
(1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in
light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would
have found the movant guilty of the offense; or
(2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). Where we make the limited determination that the movant
has made a prima facie showing that his application satisfies § 2255(h), the proper
procedure is to remand the case to the district court for a de novo decision on the
§ 2255(h) issues. See Moss, 703 F.3d at 1303. Only if the district court then
concludes that the movant “has established the statutory requirements for filing a
second or successive motion” should it “proceed to consider the merits of the
motion, along with any defenses and arguments the respondent may raise.” Id.
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A state prisoner applying for collateral relief based on newly discovered
evidence is required to demonstrate that (1) “the factual predicate for the claim
could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence”
and (2) “the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in the light of the
evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have
found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B).
However, § 2255(h), applicable to federal prisoners applying for collateral relief,
does not contain a due diligence requirement. See id. § 2255(h). We have not held
that a federal prisoner must show due diligence in discovering the factual predicate
for his claim.
To succeed on a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered
evidence, the movant must first, as a threshold determination, “show that it is more
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the
new evidence.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327, 115 S.Ct. 851, 867, 130
L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) (citing to and discussing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478,
496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2649, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (stating that, pursuant to the
fundamental miscarriage of justice exception to procedural default doctrine, a
federal habeas court may grant writ without a showing of cause and prejudice if “a
constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is
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actually innocent”)). The reviewing court must make this determination “in light
of all the evidence, including that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with
due regard to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have been
wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the trial.” Id. at 328, 115
S.Ct. at 867 (quotations omitted). The movant does not meet the threshold
requirement necessary to have his case considered on the merits “unless he
persuades the district court that, in light of the new evidence, no juror, acting
reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at
329, 115 S.Ct. at 868. In such a case, “the habeas court may have to make some
credibility assessments.” Id. at 330, 115 S.Ct. at 868. “[T]he court may consider
how the timing of the submission and the likely credibility of the affiants bear on
the probable reliability of that evidence.” Id. at 332, 115 S.Ct. at 869.
A conviction for possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance
requires the government to prove the following three elements: “(1) knowledge (of
one’s possession); (2) possession of a controlled substance; and (3) intent to
distribute that substance.” United States v. Woodard, 531 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th
Cir. 2008). “These elements may be proven by circumstantial evidence,” and
“[p]ossession may be actual or constructive, joint or sole. . . . A defendant’s
constructive possession of a substance can be proven by a showing of ownership or
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dominion and control over the drugs or over the premises on which the drugs are
concealed.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted).
As a preliminary matter, the district court erred in denying Faust’s motion to
vacate on the basis that he failed to exercise due diligence. Faust filed his motion
as a federal prisoner under § 2255, which does not require, as a threshold matter, a
showing of due diligence. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(b)(3)(C), 2255(h). Thus, as the
government concedes on appeal, the district court erred in applying the §
2244(b)(2)(B) standard for claims based on newly discovered evidence applicable
to state prisoners. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B). Because the due diligence
standard does not apply to federal prisoners, we need not address whether the
district court’s factual finding regarding diligence is clearly erroneous.
However, the district court did not clearly err in finding that Carnegie’s
testimony was not credible, and that Faust thus failed to show that no reasonable
juror would have convicted him in light of this newly discovered evidence. As we
noted in holding that Faust had established a prima facie case, if believed,
Carnegie’s testimony was sufficient to show that no reasonable juror would have
convicted Faust of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, because his
conviction was based on the cocaine that Carnegie alleges belonged exclusively to
Carroll. However, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and properly
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conducted a de novo review of the evidence in support of Faust’s claim. This
process necessitated making credibility determinations, and the district court
adopted the magistrate judge’s finding, made after viewing Carnegie’s testimony
firsthand, that her statements were not credible. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 330, 115
S.Ct. at 867. Faust has failed to show that this finding was clearly erroneous.
According to her declaration and testimony, Carnegie did not determine the
basis of the charges against Faust until speaking with Wright years after his arrest,
conviction, and subsequent incarceration, in spite of the fact that she viewed Faust
as a father figure and she knew that he would not have approved of any drugs
being present in the Olive Avenue home. She never inquired about the reason for
Faust’s arrest, even though it was shortly after she saw Carroll with cocaine in the
home. She never spoke with Wright, Carroll, or anyone else about Faust’s arrest in
any substantial way, even though she lived with Carroll for a brief time after the
arrest and stayed with Wright, Faust’s fiancée, for months at both the Olive
Avenue home and another location. Although Carnegie testified that she and
Carroll lived at the Olive Avenue home with Wright and Faust, when police
responded to the 911 call Wright told the officers that the only people there were
her, Faust, and their children, and at no time during the investigation did the lead
investigating officer learn of or hear about Carnegie. In addition, Carnegie’s
professed reasons for staying silent about Carroll’s drug dealing—her fear of
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Carroll and her belief that Faust would force her to leave the home if he found out
she was even aware of drug activity—were rendered moot when Faust was
arrested, Carroll moved out, and Carnegie moved with Wright to another location.
Despite this, she did not relay this information to Faust or anyone else until years
later, and even then she only did so at the urging and with the help of Faust and his
new fiancée. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 332, 115 S.Ct. at 869 (holding that a district
court may consider how the timing of a witness’s submission and the likely
credibility of the witness bears on the reliability of their testimony). Finally,
Carnegie initially claimed that she had typed up the declaration herself, but when
pressed she admitted that Faust had typed it up for her.
Although Carnegie’s testimony on its face was not inherently implausible or
incredible, the magistrate judge had the opportunity to observe Carnegie’s
testimony firsthand and to witness her demeanor on the stand. We allot substantial
deference to the factfinder’s credibility determinations, and we will not substitute
our judgment for that of the district court simply because we might have decided
the case differently. See McPhee, 336 F.3d at 1275. Here, where there are two
permissible interpretations of the evidence and Faust cannot point to anything in
the record demonstrating that the credibility determination was clearly erroneous,
the district court’s credibility determination as to Carnegie cannot be clear error.
See id.
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In light of this determination, the district court did not err in finding that,
viewing the evidence on the whole, Faust failed to show that no reasonable juror
would have found him guilty. Given the finding that Carnegie’s testimony was
incredible, the district court was entitled to give little weight to her testimony. The
only other new evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing was the testimony of
Rashid Harris, who stated that he bought drugs and guns from Carroll but never
from Faust. Harris testified that he had lied and told the government that he
bought drugs and guns from Faust in order to receive a better plea deal. Even if
true, Harris’s testimony would not have swayed a reasonable factfinder because his
testimony does not checkmate the government’s proof on any element of Faust’s
offense and only provides a small amount of circumstantial support for the defense.
On the other hand, the evidence at trial provided ample support for Faust’s
conviction. The evidence showed that Faust was frequently at the Olive Avenue
home: Wright, who refused to let police enter the home when they responded to a
911 call, told police that Faust lived there with her and their children, and he was
seen there by police on two occasions prior to being arrested. Police found 17
aluminum baking dishes, a number of which field-tested positive for cocaine and
bore markings indicative of crack cocaine production, in the Olive Avenue home’s
trash. Forensic analysis identified Faust’s fingerprint on one of the baking dishes
that tested positive for cocaine. When police arrested Faust at the Olive Avenue
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home and found the bag of cocaine, he had $745, mostly in small bills, on his
person. And at trial, for the purpose of showing Faust’s intent to distribute, a
witness testified that he had trafficked cocaine with Faust in the past and had
observed Faust cooking crack cocaine. Considering the whole of the newly-
supplemented record on appeal, and in light of the credibility finding as to
Carnegie’s testimony, the district court did not err in finding that Faust failed to
show that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty of possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); Schlup, 513 U.S. at 328,
115 S.Ct. at 867. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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