Manuel Hernandez v. Wilsonart International, Inc.

11-13726Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit16 de abr. de 2012

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FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 16, 2012
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 11-13726
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:09-cv-00747-CEH-SPC
MANUEL HERNANDEZ,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
WILSONART INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
a foreign corporation,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(April 16, 2012)
Before TJOFLAT, EDMONDSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Manuel Hernandez appeals the summary judgment against his complaint

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that he was denied employment at Wilsonart International, Inc., because of
discrimination based on national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Fla.
Stat. § 760.10. The district court ruled that Hernandez failed to prove that the
legitimate non-discriminatory reasons Wilsonart gave for declining to hire
Hernandez were pretextual. We affirm.
Hernandez argues that Wilsonart rejected his application for a position as a
delivery driver because he is Hispanic. Under Title VII and the Florida Civil
Rights Act, it is unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire . . . any
individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . national origin.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1); Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a). The Florida Act was modeled after and
employs the same analytical framework as Title VII. Harper v. Blockbuster
Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998); Joshua v. City of Gainesville,
768 So. 2d 432, 435 (Fla. 2000). Because the district court concluded that
Hernandez established a prima facie case of discrimination, we review de novo
whether the reasons proffered for his termination were merely pretexts for
discrimination. See Rowell v. BellSouth Corp., 433 F.3d 794, 798 (11th Cir.
2005).
Wilsonart presented evidence that it rejected Hernandez’s application for
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two legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons. First, Hernandez failed to submit a
verifiable work history. Wilsonart requested that applicants submit a general
application form and a driver’s application form listing the names and telephone
numbers of their employers for the preceding three years. Within the same time
frame that the individuals Wilsonart hired, Anthony Palmer and Carl Renninger,
had submitted their forms and supplementary documents required to complete the
application process, Hernandez had submitted only incomplete application forms.
Second, Hernandez had the least work experience. Hernandez had four years of
driving experience, but both Palmer and Renninger had more years of driving
experience.
Hernandez failed to create a genuine factual dispute about the legitimacy of
those reasons. To prove pretext, Hernandez had to establish there were “‘such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in
the . . . proffered legitimate reasons . . . that a reasonable factfinder could find
them unworthy of credence.’” Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d
1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d
1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997)). Hernandez argues that the decisionmaker at
Wilsonart, Thomas Grear, testified inconsistently about basing his decision on
customer complaints about Hernandez’s work for a previous employer, but even if
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that proffered reason is false, Hernandez is not “entitle[d] . . . to get past summary
judgment” given the other legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons to reject his
application. Id. at 1264. Hernandez also argues that he was equally qualified for
the driver position and eliminated from the interview process unfairly, but
Wilsonart was entitled to conclude that Hernandez was not as qualified as either
Palmer or Renninger. See id. at 1266.
Hernandez failed to present evidence that the reasons proffered by
Wilsonart were pretextual. “We are not in the business of adjudging whether
employment decisions are prudent or fair. Instead, our sole concern is whether
unlawful discriminatory animus motivates a challenged employment decision.”
Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1361 (11th Cir.
1999). Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to Hernandez, he
failed to create a genuine dispute that the reasons that Wilsonart proffered for
rejecting his application were discriminatory or unworthy of credence. Alvarez,
610 F.3d at 1265.
The summary judgment in favor of Wilsonart is AFFIRMED.
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