Maxwell v. NCL (Bahamas), LTD.

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 18, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 11-12257
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-21164-MGC
RICARDO MAXWELL,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff–Appellee,
versus
NCL (BAHAMAS), LTD,
d.b.a. NCL,
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
Defendant–Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(October 18, 2011)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ricardo Maxwell, a Costa Rican seaman, sued his employer NCL
(Bahamas), Ltd., under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, in Florida state court.

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NCL removed the case to federal court, where it sought to enforce an arbitration
agreement in Maxwell’s employment contract. 9 U.S.C. § 205. Maxwell asked
the district court to remand the case to state court. The district court found that
the arbitration agreement was invalid because it, along with the contract’s choice
of law clause, deprived Maxwell of his U.S. causes of action and thus violated
public policy. See Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113, 1124 (11th Cir.
2009). Because the district court found the arbitration agreement unenforceable, it
remanded the case to state court. NCL appeals from the remand order and argues
that Thomas conflicts with our earlier decision in Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396
F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2005). We agree.1
In Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas) Ltd., we recognized that Bautista limited the
defenses available to enforcement of an arbitration agreement in an international
commercial agreement like Maxwell’s employment contract. No. 10-10367 (11th
Cir. Aug. 29, 2011). Bautista limited those defenses to fraud, mistake, and waiver,
We must first decide whether we have jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand1
order. When a remand order is not based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or a procedural
defect in removal, it is reviewable on appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); Whole Health
Chiropractic & Wellness, Inc. v. Humana Med. Plan, Inc., 254 F.3d 1317, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001).
And we have previously concluded that we do have jurisdiction to review remand orders based
on forum-selection clauses. Snapper Inc. v. Redan, 171 F.3d 1249, 1260 (11th Cir. 1999).
Because arbitration agreements are a type of forum-selection clause, we conclude that we have
jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order. Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes of
Ga., 253 F.3d 611, 617 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Agreements to arbitrate are essentially forum-selection
clauses . . . .”).
2

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because we concluded that they could be applied neutrally throughout the world.
396 F.3d at 1302. Although Thomas recognized public policy as another defense
to enforcement of an arbitration agreement, 573 F.3d at 1124, we recently
concluded that Thomas’s expansion of the defenses to enforcement of an
arbitration agreement violated our prior panel precedent rule. Lindo, slip op. at p.
45–46. As such, public policy is not a valid defense to enforcement of an
arbitration agreement. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s remand order,
and remand to the district court to enter an order compelling arbitration.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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