USA v. Williams

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCT 12, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 11-10818
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cr-20345-PAS-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BUD PRATT WILLIAMS,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(October 12, 2011)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:

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Bud Pratt Williams, proceeding pro se, appeals his convictions for1
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute methylenedioxymethamphetamine
(MDMA), in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 846; possession
with intent to distribute MDMA, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C),
and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and attempted distribution of MDMA, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. On appeal, Williams argues (1) the
district court abused its discretion by denying his second motion for a new trial
without holding an evidentiary hearing, and (2) his right to due process was
violated because the government knowingly allowed false testimonies to go
uncorrected. After review, we affirm Williams’ convictions.2
I.
Williams first argues the district court erred by denying his motion for a
new trial without an evidentiary hearing. He asserts two new affidavits show that
the Government’s key witness, Donovan Jonas, lied on the stand about Williams’
involvement in the drug transactions.
We construe pro se filings liberally. See United States v. Webb, 565 F.3d 789, 792 (111 th
Cir. 2009).
We review the denial of a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. United2
States v. Puentes, 50 F.3d 1567, 1578 (11th Cir. 1995). Likewise, we review a district court’s
decision concerning whether to hold an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Massey, 89 F.3d 1433, 1443 (11th Cir. 1996).
2

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Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 allows a defendant to file a motion
for a new trial within three years after the verdict if the motion is based on newly
discovered evidence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(b). The movant of a Rule 33 motion
based on newly discovered evidence must establish that:
(1) the evidence was discovered after trial, (2) the failure
of the defendant to discover the evidence was not due to
a lack of due diligence, (3) the evidence is not merely
cumulative or impeaching, (4) the evidence is material to
issues before the court, and (5) the evidence is such that
a new trial would probably produce a different result.
United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
We highly disfavor motions for new trials based on newly discovered evidence,
and the defendant bears the burden of justifying a new trial. United States v.
Campa, 459 F.3d 1121, 1151 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Williams’ motion
for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing. The affidavits proffered by
Williams go to Jonas’s credibility and thus merely present impeachment evidence
that does not warrant a new trial. Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1287. Moreover, we have
previously held during Williams’ first motion for a new trial that there was
sufficient evidence at trial to support the jury conviction without the testimony of
Jonas. See United States v. Escobar-Urrego, 110 F.3d 1556, 1560 (11th Cir.
3

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1997) (noting that “[u]nder the law-of-the-case doctrine, an issue decided at one
stage of a case is binding at later stages of the same case”). Thus, a new trial
would probably not have produced a different result. Jernigan, 341 F.3d at 1287.
And, because the resolution of Williams’ motion for new trial is clear, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by not holding an evidentiary hearing. See id. at
1289.
II.
Williams next argues his right to due process was violated because the
Government knowingly allowed the false testimony of Jonas and Kevin Bobbitt, a
Drug Enforcement Administration agent, to go uncorrected. Because Williams
fails to establish that the Government knew of any falsehood in Jonas’s and
Bobbitt’s testimonies, he cannot establish that his right to due process was
violated. See United States v. Dickerson, 248 F.3d 1036, 1041 (11th Cir. 2001)
(noting that to succeed on a Giglio challenge, a defendant must establish that the
prosecutor knowingly used perjured testimony, or failed to correct what he
subsequently learned was false testimony, and that the falsehood was material).
AFFIRMED.
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