Braxton v. Georgia Department of Community Affairs et al

FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 11, 2011
JOHN LEY
CLERK
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 10-14297
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-02446-WSD
SONYA BRAXTON,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS,
LARUTH HOLLOWAY,
Individually and in her Official Appointment of Regional
Housing Administrator, Georgia Department of
Community Affairs,
KAREN LOVELESS,
Individually and in her Official Appointment of Assistant
Regional Housing Administrator, Georgia Department
of Community Affairs,
JEFFERY ABNEY,
Individually and in his Official Appointment of Family
Housing Counselor, Georgia Department of
Community Affairs,
GEOFFREY PARKER,
Individually and in his Official Appointment of Compliance
Officer, Georgia Department of Community Affairs, et al.,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants-Appellees.

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________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(July 11, 2011)
Before WILSON, PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Sonya Braxton appeals pro se the dismissal of her complaint as frivolous.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Braxton complained that the Georgia Department of
Community Affairs and its employees, LaRuth Holloway, Karen Loveless, Jeffrey
Abney, and Geoffrey Parker, violated the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d),
the Georgia Fair Housing Act, Ga. Code Ann. § 8-3-202(a), and Braxton’s rights
to due process and equal protection by discriminating against her based on her
race. We affirm.
We review the dismissal of a complaint as frivolous for abuse of discretion.
Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2008). We construe pro se
pleadings liberally, but we will affirm the dismissal of a complaint as frivolous if
it “‘lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.’” Id. (quoting Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 1831–32 (1989)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Braxton’s
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frivolous and internally inconsistent complaint. Braxton failed to “state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face,” that is, from which the district court could
“draw the reasonable inference that the defendant[s] [were] liable” for violating
Braxton’s civil rights. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Braxton complained that she was denied due process by
Holloway, Loveless, and Parker when they “stripped away” her housing voucher
and later denied her an “informal hearing” to reinstate her voucher, but Braxton
admitted that Holloway later reinstated the voucher. Braxton also complained that
she was discriminated against in violation of the Georgia Fair Housing Act when
Holloway failed to inspect adequately some rental property, but Braxton admitted
that “all item[s] were fixed.” Braxton accused another employee of the
Department, Jacqueline Nunis, of racial steering by “warn[ing] [Braxton] not to”
move into six counties inspected by Abney that were predominantly white
counties and encouraging Braxton to move to Rome, Georgia, where more
minorities resided, but Braxton admitted that Nunis said that housing was
available in the six counties and that “Jeff Abney [would] take [Braxton’s]
voucher if [she] move[d] there.” Braxton also accused Abney of racial steering by
“probably assum[ing]” that Braxton “was a black person” based on her voice
message and telling Braxton she would have a “hard time finding a rental” in two
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particular counties, but Braxton failed to allege that Abney had made a different
representation to or made housing available to a similarly-situated white voucher
holder. Although Braxton alleged that rental properties were available “within
[her] section 8 voucher range” and “home owners and apt. managers in that area . .
. accept Section 8,” Braxton failed to allege that any of the properties available
participated in the section 8 voucher program. Braxton expressed indignation that
“[s]ection 8 [would] unlawfully tamper[] with government records” and identify
her and her children as black instead of as American Indians, but Braxton failed to
state how the alleged tampering violated her civil rights.
Braxton also argues that she is entitled to relief for claims involving
retaliation, disability discrimination, and “state created danger,” but she did not
present those claims to the district court. We will not consider Braxton’s claims
for the first time on appeal. See Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Ala. v. Weitz, 913
F.2d 1544, 1549–51 (11th Cir. 1990).
We AFFIRM the dismissal of Braxton’s complaint.
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