Homer Jones v. LUKE PETTIGREW, Warden

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
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HOMER JONES,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
LUKE PETTIGREW, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 21-6106
(D.C. No. 5:18-CV-00633-G)
(W.D. Okla.)
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ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
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Before MATHESON, BRISCOE, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
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In June 2018, Petitioner-Appellant Homer Jones, a state prisoner proceeding
pro se, 1 petitioned for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal district court
challenging his April 1984 Oklahoma state criminal convictions. 2 The district court
* This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive
value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1 We construe a pro se appellant’s complaint liberally. Gaines v. Stenseng, 292
F.3d 1222, 1224 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). But we won’t serve as his
advocate. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
2 Jones alleges that his convictions were entered in April 1984, but other courts
have determined that he entered his guilty plea in February 1985. See Jones v. Bear,
No. CIV-19-141-G, 2019 WL 3422101, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 17, 2019) (finding
that Jones entered his guilty plea on the relevant counts in February 1985), report
and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-19-141-G, 2019 WL 2715544 (W.D. Okla.
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 20, 2022
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
Appellate Case: 21-6106 Document: 010110634627 Date Filed: 01/20/2022 Page: 1

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dismissed the petition as untimely because: (1) Jones filed the petition decades after
the one-year limitations period for habeas claims had run, and (2) Jones wasn’t
entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. The district court also denied Jones a
certificate of appealability (“COA”).
Jones seeks to appeal the dismissal of his petition. But to do so he needs a
COA. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484–85 (2000). When, as here, a district
court dismissed a petition on procedural grounds, a COA will issue only if the
petitioner shows that “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district
court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. at 478.
Jones has not met his burden. In his briefing, he restates his largely
unintelligible arguments made before the district court and baselessly asserts that he
does not require a COA to appeal. He also fails to address the timeliness of his
petition or point to legal errors warranting reversal. And upon review of the district
court’s thorough and well-reasoned order, we conclude that reasonable jurists
wouldn’t debate the correctness of the district court’s decision that Jones’s petition
was untimely. Thus, having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(c)(1)(A),
we deny Jones’s request for a COA and dismiss his appeal.
Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips
Circuit Judge
June 28, 2019). Whether the judgment was entered in 1984 or 1985 does not affect
our ruling, so this discrepancy is unimportant.
Appellate Case: 21-6106 Document: 010110634627 Date Filed: 01/20/2022 Page: 2

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