José David Alemán-Pacheco v. UNIVERSAL GROUP, INC. and UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-1565
JOSÉ DAVID ALEMÁN-PACHECO,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNIVERSAL GROUP, INC. and UNIVERSAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]
[Hon. Camille L. Vélez-Rivé, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Selya, Circuit Judges.
Carlos M. Sánchez-La Costa for appellant.
Israel Fernández-Rodríguez, with whom Juan J. Casillas-Ayala
and Casillas Santiago Torres LLC were on brief, for appellees.
March 23, 2016

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Per curiam. This civil action is brought under diversity
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Puerto Rico law supplies
the substantive rules of decision. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Summers v. Fin. Freedom Acq. LLC, 807 F.3d
351, 354 (1st Cir. 2015); see also P.C.M.E. Comm'l, S.E. v. Pace
Membership Warehouse, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 84, 88 (D.P.R. 1997).
At bottom, the case is simple. Plaintiff-appellant José
David Alemán-Pacheco sues his automobile insurers, defendants-
appellees Universal Insurance Company and Universal Group, Inc.
(collectively, the insurer), for breach of contract. 1 In the
plaintiff's view, the insurer breached its obligation to pay for
collision damage to his insured automobile following a traffic
accident.
The relevant language in the insurance policy's payment
of loss clause is straightforward: the insurer "can pay for the
loss in money or through the repair or in the replacement of the
damaged property . . . ." Here, there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact: the record reflects that the insurer satisfied
that policy obligation. In this instance, however, that
unambiguous policy language has led to a massive proliferation of
pleadings, appendices, affidavits, deposition transcripts, briefs,
1 The plaintiff also asserts a related claim against the
insurer for "dolo" under Puerto Rico law. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
31, § 3408. Because the "dolo" claim derives from the plaintiff's
breach of contract claim, it requires no separate analysis.

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memoranda, and the like. This mountain of paper is far out of
proportion to the needs of the case and — though we have reviewed
and considered the parties' filings — it would serve no useful
purpose for us to add unduly to the towering stack of pages that
comprise this altitudinous record.
Stripped of rhetorical excesses, extraneous theories,
and diversionary arguments, the critical issue is uncomplicated
(even though the lawyers' views of it are not). The Puerto Rico
Insurance Commissioner has made pellucid that the quoted language
means what it says and a magistrate judge, acting at the behest of
the district judge, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), has confirmed this
plain-language reading, Alemán-Pacheco v. Universal Grp., Inc.,
No. 13-1459, slip op. at 34-39 (D.P.R. Feb. 9, 2015) (unpublished).
Moreover, the district court, on de novo review, has unhesitatingly
reached the same conclusion, approving and adopting the magistrate
judge's report and recommendation in an unpublished order. It is
this order of the district court, entering summary judgment in
favor of the insurer, that the plaintiff now appeals.
The magistrate judge's report and recommendation is
thorough and persuasive. It not only correctly interprets the
policy language but also methodically rejects, one by one, the
infinity of arguments (procedural and substantive) advanced by the
plaintiff. We have made it abundantly clear, in a long string of
cases, that there are times that the court of appeals should not

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write at length merely to hear its own words resonate. See, e.g.,
deBenedictis v. Brady-Zell (In re Brady-Zell), 756 F.3d 69, 71
(1st Cir. 2014); Vargas-Ruiz v. Golden Arch Dev., Inc., 368 F.3d
1, 2 (1st Cir. 2004); Lawton v. State Mut. Life Assur. Co., 101
F.3d 218, 220 (1st Cir. 1996); Holders Capital Corp. v. Cal. Union
Ins. Co. (In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig.), 989 F.2d
36, 38 (1st Cir. 1993). Where, as here, a lower court has
accurately taken the measure of a case and lucidly articulated its
reasoning, it is unnecessary for us to put our own gloss on the
matter.
We need go no further. We summarily affirm the judgment
below for substantially the reasons elucidated in the magistrate
judge's sterling report and recommendation.
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27.0(c).

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