United States of America v. SANTOS J. MIRANDA-MARTÍNEZ, a/k/a "Santito"

Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 14-1391
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
SANTOS J. MIRANDA-MARTÍNEZ, a/k/a "Santito",
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Kayatta, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Raymond E. Gillespie, on brief for appellant.
Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief,
Appellate Division, and Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States
Attorney, on brief for appellee.
October 23, 2015

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TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Defendant Santos J. Miranda-
Martínez ("Miranda") appeals the district court's decision to
revoke his supervised release and imprison him for eighteen months
following his conviction for several drug trafficking crimes.
Miranda argues for the first time on appeal that the district court
committed error at the revocation hearing by failing to consider
his personal history and characteristics, as required by 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(1). We find that the district court adequately
considered these factors and therefore affirm its decision.
I. Facts
Miranda's case began on December 21, 2005, when he was
charged with one count of illegally possessing a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and (2). After trial, Miranda
was convicted and sentenced to twenty-four months' imprisonment
followed by three years of supervised release.
While Miranda was on supervised release, his probation
officer requested a warrant for Miranda's arrest after he tested
positive for cocaine. 1 Because the conditions of Miranda's
supervised release prohibited him from using any controlled
substances, on April 27, 2010, the district court revoked Miranda's
1 Miranda's probation officer also requested the warrant on the
ground that Miranda had committed a new crime. By the time the
revocation hearing occurred, these charges were dismissed.

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supervised release and sentenced him to four months' imprisonment
and a new supervised release term of two years.
The conditions of Miranda's supervised release also
prohibited him from committing any new crimes. However, between
2011 and 2012, Miranda was charged in two separate cases with
several federal drug trafficking offenses. These cases were
consolidated and Miranda eventually pled guilty to two counts of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or
more of cocaine under 21 U.S.C. § 846 (one count from each case).
On January 15, 2014, the district court sentenced Miranda to 293
months' imprisonment for both counts, to be served concurrently.
Following Miranda's guilty plea, on March 21, 2014, the
district court held a supervised release revocation hearing. The
district court sentenced Miranda to eighteen months' imprisonment
to be served consecutively with his 2014 drug trafficking
sentences. This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Miranda argues that the district court
committed error at his March 21, 2014, revocation hearing by
failing to take into account his personal history and
characteristics as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Under 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), a judge may revoke a defendant's supervised
release and impose a term of incarceration if the judge finds by

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a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a
condition of supervised release. But before a judge may revoke
or modify supervised release, the judge must "weigh a number of
factors borrowed from traditional sentencing considerations,"
United States v. Butler-Acevedo, 656 F.3d 97, 100 (1st Cir. 2011)
(citing 18 U.S.C § 3583(e)), including "the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics
of the defendant," 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(1).
This Court normally reviews revocation sentences for
abuse of discretion. United States v. McInnis, 429 F.3d 1, 4 (1st
Cir. 2005). But because Miranda did not raise this issue at his
revocation hearing, this Court reviews for plain error. United
States v. Millán-Issac, 749 F.3d 57, 66 (1st Cir. 2014). For an
error to rise to the level of plain error, a defendant must show
that (1) "an error occurred," (2) which was "clear or obvious,"
(3) "that affected his substantial rights," and (4) "seriously
impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings." Id.
Miranda argues that the district court failed to
consider his personal history and characteristics as required by
18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(1). We agree with the government that the
district court did take these factors into account.

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Although the record must reflect that the district court
considered the required sentencing factors, the district court
"need not address these factors one by one, in some sort of rote
incantation when explicating its sentencing decision." United
States v. Almenas, 553 F.3d 27, 36 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting United
States v. Dixon, 449 F.3d 194, 205 (1st Cir. 2006)). The record
in Miranda's case shows that the district court considered
Miranda's personal history and characteristics even if it did not
address them directly. The district court stated at the
revocation hearing that
[b]ased on [Miranda's] non-compliance with his
supervised release conditions, considering also the
nature of the violation and the fact that this is
the second time that release is brought before the
Court for revocation proceedings, the Court finds
that a term of imprisonment is the only viable
alternative.
Miranda argues that these comments suggest that the
district court only considered his drug trafficking convictions
and not his personal history and characteristics. But an
individual's personal history and characteristics include previous
crimes and patterns of recidivism. See Butler-Acevedo, 656 F.3d
at 100 (finding that the district court considered the defendant's
personal characteristics and history during a revocation hearing
when the court stated it "considered the nature of the offender's
original offenses, . . . as well as the responsible conduct and

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total absence of interest to exert any effort towards compliance
[by the defendant]"). The district court was not revoking
Miranda's supervised release simply because Miranda had committed
a crime. In addition to the "nature of [Miranda's] violation,"
the district court considered the fact that Miranda had been given
two opportunities on supervised release but violated the
conditions both times. This personal history of recidivism was a
factor that caused the district court to conclude "a term of
imprisonment [was] the only viable alternative."
Moreover, the basis of the district court's sentencing
can be inferred from the record. "When there are gaps in the
explanation for a particular sentence, a court's reasoning can
often be inferred by comparing what was argued by the parties or
contained in the pre-sentence report with what the judge did."
United States v. Ramos, 763 F.3d 45, 57 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting
United States v. Jiménez-Beltre, 440 F.3d 514, 519 (1st Cir. 2006)
(en banc)). Here, the record reflects that Miranda's attorney
described Miranda's full supervised release history at the
revocation hearing. Thus, the district court was fully acquainted
with Miranda's history of non-compliance and, conversely, with the
fact that there were periods during which Miranda was able to
follow the terms of his supervised release without incident.
Further, the district court had access to the pre-sentence report

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for his drug trafficking convictions, which contained descriptions
of his personal history and characteristics.
Looking at these materials, the district court could
reasonably conclude that Miranda's history of non-compliance with
his supervised release outweighed any periods of successful
supervised release. "That the district court handed down a
harsher sentence than [the defendant] desired does not reveal an
inattentiveness to his history and characteristics, but rather
that it weighed them differently than [the defendant] did."
Butler-Acevedo, 656 F.3d at 101. Given this record, we conclude
that the district court considered Miranda's personal history and
characteristics and that his claim is without merit.
III. Conclusion
Because the district court considered Miranda's personal
history and characteristics, there was no error, let alone plain
error, in the revocation hearing's procedure. Accordingly, we
affirm Miranda's eighteen month sentence.
Affirmed.

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