Lopez Mendoza, Gilberto, Applicant v. SWI FINISHING, INC.; ARCH INSURANCE GROUP, administered by GALLAGHER BASSETT, Defendants

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
GILBERTO LOPEZ MENDOZA, Applicant
vs.
SWI FINISHING, INC.; ARCH INSURANCE GROUP,
administered by GALLAGHER BASSETT, Defendants
Adjudication Numbers: ADJ17889413
Oxnard District Office
OPINION AND ORDER
GRANTING PETITION
FOR RECONSIDERATION AND
NOTICE OF INTENT
TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS
Defendant has filed a Petition for Reconsideration from the Findings of Fact issued on
August 22, 2025, by the workers’ compensation administrative law judge (WCJ). The WCJ found
that applicant sustained an industrial injury through the cumulative period ending on October 1,
2017, and that the claim is not barred by the statute of limitations.
Defendant contends that the WCJ erred in determining when applicant acquired knowledge
of disability sufficient to establish a date of injury under Labor Code1 section 5412 and that
applicant’s claim was not subject to tolling because he failed to report the injury to a supervisor.
We have not received an Answer from applicant. 	The WCJ filed a Report and
Recommendation 	on 	Petition 	for 	Reconsideration 	(Report) 	recommending 	that 	we 	grant
reconsideration and amend the Findings of Fact to remove the finding of industrial injury because
the issue of injury was not raised as a triable issue. The WCJ further recommends that the case be
returned to the trial level so that the WCJ may issue a notice of intent to impose sanctions based
upon the inclusion of multiple fabricated citations in the Petition for Reconsideration.
Defendant has requested permission to file a supplemental petition in response to the
WCJ’s Report, which we accept. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10964.) In the supplemental petition,
1 All future references are to the Labor Code unless noted.

2
defendant admits to the inclusion of misrepresentations and fabricated quotations in the Petition
and states that it used an artificial intelligence (AI) chatbot from Sullivan on Comp called
ChatSOC, which generated the false citations and fake quotations.
We have considered the allegations of the Petition for Reconsideration, the supplemental
petition, and the contents of the WCJ’s Report. Based on our review of the record and for the
reasons discussed below, we will grant the Petition for Reconsideration and issue a Notice of
Intention to impose sanctions of up to $2,500.00 jointly and severally against defendant employer
SWI Finishing, Inc.; defendant insurer Arch Insurance Group; defendant’s administrator Gallagher
Bassett; and defendant’s attorneys California Self Insurance Law and Ali Vassigh (CA BAR
#261260). We will defer issuing a final decision after reconsideration.
FACTS
Per the WCJ’s Report:
The matter proceeded to trial on a denied cumulative trauma, pled from August 1,
1998 through October 1, 2017, while the applicant was employed by defendant as
a prepper/painter, to his neck, upper extremities, back, lower extremities, leg,
nervous system, psych, right leg, right foot, left leg. The issues were statute of
limitations and failure to timely report pursuant to LC § 5400 and LC § 5403.
Minutes of Hearing, May 7, 2025, page 2, lines 21-23. The matter proceeded to trial
over two days, with the applicant being called as a witness by defendant, and
defense witness Mr. Alex Mendez testifying on day two.
The applicant did not file his claim and application for adjudication of claim until
June 29, 2023. EAMS DOC ID#47060892. Defendant issued a denial letter dated
October 20, 2023, indicating that the claim was denied because the applicant had
failed to report his injury timely. Defense Exhibit J. Defense Exhibit B, at page 2.
The daughter reported at that time that the applicant had “been working at a job that
gets his feet wet all day and as he was taking off his wet socks at the end of the day
a couple weeks ago, it pulled off a scab that had already been present. This ‘hole’
progressively enlarged, fairly rapidly over the last few weeks.” Id. at page 2. The
doctor reports that the applicant’s foot has become “swollen and endematous.” Id.
at page 2. Further, the doctor references a prior foot infection involving a rock,
which had required surgery also involving his right foot. Id. at page 2. Thus, the
rock incident had occurred in the past, and the most recent event at the time was a
scab that the applicant had developed from getting his feet wet at work.
The attending doctor recommended the applicant undergo amputation, because he
had gangrene, however, the applicant declined and left the facility. Id. at page 2-3.
Neither reports from April 4, 2017 provide an analysis or finding that the
applicant’s condition was related to a cumulative trauma injury due to his work
duties, or that he was advised of same.

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It appears the applicant had some conservative treatment for his right foot, but goes
to Watsonville Community Hospital on February 13, 2018, with right foot pain and
a “newly rapidly aggressive infection.” Defense Exhibit H, page 3. The applicant
is admitted for a two night stay, and undergoes amputation below his right knee.
Defense Exhibit I.
Again, like the reports in 2017, the reports in 2018 did not include an analysis or
finding that the applicant’s amputation was due to a work-related cumulative
trauma injury.
The parties proceeded to Panel QMEs in internal and orthopedics. Defense Exhibits
N and O. The applicant was examined by the internist Dr. Noriega on June 24,
2024. Defense Exhibit N. Dr. Noriega reported that the applicant last worked in
February 2018 for petitioner, and that the applicant had work place exposure of
“standing and walking with wet footwear, removal of wet footwear-was the
proximate cause of the right foot desquamation and injury, which eventuated to the
amputation.” Id. at pages 3 and 6. Dr. Noriega provided the applicant with a 28%
WPI, with 35% apportioned to his industrial cumulative trauma. Accordingly,
knowledge and disability coincided on June 24, 2024.
The applicant was examined by the orthopedist QME Dr. Knoblich on November
5, 2024, who also reported that the applicant last worked on February 2018, and
addressed both the applicant’s various orthopedic complaints, as well as the
applicant’s right foot infection in early 2017 “while working in wet leather work
boots while doing power washing.” Defense Exhibit O, pages 3 and 4. Following a
review of 267 medical records, Dr. Knoblich reported that the applicant “appeared
to be forthright in his history, although he could not recall some names and dates. I
believe he gave good effort at examination.” Id. at page 157. In regards to the injury
pled, Dr. Knoblich found that the applicant’s “job duties and work exposure during
the period of the CT claim increased his risk of foot infection and need for right leg
amputation.” Id. at page 160. Further that he agreed with Dr. Noriega’s findings.
Id. at 160.
During both trial days, the petitioner’s main focus was to attempt to impeach the
applicant about what and when he believed had caused his injury in 2017, versus
his deposition testimony taken in 2024. The line of questioning included references
to the various doctors and facilities that treated the applicant. This led to the
applicant being confused, and the judge having to interject to assist the parties.
On day two of trial, the petitioner called Mr. Alex Mendez, the applicant’s foreman.
Mr. Mendez testified that he was not considered a supervisor, and that it “would
not be proper for other employees to report injuries to him.” Minutes of Hearing,
May 30, 2025, page 5, lines 7-10. Further, he did not recall the applicant, and that
he did not look familiar. Id. at page 5, lines 11-12.

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The applicant was then recalled as a witness, and testified that Mr. Mendez was
“the right hand man of the supervisor Robert and that he would take charge when
Robert wasn’t there. The applicant asked everything to Alex. He confirmed that he
would only talk to Alex while at SWI, and Alex spoke in Spanish. When asked if
Mr. Townsend [Robert] spoke Spanish…applicant said no, and that’s why he was
the one that would take care of the people.” Minutes of Hearing Further Summary
of Evidence, May 30, 2025, page 8, lines 12-13, 21-23.
The applicant was then asked if an injury was to be reported to Alex, and the
applicant responded “that he didn’t know about that. No one ever told him at SWI
what to do when you get injured.” Id. at page 8, lines 16-17.
Following the submission of trial and review of the evidence submitted, a Findings
of Fact and Opinion on Decision was issued finding, in pertinent part, that the
applicant did not have notice that he had a cumulative trauma work injury in 2017.
Further, that although the applicant testified he reported symptoms to Alex, who he
felt was his supervisor, nothing was done by Alex or Mr. Robert Townsend to
provide the applicant with a claim form, or actual notices of how to report an injury.
Thus, it was found that the statute of limitations was tolled, and the claim was not
barred.
In the Report, the WCJ noted discrepancies in the Petition for Reconsideration as follows:
Petitioner argues that the undersigned “improperly relied on the applicant's
subjective belief that Alex was a supervisor to toll the statute of limitations, despite
evidence that Alex Mendez was not a supervisor and did not recall the applicant.
The Appeals Board has consistently held that an employee's subjective belief about
a coworker's supervisory status is insufficient to toll the statute of limitations when
that belief is contradicted by substantial evidence. Olson v. Workers' Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1997) 62 Cal.Comp.Cases 334, 338; Reynolds v. Workers' Comp.
Appeals Bd. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 726, 729-730.” Petition for Reconsideration, page
16, lines 7-14.
Petitioner’s cited case law is improper for the following reasons:
1. 	Olson v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1997) 62 Cal.Comp.Cases 334 does
not exist.
2. 	Reynolds v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 726, 729-730,
does not stand for the argument being made by petitioner.
The undersigned entered the citation of “62 Cal.Comp.Cases 334” into the Lexis+
search bar, which resulted in the case of “Brannon v. Workers Compensation
Appeals Bd., 62 Cal. Comp. Cases 333.” The case itself involves a decision where
the WCJ found the applicant had sustained an industrially related cumulative
trauma based on the PQME findings. The WCAB reversed the WCJ’s findings
because they had not addressed the AME findings, who found that the applicant

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had not sustained injury, and the board substituted their findings of no AOE/COE.
This case did not involve the applicant’s subjective belief about a coworkers’
supervisory status and the tolling of the statute of limitations.
When the undersigned entered “Olson v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd.” into
Lexis+, this resulted in a case by said name, but with the citation of “74 Cal. Comp.
Cases 1197.” This case also did not deal with the subjective belief of a coworker’s
supervisory status and the tolling of the statute of limitations. Instead, the case
involved issues of PD, apportionment and substantial evidence.
This issue with petitioner citing to Reynolds v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974)
12 Cal.3d 726, 729-730, is that it does not involve the subjective belief of a
coworker’s supervisory status and the tolling of the statute of limitations. While the
case does involve the statute of limitations, in the case, the Supreme Court of
California reversed the WCAB’s finding that the statute of limitations had run,
because it was found that the employer had the obligation to provide the injured
worker with notices for his potential claim, and could not raise the “technical
defense of the statute of limitations to defeat petitioner’s claim.” Reynolds, 12
Cal.3d 726, 729-730.
While petitioner listed a case that exists, the specific page numbers referenced of
“729-730” as support for his argument that the appeals board “has consistently held
that an employee's subjective belief about a coworker's supervisory status is
insufficient to toll the statute of limitations when that belief is contradicted by
substantial evidence…” is improper and a bad faith action. (emphasis added)
Further, petitioner repeated the same argument with both cases cited a second time
on page 17 of their Petition for Reconsideration.
(Id. at pp. 13-14.)
DISCUSSION
I.
Former section 5909 provided that a petition for reconsideration was deemed denied unless
the Appeals Board acted on the petition within 60 days from the date of filing. (§ 5909.) Effective
July 2, 2024, section 5909 was amended to state in relevant part that:
(a) A petition for reconsideration is deemed to have been denied by
the appeals board unless it is acted upon within 60 days from the
date a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board.
(b) (1) When a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board, the
trial judge shall provide notice to the parties of the case and the
appeals board.

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(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), service of the accompanying
report, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 5900, shall constitute
providing notice.
(§ 5909.)
Under section 5909(a), the Appeals Board must act on a petition for reconsideration within
60 days of transmission of the case to the Appeals Board. Transmission is reflected in Events in
the Electronic Adjudication Management System (EAMS). Specifically, in Case Events, under
Event Description is the phrase “Sent to Recon” and under Additional Information is the phrase
“The case is sent to the Recon board.”
Here, according to Events, the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on September
29, 2025, and 60 days from the date of transmission is Friday, November 28, 2025, which is a
holiday. Under applicable rules, the deadline is due by Monday, December 1, 2025. (Cal. Code
Regs., tit. 8, § 10600.). This decision is issued by or on December 1, 2025, so that we have timely
acted on the Petition as required by section 5909(a).
Section 5909(b)(1) requires that the parties and the Appeals Board be provided with notice
of transmission of the case. Transmission of the case to the Appeals Board in EAMS provides
notice to the Appeals Board. Thus, the requirement in subdivision (1) ensures that the parties are
notified of the accurate date for the commencement of the 60-day period for the Appeals Board to
act on a petition. Section 5909(b)(2) provides that service of the Report and Recommendation shall
be notice of transmission.
According to the proof of service for the Report and Recommendation by the WCJ, the
Report was served on September 29, 2025, and the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on
September 29, 2025. Service of the Report and transmission of the case to the Appeals Board
occurred on the same day. Thus, we conclude that the parties were provided with the notice of
transmission required by section 5909(b)(1) because service of the Report in compliance with
section 5909(b)(2) provided them with actual notice as to the commencement of the 60-day period
on September 29, 2025.
II.
Before addressing the merits of defendant’s Petition, we must first address the issue of
sanctions. Section 5813 permits the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board to issue sanctions of

7
up to $2,500.00, for acts which result from “. . . bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or
solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” (§ 5813.)
WCAB Rule 10421(b) states in relevant part that:
Bad faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely intended to
cause unnecessary delay include actions or tactics that result from a
willful failure to comply with a statutory or regulatory obligation,
that result from a willful intent to disrupt or delay the proceedings
of the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, or that are done for
an improper motive or are indisputably without merit.
WCAB Rule 10421(b) further provides a comprehensive but non-exclusive list of actions that
could be subject to sanctions. As applicable here, subdivision (b) states that a party may be subject
to sanctions where the party has engaged in the following actions:
(2) Filing a pleading, petition or legal document unless there is some
reasonable justification for filing the document.
***
(4) Failing to comply with the Workers’ Compensation Appeals
Board’s Rules of Practice and Procedure . . .
***
(6) Bringing a claim, conducting a defense or asserting a position:
(A) That is:
(i) Indisputably without merit;
***
(7) Presenting a claim or a defense, or raising an issue or argument,
that is not warranted under existing law . . .
***
(8) Asserting a position that misstates or substantially misstates the
law . . .
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10421(b).)
Business and Professions Code section 6068 provides in part that an attorney must respect
the courts of justice and judicial officers (subdivision (b)); maintain only actions that are legal or
just (subdivision (c)); be truthful at all times, including never to mislead a judge or judicial officer
by false statement of fact or law (subdivision (d)); and, refrain from beginning or continuing a
proceeding from “any corrupt motive” (subdivision (g)). Rule 3.3 of the California Rules of
Professional Conduct provides in part that a lawyer shall not: “(1) knowingly make a false
statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law

8
previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer; (2). . . . knowingly misquote to a tribunal the
language of a book, statute, decision or other authority.”
Petitions for reconsideration are verified under penalty of perjury, and they must fairly state
all of the material evidence relative to the point or points at issue. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §
10945(a).) Each contention contained in a petition for reconsideration must be stated separately
and clearly set forth. (Ibid.) The petition shall support its evidentiary statements with specific
references to the record. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10945(b).) “A petition for reconsideration,
removal or disqualification may be denied or dismissed if it is unsupported by specific references
to the record and to the principles of law involved.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10972, (emphasis
added).) In short, failure to cite the record and failure to fully and accurately set forth the facts
and evidence is grounds to deny a petition. (§ 5902; Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 8, § 10972.)
Here, and as noted in the WCJ’s Report, defendant’s Petition contains numerous citations
that are incorrect. In its supplemental response, defendant admits to the errors and explains that
the errors were generated by Sullivan on Comp’s artificial intelligence (AI) chatbot, which
defendant refers to as “ChatSOC”. Defendant stated:
Defense counsel utilized the Sullivan on Comp treatise as part of his research when
drafting the Petition for Reconsideration. As a part of this research, defense counsel
drafted several specific questions that were inputted into the Sullivan on Comp’s
artificial intelligence tool called, ChatSOC, It was within the answers provided by
ChatSOC function, that the four improper cases were obtained.
* * *
Defense counsel has since inquired with Sullivan on Comp to understand why
ChatSOC would provide fabricated or blatantly incorrect information related to
case law. Defense counsel was informed that, AI limitations, systems like ChatSOC
can sometimes generate what are called "hallucinations." These hallucinations are
described as fabricated information that appear authoritative, but are incorrect or
entirely made up.
(Supplemental Petition, October 15, 2025, p. 5, lines 18-23; p. 6, lines 9-14.)
While we appreciate the candor and the tone contained in defense counsel’s supplemental
response, the conduct that has occurred here is highly improper and sanctionable. In essence,
counsel has delegated legal work in this matter to a non-attorney AI computer program. Such
delegation of authority must be closely supervised by the attorney. As stated in a recent en banc
opinion:
It is every attorney’s duty to supervise non-attorneys in their firm and ensure that
the non-attorney’s conduct “is compatible with the professional obligations of the

9
lawyer.” (Cal. Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Rule 5.3(a).)FN 5 Section 5700 provides
that a party “may be present at any hearing, in person, by attorney, or by any other
agent….” Section 4907 provides that “[non-attorney] representatives shall be held
to the same professional standards of conduct as attorneys.” (See Cal. Code Regs.,
tit. 8, § 10401(b).) Per WCAB Rule 10401, “a non-attorney representative may act
on behalf of a party in proceedings before the Workers’ Compensation Appeals
Board if the party has been informed that the non-attorney representative is not
licensed to practice law by the State of California.” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §
10401(a).)
FN 5 - Business and Professions Code section 6068 provides in part that an attorney
must respect the courts of justice and judicial officers (subdivision (b)); maintain
only actions that are legal or just (subdivision (c)); be truthful at all times, including
never to mislead a judge or judicial officer by false statement of fact or law
(subdivision (d)); and, refrain from beginning or continuing a proceeding from “any
corrupt motive” (subdivision (g)). Rule 3.3 of the California Rules of Professional
Conduct provides in part that a lawyer shall not: “(1) knowingly make a false
statement of fact or law to a tribunal. . .” Rule 5.3 requires that: (a) “a lawyer who
. . . possesses managerial authority in a law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the
nonlawyer’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer;
(b) a lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer, whether or not
an employee of the same law firm, shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that
person’s conduct is compatible with professional obligations of the lawyer; and (c)
a lawyer shall be responsible for conduct of such a person that would be a violation
of these rules or the State Bar Act if engaged in by a lawyer if: (1) the lawyer orders
or, with knowledge of the relevant facts and of the specific conduct, ratifies the
conduct involved; or (2) the lawyer. . .possesses managerial authority in the law
firm in which the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the
person whether or not an employee of the same law firm, and knows of the conduct
at a time when its consequences be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable
remedial action.”
(Ledezma v. Kareem Cart Commissary and Mfg, (2024) 89 Cal. Comp. Cases 462, 473 (En Banc)
(emphasis added).)
The attorney is responsible for the work that they submit. While we understand and
sympathize that defense counsel used the Sullivan on Comp AI and that Sullivan on Comp provided
misrepresentations and incorrect citations, the attorney who signs the pleading is ultimately
responsible for checking the work. There is no excuse for filing documents that contain
misrepresentations or fabricated quotations.

10
Furthermore, and to the extent that the supplemental response discusses firmwide policies
relating to use of AI, the managing partner of the firm should file a separate response as to the
efforts made to remediate this issue.
Turning to the merits of the Petition for Reconsideration, the statute of limitations is an
affirmative defense and defendant, as the party asserting the defense, has the burden of proof. (§
5705.) The limitations period for which a claim must be filed is the later of (1) one year from the
date of injury, (2) one year from the last provision of disability payments per Labor Code sections
4650 et. seq., or (3) one year from the last provision of medical benefits. (Ibid.)
“Limitations provisions in the [workers’] compensation law must be liberally construed in
favor of the employee unless otherwise compelled by the language of the statute, and such
enactments should not be interpreted in a manner which will result in a loss of compensation.”
(Blanchard v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 590, 595 [40 Cal. Comp. Cases
784] (internal citations omitted).) It is well settled that where the employer has a statutory or
regulatory duty to provide notice to the injured worker of a right and fails to do so, the employer
is estopped from raising the statute of limitations as a bar to the claim. (Reynolds v. Workmen’s
Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 12 Cal.3d 726.)
The injury claimed in this matter is a cumulative injury. Date of injury for cumulative
injury claims is ordinarily established under section 5412, which states: “The date of injury in
cases of occupational diseases or cumulative injuries is that date upon which the employee first
suffered disability therefrom and either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have known, that such disability was caused by his present or prior employment.” (§ 5412.)
As used in section 5412, “disability” means either compensable temporary disability or
permanent disability. (Chavira v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 463 [56
Cal.Comp.Cases 631]; State Comp. Ins. Fund v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Rodarte) (2004)
119 Cal.App.4th 998 [69 Cal.Comp.Cases 579].) Medical treatment alone is not “disability” for
purposes of determining the date of a cumulative injury pursuant to section 5412, but it may be
evidence of compensable permanent disability. (Rodarte, supra, 119 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005.)
Likewise, modified work is not a sufficient basis for finding compensable temporary disability,
but it may be indicative of a compensable permanent disability, especially if the worker is
permanently precluded from returning to their usual and customary job duties. (Id.)

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The existence of disability is a medical question beyond the bounds of ordinary knowledge,
and, as such, will typically require medical evidence. (City & County of San Francisco v. Industrial
Acc. Com. (Murdock) (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 455 [18 Cal.Comp.Cases 103]; Bstandig v. Workers’
Comp. Appeals Bd. (1977) 68 Cal. App. 3d 988 [42 Cal.Comp.Cases 114].) Knowledge requires
more than an uninformed belief. Because the existence of disability typically requires medical
evidence, an “applicant will not be charged with knowledge that his disability is job related without
medical advice to that effect unless the nature of the disability are such that applicant should have
recognized the relationship between the known adverse factors involved in his employment and
his disability.” (City of Fresno v. Workers’ Comp. Appeals Bd. (Johnson) (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d
467, 473 [50 Cal.Comp.Cases 53].)
The dates of injurious exposure under section 5500.5 and the date of injury under section
5412 are separate analyses. While the two dates may coincide, they are not synonymous.
While we agree with the WCJ’s recommendation that the finding of industrial injury should
be vacated as the issue was not raised at trial, we must also vacate the entire Findings of Fact as a
date of injury was never found in this matter. The analysis of the statute of limitations begins with
establishing a date of injury from which the statute runs. This has not occurred. Only after
defendant has shown that applicant failed to timely file a claim does the burden then shift to
applicant to establish tolling. A finding as to the date of a cumulative injury is required when
deciding a statute of limitations defense. When this is returned to the trial level, the WCJ may wish
to consider whether bifurcation of the statute of limitations is appropriate.
However, and because we are issuing a notice of intent to impose sanctions, we are not
issuing a final decision on the merits at this time. A decision after reconsideration as to the merits
will issue alongside any decision as to sanctions. The parties may wish to meet and confer and if
possible stipulate the date of injury under section 5412, which could affect our decision on the
merits.
Accordingly, we grant the Petition for Reconsideration.
We issue a Notice of Intention to impose sanctions of up to $2,500.00 jointly and
severally against defendant employer SWI Finishing, Inc.; defendant insurer Arch Insurance
Group; defendant’s administrator Gallagher Bassett; and defendant’s attorneys California Self
Insurance Law and Ali Vassigh (CA BAR #261260).
For the foregoing reasons,

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IT IS ORDERED that defendant’s Petition for Reconsideration from the Findings of Fact
issued on August 22, 2025, by the WCJ is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a final decision after reconsideration is DEFERRED
pending further review of the merits of the Petition for Reconsideration and further consideration
of the entire record in light of the applicable statutory and decisional law.
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that absent written objection in which good cause to the
contrary is demonstrated, within twenty (20) days plus five (5) additional days for mailing
(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 10605(a)(1), 10600) after service of this Notice, pursuant to Labor
Code section 5813 and WCAB Rule 10421 (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10421), the Workers’
Compensation Appeals Board will order defendant SWI FINISHING, INC.; defendant’s insurer
ARCH INSURANCE GROUP; defendant’s administrator GALLAGHER BASSETT; and
defendant’s attorneys CALIFORNIA SELF INSURANCE LAW and ALI VASSIGH (CA BAR
#261260), to jointly and severally pay sanctions of up to $2,500.00 payable to the General Fund.

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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all responses to this Notice must be electronically filed
in the Electronic Adjudication System (EAMS) within twenty (20) days plus five (5) additional
days for mailing (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, §§ 10605(a)(1), 10600) after service of this Notice.
Untimely or misfiled responses may not be accepted or considered.
I CONCUR,
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
/s/ JOSEPH V. CAPURRO, COMMISSIONER
/s/ KATHERINE A. ZALEWSKI, CHAIR
/s/ PAUL F. KELLY, COMMISSIONER
DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
DECEMBER 1, 2025
SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT
THEIR ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD.
GILBERTO LOPEZ MENDOZA
AUGUSTO FOCIL LAW
LYDIA NEWCOMB LAW OFFICE
CA SELF INSURANCE LAW
ALI VASSIGH
ARCH INSURANCE GROUP
GALLAGHER BASSETT
SWI FINISHING INC
EDL/mt
I certify that I affixed the official seal of
the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
to this original decision on this date.
KL