Valdiviezo, Carlos, Applicant v. THE OLYMPIC CLUB; THE NORTH RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY, administered by CRUM & FORSTER, Defendants

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
CARLOS VALDIVIEZO, Applicant
vs.
THE OLYMPIC CLUB;
THE NORTH RIVER INSURANCE COMPANY, administered by CRUM & FORSTER,
Defendants
Adjudication Number: ADJ10885532
San Francisco District Office
OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING PETITION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
We have considered the allegations of the Petition for Reconsideration and the contents of
the Report and the Opinion on Decision of the workers’ compensation administrative law judge
(WCJ) with respect thereto. Based on our review of the record, and for the reasons stated in the
WCJ’s Report and the Opinion on Decision, both of which we adopt and incorporate, and for the
reasons discussed below, we will deny reconsideration.
We note that former Labor Code1 section 5909 provided that a petition for reconsideration
was deemed denied unless the Appeals Board acted on the petition within 60 days from the date
of filing. 	(Lab. Code, § 5909.) 	Effective July 2, 2024, section 5909 was amended to state in
relevant part that:
(a) 	A petition for reconsideration is deemed to have been denied by the appeals
board unless it is acted upon within 60 days from the date a trial judge transmits a
case to the appeals board.
(b)
(1) 	When a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board, the trial
judge shall provide notice to the parties of the case and the appeals board.
1 All further statutory references are to the Labor Code, unless otherwise noted.

2
(2) 	For purposes of paragraph (1), service of the accompanying report,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 5900, shall constitute providing
notice.
Under section 5909(a), the Appeals Board must act on a petition for reconsideration within
60 days of transmission of the case to the Appeals Board. Transmission is reflected in Events in
the Electronic Adjudication Management System (EAMS). 	Specifically, in Case Events, under
Event Description is the phrase “Sent to Recon” and under Additional Information is the phrase
“The case is sent to the Recon board.”
Here, according to Events, the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on September
29, 2025 and 60 days from the date of transmission is Friday, November 28, 2025, the day after
Thanksgiving which is a holiday. The next business day that is 60 days from the date of
transmission is Monday, December 1, 2025. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10600(b).)2 This
decision is issued by or on Monday, December 1, 2025, so that we have timely acted on the petition
as required by Labor Code section 5909(a).
Section 5909(b)(1) requires that the parties and the Appeals Board be provided with notice
of transmission of the case. Transmission of the case to the Appeals Board in EAMS provides
notice to the Appeals Board. Thus, the requirement in subdivision (1) ensures that the parties are
notified of the accurate date for the commencement of the 60-day period for the Appeals Board to
act on a petition. Section 5909(b)(2) provides that service of the Report and Recommendation shall
be notice of transmission.
Here, according to the proof of service for the Report and Recommendation by the workers’
compensation administrative law judge, the Report was served on September 29, 2025, and the
case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on September 29, 2025. Service of the Report and
transmission of the case to the Appeals Board occurred on the same day. Thus, we conclude that
the parties were provided with the notice of transmission required by section 5909(b)(1) because
service of the Report in compliance with section 5909(b)(2) provided them with actual notice as
to the commencement of the 60-day period on September 29, 2025.
For the foregoing reasons,
2 WCAB Rule 10600(b) (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10600(b)) states that:
Unless otherwise provided by law, if the last day for exercising or performing any right or duty to act or
respond falls on a weekend, or on a holiday for which the offices of the Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board are closed, the act or response may be performed or exercised upon the next business day.

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IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Reconsideration is DENIED.
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
/s/ JOSÉ H. RAZO, COMMISSIONER
I CONCUR,
/s/ ANNE SCHMITZ, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
/s/ CRAIG L. SNELLINGS, COMMISSIONER
DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
DECEMBER 1, 2025
SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT
THEIR ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD.
CARLOS VALDIVIEZO
LAW OFFICES OF NADEEM MAKADA
LAW OFFICES OF DANIEL K. LEE, P.C.
PAG/bp
I certify that I affixed the official seal of
the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
to this original decision on this date.
BP

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Report and Recommendation on
Petition for Reconsideration and Notice of Transmission to WCAB
Elizabeth Dehn, Workers’ Compensation Judge, hereby submits her report and
recommendation on the Petition for Reconsideration filed herein.
Introduction
On September 18, 2025 defendant through its attorney of record, filed a Petition for
Reconsideration of my August 28, 2025 Findings and Award, served on August 29, 2025.
Petitioner asserts that by the order, decision or award, the board acted without or in
excess of its powers; the evidence does not justify the findings of fact; petitioner has discovered
new evidence material to him which he could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and
produced at the hearing; and that the findings of fact do not support the order, decision or award.
The petition was timely filed and accompanied by the verification required under Labor Code
section 5902 and Regulation 10940(c). To date, I am not aware of an answer having been filed
by applicant.
Facts
Carlos Valdiviezo sustained an accepted injury to the bilateral wrists and elbows while
employed during the period of May 2, 2016 through May 2, 2017 as a groundskeeper by The
Olympic Club. The matter resolved with stipulations, and an Award on Amended Stipulations
was issued on December 5, 2023
Applicant’s primary treating physician (“PTP”) was David Smolins, M.D. Defendant
wrote to the applicant on October 3, 2023 with a Notice of Terminated Provider which was
copied on, among other parties, Remedy Medical Attn: Dr. Smolins. The address for Dr. Smolins
was “PO Box 6917 Redwood City CA 94063-9998.” Applicant’s counsel wrote to Dr. Smolins
on November 1, 2023 asking him to advise in writing if any of the conditions under Labor Code
section 4616.2(d)(1) apply.
David Smolins wrote a letter to the adjuster in response to a notification that he was no
longer in defendant’s Medical Provider Network (“MPN”) in which he stated that as the patient's
primary treating physician he believed that continued medical treatment for the patient's serious
medical or serious chronic condition was necessary and that he would continue as the primary
treating physician under Regulation 9767.9
Applicant’s attorney filed a petition for penalties on January 26, 2024 that alleged that
applicant’s treating physician issued a medical report addressing continuity of care finding the
applicant to be eligible based on a serious and chronic medical condition. Defendant did not
authorize continued treatment with Dr. Smolins, and deferred requests for authorization on the
basis.
This matter proceeded to trial on July 23, 2025 on the applicant’s claim he was entitled to
continue to treat with Dr. Smolins, penalties, attorneys’ fees and whether applicant was required
to designate a new PTP in defendant’s medical network.

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On August 28, 2025 I issued my Findings and Award in which I found that defendant did
not comply with Cal. Code Reg. title 8, section 9769.10(d)(1) and therefore applicant was
entitled to treat outside defendant’s MPN with Dr. Smolins at defendant’s expense. I also found
that defendant unreasonably delayed the provision of medical care. I awarded Labor Code
section 5814 penalty and applicant attorney fees under Labor Code section 5814.5. I also found
that Applicant was not required to designate a primary treating physician within defendant’s
Medical Provider Network.
It is from that Findings of Fact and Award that petitioner seeks reconsideration.
Petitioner’s Contentions
Petitioner contends that it was not relevant that the notice that Dr. Smolins was no longer
in the MPN did not comply with the regulations, that Dr. Smolins’ response that he believed he
should continue as the applicant’s PTP was untimely, a letter and not a medical report, that it was
not substantial medical evidence and that there was no delay in the provision of medical
treatment to warrant the award of penalties and attorneys’ fees.
For the reasons discussed below, petitioner’s contentions are without merit, and do not
provide sufficient basis to grant reconsideration.
Discussion
Defendant did not comply with the statutory requirements for notifying an injured worker
and his PTP that the doctor was terminated from defendant’s MPN. I found that defendant’s
October 3, 2023 notification of the continuity of care plan in this case did not comport with the
requirements of Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, section 9767.10(d)(1). The letter was sent to the injured
worker, however the letter was only in English and did not contain the requisite notice in
Spanish. (Joint Exhibit 102.) The applicant did require a Spanish language interpreter at trial, so
the requirement that the notice be sent to the injured worker is particularly apt in this case. In
addition, the copy of the letter sent to the PTP, Dr. Smolins, was sent to “PO Box 6917 Redwood
City CA 94063-9998.” (Id. at page 2.) This is not the address for Dr. Smolins that was listed in
his address within the MPN, nor is it the address on his letterhead, or any of the other
correspondence in evidence used by defendant to correspond with Dr. Smolins, all of which use
“1900 O’Farrell St. Ste. 90 San Mateo CA 94403.” Both the failure to provide the required
notices in both English and Spanish and the failure to send the notification to the PTP at the
correct address mean that the defendant failed to meet its burden of proof that it complied with
the notice requirements. (See, Charon v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 2013 Cal. Wrkl. Comp. P.D. Lexis
100.; Roque v. Louise’s Trattoria, 2008 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. Lexis 349.)
Failure to provide required MPN notices that results in a failure to provide reasonable
medical treatment, as what happened in this case, makes a defendant liable for reasonable self-
procured medical care. (Knight v. UPS (2006) 71 Cal. Comp. Cases 1423 (Appeals Board en
banc.); Babbit v. Ow Jing (2007) 72 Cal. Comp. Cases 70 (Appeals Bd. en banc.).) It was on this
basis that I found the applicant was entitled to treat with Dr. Smolins outside of defendant’s
MPN at defendant’s expense.

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Petitioner mistakenly believes that I found that the applicant was entitled to treat outside
of the MPN under WCAB Rule 9767.12. However, my findings were based on a different
regulation. I found that defendant did not meet the requirements of WCAB Rule 9767.10
“continuity of care policy.” That regulation governs the transfer of care when a PTP was
terminated from defendant’s MPN, which were the circumstances in this case. The issue of
applicant’s right to treat under “continuity of care” was raised in both the pretrial conference
statement and framed as an issue for trial, so defendant had sufficient notice of the issue.
I do note that prior defense counsel raised on the pretrial conference statement WCAB
Rule 9767.9, which governs transfer of care in circumstances where an applicant is treating
outside of defendant’s MPN, in support of the contention that applicant was required to pick a
new physician within the MPN. However, I found no basis for applicant to have to choose a new
provider within defendant’s MPN.
Even if defendant had complied with the notification requirements, there is sufficient
evidence to support my finding that applicant was entitled to continue to treat with Dr. Smolins
at defendant’s expense under the continuity of care policy. Applicant’s attorney requested a
report from Dr. Smolins on November 1, 2024 and Dr. Smolins provided a response on
November 19, 2024. (Applicant’s Exhibit 4; Joint Exhibit 102.) As Dr. Smolins’ response was
within 20 days of the injured worker’s request for a report, it was timely under WCAB
9767.10(2)(2). Defendant disputes that Dr. Smolins response constituted a report, or provided
sufficient justification for his opinion that applicant had a covered condition which would allow
him to continue to treat under the continuity of care policy for up to a year. However, defendant
did not seek a second opinion through the panel QME process to resolve the dispute as required.
(See, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, section 9767.10(d)(3).)
As defendant did not comply with the requirements of WCAB 9767.10, there was
sufficient basis for me to find both an unreasonable delay of medical care that warranted the
imposition of both a penalty under Labor Code section 5814 and the award of attorneys’ fees
under Labor Code section 5814.5.
Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that applicant’s Petition for Reconsideration,
filed herein on September 18, 2025, be denied. This matter is being transmitted to the Appeals
Board on the service date indicated below my signature.
Elizabeth Dehn
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
The Report and Recommendation on Petition for Reconsideration was filed and served on all
parties listed in the Official Address Record, Pursuant to Rule 10628, and the case was
transmitted to the Appeals Board on this date.
Date: September 29, 2025
By: A. Paraiso

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OPINION ON DECISION
This matter proceeded to trial on July 23, 2025 on applicant’s claim he was entitled to
continue to treat with the PTP, penalties, attorneys’ fees and whether applicant was required to
designate a new PTP in defendant’s medical network. Documentary evidence was submitted,
testimony was taken, and defendant submitted a memorandum of points and authorities.
Stipulated facts
Carlos Valdiviezo, born […], while employed during the period of May 2, 2016 through
May 2, 2017 as a groundskeeper, Occupational Group Number 491, at San Francisco, California,
by The Olympic Club, sustained injury arising out of and in the course of employment to the
bilateral wrists and elbows. At the time of injury, the employer was insured for workers'
compensation purposes by North River Insurance Company.
An Award On Amended Stipulations was issued in this matter on December 5, 2023.
Documentary evidence
Joint Exhibits
David Smolins wrote a letter to Debbie Brierly in response to a notification that he was no
longer in defendant’s Medical Provider Network (“MPN.”) He stated that as the patient's primary
treating physician “it is our professional opinion that continued medical treatment for the patient's
serious medical or serious chronic condition is necessary. It is essential that the patient be allowed
to continue treating with” and then listed at series of diagnosis codes for pain in the bilateral
elbows, bilateral wrists and bilateral shoulders. The letter then stated that he would continue as the
primary treating physician under Regulation 9767.9 It was signed David Smolins and faxed to
Debbie Brierly and Michael Neale. (Joint Exhibit 101, Letter from Dr. Smolins dated November
19, 2023.)
Crum and Forster wrote to the applicant on October 3, 2023 with a Notice of Terminated
Provider. The letter stated that the current treating provider, Remedy Network/ Dr. Smolins was
no longer in the employer approved MPN. The applicant was asked to review the information and
provide response within 10 days if he will elect another provider within the MPN. The contact for
the MPN’s medical access assistant was listed. It also advised that he needed confirmation from
defendant to continue treating with the terminated doctor. The letter was copied to Brian Egan,
Law Offices of Nadeem Makada, and Remedy Medical Attn: Dr. Smolins. The address for Dr.
Smolins was “PO Box 6917 Redwood City CA 94063-9998.” Attached was a form defendant’s
letterhead that asked to identify which conditions may apply, listed the grounds to continue treating
in the MPN, and stated that the information needed to be completed by the provider and placed on
their letterhead with their signature. The attached proof of service again showed service on Dr.
Smolins at the PO Box in Redwood City. (Joint Exhibit 102, Letter from defendant to applicant,
with a proof of service, dated October 3, 2023.)
Applicant’s Exhibits

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There is a letter dated January 25 2022 from the Law Offices of Nadeem Makada to Debbie
Brierly. It stated that the applicant wished to change trading physicians and designated David
Smolins at Remedy Medical Group. The address listed is “1900 O’Farrell St. Ste. 90 San Mateo
CA 94403.” Attached is a print out of provider net /conduit with a list of various doctors consisting
of two patient pages. Highlighted is David Smolins with the address listed on O'Farrell St. in San
Mateo. (Applicant’s Exhibit 1)
There is a letter on Crum & Forster letterhead dated February 4, 2022 to David Smolins at
the 1900 O’Farrell Street address advising the doctor that North River Insurance utilizes a
pharmacy benefits network. (Applicant’s Exhibit 2.)
A petition for penalties, sanctions, attorneys’ fees and request for an administrative audit
dated January 26, 2024 alleged that applicant’s treating physician issued a medical report
addressing continuity of care finding the applicant to be eligible based on a serious and chronic
medical condition, however, defendants did not authorize the continued care. It requested sanctions
for an alleged violation of the award of lifetime medical care and requested applicant be allowed
to continue treatment with Dr. Smolins, an order for the value of all denied medical care plus a
25% penalty, less attorneys’ fees and an estimated 6 hours of attorneys’ fees, sanctions and a
referral to the audit unit. (Applicant’s Exhibit 3.)
The first page of the Exhibit 5 is a letter from Dr. Smolins which appears to be identical to
Joint Exhibit 101 except for the date, which is May 13, 2024. The second page of the exhibit is a
letter dated November 1, 2023 from applicant’s counsel to Dr. Smolins at 1900 O’Farrell St. Ste.
190 in San Mateo CA that asked him to advise in writing if any of the conditions under Labor
Code section 4616.2(d)(1) apply. The third page is the October 3, 2023 letter from defendant to
the applicant regarding a notice of terminated provider. (Applicant’s Exhibit 5.)
Applicant’s Exhibits 6, 7 and 8 are all letters to Dr. Smolins from defendant advising him
that they were deferring the RFAs received as he was no longer in the MPN. The address listed for
Dr. Smolins on all three letters was 1900 O’Farrell Street, Suite 190 in San Mateo.
Debbie Brierly emailed applicant’s counsel on January 24, 2024 advised that Dr. Smolins
was no longer in the MPN but continued to treat the applicant. The email indicates that attached is
a copy of the “Transfer of Care-Provider is not in the MPN” letter mailed to all parties in October.
She asked if the applicant will voluntarily elect a new PTP within the MPN. (Applicant’s Exhibit
9.)
Analysis
1. 	Is applicant entitled to continue to treat with Dr. Smolins?
When a physician within a defendant’s medical provider network is terminated from that
network, the terminated provider may continue to provide treatment for up to one year under certain
conditions. (Labor Code section 4616. 2(d).) The requirements of this “continuity of care policy” require
the insurer to notify the injured worker of the need to select a new provider within the MPN and advise
of the exceptions that allow the applicant to continue treating with the current PTP. “The notification
shall be sent to the covered employees address and a copy of the letter shall be sent to the covered

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employees primary treating physician. The notification shall be written in English and Spanish and use
layperson's terms to the maximum extent possible.” (Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8, section 9767.10(d)(1).)
It is apparent the required notification of the continuity of care plan in this case did not comport
with this requirement. The letter was sent to the injured worker, however the letter was only in English
and did not contain the requisite notice in Spanish. (Joint Exhibit 102.) The applicant did require a
Spanish language interpreter at trial, so the requirement that the notice be sent to the injured worker is
particularly apt in this case. In addition, the copy of the letter sent to the PTP, Dr. Smolins, was sent to
“PO Box 6917 Redwood City CA 94063-9998.” (Id. at page 2.) This is not the address for Dr. Smolins
that was listed in his address within the MPN, nor is it the address on his letterhead, or any of the other
correspondence in evidence used by defendant to correspond with Dr. Smolins, all of which use “1900
O’Farrell St. Ste. 90 San Mateo CA 94403.” Both the failure to provide the required notices in both
English and Spanish and the failure to send the notification to the PTP at the correct address mean that
the defendant failed to meet its burden of proof that it complied with the notice requirements. (See,
Charon v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 2013 Cal. Wrkl. Comp. P.D. Lexis 100.; Roque v. Louise’s Trattoria,
2008 Cal. Wrk. Comp. P.D. Lexis 349.)
Failure to provide required MPN notices that results in a failure to provide reasonable medical
treatment, as what happened in this case, makes a defendant liable for reasonable self-procured medical
care. (Knight v. UPS (2006) 71 Cal. Comp. Cases 1423 (Appeals Board en banc.); Babbit v. Ow Jing
(2007) 72 Cal. Comp. Cases 70 (Appeals Bd. en banc.).) I therefore find that applicant is entitled to treat
outside of defendant’s MPN at defendant’s expense.
2. 	Is applicant entitled to Labor Code section 5814 penalties?
Defendant did delay the provision of medical care in this case, as evidenced by the three letters to
Dr. Smolins advising him that they were deferring requests for authorization of treatment as he was no
longer in the MPN. (Applicant’s Exhibits 5, 6 and 7.) However, the imposition of penalties is appropriate
only if the delay is unreasonable. (Labor Code section 5814.)
Debbie Brierly, the claims adjuster, testified at trial that she received a letter from Dr. Smolins
dated November 19, 2023 with a request for continuity of care but denied that it had an explanation as to
whether the applicant’s condition was serious and chronic. (Summary of Evidence at July 23, 2025 trial
8:1-6.) Defendant contends that the letter from Dr. Smolins, contained in Joint Exhibit 101 is not a “report”
and therefore was not a response compliant with Rule 9767.10.
Rule 9767.10(3) requires the parties to go through the Labor Code section 4062 medica-legal
process if defendant disputes the PTP’s opinion that the applicant meets one of the grounds for continuing
to treat under a continuity of care policy. That did not happen here. Defendant acknowledges that Dr.
Smolins wrote a letter. (Id.) Defendant does not believe that the letter has sufficient explanation of the
contention that the applicant has a serious and chronic condition, and contends a letter is the same as a
report and thus does not comply with the regulation. Dr. Smolins does state that the applicant had a serious
and chronic condition. (Joint Exhibit 101.) It is consistent with the letter from defendant to the injured
worker that asked the provider identify if an exception to the continuity of care transfer to an MPN
physician applies, with the request that it be placed on his letterhead and contain his signature. (Joint
Exhibit 102, page 3.) I find it unreasonable that defendant received notice from the PTP that he opined

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that the applicant should continue in his care, and they did not either make a follow up request to Dr.
Smolins or applicant’s attorney if they did not believe that the provided information was sufficient, or
initiate the medical legal process. Instead, defendant denied medical care by deferring Dr. Smolins’ RFAs.
When determining the amount of the penalty to be awarded, the trier of fact should consider factors
such as the amount of the delayed benefit, the length of the delay, and whether the delay was inadvertent
and corrected. (Ramirez v. Drive Financial Services (2008) 73 Cal. Comp. Cases 1324 (Appeals Bd En
Banc.). The delay in medical care in this case is from November 19, 2023, the date Dr. Smolins submitted
the letter invoking the continuity of care exception, through the date of trial, or July 23, 2025, more than
a year and a half. Defendant did not provide any evidence of mitigation. Based on the length of the delay,
I find that the penalty of 25% of the delayed benefit is warranted.
As applicant did not provide any information on the number of visits during the delay period, or
the dollar value of the delayed medical treatment, I do not have sufficient information to calculate the
dollar amount of the penalty being awarded.
I therefore find that applicant is entitled to a penalty 25% of the official medical fee schedule
(OMFS) of the treatment provided by Dr. Smolins from November 19, 2023 through July 23, 2025, up to
the $10,000.00 cap, in an amount to be adjusted by the parties.
3. 	Is applicant attorney entitled to a fee?
The imposition of attorney’s fees incurred in the enforcement of an award, including an award of
further medical care, is mandatory. Labor Code section 5814.5 states that when compensation was
unreasonably delayed or refused following an award, “the appeals board shall, in addition to increasing the
order, decision or award pursuant to Section 5814, award reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in enforcing
the payment of compensation awarded.” (emphasis added) Fees under Labor Code section 5814.5 are to be
based on a reasonable hourly rate, and not a percentage of the applicant’s penalty award. (Ramirez, Supra,
at 1336.)
Applicant’s counsel did not provide a bill of particulars or an itemization of the time spent in
enforcing the award in this case. Applicant’s penalty petition states he “will” spend 6 hours in this matter,
but that is not an itemization of the time actually spent in enforcing the award. I do note that this matter
has been highly litigated. At a minimum, applicant’s counsel did prepare and file the January 26, 2024
penalty petition, an August 30, 2024 declaration of readiness to proceed on the issue, appeared at the
December 2, 2024 mandatory settlement conference when the penalty issue was set for trial, and filed an
answer to the defendant’s petition for removal on the issue of whether the adjuster, Ms. Brierly, had to
testify at the penalty trial. I am awarding applicant’s attorney fees based on 10 hours, at the rate of $400.00
per hour, for a total of $4000.00. In calculating this fee, I note applicant attorney spent 7.5 hours at the July
23, 2025 trial. I am providing an additional hour for his appearance at the December 2, 2024 MSC which
includes the preparation of the pretrial conference statement, and an hour and a half hour for drafting the
penalty petition, DOR and answer to the petition for removal.
4. 	Is applicant required to designate a new PTP?

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As defendant did not comply with the requisite notification requirements of 9767.10(d)(1), I find
no basis to require the applicant to designate a new treating physician within defendant’s MPN.
DATE: August 28, 2025 	Elizabeth Dehn
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
OPINION ON DECISION served on all parties as shown on the Official Address
Record, pursuant to Rule 10628.
DATE: August 29, 2025
BY: A. Paraiso