Franco, Ursula, Applicant v. VIE DE FRANCE YAMAZAKI; SOMPO AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Administered By BROADSPIRE SERVICES, Defendants

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
URSULA FRANCO, Applicant
vs.
VIE DE FRANCE YAMAZAKI; SOMPO AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
Administered By BROADSPIRE SERVICES, Defendants
Adjudication Number: ADJ13570874
Van Nuys District Office
OPINION AND ORDER
DENYING PETITION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
Lien Claimant Universal Diagnostic & Imaging seeks reconsideration of a workers’
compensation administrative law judge’s (WCJ) Findings and Order of August 13, 2025, wherein
it was found that lien claimant was not entitled to reimbursement because it “failed to meet [its]
burden of proof in demonstrating that [it was] a validly licensed medical provider allowed to
provide services in this case as a medical facility.” 	In this matter, in a Compromise & Release
approved on May 24, 2024, in exchange for $115,000, applicant settled her claim that while
employed as a packing and machine operator during a cumulative period ending August 21, 2020,
she sustained industrial injury to various body parts. As part of the settlement, defendant agreed
to “pay, adjust, or litigate” all liens of record, including Universal Diagnostic & Imaging’s lien
claim.
Lien claimant contends that the WCJ erred in disallowing its lien claim, arguing that it was
able to provide the services it billed for under its structure as a normal corporation (rather than a
validly formed professional corporation) controlled by a non-physician. 	We have received an
Answer from defendant and the WCJ has filed a Report and Recommendation on Petition for
Reconsideration.
As explained below, for the reasons stated by the WCJ in the portions of the Report quoted
below, and for the additional reasons set forth below, we will deny the lien claimant’s Petition.
Preliminarily, we note that former Labor Code section 5909 provided that a petition for
reconsideration was deemed denied unless the Appeals Board acted on the petition within 60 days

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from the date of filing. (Lab. Code, § 5909.) 	Effective July 2, 2024, Labor Code section 5909
was amended to state in relevant part that:
(a) 	A petition for reconsideration is deemed to have been denied by the
appeals board unless it is acted upon within 60 days from the date a trial judge
transmits a case to the appeals board.
(b)
(1) When a trial judge transmits a case to the appeals board, the trial judge
shall provide notice to the parties of the case and the appeals board.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), service of the accompanying report,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 5900, shall constitute providing notice.
Under Labor Code section 5909(a), the Appeals Board must act on a petition for
reconsideration within 60 days of transmission of the case to the Appeals Board. Transmission is
reflected in Events in the Electronic Adjudication Management System (EAMS). Specifically, in
Case Events, under Event Description is the phrase “Sent to Recon” and under Additional
Information is the phrase “The case is sent to the Recon board.”
Here, according to Events, the case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on September
16, 2025 and 60 days from the date of transmission is Saturday, November 15, 2025. The next
business day that is 60 days from the date of transmission is Monday, November 17, 2025. (See
Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10600(b).)1 This decision is issued by or on November 17, 2025, so we
have timely acted on the petition as required by Labor Code section 5909(a).
Labor Code section 5909(b)(1) requires that the parties and the Appeals Board be provided
with notice of transmission of the case. Transmission of the case to the Appeals Board in EAMS
provides notice to the Appeals Board. Thus, the requirement in subdivision (1) ensures that the
parties are notified of the accurate date for the commencement of the 60-day period for the Appeals
Board to act on a petition. Labor Code section 5909(b)(2) provides that service of the Report and
Recommendation shall be notice of transmission.
Here, according to the proof of service for the Report and Recommendation by the workers’
compensation administrative law judge, the Report was served on September 16, 2025, and the
1 WCAB Rule 10600(b) (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 10600(b)) states that:
Unless otherwise provided by law, if the last day for exercising or performing any right or duty to act or
respond falls on a weekend, or on a holiday for which the offices of the Workers' Compensation Appeals
Board are closed, the act or response may be performed or exercised upon the next business day.

3
case was transmitted to the Appeals Board on September 16, 2025. 	Service of the Report and
transmission of the case to the Appeals Board occurred on the same day. Thus, we conclude that
the parties were provided with the notice of transmission required by Labor Code section
5909(b)(1) because service of the Report in compliance with Labor Code section 5909(b)(2)
provided them with actual notice as to the commencement of the 60-day period on September 16,
2025.
Turning to the merits, in reaching her decision, the WCJ relied upon People ex rel. Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Discovery Radiology Physicians, P.C. (Allstate) (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 521, 533-535
[88 Cal.Comp.Cases 857]), where the Court of Appeal explained:
Historically, the Medical Practice Act prohibited physicians from practicing
through for-profit corporations or artificial legal entities of any kind. (See
Lathrop v. HealthCare Partners Medical Group (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1412,
1420 [8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 668].) More recently, the Act has been amended to permit
physicians to conduct their medical practices through medical corporations or
partnerships so long as all the entities’ shareholders or partners, as well as all
employees rendering professional services, are themselves licensed. (Lathrop,
at pp. 1420–1421, citing §§ 2402, 2406, 2415, 2416; Corp. Code, §§ 13401,
13405.) However, the Act continues to prohibit what is sometimes referred to as
the corporate practice of medicine (see, e.g., Markow v. Rosner (2016) 3
Cal.App.5th 1027, 1033 [208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363])—that is, it “generally
precludes for-profit corporations—other than licensed medical corporations—
from providing medical care through either salaried employees or independent
contractors.” (People v. Cole (2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 970 [44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 261,
135 P.3d 669], italics added; see also Steinsmith v. Medical Board (2000) 85
Cal.App.4th 458, 460 [102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 115] (Steinsmith) [“[m]edicine may be
practiced in a partnership or group of physicians (§ 2416), but ‘[c]orporations
and other artificial legal entities … have no professional rights, privileges, or
powers’ (§ 2400), and a ‘fictitious-name’ permit to operate a facility called a
‘“medical clinic”’ can be issued only if the clinic is wholly owned by licensed
physicians (§ 2415, subd. (b))”].)
Applying this principle, the Court of Appeal found a violation of the Medical
Practice Act in Steinsmith, supra, 85 Cal.App.4th 458. There, the plaintiff was
a licensed physician who performed disability evaluations as an independent
contractor of a clinic owned in part by nonphysicians. (Id. at p. 460.) The
physician was cited by the Medical Board of California for aiding in the
unlicensed practice of medicine, a finding that the Court of Appeal upheld. (Id.
at pp. 460–464.) In so finding, the court rejected the physician's contention that
the nonphysician owners did not practice medicine because they merely owned
the clinic and administered its business affairs. The court explained: “A similar
argument was rejected long ago in Painless Parker v. Board of Dental Exam.

4
(1932) 216 Cal. 285 [14 P.2d 67]. In that case, a licensed dentist was found to
have aided and abetted the unlicensed practice of dentistry by a corporation he
formed to own and operate dental offices. (Id. at pp. 289, 298.) The dentist
argued, as Steinsmith does here, that the licensing requirements for the provision
of professional services did not apply to ‘the purely business side of the
practice.’ (Id. at p. 295.) Our Supreme Court rejected that argument … . [¶] …
The unlicensed practitioner in Painless Parker was a corporation, but it has long
been ‘well settled’ that ‘any other unlicensed person or entity’ is subject to the
same sanctions for unlawful practice as an unlicensed corporation. [Citation.]
Accordingly, the Painless Parker case disposes of Steinsmith’s argument that
there was no unlicensed practice he could have aided.” (Id. at pp. 465–466.)
The Attorney General similarly opined in a 1982 opinion addressing whether an
entity not licensed as a medical corporation could lawfully engage physicians to
treat employment-related injuries sustained by employees of another corporate
entity. (65 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 223 (1982).) The Attorney General noted that, as
general rule, a corporation “may neither engage in the practice of medicine
directly, nor may it do so indirectly by ‘engaging [physicians] to perform
professional services for those with whom the corporation contracts to furnish
such services.’” (Id. at p. 224.)
Although Allstate discussed this limitation in the context of the unlicensed practice of
medicine, the limitation applies to all licensed professionals. (Corp. Code, § 13401).
In the instant matter, lien claimant sought reimbursement for a medical legal report
authored 	by 	neurologist 	Benjamin 	Gross, 	M.D. 	as 	well 	as 	for 	the 	provision 	of 	certain
electrodiagnostic testing. 	Clearly, the drafting of Dr. Gross’s report which interpreted the
electrodiagnostic testing and offered an actual medical diagnosis of mild right carpal tunnel
syndrome constitutes the practice of medicine.
As far as the actual conducting of the electrodiagnostic tests, the lien claimant states in its
Petition, without any citation to authority, that a diagnostic testing and imaging facility “is not
even regulated by the Medical Board of California, because medicine is not prescribed and medical
doctors are not required, only specialized technicians.” (Petition for Reconsideration at p. 4.) In
fact, in the case of radiological technologists, “It shall be unlawful for any person to administer or
use diagnostic or therapeutic x-ray on human beings in this state, unless that person … is acting
withing the scope of [their] certification or permit, and is acting under the supervision of a
licentiate of the healing arts.” (Health & Safety Code, § 106965, subd. (a) [Emphasis added].)
“Licentiate of the healing arts” is defined as medical doctors, osteopaths, and chiropractors.
(Health & Safety Code, § 114850, subd. (h)(1).) As far as other “technical supportive services”

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such as electrodiagnostic testing, “a medical assistant may … perform … additional technical
supportive services upon the specific authorization and supervision of a licensed physician and
surgeon or a licensed podiatrist. A medical assistant may also perform all these tasks and services
upon the specific authorization of a physician assistant, a nurse practitioner, or a certified nurse-
midwife.” 	(Health & Safety Code, § 2069, subd. (a)(1).) 	Any physician assistant, nurse
practitioner or certified nurse-midwife must, in turn, be supervised by a licensed physician.
(Health & Safety Code, § 2069, subd. (a)(2).) The physician, podiatrist, physician assistant, nurse-
practitioner, or certified nurse-midwife must be present in the facility when these procedures are
undertaken. (Health & Safety Code, § 2069, subd. (b)(3).) So, while certified technicians may be
performing the tests, they do so only under the ultimate supervision of a physician, and they thus
also constitute the practice of medicine.2
Accordingly, the WCJ correctly determined that the services for which lien claimant seeks
reimbursement could only be performed and billed by healing arts professionals in the scope of
their licenses or their duly organized professional corporations. For these reasons and the reasons
stated in the portions of the WCJ’s Report which we quote below, we will deny lien claimant’s
Petition. 	We have omitted the WCJ’s discussion of whether the tests performed were “simple”
and whether lien claimant was required to obtain a fictitious business name permit. Those issues
are not relevant to the resolution of this matter.
RECOMMENDATIONS ON PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION
A. 	BRIEF 	STATEMENT 	OF 	THE 	CASE 	AND 	PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
Ursula Franco, while employed during the period July 14, 2005 through August
21, 2020, as a packing and machine operator, sustained injury arising out of and
in the course of employment to her bilateral shoulders and left elbow. The claim
was resolved by way of Order Approving Compromise & Release agreement for
$115,000 on May 24, 2024.
Following the settlement, the case was set for trial solely on the lien of Universal
Diagnostics & Imaging, with the parties stipulating that the lien issues would be
2 Certain physical therapists may perform these tests upon authorization of a licensed physician, although without their
supervision, so long as the physical therapist does not interpret the data. (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code sec. 2620.5.) There
is no argument that a physical therapist performed the tests here and if they did those tests could only be billed by
licensed physical therapists or their professional corporation. (Corp. Code, § 13401; Health & Safety Code, § 2600 et
seq.) Here it appears that the owner of the lien claimant corporation is a psychologist, not a medical doctor or physical
therapist.

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bifurcated and the Court would only be making a determination regarding those
issues raised related to the corporate status of Universal Diagnostics & Imaging,
and their ability to provide diagnostic studies based on their licensing status. The
parties have a dispute as to whether Universal Diagnostics is a general
corporation 	or 	a 	professional 	corporation. 	The 	lien 	claim 	of 	Universal
Diagnostics & Imaging is in the amount of $11,050.
The matter proceeded to trial on July 16, 2025. The WCJ issued a Findings and
Order dated August 13, 2025, wherein it was found that while Universal
Diagnostics & Imaging (UD&I), did have Fictitious Business Name Statement
(FBNS), which allowed them to operate in the state, they did not have the proper
Medical Board Designation to allow them to practice medicine based on the fact
that the facility was providing medical services in the form of professional
diagnostics studies but was owned and operated by a non-physician, Jo Anne
Kaplan, Ph.D., psychologist The lien claimant has now filed a Petition for
Reconsideration of that determination, where they reiterate their arguments that
the lien claimant is not practicing medicine and as such is not required to be a
Professional Corporation but instead, may operate as a General Corporation and
provide the diagnostic tests which do not require a licensed medical corporation.
The Petition is timely and verified.
B. REVIEW OF APPEAL
The lien claimant argues that neither the court, nor the WCJ offered any case
law to support the proposition that a medical license is required in order to
operate the diagnostic testing facility. To the contrary, however, numerous cases
were cited, as well as panel decisions, for this proposition. Lien claimant wishes
to shift the burden to the Defendant on this issue, rather than offer case law to
support their contention that they are legally authorized to provide the medical
testing. No cases are presented by lien claimant which support their theory. The
Board has considered this issue in the past, yet, no cases are found to support the
lien claimant’s argument.
[Discussion of whether these were “simple” tests or not omitted. Regardless of
whether they were simple or not, they require the ultimate supervision of a
licentiate of the healing arts.]
C. DISCUSSION
To reiterate the cases decisions, the WCJ references Defendant’s trial brief
stating that:
The Allstate Court further explained:
“ ... the Act [Medical Practice Act] continues to prohibit what is sometimes
referred to as the corporate practice of medicine (see, e.g., Markow v. Rosner

7
(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1033 [208 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363])-that is, it ‘generally
precludes for-profit corporations-other than licensed medical corporations-from
providing medical care through either salaried employees or independent
contractors.’ (People v. Cole (2006) 3 8 Cal.4th 964, 970-971, italics added; see
also Steinsmith v. Medical Board (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 458, 460 (Steinsmith)
[“[m]edicine may be practiced in a partnership or group of physicians(§ 2416),
but [c]orporations and other artificial legal entities ... have no professional rights,
privileges, or powers’ (§ 2400), and a ‘fictitious-name’ permit to operate a
facility called a “‘medical clinic’” can be issued only if the clinic is wholly
owned by licensed physicians (§ 2415, subd. (b))”].)” [Clarification added]
(Emphasis added.)
The Court continued in Allstate:
... “Subsequently, in a 2009 opinion the Attorney General “reiterate[ d] [its] view
that professional radiology services-specifically including the selection of a
suitable radiologist, and the selection of a suitable radiology facility with
appropriate equipment and personnel, as well as preparing and interpreting
radiological images-involve the exercise of professional judgment as part of the
practice of medicine.” (92 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 56 (2009).).” Id at 869.
(a) Statutory law in California requires a corporation to be registered as a
professional corporation prior to rendering any medical or diagnostic services to
patients.
Corporations (Corp.) Code§ 1340l(b) defines a professional corporation:
“‘Professional corporation’ means a corporation organized under the General
Corporation Law or pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 13406 that is engaged
in rendering professional services in a single profession, … pursuant to a
certificate of registration issued by the governmental agency regulating the
profession as herein provided and that in its practice or business designates itself
as a professional or other corporation as may be required by statute. However,
any professional corporation or foreign professional corporation rendering
professional services by persons duly licensed by the Medical Board of
California or any examining committee under the jurisdiction of the board ...
shall not be required to obtain a certificate of registration in order to render those
professional services.
In the matter before this court, there was no evidence that UD&I is a professional
corporation or was a professional corporation at the time services were rendered
to the applicant. The California Secretary of State’s business search website
revealed UD&I filed its Articles of Incorporation on 3/28/2012 indicating it is a
general corporation (Defense Exhibit A).
In response, the Lien claimant asserts the following:

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The defendant claims that Universal Diagnostic & Imaging (UD&I) must be a
professional corporation in accordance with Business and Professions (B&P)
Code §2400. However, the defendant’s argument is incorrect. California
Corporation Code § 13401 (b) [in pertinent parts] states the following:
• “Professional corporation” means a corporation organized under the General
Corporation Law or pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 13406 that is engaged
in rendering professional services in a single profession, except as otherwise
authorized in Section 13401.5
Jo Anne Kaplan is a psychologist (PhD), who is licensed to practice by the State
Board California. License No.: PSYl 71260. The lien claimant’s facility
provides services in the field of imaging and diagnostic studies, not psychology.
The facility is not a hospital, nor any other medical facility owned or operated
by medical doctors practicing medicine. As such, the lien claimant’s facility is
not regulated by the CA Medical Board, nor the code sections described by the
defendant.
Professional Service vs. Professional Corporation
The defendant has misinterpreted the law. Professional service and professional
corporation are two separate things, and not all those who provide professional
services are required to form a professional corporation.
The lien claimant is not aware of any code section(s) that states an imaging
facility is required to form a professional corporation, or if owned by a
psychologist, it is required to do the same, especially when psychological
services are not provided.
D. CONCLUSION
As found in the Opinion on Decision, the Judge continues to recommend that
the Petition be denied for the reasons previously stated, which are summarized
below:
[Discussion of whether a fictitious name permit is required is omitted as moot.]
Next, turning to the principal issue of whether Universal Diagnostics is
providing medical services, the answer, in accordance with the B&P codes. the
Medical Board of California and the finding in the Allstate case, is yes. This
practice was invalidated in the ruling in Allstate when the court stated:
“The Medical Board of California further states that a non-physician may not
“own or operat[e] a business that offers patient evaluation, diagnosis, care and/or
treatment,” and a management service organization may not ‘arrang[e] for,

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advertis[e], 	or 	provid[e] 	medical 	services 	rather 	than 	only 	provid[e]
administrative staff and services for a physician’s medical practice (non-
physician exercising controls over a physician’s medical practice, even where
physicians own and operate the business)’ ... It explains: ‘In the examples above,
non-physicians would be engaged in the unlicensed practice of medicine, and
the physician may be aiding and abetting the unlicensed practice of medicine.’”
Joann Kaplan is not a medical doctor but is instead a psychologist and is the
owner of the Universal Diagnostics & Imaging office. Under the Allstate ruling,
she is not allowed to own and operate a medical facility which is what Universal
Diagnostics is. The fact that she has a FBS and is hiring certified technicians and
doctors to administer the diagnostic tests, does not cure the defect or render her
services valid as they are not being provided in accordance with the requirements
of the Medical Board of California. The WCJ recommends that the Petition for
Reconsideration be denied.

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For the foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that Lien Claimant Universal Diagnostic & Imaging’s Petition for
Reconsideration of the Findings and Order of August 13, 2025 is DENIED.
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
/s/ KATHERINE A. ZALEWSKI, CHAIR
I CONCUR,
/s/ ANNE SCHMITZ, DEPUTY COMISSIONER
/s/ PAUL F. KELLY, COMISSIONER
DATED AND FILED AT SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
November 17, 2025
SERVICE MADE ON THE ABOVE DATE ON THE PERSONS LISTED BELOW AT
THEIR ADDRESSES SHOWN ON THE CURRENT OFFICIAL ADDRESS RECORD.
URSULA FRANCO
GLAUBER BERENSON
COSTFIRST CORP
LIEN RECOVERY GROUP
DW/oo
I certify that I affixed the official seal of
the Workers’ Compensation Appeals
Board to this original decision on this
date. 	o.o