In re Morrision

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Filed 2/18/20 In re Morrision CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re SINQUE MORRISION,
On Habeas Corpus.
E067811
(Super.Ct.No. WHCJS1500067)
OPINION
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.
Katrina West, Judge.
Alan S. Yockelson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Randall D. Einhorn and Arlene A.
Sevidal, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.

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I.
INTRODUCTION
In 2005, a jury convicted petitioner Sinque Morrison of, among other things, first
degree murder and attempted murder for his involvement in the shooting death of 11-
year-old Mynisha Crenshaw. In 2014, the California Supreme Court held that the natural
and probable consequences doctrine is not a valid theory of liability for first degree
murder. (People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th 155 (Chiu).) Morrison subsequently filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he alleged the trial court impermissibly
instructed the jury on the natural and probable consequences doctrine in violation of
Chiu.
After we summarily denied the petition, the California Supreme Court vacated our
opinion and directed us to order the People to show cause why Morrison’s requested
relief should not be granted. Having received further briefing from the parties, we again
deny Morrison’s writ petition for habeas corpus relief.

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II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Facts1
Playboys, Hustlers, and Gangers (PPHG) member Barry Jones’s shooting death
precipitated the events in this case. Jones, defendant Morrison, and PPHG affiliate
Alonzo Monk sought to purchase marijuana at Lynwood Apartments in San Bernardino,
but became embroiled in a gun battle with members of a rival gang, the Rolling 60’s.
Jones was shot and died at a nearby hospital.
Jones’s cousin and fellow PPHG member, Shawn Davis, learned of Jones’s death
and found Morrison and other PPHG members at the home of their leader, Sidikiba
Greenwood. Morrison explained he panicked after the shooting and drove around with
Jones in the car for awhile before dropping him off at the hospital.
Within days of Jones’s death, his family held a car wash to raise money for his
burial. PPHG members attended the car wash, including Morrison and Barnett.
According to Davis, Morrison blamed the Rolling 60’s for Jones’s death and urged
revenge, stating, “[W]e was [sic ] going over there [to] take care of business, and N---ers
going to get killed . . . .” Greenwood similarly exhorted the group, “[O]ur homie just got
1
In July 2011, our colleagues in the Fourth District, Division Three affirmed
Morrison’s convictions. (People v. Barnett (July 28, 2011, G041416) [nonpub.opn.].)
The following facts are drawn from the unpublished opinion in that matter with some
modifications.

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killed. You guys are just going to let this ride?” Someone mentioned a so-called four-
day rule among PPHG members, requiring retaliation within four days.
Davis called Monk after the car wash to meet at Greenwood’s home for further
planning. According to Monk, Morrison and Barnett were at the meeting, along with
Patrick Lair and several other PPHG members. Lair testified Morrison concluded, “[W]e
can’t let it ride. We can’t let them get away with killing Little J-Blue,” a reference to
Jones. Monk armed Morrison with a semiautomatic weapon and the .357-caliber
revolver Jones used in the fatal shootout. Morrison or his brother departed the meeting
briefly and returned with a duffle bag containing an assault rifle and a hunting rifle.
When the assault rifle was given to Harold Phillips, Monk questioned Phillips’s ability to
handle the weapon, but Morrison threatened, “He better know how to use it” or Morrison
would “shoot him in his head if not.” Davis testified Greenwood armed him and Lair
with .45-caliber semiautomatic weapons before informing the PPHG cohort it was time to
“[g]o take care of your business.” The men piled into four different cars; according to
Monk, everyone was armed and prepared to retaliate for Jones’s death.
One of the victims, Jaynita McWilliams, testified she and two of her sisters,
including Mynisha, noticed several cars filled with “a lot” of men drive slowly past them
as they walked home to Lynwood Apartments. McWilliams relayed the incident to her
mother, who warned the girls to stay in the apartment.

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In the meantime, Morrison arrived at the Lynwood Apartments in the lead car. A
resident of the apartment complex observed a group of eight men, dressed in black with
rags covering their faces, exit the vehicles. One of the men pulled weapons from a
vehicle’s backseat and distributed them. The group then proceeded into the apartment
complex. Another resident looked down from her apartment and saw the men, all armed,
walking through the complex. Barnett, who had separated from the group to serve as a
lookout, returned on the run, stating an armed man was approaching. A shot rang out
from Barnett’s group. Davis had fired his weapon at the approaching man, who turned
out to be Davis’s cousin, Lucky Kelly. Kelly was unharmed, but the group panicked and
returned to their vehicles. Some departed, but the remainder, including Morrison and
Barnett, acted swiftly when a PPHG member, Marquis Taylor, ran up to the group
claiming apartment 22 belonged to the Rolling 60’s.
Morrison, Barnett, and several others made their way to apartment 22, lined up in
formation outside the apartment, and fired a barrage of up to 30 shots into the apartment.
Investigators later recovered .45-caliber and nine-millimeter casings and a live .22-caliber
round at the apartment. 11-year-old Mynisha Crenshaw suffered four gunshot wounds,
including a fatal shot that passed through her chest, right lung, heart, aorta, and
pulmonary artery. She bled to death. Her sister Jaynita suffered a gunshot wound that
shattered the bones in her right arm, requiring a prosthesis and continuing therapy.

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The PPHG members returned to Greenwood’s home as he had instructed them.
Lair, who saw Morrison and Barnett standing in formation outside apartment 22 and saw
Morrison fire into the apartment, had been left behind by the group. Lair took a cab
home. Morrison “disciplined” Barnett and another PPHG member by inflicting a beating
on them for leaving Lair behind.
In a police interview, Barnett admitted his lookout role at the scene and
corroborated the attack on apartment 22, including shots from an assault rifle, and he
confirmed the earlier shot fired at Kelly. He also admitted his presence at the car wash
and knowledge of PPHG discussions at Greenwood’s house about avenging Jones’s
death.
Lair and Davis received threats against their lives and against close relatives if
they testified. Lair received a “kite” or note in prison that warned him, “[Y]ou[’re] dead
if you get on the stand and we know that you gave a statement [and] that you’re supposed
to get on the stand against us . . . if we can’t get you, we are going to kill someone close
to you . . . we’re going to kill one of your family members. We’re going to kill your
mom, somebody.” The kite instructed Lair to “play crazy when you get on the stand.
That way you might get lucky and be able to keep your deal . . . .”
One of the sisters walking home with Jaynita before the shooting identified
Morrison as an occupant in the lead car of the caravan that passed her and her sisters.
The prosecution’s gang expert, Detective Travis Walker of the San Bernardino Police
Department, identified Morrison as an “original gangster” who joined PPHG around 1986

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or 1987, near the time of its founding, and climbed to the top tier of PPHG’s hierarchy.
The expert further explained that Morrison’s presence at Jones’s slaying entailed a
special duty to participate in the retaliatory strike. The police began searching for
Morrison within 11 hours of the slaying, but he had fled to Georgia, where he was
arrested three weeks later.
B. Procedural Background
A jury convicted Morrison of, among other things, one count of first degree
murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and two counts of attempted murder (Pen.
Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; counts 2 & 3). In 2011, our colleagues in the Fourth
District, Division Three upheld Morrison’s convictions. (See People v. Barnett, supra,
G041416.)
In 2015, Morrison filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial court. The
thrust of the petition was that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on first degree
murder and attempted murder under Chiu, which was issued after his convictions, and
applied retroactively. (In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216, 1222.) In January 2017, the
trial court denied the petition.
Morrison filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court. We summarily
denied the petition in March 2017.

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Morrison sought review in the California Supreme Court. In April 2019, the
California Supreme Court transferred the matter back to this court with directions to
vacate our March 2017 order denying Morrison’s petition for writ of habeas corpus, and
to order the People to show cause “why petitioner is not entitled to the relief request.”
III.
DISCUSSION
A. Habeas Corpus Principles and Standard of Review
When, as here, a habeas petition claims the trial court incorrectly instructed the
jury, our review is de novo. (People v. Poser (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218.) “We
determine whether the trial court fully and fairly instructed the jury on the applicable law.
[Citation.] When making this determination, we consider the instructions taken as a
whole; we also presume jurors are intelligent people capable of understanding and
correlating all of the instructions they were given. [Citations.]” (In re Loza (2018) 27
Cal.App.5th 797, 800 (Loza).)
“[H]abeas corpus is an extraordinary, limited remedy against a presumptively fair
and valid final judgment.” (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1260, superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Satele v. Superior Court (2019) 7 Cal.5th 852,
857.) “[T]he writ of habeas corpus permits a person deprived of his or her freedom, such
as a prisoner, to bring before a court evidence from outside the trial or appellate record,
and often represents a prisoner’s last chance to obtain judicial review.” (In re Reno
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 428, 450.) “Because a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeks to

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collaterally attack a presumptively final criminal judgment, the petitioner bears a heavy
burden initially to plead sufficient grounds for relief, and then later to prove them.”
(People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474.)
B. The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury on First Degree Murder
The People offered four theories of Morrison’s liability for first degree murder:
(1) direct liability as a perpetrator under CALCRIM No. 520; (2) direct aiding and
abetting of first degree murder under CALCRIM No. 401; (3) conspiracy to commit
murder under CALCRIM No. 563; and (4) murder based on the natural and probable
consequences of brandishing a firearm under CALCRIM No. 403. Morrison contends the
jury was improperly instructed that he could be found guilty of first degree murder under
the natural and probable consequence doctrine, which is impermissible under Chiu,
supra, 59 Cal.4th 155. We disagree.
In Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th 155, the California Supreme Court held that a defendant
may not be found guilty of first degree murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. The court reasoned that first degree murder requires a “uniquely
subjective and personal” mental state that shows “willfulness, premeditation, and
deliberation.” (Id. at p. 166.) In contrast, under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, an aider and abettor can be liable for murder, “even if unintended, if it is a
natural and probable consequence of” another crime. (Id. at p. 161.) The court held that
“the connection between the [aider and abettor’s] culpability and the perpetrator’s
premeditative state is too attenuated to impose aider and abettor liability for first degree

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murder” under the natural and probable consequences theory. (Id. at p. 166.)
Accordingly, the court held that an aider and abettor can be guilty of second degree
murder—but not first degree murder—under the natural and probable consequences
theory. (Ibid.) An aider and abettor therefore may be liable for premediated first degree
murder only if “based on direct aiding and abetting principles.” (Id. at p. 159.) The court
explained that “[a]n aider and abettor who knowingly and intentionally assists a
confederate to kill someone could be found to have acted willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation, having formed his own culpable intent. Such an aider and abettor, then,
acts with the mens rea required for first degree murder.” (Id. at pp. 166-167.)
In Chiu, the jury was improperly instructed “that to find defendant guilty of first
degree murder, the People had to prove that the perpetrator acted willfully, deliberately,
and with premeditation, and that all other murders were of the second degree.” (Chiu,
supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 160-161, italics added.) In other words, the instruction allowed
the jury to find the defendant—an aider and abettor—guilty of first degree murder based
on the perpetrator’s (his codefendant’s) premeditation and deliberation. And no other
instruction required that the jury find that the defendant acted with the culpable intent
required for first degree murder, i.e., that he acted willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation.

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People v. Stevenson (2018) 25 Cal.App.5th 974 (Stevenson), review granted
November 14, 2018, S251071,2 shows that Chiu error does not necessarily occur even if
the jury is instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine on a first degree
murder charge. In Stevenson, the defendants, a trio of gang members, fired multiple shots
into a car in an attempt to kill a rival gang member, Joshua Alford. The defendants six
victims, killing three of them, including Alford. (Id. at pp. 979-980.) The defendants
were charged with first degree murder, and the jury was instructed on three theories of
liability: “[D]irect liability as a perpetrator under CALCRIM No. 520, direct aiding and
abetting of murder under CALCRIM No. 401, and murder based on the natural and
probable consequences of conspiracy to murder Alford under CALCRIM No. 417.” (Id.
at p. 981, fn. omitted). The jury was further instructed that the defendants could be liable
for first degree murder for killing the two victims other than Alford “if [the] killings were
the natural and probable consequences of aiding and abetting the murder of Alford.”
(Ibid.) The jury, however, also was instructed with CALCRIM No. 521, which provided
in part that “‘[a] defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People have proved that
he acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation . . . . The People have the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was first degree murder rather than
2
The Supreme Court appears to have granted review in Stevenson to address its
analysis of a “kill zone” theory at issue here. The court granted review of Stevenson
pending the outcome of People v. Canizales (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 820, rev. granted
Nov. 19, 2014, S221958, which the court issued in June 2019. (See People v. Canizales
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 591.) The court then dismissed and remanded Stevenson. (See People
v. Stevenson (Sept. 18, 2019) 2019 WL 4493488.) Stevenson therefore remains good law.

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a lesser crime. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not
guilty of first degree murder and the murder is second degree murder.’” (Id. at pp. 981-
982.)
The Stevenson Court held that “[t]he error identified in Chiu did not occur . . . .”
(Stevenson, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 984.) The court explained that the error in Chiu
“allowed the jury to find an aider and abettor guilty of first degree murder based on the
perpetrator’s premeditation and deliberation.” (Stevenson, supra, at p. 983.) That error
did not occur in Stevenson because the jury instructions provided: (1) “‘A defendant is
guilty of first degree murder if the People have proved that he acted willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation’” (ibid); (2) “‘acted willfully if he intended to kill.
[The] defendant acted deliberately if he carefully weighed the considerations for and
against his choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill. [The] defendant acted
with premeditation if he decided to kill before completing the act that caused death’” (id.
at pp. 983-984); and (3) “‘[i]f any juror is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
crime of murder has been committed by a defendant, but has a reasonable doubt whether
the murder was of the first or of the second degree, that juror must give defendant the
benefit of that doubt and find that the murder is of the second degree.’” (Id. at p 984.)
Thus, unlike in Chiu, “the jury [in Stevenson] was required to find that each defendant
committed the crimes with the required deliberation and premeditation before it could
find that defendant guilty of first degree murder.” (Stevenson, supra, at p. 984.)

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Loza, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th 797, illustrates when a Chiu error occurs. Cesar Loza
handed a gun to a fellow gang member, Oscar Andrade, who shot and killed someone.
(Loza, supra, at p. 799.) Loza and three others were charged with first degree murder and
tried together. (Id. at p. 802.) The trial court instructed the jury that the instructions
applied to all four defendants equally. (Id. at p. 802.) The trial court provided the jury
with, among others, the following instruction related to first degree murder: “‘If you find
that the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent on the part of
the defendant to kill, which was the result of deliberation and premeditation, so that it
must have been formed upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of
passion . . . it is murder of the first degree.’” (Id. at pp. 802-803.) The instruction went
on: “‘To constitute a deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and
consider the question of killing and the reasons for and against such a choice and, having
in mind the consequences, decides to and does kill.’” (Id. at p. 804.)
The Loza Court found these instructions violated Chiu. The court reasoned that
the instructions impermissibly allowed the jury to find Loza guilty of first degree murder
if it found that “the slayer” acted with deliberation and premeditation, which “essentially
mirrored the error that occurred in Chiu,” where the jury was instructed that the
defendant was guilty of first degree murder if “‘the perpetrator’” acted with deliberation
and premeditation. (Loza, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 804.)
The Loza Court then rejected the People’s argument that Stevenson applied.
(Loza, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 805.) The court explained that “[u]nlike Stevenson,

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the court’s instructions here allowed the jurors to find the defendant (Loza) guilty of first
degree murder if they found that one of the other three defendants—the ‘slayer’
Andrade—deliberated and premeditated.” (Loza, supra, at p. 805.) This, according to
the Loza Court, was “precisely the type of instructional error” that Chiu prohibits. (Loza,
supra, at p. 805.) Therefore, Loza shows that no Chiu error occurred in the instant case.
Stevenson is controlling here. “The critical holding in Chiu is that the
perpetrator’s mental state of premeditation and deliberation ‘is too attenuated to impose
aider and abettor liability for first degree murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.’” (People v. Mejia (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 42, 49, review granted
Jan. 2, 2020, S258796 quoting Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 166.) Although the jury here
was instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine and the instruction
allowed the jury to find Morrison guilty of murder and/or attempted murder, the
instruction did “not address the degree of that murder.” (Stevenson, supra, 25
Cal.App.5th at p. 983.) Other instructions, however, provided that Morrison was guilty
of first degree murder only if the jury found that he had the requisite intent of acting
willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. Specifically, Jury Instruction No. 521
provided in part: “If you decide that defendant Sinque Morrison has committed murder,
you must decide whether it is murder of the first or second degree.” “The defendant is
guilty of first degree murder if the People have proved that he acted willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation. The defendant acted willfully if he intended to kill.
The defendant acted deliberately if he carefully weighed the considerations for and

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against his choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to kill. The defendant acted
with premeditation if he decided to kill before committing the act that caused the death.”
“All other murders are of the second degree. [¶] The People have the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was first degree murder rather than a lesser
crime. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of
first degree murder.”
Jury Instruction No. 641 explained: “As to Sinque Morrison only, you will be
given verdict forms of guilty of first degree murder, guilty of second degree murder, and
not guilty.” “I can accept a verdict of guilty of a lesser crime only if all of you have
found a defendant not guilty of the greater crime.” “If all of you agree that the People
have proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty of first degree murder,
complete and sign that verdict form. Do not complete or sign any other verdict form.”
“If all of you agree that the People have not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant is guilty of first degree murder but also agree that a defendant is guilty of
second degree murder, complete and sign the form for guilty of second degree murder.
Do not complete or sign any other verdict forms. You may return a verdict of guilty of
second degree murder only if you have found a defendant not guilty of first degree
murder.”
These instructions make clear that, “unlike in Chiu, the jury [in the instant case]
was required to find that [Morrison] committed the crimes with the required deliberation
and premeditation before it could find [him] guilty of first degree murder.” (Stevenson,

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supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at p. 984.) The jury was not erroneously instructed like the Chiu
and Loza juries that it could find Morrison guilty of first degree murder based on the
“perpetrator’s” or the “slayer’s” intent. (Loza, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 805 [“Unlike
Stevenson, the court’s instructions here allowed the jurors to find the defendant (Loza)
guilty of first degree murder if they found that one of the other three defendants—the
‘slayer’ Andrade—deliberated and premeditated.]; Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 160-161
[“[T]o find defendant guilty of first degree murder, the People had to prove that the
perpetrator acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation.”].)
Instead, the jury instructions here clearly stated that Morrison alone was charged
with first degree murder, and that the jury could find Morrison guilty of first degree
murder only if it found that he acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. In
finding him guilty of first degree murder, the jury necessarily found that Morrison acted
with the required intent, deliberation, and premeditation before he committed the murder.
(See People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 641.)
Our review of the jury instructions confirms this conclusion. As in Stevenson, the
jury was instructed that it had to convict Morrison of second degree murder if it had any
doubt that he was guilty of first degree murder. (Stevenson, supra, 25 Cal.App.5th at
p. 984.) The jury therefore “was required to find that [Morrison] committed the crime[]
with the required deliberation and premeditation before it could find [him] guilty of first
degree murder.” (Ibid.)

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In short, “[t]he error identified in Chiu did not occur here.” (Stevenson, supra, 25
Cal.App.5th at p. 984.) We therefore deny Morrison’s petition for writ of habeas corpus
regarding his conviction for first degree murder.
C. The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury on Attempted Murder
Morrison contends the trial court impermissibly instructed the jury that it could
convict him of attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
He argues Chiu should be extended to the attempted murder context.
Morrison concedes People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868 (Favor) forecloses this
argument. As Morrison acknowledges, the California Supreme Court held in Favor that
an aider and abettor can be found guilty of attempted murder with premeditation and
deliberation under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Id. at p. 872.) In
Chiu, the court addressed Favor’s holding and explained why it did not apply in the first
degree murder context at issue in Chiu. (Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th at pp. 162-163.) In
doing so, the Chiu majority reaffirmed Favor despite the dissent of two justices, who
thought the majority wrongly “stretche[d] the natural and probable consequences doctrine
beyond principled application.” (Ibid.; People v. Favor, supra, at p. 884 [dis. opn. of Liu,
J.].) We therefore decline Morrison’s invitation to ignore Favor as “[b]ased on [f]lawed
[p]remises.”
We acknowledge a divided panel of our colleagues in the Fourth District, Division
Three recently extended Chiu to the premeditated attempted murder context as Morrison
urges us to do. (People v. Mejia, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th 42, review granted Jan. 2, 2020,

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S258796.) The majority agreed with the petitioner that there is “no principled reason for
any distinction between the results in Chiu and in Favor.” (Id. at p. 46.) However, as
Justice Bedsworth noted in dissent, that “may be right,” but it is up to “the Supreme
Court to tell us whether that is the case.” (Id. at p. 54 [dis. opn. of Bedsworth, J.].) We
agree with Justice Bedsworth that we are bound to follow Favor, which remains good
law, until the Supreme Court rules otherwise. (Ibid.; Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455; see also People v. Gallardo (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 51,
85 [“Simply put, there is no language in Chiu that overrules or otherwise questions the
continuing validity of . . . Favor.”].)
Morrison nonetheless suggests Favor is no longer good law in light of the United
State Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne v. United States (2013) 570 U.S. 99. We
disagree. Alleyne held that the jury—not the trial court—must find true beyond a
reasonable doubt any fact that increases the mandatory minimum penalty for a crime.
(Ibid.) Alleyne does not apply because Morrison’s sentence does not turn on any judicial
fact-finding. (See People v. Henriquez (2017) 4 Cal.5th 1, 48 [“The trial court in this
case found no facts that increased the mandatory minimum penalty for defendant’s crime,
so Alleyne does not affect the analysis.”].)
Favor remains controlling here. Accordingly, we deny Morrison’s petition for
writ of habeas corpus as to his conviction for attempted murder.

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IV.
DISPOSITION
The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
CODRINGTON
J.
We concur:
MILLER
Acting P. J.
SLOUGH
J.

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