Godshall v. Peterson

Filed 7/20/26; certified for publication 8/11/26 (order attached)
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
CECILIA GODSHALL et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
DREW A. PETERSON et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
D086572
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2022-
00029915-CU-MM-CTL)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Marcella O. McLaughlin, Judge. Reversed.
Denning Morres, Jennifer S. Hegemier for Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Schmid & Voiles, Denise H. Greer, Kyle A. Cruse, and Catherine M.
Schroeder for Defendants and Respondents.
In this medical malpractice action, Cecilia Godshall alleges Drew A.
Peterson, M.D. and California Orthopaedic Institute Medical Associates, Inc.
(Orthopaedic Institute) negligently performed carpal tunnel surgery on her in
2017. The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the
ground that Godshall’s complaint is barred by the statute of limitations set

-- 1 of 15 --

2
forth in Code of Civil Procedure, section 340.5.1 We conclude triable issues of
material fact remain as to the date of Godshall’s injury and, accordingly,
reverse the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Evidence in the summary judgment record establishes the following
facts. Godshall is an office support technician with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) whose job involved substantial typing duties. On
October 28, 2016, she visited Dr. Peterson for an initial consultation for
carpal tunnel syndrome. At her visit, Godshall reported that for five to six
weeks she had been experiencing numbness and tingling in her right hand
that increased with grasping, gripping and repetitive use. Godshall also
reported she had a history of carpal tunnel syndrome in 2012 that resolved on
its own. After an examination, Dr. Peterson diagnosed Godshall with
“[p]robable recurrent right carpal tunnel syndrome.” Dr. Peterson
administered a corticosteroid injection and directed Godshall to return if her
symptoms did not resolve in three to four weeks.
When her symptoms did not resolve, Godshall had another consultation
with Dr. Peterson and he referred her for an electrodiagnostic study. The
radiologist who performed the study reported Godshall had “moderate severe
carpal tunnel syndrome” in her right wrist and “mild to moderate carpal
tunnel syndrome” on the left side. After receiving the radiologist’s report,
Dr. Peterson recommended carpal tunnel release surgery. He performed the
operation on January 30, 2017. Dr. Peterson’s report of the operation
1 Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

-- 2 of 15 --

3
indicated he made an incision to the transverse carpal ligament, resulting in
a “complete release [of] the median nerve.”
At her follow up appointment two weeks after surgery, Godshall
reported no change in her symptoms, but Dr. Peterson reported “good
healing” and “good range of motion.” He referred Godshall to occupational
therapy and ordered her to return for a follow-up visit with him in six weeks.
Dr. Peterson also advised Godshall she could return to work, but she should
take frequent breaks from typing and should consider using a brace. Two
weeks later, Godshall returned to Dr. Peterson with complaints that her
incision was warm and tender. He reported after the visit that Godshall’s
surgical wound was well-healed, she had good sensation in all digits, and
good range of motion. Dr. Peterson reassured Godshall there were no signs of
infection and requested that she follow up in six weeks.
When Godshall returned for her follow-up visit on April 25, 2017, she
reported “an ‘ache’ up to her right mid-forearm,” “a ‘tightness’ in the joint,”
and concerns about “her right forearm muscle fatigue pain with repetitive
typing.” Godshall also told Dr. Peterson she did not have numbness or
tingling and was otherwise “doing well.” Dr. Peterson recommended six
physical therapy sessions for her right forearm and noted that she would
“return in late summer to consider scheduling of left carpal tunnel release in
the fall.”
On May 3, 2017, Godshall’s occupational therapist reported that
Godshall thought her “carpal tunnel was ‘creeping back up.’ ” Godshall also
reported “grip and pinch strength limitations” and that “grasping and
twisting tasks remain[ed] challenging.” The therapist advised her to
continue with occupational therapy. On June 21, 2017, the therapist
reported Godshall had completed 12 sessions and “demonstrate[d] no pain or

-- 3 of 15 --

4
paresthesia, and functional [range of motion] and strength. Her scar is flat
and well healed. She has minimal functional limitations and is working full
duty.” The therapist recommended a discharge from occupational therapy.
On June 23, 2017, Godshall contacted Dr. Peterson’s office and asked
him to provide a note restricting her typing activity at work for a large
project because she was unable to type for long periods of time. On June 26,
2017, Dr. Peterson provided a note restricting Godshall to typing for
30 minutes per one hour period. Around this time, Godshall recalled Dr.
Peterson telling her that the symptoms she continued experiencing after the
operation were normal and that the surgery was successful. She remembered
Dr. Peterson saying, “look, I can do 25 pushups but I cannot do a sit up to
save my life because I have a bad back, just like you have a bad hand.”
Almost four years later, on April 29, 2021, Godshall sought treatment
from another physician, Eric Hofmeister, M.D., because the symptoms in her
right hand had worsened, including numbness and her long finger locking in
the flexed position. The visit was authorized by the U.S. Department of
Labor through Godshall’s employment with the FBI. Dr. Hofmeister ordered
an ultrasound, which showed the distal transverse ligament, supposedly
released during the prior operation, was still intact.
On July 12, 2021, Godshall met with Dr. Hofmeister and he informed
her there was the “possibility that she had incomplete release of her
transverse carpal ligament from her previous surgery in 2017.” Godshall told
Dr. Hofmeister that after the operation, she did not have complete resolution
of her symptoms and that her symptoms had worsened in the past few
months. Dr. Hofmeister recommended a “revision right carpal tunnel
release” and this second operation was performed on August 17, 2021.

-- 4 of 15 --

5
On April 28, 2022, Godshall and her husband Bradlee Godshall served
a notice of intent to sue under section 364 on Dr. Peterson. On July 28, 2022,
the Godshalls filed an initial complaint against Dr. Peterson and the
Orthopaedic Institute asserting claims for medical negligence, lack of
informed consent, and loss of consortium. On December 20, 2023, the parties
filed a stipulation for leave to file an amended complaint removing the lack of
informed consent cause of action and the amended complaint was deemed
filed the next day. The defendants filed their answer on December 28, 2023.
On July 1, 2024, Dr. Peterson and the Orthopaedic Institute filed a
motion for summary judgment asserting the Godshalls’ claims were barred by
the statute of limitations under section 340.5. The Godshalls opposed the
motion, arguing triable issues of material fact remained as to when the
statute of limitations was triggered. After oral argument, the trial court
issued its ruling finding the statute of limitations barred the Godshalls’
claims and granting summary judgment in favor of Dr. Peterson and the
Orthopaedic Institute. After the entry of judgment, the Godshalls appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
Summary Judgment
“The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with
a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine
whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their
dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)
“[G]enerally, from commencement to conclusion, the party moving for
summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable
issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
(Id. at p. 850.) Thus, a defendant moving for summary judgment “bears the

-- 5 of 15 --

6
burden of persuasion that ‘one or more elements of’ the ‘cause of action’ in
question ‘cannot be established,’ or that ‘there is a complete defense’ thereto.”
(Ibid., citing § 437c, subd. (o)(2).)
“ ‘Because this case comes before us after the trial court granted a
motion for summary judgment, we take the facts from the record that was
before the trial court when it ruled on that motion. [Citation.] “ ‘We review
the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the
moving and opposing papers except that to which objections were made and
sustained.’ ” [Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in support of the
party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the
evidence in favor of that party.’ ” (Conroy v. Regents of University of
California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1249–1250.)
II
Statute of Limitations
The statute of limitations for medical malpractice, set forth in
section 340.5, states, “In an action for injury or death against a health care
provider based upon such person’s alleged professional negligence, the time
for the commencement of action shall be three years after the date of injury
or one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence should have discovered, the injury, whichever occurs first.” “A
plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must satisfy the requirements of
both the one-year and the three-year limitations periods.” (Drexler v.
Petersen (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1181, 1189 (Drexler).)
The one-year limitations period does not begin to run until the plaintiff
discovers both his or her injury and its negligent cause. (See Gutierrez v.
Mofid (1985) 39 Cal.3d 892, 896 [“the term ‘injury,’ as used in section 340.5,
means both a person’s physical condition and its ‘negligent cause’ ”]; Sanchez

-- 6 of 15 --

7
v. South Hoover Hospital (1976) 18 Cal.3d 93, 99 [“the word ‘injury’ had come
to be used in the cases to denote both ‘a person’s physical condition and its
“negligent cause” ’ ”].) However, “[t]he plaintiff ‘need not be aware of either
the specific facts or the actual negligent cause of the injury. [Citation.] If the
plaintiff has notice or information of circumstances that would put a
reasonable person on inquiry notice, the limitation period is activated.’ ”
(Filosa v. Alagappan (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 772, 779 (Filosa).)
“The term ‘injury’ for purposes of section 340.5 ‘ “refer[s] to the
damaging effect of the alleged wrongful act and not to the act itself.”
[Citation.] The injury is not necessarily the ultimate harm suffered, but
instead occurs at “the point at which ‘appreciable harm’ [is] first
manifested.” ’ [Citation.] An injury manifests when damage is ‘evidenced in
some significant fashion; when the damage has clearly surfaced and is
noticeable.’ ” (Filosa, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 779.) Because the
“limitations period accrues at the time of injury, it is the surfacing of
appreciable harm that marks the beginning of the” period. (Ibid.)
“In sum, an action is barred under section 340.5 if it is brought either
more than three years after an injury or more than one year after the
plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the injury and its negligent cause.” (Filosa, supra, 59
Cal.App.5th at p. 781.)
Identifying “both the injury and its cause” creates a challenge “when a
doctor fails to diagnose or treat a preexisting condition: ‘Where a claim of
medical malpractice is based on the failure to diagnose or treat a pre-existing
condition, the injury is not the mere undetected existence of the medical
problem at the time the physician failed to diagnose or treat the patient or
the mere continuance of that same undiagnosed problem in substantially the

-- 7 of 15 --

8
same state. Rather, the injury is the development of the problem into a more
serious condition which poses greater danger to the patient or which requires
more extensive treatment.’ ” (Drexler, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 1193.)
“ ‘In this type of case, it is only when the patient becomes aware or
through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have become aware of the
development of a pre-existing problem into a more serious condition that his
cause of action can be said to have accrued for purposes of’ ” section 340.5.
(Drexler, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1193–1194; see also Mason v. Marriage
& Family Center (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 537, 542 (Mason) [“ ‘Until the patient
“suffers appreciable harm” as a consequence of the alleged act of malpractice,
he cannot establish a cause of action. “ ‘It follows that the statute of
limitations does not begin to run against a negligence action until some
damage has occurred.’ ” ’ ”].)
Critically here, “ ‘ “[t]he mere fact that [a medical] operation does not
produce hoped-for results does not signify negligence and will not cause
commencement of the statutory period.” ’ [Citation.] Rather, ‘[w]hen there
has been a belated discovery of the cause of action, the issue whether the
plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence is a question of fact for the court or
jury to decide. The drastic remedy of summary judgment may not be granted
unless reasonable minds can draw only one conclusion from the evidence.’ ”
(Kernan v. Regents of University of California (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 675, 684
(Kernan).)
III
Analysis
In its order granting summary judgment, the trial court found it was
undisputed that after the initial operation in 2017, Godshall “experienced
physical manifestations of harm in her right wrist in the following months”

-- 8 of 15 --

9
and this was “sufficient to trigger the three-year limitations period …, which
expired well before plaintiffs filed their complaint.” The court found Filosa,
supra, 59 Cal.App.5th 772 and Steingart v. White (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 406
(Steingart) were distinguishable because they involved latent or hidden
medical conditions, and Godshall was “not alleging that she was injured by
Dr. Peterson’s failure to diagnose a preexisting condition that later developed
into a more serious problem. Rather, [Godshall] allege[d] that her injuries
were caused by Dr. Peterson’s negligent attempt to repair the carpal tunnel.”
The trial court erred by looking solely to the time the injury was caused
(i.e., the initial surgery), and not when Godshall became “aware or through
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have become aware” that the
operation was the source of her continued carpal tunnel syndrome. (Drexler,
supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1193–1194.) Contrary to the trial court’s finding,
this case is like a failure to diagnose case because the cause of the injury—
the allegedly unsuccessful surgery—was latent until a later point. Because of
this latency, a question of fact remains concerning when Godshall became, or
reasonably should have become, aware that the operation was the cause of
her continued symptoms and when those symptoms were sufficiently
appreciable to constitute injury.
In her complaint, she asserts that Dr. Peterson negligently performed
the carpal tunnel surgery, and it was not until “or about July of 2021 during
a procedure that it was found that the median nerve was intact so, during the
prior surgery by Defendants, the ligament was snipped instead of cut so it
grew back and fused together.” In essence, Godshall alleges Dr. Peterson
negligently performed the surgery, negligently failed to diagnose the failed
surgery, and she only became aware of the appreciable harm and its cause
around the time of the revision surgery by Dr. Hofmeister. Put simply,

-- 9 of 15 --

10
questions of material fact remain as to when the symptoms were sufficiently
appreciable to constitute injury and when Godshall became aware that the
cause of the injury was the prior surgery.
As Godshall argues, Dr. Peterson’s statements to Godshall that the
pain she continued to experience after the initial surgery was normal and
that the surgery had been successful raise factual questions as to when she
became aware that the surgery was the cause of her continued pain. As she
states in her briefing before this court, Godshall alleges she was “injured by
Dr. Peterson’s failure to realize he had not completely severed the ligament
… that later developed into a more serious problem because the ligament
grew back and put more pressure on her menial [sic] nerve.” When such
harm became sufficiently appreciable to trigger the statute of limitations
remains in dispute and is a question of fact for the jury. (See Mason, supra,
228 Cal.App.3d at p. 543 [reversing summary judgment where “nothing in
the record … establishe[d] the date of [the plaintiff’s] injury as a matter of
law”].)
Kernan, supra, 83 Cal.App.5th 675 presents a helpful analogy. There,
the pregnant plaintiff underwent an external cephalic version (ECV)—a
procedure to rotate her fetus from a breech position to a headfirst position—
at defendant’s hospital in November 2016. (Id. at p. 678.) The plaintiff and
her medical care providers believed the procedure was successful, but that
evening the plaintiff did not detect any fetal movement and returned to the
hospital the next day and delivered a stillborn fetus. (Ibid.) The plaintiff did
not suspect negligence until the following July when the doctor who
performed the procedure refused to review the autopsy with her and another
doctor refused to answer questions about the fetal death. She filed a notice of

-- 10 of 15 --

11
intent to sue in November 2017 and filed suit the following February. (Id. at
p. 679.)
The trial court granted summary judgment, concluding that the date of
injury triggering the one-year statute of limitations was the day the plaintiff
learned of the fetal death, barring her complaint. (Kernan, supra, 83
Cal.App.5th at p. 679.) The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that a triable
issue of fact remained as to when the plaintiff should have suspected the
ECV was negligently performed: “The November 4, 2016 ECV initially
appeared uncomplicated and successful. On November 5, 2016, plaintiff’s
doctors did not know the cause of the [fetal death], and as of November 6,
2016, they remained unaware of any association between ECV procedures
and fetal demise. Given that medical professionals did not suspect
wrongdoing, and given that defendant’s autopsy report corroborates
plaintiff’s understanding that fetuses sometimes die in utero for unknown
reasons, we cannot say that reasonable minds could draw only one
conclusion—that plaintiff should have suspected defendant’s wrongdoing on
November 5, 2016.” (Id. at p. 684.)
Like in Kernan, a question of fact remains as to when Godshall
reasonably should have suspected her injury was a result of the operation
performed by Dr. Peterson in 2017. Dr. Peterson argues that there is no
dispute that Godshall and her husband were aware of the cause of her right-
hand wrist pain in 2017 when Godshall “experienced persistent post-
operative [wrist] pain and symptoms and when [her husband] experienced
the deterioration of his marital relationship and loss of her household
services.” As noted, however, Dr. Peterson told Godshall her symptoms after
the operation were normal and that she was healing fine. Further, the
evidence at summary judgment showed Godshall did not understand her

-- 11 of 15 --

12
continued pain was related to the initial operation until Dr. Hofmeister
performed the carpal tunnel revision surgery in 2021 and discovered
Dr. Peterson had failed to fully sever the ligament.2
2 Steingart, Filosa, and Drexler do not support affirmance of the court’s
decision. In each of these cases, the cause of the injury was the physician’s
failure to diagnose a hidden, preexisting condition but the evidence at
summary judgment did not conclusively establish the plaintiff was aware of
the injury and its cause before the expiration of the statute of limitations. In
Steingart, the plaintiff discovered a lump in her breast in 1982 and the
physician that examined her at that time diagnosed the condition as benign.
(Steingart, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d at p. 409.) Unsatisfied, the plaintiff visited
a second doctor, who ordered a mammogram and also diagnosed the lump as
benign. (Id. at p. 410.) Another mammogram in 1984 was also negative for
cancer, but in 1985 the plaintiff noticed worrying changes in the lump and a
fourth physician ordered a lumpectomy that showed she had stage II breast
cancer. (Ibid.) In 1986, the plaintiff sued the first three doctors, and the trial
court granted summary judgment, concluding the statute of limitations was
triggered when the plaintiff first noticed the lump in 1982. (Id. at p. 414.)
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding triable issues of material fact existed
“as to whether [the plaintiff] exercised reasonable diligence after the
purported misdiagnosis. Reasonable minds could easily conclude [the
plaintiff] did everything within her power to ascertain what, if any, illnesses
she had after receiving [the first doctor’s] initial diagnosis.” (Id. at p. 416.)
In Drexler, the plaintiff had various symptoms over several years that
were eventually revealed to be caused by a brain tumor. Drexler sued two
physicians that had treated him but had failed to diagnose the tumor. The
trial court granted summary judgment, concluding “the one-year statute of
limitations barred Drexler’s medical malpractice claim … because Drexler
had a suspicion of wrongdoing … when he ordered his medical records and
consulted an attorney.” (Drexler, supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 1188.) On
appeal, the court reversed, holding that disputed issues of material fact
remained regarding when Drexler was put on notice that his symptoms were
so severe that he needed further medical intervention. (Id. at p. 1184.)

-- 12 of 15 --

13
These facts establish the existence of a dispute both as to when the
actual injury arose and when Godshall understood that her continued pain
and the need for the second surgery was the result of the first surgery.
Therefore, triable issues of material fact remain as to when the statute of
limitations was triggered, and summary judgment was not properly
granted.3
Likewise, in Filosa, the plaintiff complained for years to multiple
physicians about severe headaches and other symptoms that were later
revealed to be caused by a brain tumor. On appeal from summary judgment
in which the trial court found the medical negligence claims were barred by
section 340.5, the appellate court held that the “undisputed facts d[id] not
establish that Filosa was on notice of his injury and should have discovered it
and its negligent cause [the failure to diagnose], through the exercise of
reasonable diligence, more than a year before he filed his complaint.” (Filosa,
supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 784.)
In each of these cases, like the present case, there was no evidence that
conclusively established for purposes of summary judgment that the plaintiff
was aware of the injury and its cause more than one year before filing suit.
3 The parties agree that the claims against the Orthopaedic Institute and
the loss of consortium claim are derivative of the medical negligence claim.
Accordingly, these claims must also be reinstated.

-- 13 of 15 --

14
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. Appellants are awarded the costs of appeal.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, J.
DO, J.

-- 14 of 15 --

Filed 8/11/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
CECILIA GODSHALL et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
DREW A. PETERSON et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
D086572
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2022-
00029915-CU-MM-CTL)
ORDER CERTIFYING OPINION
FOR PUBLICATION
THE COURT:
The opinion in this case filed July 20, 2026 was not certified for
publication. It appearing the opinion meets the standards for publication
specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c), the request pursuant to
rule 8.1120(a) for publication is GRANTED.
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the standards for
publication specified in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c); and
ORDERED that the words “Not to Be Published in the Official Reports”
appearing on page one of said opinion be deleted and the opinion herein be
published in the Official Reports.
MCCONNELL, P. J.
Copies to: All parties

-- 15 of 15 --