P. v. Lemeur

Filed 10/23/20 P. v. Lemeur CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
STEVEN EUGENE LEMEUR,
Defendant and Appellant.
D076846
(Super. Ct. No. SWF026931)
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
John D. Molloy, Judge. Affirmed.
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Meredith S.
White and Robin Urbanski, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

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I
OPINION
In 2018, the Legislature passed and the Governor signed into law
Senate Bill No. 1437, which amended Penal Code sections 188 and 1891 to
restrict the circumstances under which a person can be liable for felony
murder and abrogated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as
applied to murder. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015.) The measure also added section
1170.95, which established a procedure permitting qualified persons with
murder convictions to petition to vacate their convictions and obtain
resentencing if they were previously convicted of felony murder or murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Id., § 4.)
Defendant Steven Eugene Lemeur was convicted of one count of
premeditated attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664), among other
offenses, and his attempted murder conviction became final in 2013. Lemeur
filed a petition to vacate his attempted murder conviction and obtain
resentencing under section 1170.95. The trial court found that section
1170.95 does not apply to attempted murder convictions and summarily
dismissed Lemeur’s petition.
Lemeur appeals the order dismissing his resentencing petition. He
contends Senate Bill No. 1437 redefined accomplice liability for the offense of
attempted murder, in addition to murder. Further, he claims qualifying
defendants may petition to vacate their attempted murder convictions and
obtain resentencing under section 1170.95. Lemeur’s arguments present
questions of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. (Goodman v.
Lozano (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1327, 1332.)
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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The Courts of Appeal are divided on the question of whether Senate
Bill No. 1437 amended accomplice liability for the offense of attempted
murder, in addition to murder. (Compare People v. Alaybue (2020) 51
Cal.App.5th 207, 222–225 (Alaybue) [Senate Bill No. 1437 did not amend
accomplice liability for attempted murder]; People v. Dennis (2020) 47
Cal.App.5th 838, 844–847 (Dennis) [same], review granted July 29, 2020,
S262184; People v. Munoz (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 738, 753–760 (Munoz)
[same], review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258234; People v. Lopez (2019) 38
Cal.App.5th 1087, 1103–1107 (Lopez) [same], review granted Nov. 13, 2019,
S258175; with People v. Sanchez (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 637, 642–644 [Senate
Bill No. 1437 amended accomplice liability for attempted murder], review
granted June 10, 2020, S261768; People v. Medrano (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th
1001, 1012–1016 (Medrano) [same], review granted Mar. 11, 2020, S259948;
People v. Larios (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 956, 963–968 (Larios) [same], review
granted Feb. 26, 2020, S259983.)
We need not enter the fray because, irrespective of whether Senate Bill
No. 1437 amended accomplice liability for attempted murder, section
1170.95—the resentencing provision at issue here—does not apply to
attempted murder convictions. Indeed, every published decision to address
the issue has concluded, and we agree, section 1170.95 creates a resentencing
mechanism available only to defendants who were convicted of murder. As
explained by the Larios court, “[t]he plain language of section 1170.95,
subdivision (a) limits relief to persons ‘convicted of felony murder or murder
under a natural and probable consequences theory [to] file a petition with the
court ....’ No language in section 1170.95 references relief to persons
convicted of attempted murder.” (Larios, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 969; see
Alaybue, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 223; Dennis, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at

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pp. 845–846; Medrano, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1017–1018; Munoz,
supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at p. 754; Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1104–
1105.)
The legislative history of Senate Bill No. 1437 underscores that section
1170.95 applies only to murder convictions. Legislative reports “consistently
referred to [section 1170.95] relief being available to individuals charged in a
complaint, information or indictment ‘that allowed the prosecution to proceed
under a theory of first degree felony murder, second degree felony murder, or
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine’ and who were
‘sentenced to first degree or second degree murder.’ [Citation.] In addition,
when discussing the fiscal impact and assessing the likely number of inmates
who may petition for relief, the Senate Committee on Appropriations
considered the prison population serving a sentence for first and second
degree murder and calculated costs based on that number. [Citation.] The
analysis of potential costs did not include inmates convicted of attempted
murder.” (Lopez, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at p. 1105; see Alaybue, supra, 51
Cal.App.5th 223–224; Dennis, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at pp. 845–846;
Medrano, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1017–1018; Larios, supra, 42
Cal.App.5th at pp. 969–971; Munoz, supra, 39 Cal.App.5th at pp. 763–764.)
Lemeur directs us to no statutory language or decisional authority
supporting his claim that section 1170.95 applies to attempted murder
convictions. However, he claims “absurd” and “anomalous” consequences
would arise if defendants could petition to vacate murder convictions, but not
attempted murder convictions. Like other courts that have addressed this
argument, we are not persuaded our interpretation of section 1170.95
produces results so absurd that we may deviate from the statute’s plain
language.

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“Because the punishment for murder is so much more severe than the
punishment for attempted murder, the Legislature may have wished to limit
Senate Bill [No.] 1437’s [resentencing] reforms to those instances where it
perceived the disconnect between culpability and punishment to be most
glaring. It is not our place to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of the
Legislature’s decision to omit attempted murder” from the resentencing
mechanism created by section 1170.95. (Alaybue, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at
p. 225; see Larios, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 970 [“[T]here is a rational basis
for the Legislature’s decision to grant relief pursuant to section 1170.95 only
to murder convictions and exclude attempted murder convictions based on
judicial economy and the financial costs associated with reopening both final
murder and final attempted murder convictions.”]; Munoz, supra, 39
Cal.App.5th at p. 760 [“The remedy for any potentially inequitable operation
of section 1170.95 lies with the Legislature.”].)
II
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
McCONNELL, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
BENKE, J.
O'ROURKE, J.

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