Las Virgenes Unified School District (PERB I008E)

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION 	OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
LAS VIRGENES UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Charging Party, 	Petitioner,
v.
LAS VIRGENES EDUCATORS ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
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) 	Case No. 	LA-CO-86-78/79
PERB Order No. 	IR-8
Administrative Appeal
June 12, 	1979
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Appearances; 	Rosalyn F. 	Barrie, Attorney 	(Biddle, Walters &
Bukey) 	for 	Las Virgenes Unified School District; 	William
Gordon, 	Executive Director 	for 	Las Virgenes Educators
Association.
Before Gluck, Chairperson; Moore and Gonzales, Members.1
DECISION AND 	ORDER
On May 17, 	1979, 	the Las Virgenes Unified School District
(hereafter 	District) 	requested 	injunctive 	relief 	from a work
stoppage 	alleged 	as 	being 	conducted 	by 	the Las Virgenes
Educators Association 	(hereafter Association) 	among
certificated 	employees of 	the District. 	The District's 	request
was 	based 	on 	an 	unfair 	practice 	charge 	filed 	against 	the
Association 	alleging 	that 	the Association 	was 	conducting 	a work
stoppage 	prior 	to 	the 	exhaustion of 	impasse 	procedures mandated
by sections 	3548 	through 3548.4, 	inclusive, 	of 	the Educational
Employment Relations Act2 	(hereafter EERA). 	Pursuant
1Member 	Gonzales 	did 	not participate 	in 	the Board's
deliberation 	but 	submitted 	his 	vote 	on 	the 	basis 	of 	the 	General
Counsel's 	written 	report.
2The 	Educational Employment 	Relations 	Act 	is 	codified 	at
Government Code 	section 	3540 	et 	seq.

to 	rule 	381103 	of 	the 	Public 	Employment Relations 	Board, 	the
general 	counsel 	conducted 	an 	investigatory 	proceeding 	and
subsequently 	submitted 	a 	report 	to 	the 	Board 	itself.
Certain 	facts 	emerge 	from 	the 	general 	counsel's
investigation:
1. 	The 	District 	and 	the Association 	reached 	impasse
in 	the 	course 	of 	negotiations, 	proceeding 	to mediation 	and
eventually 	to 	factfinding.
3 California Administrative Code, 	title 8, 	section 38110,
provides:
(a) 	Upon 	receipt of 	a request, 	the
general 	counsel 	shall 	conduct 	an
investigative 	proceeding 	into 	the
circumstances 	of 	the 	alleged 	lockout 	or 	work
stoppage. 	To expedite 	the 	investigation,
the 	executive 	director 	shall 	make 	available
to 	the 	general 	counsel 	the 	services 	of 	the
regional 	director 	and 	the 	regional
director's 	staff.
(b) 	The 	regional director 	shall make 	a
reasonable 	effort 	to 	notify 	the 	parties 	that
an 	investigative 	proceeding 	will 	be
conducted, 	indicating 	the 	time 	and 	place
thereof. 	The 	proceeding 	will 	be 	scheduled
at 	such 	time 	as 	provides 	the 	parties 	with
reasonable 	opportunity 	to 	appear. 	Failure
of 	a 	respondent 	to 	appear 	shall 	not 	preclude
the 	board 	agent 	from 	conducting 	the
investigative 	proceeding.
(c) 	The 	board 	agent may call 	and
question 	such 	witnesses 	as 	the 	agent 	deems
necessary 	to 	effectuate 	the 	investigation.
(d) 	The 	board 	agent 	shall 	observe 	the
time 	limitations 	contained 	in 	section
38115. 	A 	report 	shall 	be 	submitted 	to 	the
general 	counsel 	at 	the 	conclusion 	of 	the
investigative 	proceeding.

2. 	On May 4, 	1979, 	the District circulated a
memorandum 	among 	certificated 	employees 	which 	reproduced 	a
District press 	release 	dated May 	3 	which 	revealed
significant portions 	of 	the 	factfinders' 	report, 	though 	in
paraphrased 	form. 	The May 	4 memorandum 	requested 	the
certificated 	employees 	to 	keep confidential 	the
factfinders 1 recommendations 	reported 	in 	the May 	3 	press
release. 	The 	reason given 	for 	the 	request 	for
confidentiality 	was 	that 	the 	factfinders 1 report would 	not
be 	released 	to 	the public 	for 	another 	week.
3. 	There 	is 	some 	evidence 	that 	the May 3 press
release 	and May 	4 	letter 	(which 	incorporated 	the May 	3
press 	release) 	were 	prompted 	by 	the Association's
circulation of purported 	details 	of 	the 	factfinders 1 report.
4. 	On May 14 	the 	factfinders 1 final 	report, 	signed 	by
the panel chairman, 	was 	served on the parties. 	On the 	same
date, 	members of 	the Association voted 	for 	a work 	stoppage
which 	actually 	commenced 	on May 	15.

Section 	3548.34 	of 	the EERA requires 	the employer 	to
release 	a 	factfinders' 	report 	to 	the 	public 	within 	10 	days of
its 	receipt by 	the parties. 	Board 	rule 	381005 	expresses 	a
4Government 	Code 	section 	3548.3 	states:
If 	the 	dispute 	is 	not 	settled within 30 days
after 	the appointment of the panel, 	or, 	upon
agreement 	by 	both 	parties 	within a 	longer
period, 	the panel 	shall make 	findings of
fact 	and 	recommend 	terms 	of 	settlement,
which 	recommendations 	shall 	be 	advisory
only. 	Any 	findings 	of 	fact 	and 	recommended
terms 	of 	settlement 	shall 	be 	submitted 	in
writing 	to 	the 	parties 	privately 	before 	they
are made public. 	The public 	school employer
shall make 	such 	findings 	and 	recommendations
public 	within 	10 	days 	after 	their 	receipt.
The 	costs 	for 	the 	services of 	the panel
chairman, 	including per diem fees, 	if any,
and 	actual 	and 	necessary 	travel 	and
subsistence 	expenses 	shall 	be 	borne 	by 	the
board. 	Any 	other 	mutually 	incurred 	costs
shall 	be 	borne 	equally by 	the public 	school
employer 	and 	the 	exclusive 	representative.
Any 	separately 	incurred 	costs 	for 	the 	panel
member 	selected 	by each party, 	shall be
borne 	by 	such party.
5California Administrative Code, 	title 8, 	section 38100,
provides:
In 	recognition of 	the 	fact 	that 	in 	some
instances 	work 	stoppages 	by public 	school
employees 	and 	lockouts 	by public 	school
employers can be 	inimical 	to 	the 	public
interest 	and 	inconsistent 	with 	those
provisions 	of 	the 	Educational 	Employment
Relations Act 	(EERA) 	requiring 	the parties
to participate 	in good 	faith 	in 	the 	impasse
procedure, 	it 	is 	the purpose of 	this rule to
provide 	a process 	by which 	the 	Board 	can
respond 	quickly 	to 	injunctive 	relief
requests 	involving 	work 	stoppages 	or
lockouts.
The 	EERA 	imposes 	a duty on employers 	and
exclusive 	representatives 	to participate 	in

policy 	that 	the Board 	considers 	the 	enactment of 	the 	impasse
provisions 	of 	the EERA as 	evidence 	of 	a 	legislative 	intent 	to
head 	off 	work 	stoppages 	prior 	to 	the 	exhaustion of 	those
procedures. 	As 	of May 15, 	the District had 	not 	released 	the
official, 	final 	report of 	the 	factfinder 	and 	was 	not 	required
to do 	so 	until 	10 	days 	from that 	date. 	The work 	stoppage
occurred 	prior 	to 	the 	exhaustion of 	the 	statutory procedures,
though more 	than 	10 	days 	after 	the May 	3 press 	release 	and May
4 	letter.
good 	faith 	in 	the 	impasse 	procedure 	and
treats 	that 	duty 	so 	seriously 	that 	it
specifically makes 	it 	unlawful 	for 	either 	an
employer 	or 	an exclusive 	representative 	to
refuse 	to do so. 	The Board 	considers 	those
provisions 	as 	strong 	evidence 	of 	legislative
intent 	to head off 	work 	stoppages 	and
lockouts 	until 	completion of 	the 	impasse
procedure and will, 	therefore, 	in each case
before 	it, 	determine whether 	injunctive
relief 	will 	further 	the purposes 	of 	the EERA
by 	fostering 	constructive 	employment
relations, 	by facilitating 	the collective
negotiations 	process 	and 	by protecting 	the
public 	interest 	in maintaining 	the
continuity 	and 	quality 	of 	educational
services.
Under 	the circumstances, 	it 	is possible 	to conclude 	that
the District's 	premature 	publications 	had 	some 	influence 	on 	the
Association's 	choice 	of 	a date on which 	to commence 	the work
stoppage. 	It 	is evident, 	however, 	that neither 	the District
nor 	the Association 	treated 	the 	inherent 	statutory 	requirement
of 	confidentiality 	pending 	official 	publication 	of 	the
factfinders 1 report 	with 	the 	deference 	that 	provision 	deserves,
thus 	impairing 	the 	value 	of 	the 	impasse 	procedures. 	Release 	by
a party of other 	than 	the 	full 	final 	factfinders' 	report
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circumvents 	the 	statutory 	purpose 	of 	encouraging 	the 	parties 	to
use 	that 	report 	as 	a 	basis 	for 	reconsideration of 	their 	last
negotiating positions 	in order 	to reach 	agreement. 	Such
premature 	release may 	also 	be 	inconsistent 	with 	the 	parties'
duty 	to participate 	in good 	faith 	in 	the 	impasse 	procedures.
Any 	release must be of 	the 	final 	report, 	unaltered 	and 	in 	its
entirety. 	While publication of other 	than 	the 	full 	final
factfinders' 	report may not 	terminate 	impasse, 	PERB will
consider 	such 	publication 	in evaluating 	a 	request 	for
injunctive 	relief.
The 	Board 	believes 	that 	the 	entire 	official 	factfinders 1
report 	should 	be 	released 	to 	the 	public 	immediately 	to 	correct
any possible 	public 	bias 	or 	misunderstanding 	resulting 	from 	the
partial 	release 	through 	the May 	3 	and May 	4 	documents.
Further, 	the 	parties 	should 	resume 	negotiations 	with 	the
assistance 	of 	an 	appointed mediator. 	Based 	on 	information
brought 	to 	light 	in the 	general counsel's 	investigation, 	there
is 	reasonable 	cause 	to believe 	that one 	issue, 	referred 	to as a
"management's 	right clause," 	which 	includes 	a provision
entitling 	the District 	to abrogate 	portions 	of 	the 	collective
agreement 	in 	the 	event of 	an emergency, 	has 	been and 	continues
to 	be objected 	to 	by 	the Association 	as outside 	the 	scope 	of
negotiations. 	The District's 	urging of 	this provision 	is 	the
basis of 	an 	unfair 	practice 	charge 	filed 	against 	the 	District
by 	the Association. 	To 	facilitate 	the possibility of 	the

parties 	reaching 	agreement, 	the Board 	believes 	that 	issue
should 	be 	withdrawn 	from 	negotiations 	pending 	resolution 	of 	the
question 	of 	negotiability 	pursuant 	to 	normal Board 	processes.
The 	Board 	therefore 	directs 	the 	general 	counsel 	to seek 	a
Temporary Restraining Order 	against 	the Association, 	its
members 	and 	employees 	in 	the 	unit engaging 	in or 	advocating 	a
work 	stoppage. 	Said TRO 	is 	to be 	for 	a period of 	10 days,
subject, 	however, 	to the conditions 	that 	the employees 	return
to work 	immediately; 	that 	the 	parties 	resume 	negotiations with
the 	assistance 	of a mediator; 	that 	the District 	immediately
publish 	the official, 	final factfinders' report; 	and 	that 	the
management's 	right proposal 	be withdrawn by 	the 	District
pending 	resolution of 	the 	issue 	of 	negotiability 	through 	other
Board 	processes.
Informational 	picketing 	by 	the Association 	and 	employees
should 	be 	permitted 	provided 	that 	not more 	than 	five 	pickets 	be
allowed 	at 	each 	building 	site 	and 	that 	such 	picketing 	does 	not
interfere with 	ingress 	and egress 	by 	students, 	administrators
and 	other 	school personnel 	and 	by persons 	doing 	business 	with
the 	school 	district.
Should 	either 	or 	both of 	the parties 	refuse 	to meet 	the
obligations 	or 	conditions 	of 	the 	Temporary 	Restraining

Order, 	the Board will 	reevaluate 	the 	request 	for 	injunctive
relief.
By: 	Harry Gluck, 	Chairperson 	Barbara Moore, 	Member
Raymond J. 	Gonzales, 	Member, 	concurring 	and 	dissenting:
I 	concur 	in 	the majority's 	decision 	to 	direct 	the
general 	counsel 	to 	seek 	a 	temporary 	restraining 	order
prohibiting 	the Association, 	its members, 	and employees 	in 	the
certificated 	employees 	unit 	from 	engaging 	in 	a 	work 	stoppage.
I 	do not 	agree, 	however, 	with 	the direction 	that 	the TRO be
conditioned 	on 	certain 	acts 	to be performed 	by 	the parties.
The majority 	has 	transformed 	what 	should 	be 	a
relatively 	simple 	procedure 	enjoining 	a 	work 	stoppage 	that 	the
Board 	has 	reasonable 	cause 	to believe 	is 	unlawful 	into 	a
complicated 	attempt 	to 	resolve 	all 	problems 	between 	the
parties. 	In 	so doing, 	the majority has 	reached 	conclusions
unwarranted 	by 	the general 	counsel's 	investigation, 	and 	has
involved 	itself 	in 	the 	relationship between 	the parties 	to 	the
extent 	of 	conditioning 	the 	injunctive 	relief 	needed 	by 	the

District 	to 	keep 	schools 	open 	on 	the 	District's 	taking 	actions
it 	has 	no 	legal 	obligation 	to perform.1
The majority opinion 	states 	that 	"there 	is 	a
reasonable cause 	to believe 	that 	one 	issue, 	referred 	to 	as 	a
'management's 	right clause,' 	which 	includes 	a provision
entitling 	the 	District 	to 	abrogate 	portions 	of 	the 	collective
agreement 	in 	the 	event of 	an emergency, 	has been 	and 	continues
to 	be 	objected 	to by 	the Association 	as 	outside 	the 	scope 	of
negotiations."2 Nothing 	in 	the 	record 	before 	the 	Board 	at
the 	time 	it made 	its 	decision 	to 	seek 	injunctive 	relief
1In writing 	this 	decision, 	I 	have, 	of 	course, 	reviewed 	the
record 	before 	the Board. 	At 	the 	time 	the Board 	voted 	to 	seek
injunctive 	relief, 	however, 	I had 	reviewed only 	the general
counsel's 	recommendations. 	I based my decision 	to 	seek
injunctive 	relief 	only 	on 	those 	recommendations 	and 	on my
continued 	belief 	that 	strikes 	and 	lockouts 	before 	impasse
procedures 	are 	exhausted 	constitute 	unfair practices 	and 	should
be 	enjoined. 	I 	feel 	that 	the Board's 	involvement 	in 	the 	facts
surrounding 	the 	strike 	may 	jeopardize 	the 	Board's 	neutrality 	as
an appellate 	administrative body. 	This 	is 	not because members
of 	the Board 	have, 	in 	fact, 	reached 	conclusions 	on 	the merits
of 	all of 	the 	underlying 	unfair practice charges. 	Rather, 	(1)
the 	Board's 	appearance 	of 	neutrality may be 	damaged 	by 	a
procedure 	in which 	the 	same persons 	who must 	ultimately 	resolve
the 	unfair 	practice 	charges 	must 	make 	a preliminary 	decision
that 	there 	is 	reasonable 	cause 	to believe 	an unfair practice
was 	committed 	and 	that 	the 	charging 	party 	is 	likely 	to prevail
on the merits, 	and 	(2) 	the Board members may 	retain an
impression 	of 	the 	case 	based 	on 	evidence 	from 	the 	preliminary
investigation which 	is 	not 	developed 	in 	the official 	record
before 	the 	Board 	on appeal.
original 	TRO 	sought 	by 	and 	granted 	to PERB 	did 	not
specifically 	name 	the management's 	right 	clause. 	It 	stated:
The 	temporary 	restraining 	order 	shall 	be 	conditioned
on 	the 	following:
(a) 	Both 	real party in 	interest 	and
Defendant drop 	any 	proposals 	of 	bargaining
subjects 	that 	the 	other 	party 	has
continuously claimed 	is 	[sic] 	outside 	the

justifies 	this 	finding. 	The Association 	did 	not make 	this
claim 	at 	PERB's 	investigative proceeding, 	nor 	did 	it 	allege
that 	the management's 	right 	clause 	was 	out of 	scope 	in 	its
original 	unfair practice charge.3 In 	addition, 	the
factfinders' 	finding 	with 	respect 	to 	the management's 	rights
clause 	indicates 	that 	the 	dispute 	between 	the parties 	concerned
only the content of 	the clause. 	In 	fact, 	the clause proposed
by 	the 	District 	is 	identical 	to 	the 	one 	included 	in 	the
previous 	contract. 	Factfinders 	typically do 	not make
recommendations 	on 	issues 	over 	which 	there 	is 	a 	scope dispute;
scope 	of 	bargaining 	as 	defined 	by Government
Code 	section 	3543.2 pending 	a 	decision by
PERB 	relating 	to 	such 	issues.
This provision 	apparently 	confused 	the parties, 	resulting
in 	a memo 	from Chairperson 	Gluck 	to 	the general 	counsel
clarifying 	what 	"the 	Board" 	had 	intended. 	The memo was
released 	to 	the parties. 	Since 	I 	did 	not participate 	in 	the
decision 	to 	impose conditions 	on the TRO, 	I want 	to 	refute 	any
impression 	that 	I was 	a party to 	that memo. 	I 	so notified 	the
parties 	by mailgram on May 	31, 	1979.
3The 	only 	element 	of 	the 	charge 	involving 	the management's
rights 	clause 	was 	that 	the 	District 	failed 	to meet 	and
negotiate 	in good 	faith 	by:
Insisting 	to 	impasse 	and 	beyond 	upon 	the 	inclusion 	in
any 	written 	document 	incorporating 	agreements 	reached
of 	a provision 	for 	management's 	rights 	which 	includes
language 	which 	would 	be 	unacceptable 	to 	any 	union,
namely, 	language purporting 	to permit 	the 	employer,
upon 	its 	own 	determination 	and 	not 	subject 	to 	any
grievance 	procedure 	to 	suspend 	the 	agreement.
This 	demonstrates 	that 	the Association was 	not 	concerned
about 	the 	clause's 	negotiability, 	but 	rather 	about 	its
content. 	The 	original 	charge was 	amended 	to 	include 	the
argument 	that 	the management's 	rights 	clause 	was 	out 	of 	scope
after 	the 	Board 	had 	successfully 	sought 	a 	TRO which 	intimated
that 	the 	majority of 	PERB 	believed 	that 	the parties 	had 	a
continuing 	dispute 	as 	to 	the 	negotiability of 	certain 	items.
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such 	a 	recommendation 	would 	involve 	a question 	of 	law 	rather
than 	one 	of 	fact. 	That 	the 	factfinder 	made 	a 	recommendation
indicates 	to me 	that 	the Association 	had 	not 	continuously
claimed 	the management's 	rights 	clause was out 	of 	scope.
It 	seems 	to me 	that 	the majority of 	the Board 	is
trying 	to 	end 	an 	unlawful 	strike, 	not 	by 	simply 	enjoining 	it,
but 	by 	forcing 	the 	employer 	to make 	concessions 	that 	it 	has 	no
legal 	obligation 	to make. 	Unless 	the management's 	rights
clause 	is, 	in fact, 	out of scope, 	the District has every right
to maintain 	its position on 	that 	issue, 	and 	the 	employee
organization had, 	at 	the 	time 	it 	struck, 	no right 	to engage 	in
a work 	stoppage 	to 	force 	the District 	to change 	its position.
By 	requiring 	the 	employer 	to give 	up what 	is 	very possibly 	a
legitimate 	negotiating 	position 	in 	order 	to obtain 	a TRO
against 	the 	unlawful work 	stoppage, 	the majority 	is 	involving
itself 	to 	an 	unacceptable 	extent 	in 	the 	content 	of 	the
negotiations between the parties. 	It 	is 	especially
unacceptable when 	the majority, 	in order 	to obtain 	a District
concession, 	must create 	a scope 	issue 	as 	a means of 	forcing 	the
District 	to give 	up 	a 	negotiating 	position 	until 	that 	issue 	is
resolved 	by 	the 	Board.
The 	majority 	has 	also 	required 	the 	District 	to
immediately 	release 	the 	factfinders' 	report 	as 	a condition 	for
obtaining 	injunctive 	relief. 	Again, 	the majority 	is 	requiring
the District 	to do 	something 	it 	has 	no legal obligation 	to do.
Government 	Code 	section 	3548.3 	states 	that 	the public 	school
employer 	shall make 	the 	report public within 	10 	days 	after 	its
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receipt. 	Thus, 	the employer 	is given discretion as 	to when,
within 	a 10 	day period, 	the 	factfinders' 	report 	should 	be
released. 	Unless 	there 	is 	reasonable cause 	to believe 	that 	the
District's 	withholding 	the 	release 	of 	the 	factfinders 1 report
constitutes 	an unfair practice, 	I believe 	that 	the Board should
not 	interfere 	with 	the 	employer's 	behavior.
To me, 	the 	issue 	in all of 	the 	injunctive 	relief 	cases
under 	our 	new 	rules 	is 	simple. 	Unlawful 	strikes 	are 	not 	a
legitimate 	negotiating 	tool 	and 	should be 	enjoined. 	Public
school 	employees 	have 	no 	right 	to 	use 	an 	illegal 	tactic 	to
attempt 	to force 	concessions 	from a 	reluctant 	employer. 	The
fact 	that 	an 	employer 	may 	have 	engaged 	in 	unlawful 	behavior
does 	not legitimize a 	strike; 	two wrongs do not make a right.
The 	employee 	organization's 	legitimate 	remedy 	is 	to 	file 	an
unfair practice 	charge 	and, 	if 	necessary, 	request 	the Board 	to
seek 	injunctive 	relief. 	If 	an 	agent 	of 	PERB 	finds 	that 	there
is 	reasonable 	cause 	to believe 	that 	the employer 	has 	committed
an 	unfair 	practice, 	the 	PERB can 	seek 	a TRO enjoining 	the
allegedly 	unlawful behavior 	as 	well 	as 	the 	strike. 	But when
there 	is 	no 	reasonable cause 	to believe 	that 	the 	district's
behavior 	is 	unlawful, 	the Board should 	not use 	its 	exclusive
power 	to 	seek 	injunctive 	relief 	to 	force 	changes 	in 	that
behavior.
I believe 	that 	the majority of 	the Board, 	in 	its 	zeal
to 	resolve 	the 	admittedly 	complex 	situations 	leading 	to
strikes, 	has 	overreached 	itself. 	It 	has 	taken 	advantage of 	its
"exclusive 	initial 	jurisdiction" 	to 	seek 	injunctive 	relief 	to
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control behavior 	that 	is 	not 	unlawful. 	I believe 	that PERB's
jurisdiction 	is 	to enforce 	the EERA. 	While PERB has broad
powers 	under 	Government 	Code 	section 	3541.3(n),4 I 	do 	not
believe 	that 	these powers 	should 	be 	interpreted 	to 	enable 	the
Board 	to control 	or 	limit 	behavior 	that 	is permitted 	by 	the
EERA. 	If 	PERB 	has 	reasonable 	cause 	to believe 	that 	the 	conduct
of 	the parties 	violates 	the EERA, 	and 	if 	the 	situation merits
extraordinary 	relief, 	PERB should 	act 	to 	stop 	the 	unlawful
conduct. 	To do more, 	to condition 	injunctive 	relief on 	a
party's 	ceasing 	otherwise 	lawful 	behavior 	or 	to 	doing 	something
it 	has 	no legal obligation 	to do, 	is 	to become too 	involved,
too 	active 	in 	the 	relationship between 	the parties, 	and 	in 	fact
would 	appear 	to be 	in 	excess 	of 	the Board's 	jurisdiction.
The majority 	is 	using 	the 	decision 	in 	San Diego
Teachers Association et al. 	v. 	Superior Court 	(1979) 	24 Cal.
3d 1, 	which gives PERB 	some discretion over 	strike 	remedies, 	as
a mandate 	to 	solve 	all problems 	leading 	up 	to strikes. 	In 	this
case, 	the District 	refused 	to make 	a concession 	that 	the
Association 	wanted, 	so 	the majority forced 	the District 	to
withdraw 	its proposal 	for 	an 	indefinite period. 	Next 	time,
perhaps 	the 	majority will 	find 	that 	the 	situation 	will 	be
resolved 	if 	the employer 	will 	change 	its position a 	little 	bit,
4Government Code 	section 	3541.3(n) 	provides 	that PERB
shall 	have 	the power 	and 	duty:
To 	take 	such 	other 	action 	as 	the 	board 	deems
necessary 	to discharge 	its powers 	and 	duties
and 	otherwise 	to 	effectuate 	the purpose 	of
this 	chapter.
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and will 	therefore condition 	the TRO on such 	a 	change. 	I 	find
this 	case 	to be 	a 	dangerous precedent 	and 	therefore
disassociate 	myself 	from 	the majority's 	decision 	to 	impose
conditions 	on 	the 	TRO enjoining 	the 	work 	stoppage.
Raymond J. 	Gonzales, 	Member
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