State of California (Department of Youth Authority) (PERB 1374S)

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION 	OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
e
CALIFORNIA STATE 	EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, 	SEIU LOCAL 	1000,
AFL-CIO,
Charging 	Party,
v.
STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA 	(DEPARTMENT
YOUTH AUTHORITY),
Respondent.
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) 	Case No. 	SA-CE-1107-S
PERB Decision No. 	1374-S
February 28, 	2000
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Appearances: 	California State 	Employees Association by
Janis Mickel, 	Labor Relations Representative, 	for California
State Employees Association, 	SEIU Local 1000, 	AFL-CIO; 	State of
California 	(Department 	of 	Personnel Administration) 	by Wendi 	L.
Ross, 	Labor Relations Counsel, 	for State of California
(Department of Youth Authority).
Before Caffrey, 	Chairman; 	Dyer and Amador, 	Members.
DECISION
AMADOR, 	Member: 	This 	case comes before the Public
Employment Relations 	Board 	(PERB or Board) 	on appeal 	by the 	State
of 	California 	(Department 	of Youth Authority) 	(CYA or State) 	to
an administrative 	law judge's 	(ALJ) 	proposed decision. 	The
unfair practice 	charge 	alleged 	that 	the 	CYA violated 	section
3519(a), 	(b) 	and 	(c) 	of the Ralph C. Dills Act 	(Dills Act)1 when
1The Dills Act 	is 	codified at 	Government 	Code 	section 	3512
et 	seq. 	Unless 	otherwise 	indicated, 	all 	statutory references
are to the Government Code. 	Section 3519 	states, 	in pertinent
part:
It 	shall be unlawful 	for the 	state 	to do any
of 	the 	following:
(a) 	Impose or threaten to 	impose 	reprisals
on employees, 	to discriminate or threaten to
•
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it 	changed its past practice with regard to permitting union
stewards 	to 	take 	state-paid release 	time 	to 	represent 	an employee
at 	a 	facility other 	than 	the 	one 	in which 	the 	steward 	is
employed.
discriminate against 	employees, 	or otherwise
to interfere with, 	restrain, 	or coerce
employees because 	of 	their exercise 	of 	rights
guaranteed by 	this 	chapter. 	For purposes 	of
this subdivision, 	"employee" 	includes an
applicant 	for employment 	or 	reemployment.
(b) 	Deny to employee organizations rights
guaranteed 	to 	them by 	this 	chapter.
(c) 	Refuse or fail 	to meet and confer in
good 	faith 	with a 	recognized 	employee
organization.
After reviewing 	the 	entire 	record, 	including 	the unfair
practice charge, 	the ALJ's proposed decision, 	CYA's 	exceptions
and California State Employees Association, 	SEIU Local 	1000,
AFL-CIO's 	(CSEA) 	response, 	the Board hereby affirms 	the proposed
decision 	in accordance with 	the 	following discussion.
BACKGROUND
The parties 	stipulated to CSEA being a 	recognized 	employee
organization and 	CYA being 	the 	State 	employer within 	the meaning
of 	the Dills Act.
CSEA is 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	for State Bargaining
Units 1, 	3, 	4, 	15, 	17 and 20, 	all of which have members employed
at 	the Northern California Youth Correctional 	Center 	(NCYC).
This 	location has 	four school 	facilities, 	a central
administration, 	which includes 	culinary, 	nursing, 	accounting and
maintenance, 	and the Youth Authority Training Center 	(YATC). 	The
22

entire NCYC, 	including all units within it, 	have a common street
address, 	7650 S. 	Newcastle Road, 	Stockton, 	California. 	A central
security 	force monitors 	the 	one 	entrance gate and a 	five-to 	six-
mile perimeter fence, 	which encompasses all 	of NCYC, 	with the
exception of YATC. 	The 	four NCYC school 	facilities are:
N. 	A. 	Chaderjian Youth Correctional Center 	(N.A. 	Chaderjian),
Karl 	Holton Youth 	Correctional 	Drug 	and Alcohol 	Treatment
Facility, 	DeWitt 	Nelson Youth Correctional 	Facility 	(DeWitt
Nelson) 	and 0. 	H. 	Close Youth Correctional Facility 	(O.H. 	Close).
Each facility is 	designed to 	serve 	a different 	type 	of 	juvenile
ward. 	Each facility has 	its 	own superintendent, 	school principal
and budget, 	as 	well 	as 	its 	own security personnel 	and a 	security
perimeter fence around 	its 	own borders.
The 	furthest 	distance between any two 	of 	these 	facilities 	is
six-tenths 	of a mile. 	Witnesses 	estimate 	the amount 	of 	time
required 	to drive 	from one 	facility 	to another 	is 	between 	two and
five minutes.
In 1982, 	the 	State and CSEA reached agreement 	on language
concerning 	steward access 	and 	representation, 	specifically
memorandum of understanding 	(MOU) 	section 2.1.b. 	The 	language
has 	not 	changed substantively over the years. 	The most 	recent
MOU at 	the 	time 	in question stated:
b. 	A written list 	of Union stewards, 	broken
down by units 	within 	each 	individual
department 	and 	designated area 	of 	primary
responsibility, 	shall be 	furnished to each
department 	and a 	copy sent 	to 	the 	State
immediately 	after 	their 	designation 	and 	Union
shall 	notify the 	State promptly of 	any
changes 	of 	such stewards. 	Union stewards
W
	3

shall 	not 	be 	recognized by 	the 	State until
such 	lists 	or changes 	thereto are 	received.
A Union 	steward's 	'area 	of 	primary
responsibility' 	is meant 	to mean institution,
office or building. 	However, 	the parties
recognize 	that 	it may be 	necessary 	for 	the
Union 	to assign a 	steward an area 	of 	primary
responsibility 	for 	several 	small 	offices 	or
buildings within 	close proximity. 	[Emphasis
added.]
Since at 	least 	1982, 	CSEA has designated the entire NCYC as
its 	stewards' 	area of primary responsibility. 	From 1982 	until
April 	1995, 	CYA did not object 	to, 	or even negatively comment 	on,
designations.
In April 	1995, 	an employee of 	the O.H. 	Close 	facility needed
a 	representative 	for an 	investigatory 	interview.2 Since
Janis Mickel, 	the 	local 	CSEA staff 	labor relations
representative, 	could not attend the 	interview, 	the employee
requested 	that 	the 	CSEA chapter president, 	Harvey Martinez
(Martinez),3 provide the representation. 	However, 	Martinez
worked at 	a 	different 	facility and due 	to a 	class 	scheduling
conflict 	was 	not 	allowed 	release 	time 	to attend 	the 	interview.
2An 	investigatory 	interview 	is 	necessitated by a 	negative
allegation against 	an employee 	that 	could 	result 	in 	some 	kind of
adverse action or corrective action. 	The purpose 	of 	the
interview is 	to determine 	the 	truth or 	falsity of 	the 	charge.
Due to the potential 	seriousness of 	the 	issues, 	CSEA professional
staff 	usually 	represents 	employees 	at 	investigatory 	interviews.
Unlike 	the 	normal 	grievance 	hearing 	regarding 	alleged MOU
violations, 	there 	is 	often very little 	time provided to secure
representation 	for 	investigatory 	interviews.
3Martinez 	has been a 	steward and a 	teacher at 	Karl 	Holton
for 	18 years. 	He testified that he has 	represented employees 	in
investigatory interviews approximately six times 	in 18 	years, 	and
that 	he 	does 	not 	believe 	any other NCYC 	stewards 	have 	represented
employees 	in such interviews 	during 	that 	time.
44

Jay Aguas 	(Aguas), 	at 	that 	time CYA's assistant director of
labor relations, 	wrote Janis Gerhart, 	CSEA labor relations
representative, 	stating in part:
As 	I 	indicated, 	the employer was placed 	in
the awkward position of 	one 	institution
having 	to 	disrupt 	its 	school 	programming 	to
provide 	representation at 	another school.
Our preference 	is 	for representation needs 	to
be met 	by 	stewards 	in a 	specific work area,
i.e., 	institution. 	I understand we need to
address 	any modification 	of 	current 	steward
areas 	of 	responsibility with Mr. 	Kenney 	[sic]
of your organization.
On April 	17, 	1995, 	Aguas wrote to CSEA Civil 	Service
Division Director 	Perry Kenny 	(Kenny) 	requesting 	that 	CSEA change
its 	designations 	at 	NCYC 	to make 	each 	facility 	"separate
worksites 	for representational purposes." 	Kenny responded,
stating 	that 	CSEA 	"is 	not unreceptive" 	to 	this 	request but 	that
as 	negotiations 	on a 	successor agreement were about 	to 	commence,
it was not possible 	to focus 	on this problem. 	He added that 	CSEA
would address 	this 	issue 	once 	the 	new contract 	had been 	reached.
In August 	1995, 	at the Unit 20 bargaining table, 	the State
submitted a proposal 	that 	addressed this 	issue. 	While 	the
State's proposal was being discussed at 	the table, 	no
restrictions were placed on NCYC 	stewards. 	They continued to
represent 	individuals 	at 	all 	four 	facilities 	on State-paid
steward time off.4
4Such 	release 	time 	is 	governed by MOU section 	2.6
Upon request of 	an aggrieved employee, 	a
Union 	steward 	shall 	be 	allowed 	reasonable
time 	off during working hours, 	without 	loss
of 	compensation, 	for representational
55

The 	issue was 	not 	addressed again until 	an 	incident 	in
September 1997, 	which led to the 	filing of 	this 	charge.
On September 30, 	1997, 	Diana Rodriguez 	(Rodriguez), 	a CSEA
steward at O.H. 	Close, 	was 	asked to represent 	an employee at
DeWitt Nelson. 	The 	issue 	concerned 	teaching assistants 	covering
classes 	for teachers. 	Rodriguez 	is 	familiar with this 	issue, 	as
she 	is 	a 	teaching assistant 	and the matter has 	been 	raised at 	the
Unit 	20 	negotiating 	table where 	she 	is 	a CSEA team member.
Rodriguez 	has 	been a 	CYA employee 	for 	twenty years 	and a 	steward
for at 	least 	eight years. 	During that 	time she has 	represented
employees at 	each of 	the NCYC 	facilities, 	other than her own,
approximately five 	to ten times. 	It 	had been her practice, 	when
she wished to go to another 	facility to 	represent 	an employee, 	to
request 	release 	time. 	These 	requests 	had routinely been
approved. 	This 	time, 	after approval by her immediate 	supervisor,
her request was 	denied by school 	Principal 	Jay Holmes, 	who
stated:
Dee 	is not 	to go to other institutions as a
job steward as 	long as 	one 	of 	theirs 	(DWN)
[DeWitt Nelson] 	is available.
Rodriguez 	represented 	the 	employee by using her own 	time,
i.e., 	vacation or compensating time off. 	Since then, 	she has
purposes 	in accordance with 	Section 	2.1.a 	of
this Contract, 	provided the employee
represented 	is 	in the 	steward's 	department
and 	designated 	area 	of 	primary
responsibility. 	Release 	time 	for these
purposes 	is 	subject 	to prior notification and
approval 	by 	the 	steward's 	immediate
supervisor.
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used her own 	time 	approximately 	ten 	to 	fifteen 	times 	to 	represent
employees at 	other 	facilities.
Rodriguez 	has 	since been 	told 	that 	she 	can 	represent
employees at 	other 	facilities 	if 	that 	facility does 	not 	have a
steward 	in residence. 	However, 	the employee requesting such
representation must 	request 	her assistance 	by personally 	calling
her 	(Rodriguez's) 	immediate supervisor. 	Grievants are very
reluctant 	to do this, 	as 	they believe 	this 	is 	a breach of 	their
confidentiality.
On June 22, 	1998, 	Timothy Mahoney, 	CYA assistant director
for labor relations, 	sent a notice 	to Kay Hankins, 	the CSEA
official 	who 	compiles and disseminates 	its 	steward lists. 	He
requested her 	to 	change 	her NCYC 	steward designations 	to 	reflect
institutions. 	He explained the 	reason for his 	request was 	that,
according 	to CYA's 	interpretation of MOU section 2.2 	(Access),
stewards 	were 	required to be assigned to 	institutions, 	not
addresses.
Martinez 	stated that 	from 1982 	to 1997, 	he never had a
problem obtaining 	release 	time 	to 	travel 	to 	other NCYC
facilities. 	He gave a rough estimate 	of 	having 	represented
employees 	at 	such 	facilities between 	twelve and 	fourteen 	times
over the past 	18 years.
Since September 1997, 	Martinez has not 	requested state 	time
to represent 	employees at 	other 	facilities, 	as he knows his
request would be denied. 	He 	continues 	to provide 	representation,
however, 	by doing so on his own time.
7

Each school 	site at NCYC has 	a 	concrete 	sign embedded 	in the
lawn near its 	entrance. 	These 	signs proclaim the 	location as
being a 	"facility", 	i.e., 	the entrance sign at O.H. 	Close
proclaims 	the areas 	as being 	the O.H. 	Close Youth Correctional
Facility. 	This 	same 	"facility" 	designation is used in the 	state
telephone 	directory.
Aguas 	has 	been with CYA since 	February 	1986 	in various
capacities. 	He discussed the 	evolution of 	the naming of 	the
various 	CYA schools, 	and explained that 	the names 	of 	the
institutions 	in 	the 	Institutions 	and Camps 	Branch have 	evolved
over the years. 	In the early years 	they were 	called schools,
until approximately June of 	1997. 	At 	that 	time, 	according to
Aguas, 	the director, 	Francisco Alarcon, 	decided to rename all 	the
institutions 	as 	"facilities," 	to be 	consistent with the 	common
wording 	throughout 	the United States.
ISSUE
Did CYA's 	failure 	to grant 	Rodriguez 	release 	time 	to
represent an employee at DeWitt Nelson violate 	the provisions 	of
Dills Act section 3519(a), 	(b) 	or 	(c)?
DISCUSSION
A unilateral modification 	in 	terms 	and 	conditions 	of
employment within the scope of negotiations 	is a per se 	refusal
to negotiate. 	(NLRB v. 	Katz 	(1962) 	369 U.S. 	736 	[50 LRRM 2177].)
PERB has 	long recognized this principle. 	(Pajaro Valley Unified
School District 	(1978) 	PERB Decision No. 	51; 	Grant Joint Union
High School District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	196 	(Grant).
8

Under section 3519(c), 	the State 	is obligated to meet and
negotiate 	in good 	faith with a 	recognized 	representative 	about
matters 	within the 	scope 	of 	representation.5 This 	section
precludes 	an employer 	from making 	changes 	in the 	status 	quo
without 	giving notice 	of 	its action to 	the appropriate 	exclusive
representative. 	(Anaheim City School District 	(1983) 	PERB
Decision No. 	364; 	Pittsburg Unified School District 	(1982) 	PERB
Decision No. 	199.) 	In addition, 	such change must have a
generalized 	effect 	or 	continuing 	impact 	on 	terms 	and 	conditions
of 	employment. 	(Grant.)
The 	issues 	in this 	case 	concern payment of wages 	in
relationship to hours. 	Accordingly, 	the matter is within the
scope 	of 	representation. 	(Jefferson School District 	(1980) 	PERB
Decision No. 	133, pp. 	57-58.)
The 	record 	clearly 	shows 	that 	CSEA stewards 	have 	represented
employees 	at NCYC 	facilities 	other than their own since 	1982.
CYA acknowledges, 	but minimizes, 	this pattern of representation,
and 	it 	also asserts 	that 	this pattern of 	representation 	is 	not
justified by 	the MOU. 	It 	argues 	that MOU section 2.1.b 	is
ambiguous 	in that 	the word 	"institution" 	really means 	"facility"
when applied to 	the 	four 	facilities 	at NCYC. 	It 	also asserts
that 	one 	steward 	can be used 	for multiple 	locations 	only 	in 	the
case of 	closely proximate offices 	or buildings, 	not 	institutions.
5Dills Act section 3516 	states, 	in pertinent part:
The 	scope 	of 	representation 	shall 	be 	limited
to wages, 	hours, 	and other terms and
conditions of employment, 	. 	. 	.
99

Although the original 	negotiators' 	intent would be helpful,
the 	evidence 	shows 	that 	no 	one at 	that 	time gave much thought 	to
the matter. 	It 	is 	clear that 	in 1982 	the 	four facilities were
not 	called 	institutions. 	Nor did CYA consider 	them institutions
for 	the purposes 	of MOU section 2.l.b 	for 	the 	next 	fifteen years.
It 	is 	concluded 	there was 	insufficient 	evidence proffered to
show 	that 	the parties mutually 	considered 	such schools 	or
facilities 	to be 	institutions 	at 	any time prior to the 	events 	in
this 	case.
Based on the 	foregoing, 	it 	is 	determined that 	the 	four
educational 	facilities 	at 	NCYC are 	not 	separate 	institutions 	for
the purposes 	of MOU section 2.1.b.6
The 	foregoing 	supports a 	conclusion that, 	absent 	a valid
defense, 	CYA's action in denying stewards 	the right 	to represent
employees at any NCYC facility is a violation of 	section 3519 (c).
CYA contends 	that 	CSEA waived 	its 	right 	to 	object 	to 	its
actions by not 	filing 	its 	charge within six months 	of Aguas'
letter of April 	17, 	1995. 	However, 	that letter merely asked
Kenny 	to 	change 	CSEA's 	NCYC designations 	to 	conform with CYA's
interpretation of MOU section 2.1.b. 	Kenny's 	response was 	that
CSEA was 	too busy to discuss 	the matter at 	that 	time, 	but would
be willing 	to do 	so 	once a 	successor 	contract was 	reached.
6CYA also asserts 	that 	one 	steward cannot 	have 	an area 	of
primary 	responsibility 	that 	encompasses 	more 	than 	one
institution. 	The determination above 	is 	also 	controlling 	on 	this
issue. 	If 	these four facilities are not 	institutions, 	the MOU
does 	not 	restrict 	NCYC 	stewards 	from representing 	employees
anywhere at NCYC.
10

Aguas' 	letter did not put 	CSEA on notice 	that 	a 	change 	in
NCYC's 	representational policy was being 	implemented. 	It was
merely a 	request 	for a 	change 	in CSEA's manner 	of 	designating
stewards. 	Furthermore, 	the evidence clearly shows 	that after
Aguas' 	1995 	letter, 	CYA continued to permit 	intra NCYC
representation until 	September 1997, 	when Rodriguez' 	request was
denied. 	In no manner did CSEA's 	failure 	to 	file a 	charge 	in 	1995
constitute a waiver of 	its 	rights.
CSEA also asserts 	that 	the 	charge 	is 	untimely. 	As
determined above, 	however, 	Aguas' 	1995 	letter did not convey a
notice of a change 	in policy. 	Therefore, 	CSEA's 	failure to file
a 	charge 	within 	six months 	does 	not 	bar 	its 	subsequent 	filing 	in
April 	1998.
Citing Dills Act 	section 3514.5(c),7 CYA contends 	that 	this
matter concerns 	contract 	interpretation, 	and that 	PERB has 	no
jurisdiction over 	the matter. 	(Oakland Unified School 	District
(1985) 	PERB Decision No. 	540.)
PERB, 	in Grant. 	stated:
This 	is not 	to say that 	every breach of
contract also violates 	the Act. 	Such a
breach must amount 	to a change of policy, 	not
merely a default 	in a 	contractual 	obligation,
before 	it 	constitutes 	a violation of 	the duty
to bargain. 	This distinction is 	crucial. 	A
7Section 3514.5(b) 	states:
The board 	shall 	not 	have 	authority to 	enforce
agreements between the parties, 	and shall not
issue 	a 	complaint 	on any 	charge based on
alleged violation 	of 	such an agreement 	that
would not 	also 	constitute 	an unfair practice
under this 	chapter.
11

change of policy has, 	by definition, 	a
generalized effect 	or 	continuing 	impact 	upon
the 	terms 	and conditions 	of 	employment 	of
bargaining unit members.
There 	is 	no doubt 	that 	CYA's 	action 	in changing 	the pattern
of 	representation at NCYC amount 	to a 	change 	in policy and are
more 	than a mere default 	in a 	contractual 	obligation. 	CYA
changed a 	long-standing past 	practice 	in a manner 	that 	will 	have
both a generalized effect and a continuing 	impact. 	Hence, 	PERB
has 	jurisdiction over this matter.
CYA next 	argues 	that 	the Dills Act 	does not have a statutory
right 	of access, 	such as 	is 	found in two similar public employer-
employee 	relations acts, 	also administered by PERB. 	Although
this 	is 	true, 	PERB has 	found an identical 	right of access 	is
implicit 	in the purpose and intent 	of 	the Dills Act. 	(State of
California 	(Department of Corrections) 	(1980) 	PERB Decision
No. 	127-S.) 	We 	find that 	the absence of 	such a statutory right
does 	not prohibit 	the 	finding of a violation in this unilateral
change case.
CYA also asserts 	that 	an employee 	is 	not 	entitled 	to a
particular 	representative 	if 	another 	is 	reasonably available.
CYA insists 	that 	if 	a steward 	is 	available at 	the grievant's
facility, 	a 	steward 	from another 	facility 	is not permitted to
provide 	representation. 	Although the 	State has 	a 	right 	to
minimize paid release 	time, 	in order to determine 	if an employee
must 	accept 	a more accessible 	steward, 	all 	relevant 	circumstances
must be 	examined on a 	case by case basis.
12

Looking at 	the 	facts 	in the case at bar, 	several 	factors
lead us 	to 	conclude 	that Rodriguez' 	request 	for release 	time 	to
represent a particular grievant was 	reasonable. 	First, 	we note
that 	travel 	time 	among the various NCYC 	facilities 	is minimal.
There 	is 	no evidence that Rodriguez' 	request 	for release 	time
would have 	caused an 	inordinate use 	of 	release 	time. 	We also
note 	that 	the 	grievance 	concerned a 	teaching assistant 	work 	issue
and Rodriguez works 	in that 	classification. 	Furthermore,
Rodriguez 	is 	a member of Unit 	20's bargaining 	team and,
therefore, 	she 	is knowledgeable of 	the nuances 	of 	the issues 	in
this area.
It 	is 	determined that, 	based on the particular 	facts 	of 	this
case, 	in light of the longstanding past practice at NCYC, 	the
subject 	grievant 	had a 	right 	to 	request 	Rodriguez 	as 	her
representative, 	subject 	to the prior notification and
supervisorial 	approval 	required by 	the MOU.
As a final 	defense, 	CYA insists 	that 	its action did not
alter the 	status 	quo 	in that 	it was 	consistent with 	its past
practice. 	This defense relies, 	to some extent, 	on its
"facilities are 	really institutions" 	argument, 	which has been
discussed and 	rejected. 	CYA also 	states 	in 	its brief 	that
although 	some 	"stewards 	on a 	few occasions 	traveled 	from one
institution 	to 	another 	in 	order 	to perform representational
duties," 	no real pattern of 	such activity was 	ever proven.
13

This argument 	is without merit. 	The 	evidence was quite
clear 	that 	both Rodriguez 	and Martinez 	have 	represented 	employees
at 	facilities 	other than their own, 	on many occasions 	since 	1982.
CYA's 	action also denied CSEA's 	rights 	guaranteed to 	it by
the Dills Act, 	i.e., 	the right 	to represent 	its members 	in their
employment 	relations with the 	state 	employer. 	CYA's 	failure 	to
permit 	a 	CSEA steward to move 	freely within her 	"area 	of 	primary
responsibility" 	derivatively violated section 3519(b).
CYA's 	failure 	to permit 	intra-NCYC 	representation 	interfered
with employees' 	right to the provisions of their MOU, 	i.e., 	the
right 	to 	select 	a 	representative within 	their 	"area 	of 	primary
responsibility." 	This 	action 	constitutes 	a violation of 	Dills
Act section 3519(a).
After an examination of 	the 	foregoing 	findings 	of 	fact,
conclusions 	of 	law, 	and the entire record in this 	case, 	it 	is
found that 	CYA: 	(1) 	interfered with its 	employees 	due 	to their
exercise of 	rights under the Dills Act; 	(2) 	denied CSEA its 	right
to 	represent 	its members 	in their employment 	relations with 	the
employer; 	and 	(3) 	failed to negotiate 	in good faith over a matter
within the 	scope 	of 	representation. 	Such 	failure and denial
constitute a violation of Dills Act section 3519(a), 	(b) 	and 	(c),
respectively.
Dills Act 	section 3514.5(c) 	provides 	that:
The Board shall 	have 	the power to 	issue a
decision 	and 	order 	directing 	an 	offending
party 	to 	cease 	and desist 	from the unfair
practice 	and to 	take 	such affirmative 	action,
including but 	not 	limited 	to 	the
14

reinstatement 	of 	employees 	with or without
back pay, 	as will 	effectuate the policies 	of
this 	chapter.
In order to 	remedy the unfair practice 	of 	the State and to
prevent 	it 	from benefiting 	from its 	unlawful 	conduct 	and
effectuate the purpose of 	the Dills Act, 	it 	is appropriate to
order the State to: 	(1) 	approve 	intra-NCYC representation by CSEA
stewards, 	subject 	to the conditions 	set 	forth in the MOU; 	(2)
cease 	denying 	to 	CSEA its 	right 	to 	represent 	its members 	in their
employment 	relations with the state employer; 	(3) 	cease
interfering with its 	employees' 	rights under the Dills Act; 	and
(4) 	reimburse Rodriguez and Martinez 	for vacation hours and
compensating 	time 	off 	they expended 	in 	the 	representation 	of
employees at NCYC 	facilities 	other than their own, 	since
September 30, 	1997.
It 	is 	also appropriate 	that 	CYA be 	required 	to post 	a notice
incorporating the 	terms 	of 	the attached order at 	all 	of 	its
locations where notices are customarily placed for Units 	1, 	3, 	4,
15, 	17 and 20 	employees. 	This notice 	should be signed by an
authorized agent 	of 	CYA, 	indicating 	that 	it will 	comply with the
terms 	therein. 	The notice 	shall not be 	reduced in size, 	defaced,
altered or 	covered by any other material. 	Posting 	such a notice
will 	provide 	employees with notice 	that 	CYA has 	acted 	in an
unlawful 	manner and 	is 	being 	required 	to 	cease 	and desist 	from
this activity. 	It 	effectuates 	the purposes 	of 	the Dills Act 	that
employees 	be 	informed of 	the 	resolution 	of 	the 	controversy and
15

will 	announce 	CYA's 	readiness 	to 	comply with the 	ordered 	remedy.
(See 	Placerville Union School District 	(1978) 	PERB Decision
No. 	69.) 	In Pandol 	& Sons v. 	Agricultural Labor Relations Bd.
(1979) 	98 Cal.App.3d 580, 	587 	[159 Cal.Rptr. 	584], 	the California
District 	Court 	of Appeals 	approved a 	similar posting
requirement. 	(See also, 	National 	Labor Relations Board v.
Express Publishing Co. 	(1941) 	312 U.S. 	426 	[8 LRRM 415].)
ORDER
Based on the 	foregoing 	findings 	of 	fact, 	conclusions 	of 	law,
and the entire 	record in this 	case, 	it 	is 	found that 	the State of
California 	(Department 	of 	Youth Authority) 	(CYA or State)
violated the Ralph C. 	Dills Act 	(Dills Act), 	Government Code
section 3519(a), 	(b) 	and 	(c). 	Therefore, 	it is hereby ORDERED
that 	CYA, 	its administrators and representatives 	shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST 	FROM:
1. 	Prohibiting 	the 	California 	State 	Employees
Association, 	SEIU Local 1000, 	AFL-CIO 	(CSEA), 	stewards at the
Northern California Youth Correctional 	Center 	(NCYC) 	from
representing 	employees 	at 	facilities 	other 	than the 	one 	to which
they are 	assigned;
2. 	Interfering with NCYC stewards, 	due 	to their
exercise 	of 	rights 	guaranteed by the Dills Act.
3. 	Denying to 	CSEA its 	right 	to 	represent 	its members
with 	regard 	to 	their 	employment 	relations 	with 	the 	State.
B. 	TAKE 	THE 	FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE 	POLICIES 	OF THE DILLS ACT:
16

1. 	Permit 	CSEA stewards 	at NCYC 	to 	represent
employees at any of 	its 	subunits, 	subject 	only to prior
notification 	and 	approval 	by 	the 	steward's 	immediate 	supervisor.
2. 	Reimburse Diana Rodriguez 	and Harvey Martinez 	for
any vacation or 	compensating 	time 	off 	they expended 	in 	the
representation of 	employees at NCYC, 	including central
administration and 	the Youth Authority Training 	Center, 	other
than their own, 	since September 30, 	1997. 	Such expenditure shall
include 	the 	subject 	incident 	at DeWitt Nelson. 	Such
reimbursement 	shall 	be made by restoring 	the 	time 	expended by
Rodriguez and Martinez, 	respectively.
3. 	Within ten 	(10) 	workdays 	following the date 	this
decision is 	no longer subject 	to appeal, 	post at all 	locations
where notices are customarily posted for Units 1, 	3, 	4, 	15, 	17
and 20 	employees, 	copies of 	the notice attached hereto as an
Appendix.
4. 	Written notification of 	the actions 	taken to
comply with 	this 	Order shall 	be made 	to 	the 	Sacramento Regional
Director 	of 	the 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board 	in accordance
with the director's 	instructions. 	Continue to report, 	in
writing, 	to 	the 	regional 	director thereafter as directed. 	All
reports 	to 	the 	regional 	director 	shall 	be 	concurrently served on
CSEA.
17

It 	is 	further Ordered that all 	other aspects 	of 	the unfair
practice 	charge and complaint 	in Case No. 	SA-CE-1107-S are hereby
DISMISSED.
Chairman 	Caffrey and Member Dyer 	joined 	in 	this 	Decision.
18

APPENDIX
NOTICE 	TO 	EMPLOYEES
POSTED 	BY ORDER OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
An Agency of 	the 	State 	of 	California
After a hearing 	in Unfair Practice Case No. 	SA-CE-1107-S,
California State Employees Association. 	SEIU Local 	1000. 	AFL-CIO
v. 	State of California 	(Department of the Youth Authority). 	in
which all parties had the 	right 	to participate, 	it has been 	found
that 	the 	State 	of 	California 	(Department 	of 	the Youth Authority)
(State) 	violated the Ralph C. 	Dills Act 	(Dills Act), 	Government
Code section 3519(a), 	(b) and (c).
As a result 	of 	this 	conduct, 	we have been ordered to post
this Notice and we will:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
1. 	Prohibiting 	the 	California 	State 	Employees
Association, 	SEIU Local 	1000, 	AFL-CIO 	(CSEA), 	stewards at the
Northern California Youth Correctional 	Center 	(NCYC) 	from
representing 	employees 	at 	facilities 	other 	than 	the 	one 	to which
they are 	assigned.
2. 	Interfering with NCYC stewards, 	due 	to their
exercise 	of 	rights 	guaranteed by the Dills Act.
3. 	Denying to CSEA its 	right 	to 	represent 	its members
with 	regard 	to 	their employment 	relations 	with the 	State.
B. 	TAKE THE 	FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS 	DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE 	POLICIES 	OF THE DILLS ACT:
1. 	Permit 	CSEA stewards 	at NCYC to 	represent
employees at any of 	its 	subunits, 	subject 	only to prior
notification and approval 	by 	the 	steward's 	immediate 	supervisor.
2. 	Reimburse Diana Rodriguez 	and Harvey Martinez 	for
any vacation 	or 	compensating 	time 	off 	they 	expended 	in 	the
representation of 	employees at NCYC, 	including central
administration and 	the Youth Authority Training 	Center, 	other
than their own, 	since September 30, 	1997. 	Such expenditure shall
--===--------- --

include 	the 	subject 	incident 	at DeWitt Nelson. 	Such
reimbursement 	shall 	be made by 	restoring 	the hours 	expended by
Rodriguez and Martinez, 	respectively.
Dated: 	STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA 	(DEPARTMENT OF
THE 	YOUTH AUTHORITY)
By: Authorized 	Agent
THIS 	IS 	AN OFFICIAL NOTICE. 	IT MUST REMAIN POSTED 	FOR AT LEAST
THIRTY 	(30) 	CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS 	FROM THE DATE OF 	POSTING AND
MUST NOT BE REDUCED IN SIZE, 	DEFACED, 	ALTERED, 	OR COVERED WITH
ANY 	OTHER MATERIAL.
22