Los Angeles County Office of Education (Burton) (PERB 1360E)

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
LILLIAN H. 	BURTON
Charging 	Party,
v.
LOS ANGELES 	COUNTY OFFICE OF
EDUCATION,
Respondent.
Case No. 	LA-CE-4046
PERB Decision No. 	1360
November 3, 	1999
Appearance; 	Lillian H. 	Burton, 	on her own behalf.
Before Caffrey, 	Chairman; 	Dyer and Amador, 	Members.
DECISION
DYER, 	Member: 	This 	case 	comes before the Public Employment
Relations Board 	(Board) 	on appeal by Lillian H. 	Burton 	(Burton)
from a Board agent's 	dismissal 	(attached) 	of her unfair practice
charge.
On March 20, 	1999,1 	Burton filed a 	charge alleging that 	the
Los Angeles 	County Office 	of 	Education violated 	the 	Educational
Employment Relations Act 	(EERA)2 when she was ordered to leave
campus on September 22, 	1998.
Following a March 26 	warning 	letter 	from the 	Board agent,
which 	indicated 	that 	the 	charge 	did not 	state a prima 	facie 	case,
Burton filed an amended 	charge 	on April 	6. 	In both the 	original
and amended charges, 	Burton failed to allege 	that 	any specific
section of 	EERA had been violated. 	A review of 	the 	charges 	by
1
All	All 	dates 	refer to 	1999 	unless 	otherwise noted.
2EERA is 	codified at 	Government 	Code 	section 3540 	et 	seq.
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the 	Board agent 	demonstrated 	that 	they 	should be 	analyzed as 	an
alleged violation of EERA section 3543.5(a).3
The 	Board has 	reviewed the 	entire 	record 	in this 	case,
including the unfair practice 	charge, 	the warning and dismissal
letters and Burton's appeal. 	The Board finds 	the warning and
dismissal 	letters 	to be 	free 	from prejudicial 	error and adopts
them as 	the decision of 	the Board 	itself.
ORDER
The unfair practice 	charge 	in Case No. 	LA-CE-4046 	is hereby
DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE 	TO AMEND.
Chairman 	Caffrey and Member Amador 	joined 	in 	this 	Decision.
3Section 3543.5(a) 	provides:
It 	shall 	be unlawful 	for a public 	school
employer to do any of 	the 	following:
(a) 	Impose 	or threaten to 	impose reprisals 	on
employees, 	to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against 	employees, 	or otherwise
to 	interfere with, 	restrain or coerce
employees because of 	their exercise of 	rights
guaranteed by this 	chapter. 	For purposes 	of
this subdivision, 	"employee" 	includes any
applicant 	for employment 	or 	reemployment.
22

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	, 	GRAY DAVIS, Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
San Francisco Regional Office
177 Post Street, 9th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94108-4737
(415) 439-6940
June 17, 	1999
Lillian H. 	Burton
Re: 	DISMISSAL OF CHARGE/REFUSAL TO ISSUE COMPLAINT
Lillian H. 	Burton v. 	Los Angeles County Office of Education
Unfair Practice Charge No. 	LA-CE-4046
Dear Ms. Burton:
The above-referenced unfair practice charge, 	filed March 20,
1999, 	alleges the Los Angeles County Office of Education 	(LACOE)
violated your due process rights by ordering you to leave campus
on September 22, 	1998.1 Charging Party does not allege any
specific section of the Educational Employment Relations Act
(EERA or Act) 	has been violated. 	A review of the charge
demonstrates, 	however, 	the charge should be analyzed as a
violation of Government Code section 3543.5 (a).
I 	indicated to you, 	in my attached letter dated March 26, 	1999,
that the above-referenced charge did not 	state a prima facie
case. 	You were advised that, 	if there were any factual
inaccuracies or additional 	facts which would correct 	the
deficiencies explained in that letter, 	you should amend the
charge. 	You were further advised that, 	unless you amended the
charge to state a prima facie case or withdrew it prior to April
5, 	1999, 	the charge would be dismissed.
On April 	6, 	1999, 	Charging Party filed a first amended charge.
The first amended charge contains a six 	(6) 	page hand-written
narrative, 	and included a binder of attachments totaling nearly
100 pages. 	A summary of those documents and Charging Party's
allegations follow.
Charging Party provides numerous documents regarding a 1996
incident 	involving student Ruben Martinez. 	Apparently Charging
1 Specifically, 	Charging Party alleges in Section 6(b) 	of
the unfair practice charge form: 	"Suspension-Censorship-
Expulsion-Coercion to engage 	in child endangerment 	activities and
other illegal activities. 	Harassment, 	invalid grievance
procedure-Criminal Activity, Discrimination, etc."

Dismissal 	Letter
LA-CE-4046
Page 2
Party provided 	such information to demonstrate 	the District's
treatment of her. 	Such information also included police reports
filed against Charging Party. 	Additionally, 	Charging Party
provided several 	documents regarding her 1997 grievances against
the District 	over her disciplinary suspension. 	Included in this
information are letters between Charging Party, 	the Los Angeles
County Employees Association 	(LACEA) 	and the District which date
back to 1997. 	It appears Charging Party was not satisfied with
the representation she received in 1997 and was not 	satisfied
with the District's reasons 	for her suspension.
Charging Party also 	includes 	a 	section entitled 	"Child
Endangerment" 	in which she includes more information regarding
what 	she believes are unsafe conditions at the District dating
back to 1997.
In March 1998, 	Charging Party requested a Medical Leave of
Absence due 	to a reoccurring back injury allegedly caused by her
employment. 	Charging Party's request was granted, 	and Charging
Party did not 	return to her position during the 	1997-1998 	school
year.
On June 15, 	1998, 	LACOE sent Charging Party a letter asking
whether Charging Party planned to return in September 1998, 	for
the 1998-1999 school year. 	On June 22, 	1998, 	Charging Party
informed the LACOE of her intent to return to teaching. 	On July
29, 	1998, 	the LACOE instructed Charging Party to report to La
Merced Intermediate for the 1998-1999 school year.
On September 22, 	1998, 	Charging Party was met in her classroom by
Buena Vista Principal Ms. 	Hopko and LACOE's Worker's Compensation
coordinator, 	Janice Whittle. 	Ms. 	Hopko informed Charging Party
that because Charging Party had not provided a doctor's 	release
for her to return to work, 	she would have to leave campus
immediately.2 As there was only 30 minutes 	left 	in the school
day, 	Charging Party asked to stay until 	the end of the day.
Charging Party also requested written confirmation from Ms. 	Hopko
2 Article VII 	of the parties collective bargaining
agreement, entitled Leaves of Absence and Vacation, 	states the
following with regard to Medical Verifications:
. 	. 	. Upon a unit member's return from any
extended disability leave, 	the Office will
routinely require the unit member to furnish
written medical 	evidence 	from a physician
releasing the unit member to return to
service without duty restrictions.
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Dismissal 	Letter
LA-CE-4046
Page 3
that 	she was being told to leave the campus prior to the end of
the school day.
Ms. 	Hopko refused to allow Charging Party to stay until 	the end
of 	the school 	day and refused to provide written documentation.
As 	Charging Party walked towards 	the 	classroom telephone 	to
contact her union representatives, 	Ms. 	Hopko stated she had
already spoken with LACEA President, 	John Kohn. 	Charging Party
then telephoned LACEA site representative Doug Jockinson, 	seeking
his advice. 	Mr. 	Jockinson was not aware of the situation and
stated it was 	"bizarre." 	Mr. 	Jockinson then attempted to contact
another LACEA representative. 	During this time, 	Ms. 	Hopko and
Ms. 	Whittle stationed themselves outside Charging Party's
classroom door.
After several minutes had passed, 	Ms. 	Hopko telephoned campus
security who 	refused to remove Charging Party from the 	school
grounds. 	Eventually, 	the school day ended and Charging Party
gathered her things to leave the classroom. 	Before she could
leave, 	however, 	Charging Party and Ms. 	Hopko engaged in a verbal
confrontation. 	Charging Party ended the conversation stating she
would return the 	following day to receive written confirmation of
her removal 	from the 	classroom.
After leaving school grounds, 	Charging Party met with Association
representative Andrea Wakefield. 	Ms. 	Wakefield telephoned Mr.
Kohn and confirmed that Mr. 	Kohn had been informed of Charging
Party's 	situation prior to her removal 	from the classroom.
Charging Party voiced her anger over Mr. 	Kohn's 	failure to inform
her of the impending events. 	Ms. 	Wakefield then telephoned the
District's Labor Relations Officer, 	Rene Gagnon and secured his
word that 	Charging Party would receive written confirmation of
the days events the next day. 	Charging Party also alleges Mr.
Gagnon 	"warned Andrea Wakefield that Ms. 	Hopko might create a
difficult 	situation."
Charging Party and Ms. 	Wakefield returned to school grounds on
the following day. 	Upon returning to the school grounds,
Charging Party and Ms. 	Wakefield noticed a Montebello Police
Department officer was circling the school parking lot. 	Charging
Party states the police officer was called by Ms. 	Hopko, 	who
feared Charging Party "might make a-scene." 	Ms. 	Hopko was not
present at the time, 	thus Charging Party waited outside. 	When
Ms. Hopko finally arrived, 	30 minutes late, 	Charging Party
secured her letter and left the campus.
Charging Party alleges the District's conduct denied her due
process and demonstrates discrimination. 	Charging Party also
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Dismissal 	Letter
LA-CE-4046
Page 4
contends 	she 	was 	denied her 	right 	to 	union 	representation under
the Agreement.3
Based on 	the 	facts 	presented 	in 	the 	original 	and 	first 	amended
charges, 	the 	charge 	fails 	to 	state a prima 	facie 	case of
discrimination 	and 	denial 	on union representation, 	for 	the
reasons 	provided 	below.
I. 	Discrimination
Government 	Code 	section 3541.5(a)(1) 	prohibits 	the 	Board 	from
issuing 	a 	complaint 	in 	respect 	of 	any charge based upon an
alleged unfair practice 	occurring more 	than 	six months 	prior 	to
the 	filing of 	the 	charge. 	As 	such, 	Charging Party allegations
with 	regard 	to 	her 	1996 	and 	1997 	grievances 	and 	suspension are
time 	barred 	and outside 	of 	PERB's 	jurisdiction.
With regard to the September 22, 	1998, 	incident, 	the charge 	fails
to 	demonstrate 	a prima 	facie 	case 	of 	discrimination. 	To
demonstrate a violation of EERA section 3543.5(a), 	the charging
party must 	show that: 	(1) 	the 	employee 	exercised rights 	under
EERA; 	(2) 	the 	employer had knowledge of 	the 	exercise 	of 	those
rights; 	and 	(3) 	the 	employer imposed or threatened to 	impose
reprisals, 	discriminated or threatened to discriminate,
or 	otherwise 	interfered with, 	restrained or 	coerced 	the 	employees
because 	of 	the 	exercise 	of 	those 	rights. 	(Novato Unified School
District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	210; 	Carlsbad Unified School
District 	(1979) 	PERB Decision No. 	89; 	Department of Developmental
Services 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	228-S; 	California State
University 	(Sacramento) 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	211-H.)
Although 	Charging 	Party engaged 	in protected activity 	in 	1996 	and
1997, 	facts presented fail 	to demonstrate 	she was 	removed 	from
the classroom on September 22, 	1998, 	because of these protected
activity. 	As noted in my March 26, 	1999, 	warning letter,
Charging 	Party must 	demonstrate 	facts 	establishing 	one 	or more 	of
the 	following factors: 	(1) 	the employer's disparate treatment of
the employee; 	(2) 	the employer's departure 	from established
procedures 	and standards when dealing with the 	employee; 	(3) 	the
3 Article 	IV of 	the Agreement 	provides 	the 	following 	with
regard 	to 	Representation Rights:
A unit 	member 	shall 	be 	entitled 	to
representation by 	the Association 	in matters
which 	may 	effect 	his/her 	continued 	employment
with the Office; 	at 	times when disciplinary
action 	is 	contemplated; 	or when reviewing 	the
unit 	member's personnel 	file.
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Dismissal 	Letter
LA-CE-4046
Page 	5
employer's 	inconsistent 	or contradictory 	justifications 	for 	its
actions; 	(4) 	the employer's 	cursory investigation of 	the
employee's misconduct; 	(5) 	the employer's 	failure to offer the
employee 	justification at 	the 	time 	it 	took action or 	the 	offering
of exaggerated, 	vague, 	or ambiguous reasons; 	or 	(6) 	any other
facts 	which might 	demonstrate 	the 	employer's 	unlawful 	motive.
(Novato Unified School 	District, 	supra; 	North Sacramento School
District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	264.)
Charging 	Party 	fails 	to 	demonstrate 	that 	other employees 	have
been 	allowed 	to 	return 	to 	work without 	medical 	verification 	or
that 	the 	LACOE 	departed 	from its 	procedures 	in attempting 	to
remove 	Charging 	Party 	from the 	classroom. 	As 	Charging 	Party
fails to demonstrate these, 	or any other, 	nexus factors, 	the
allegation must 	be 	dismissed.
II. 	Weingarten Rights
Charging 	Party contends 	that when Ms. 	Hopko and Ms. 	Whittle
entered her 	classroom, 	Charging 	Party requested union
representation. 	Charging Party contends 	this 	request 	was 	denied,
although 	Charging 	Party 	engaged 	in 	a 	lengthy telephone
conversation with a 	union representative 	during 	the 	stand-off 	and
met 	with a union representative 	at 	the 	end of 	the 	school 	day.
A Weingarten4 violation occurs 	when an employee 	requests 	union
representation during 	a meeting with management 	and 	the 	request
is denied. 	The charging party must demonstrate: 	(a) 	the employee
requested representation, 	(b) 	for an investigatory meeting, 	(c)
which 	the 	employee 	reasonably believed might 	result 	in
disciplinary action, 	and 	(d) 	the employer denied the 	request.
(See 	Redwoods 	Community College 	District 	v. 	Public 	Employment
Relations Board 	(1984) 	159 	Cal.App.3d 617.; 	Fremont Union High
School District 	(1983) 	PERB Decision No. 	301.)
In Rio Hondo 	Community College District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No.
260, 	the 	Board cited with approval 	Baton Rouge Water Works
Company 	(1979) 	246 NLRB 	995, 	which provided:
the 	right 	to representation applies 	to 	a
disciplinary interview, 	whether 	labeled as
investigatory or not, 	so long as 	the
interview 	in question 	is 	not 	merely for 	the
purpose 	of 	informing 	the 	employee 	that 	he 	or
she 	is 	being disciplined.
4In National 	Labor Relations Board v. 	Weingarten 	(1975) 	420
U.S. 	251, 	the Court granted employees 	the 	right 	to representation
during 	disciplinary 	interviews.
( 	(

Dismissal 	Letter
LA-CE-4046
Page 6
In the instant charge, 	Charging Party did not participate in an
investigatory or disciplinary meeting. 	Despite Charging Party's
attempts to classify her removal as disciplinary, 	Ms. 	Hopko and
Ms. 	Whittle simply attempted to inform Charging Party of their
decision to remove her from the classroom. 	They did not 	intend
to engage 	in any meeting or investigation with Charging Party.
As no meeting or interview took place, 	Charging Party was not
denied her Weingarten rights.
III. 	Contractual Representation Rights
Charging Party also alleges the LACOE denied her a contractual
right to representation. 	However, 	an individual employee lacks
standing to present 	an allegation of unilateral 	change. 	(Oxnard
School District 	(1988) 	PERB Decision No. 	667.) 	As such, 	Charging
Party does not have standing to allege the LACOE unilaterally
changed the Representation Rights article of the Agreement
between Respondent 	and LACEA.
Right to Appeal
Pursuant to Public Employment Relations Board regulations, 	you
may obtain a review of this dismissal of the charge by filing
an appeal to the Board itself within twenty (2 0) calendar days
after service of this dismissal. 	(Cal. 	Code Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32635(a).) 	Any document 	filed with the Board must 	contain
the case name and number, 	and the original and five 	(5) 	copies of
all 	documents must be provided to the Board.
A document 	is 	considered 	"filed" 	when actually received before
the close of business 	(5 p.m.) 	on the last day set for filing or
when mailed by certified or Express United States mail, 	as shown
on the postal 	receipt or postmark, 	or delivered to a common
carrier promising overnight delivery, 	as 	shown on the carrier's
receipt, 	not later than the last day set for filing. 	(Cal.- Code
Regs., tit. 8, sec. 32135 (a); see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8,
sec. 32130.)
A document 	is 	also considered 	"filed" 	when received by facsimile
transmission before the close of business on the last day for
filing together with a Facsimile Transmission Cover Sheet 	which
meets the requirements of Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, sec. 32135(d),
provided the filing party also places the original, 	together with
the required number of copies and proof of service, 	in the U.S.
mail. 	(Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 	8, secs. 32135(b), 	(c) 	and (d) ;
see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 	8, 	secs. 32090 and 32130.)
The Board's address is:
f

Dismissal 	Letter
LA-CE-4046
Page 7
Public Employment Relations Board
Attention: Appeals Assistant
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, 	CA 	95814-4174
FAX: 	(916) 327-7960
If you file a timely appeal of the refusal 	to issue a complaint,
any other party may file with the Board an original 	and five
copies of a statement 	in opposition within twenty 	(20) 	calendar
days following the date of service of the appeal. 	(Cal. 	Code
Regs., tit. 8, sec. 32635(b) .)
Service
All 	documents authorized to be 	filed herein must also be 	"served"
upon all parties to the proceeding, 	and a 	"proof of service"
must 	accompany each copy of a document 	served upon a party or
filed with the Board itself. 	(See Cal. 	Code Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32140 	for the required contents and a sample form.) 	The
document will be considered properly 	"served" 	when personally
delivered or deposited in the 	first-class mail, 	postage paid and
properly addressed. 	A document 	filed by facsimile 	transmission
may be concurrently served via 	facsimile 	transmission on all
parties to the proceeding. 	(Cal. Code Regs., 	tit. 	8, 	sec.
32135(c) .)
Extension of Time
A request 	for an extension of time, 	in which to file a document
with the Board itself, 	must be in writing and filed with the
Board at 	the previously noted address. 	A request 	for an
extension must be filed at least three 	(3) 	calendar days before
the expiration of the time required for filing the document.
The request must indicate good cause for and, 	if known, 	the
position of each other party regarding the extension, 	and shall
be accompanied by proof of 	service of the request upon each
party. 	(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, sec. 32132.)
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Dismissal 	Letter
LA-CE-4046
Page 8
Final Date
If no appeal 	is filed within the specified time limits, 	the
dismissal will become final when the time limits have expired.
Sincerely,
ROBERT THOMPSON
Deputy General 	Counsel
By Kristin L. 	Rosi
Regional Attorney
Attachment
cc: 	Steven J. Andelson

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	GRAY DAVIS, Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
San Francisco Regional Office
177 Post Street, 9th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94108-4737
(415) 439-6940
March 26, 	1999
Lillian H. 	Burton
Re: 	WARNING LETTER
Lillian H. 	Burton v. 	Los Angeles County Office of Education
Unfair Practice Charge No. 	LA-CE-4046
Dear Ms. Burton:
The above-referenced unfair practice charge, 	filed March 20,
1999, 	alleges the Los Angeles County Office of Education 	(LACOE)
violated your due process rights by ordering you to leave campus
on September 22, 	1998.1 Charging Party does not allege any
specific 	section of 	the Educational Employment Relations Act
(EERA or Act) 	has been violated. 	A review of the charge reveals
the charge is properly analyzed as a violation of Government Code
section 3543.5 (a) .
Investigation of the charge revealed the 	following. 	Charging
Party is a Special Education teacher with the LACOE at La Merced
Intermediate School 	(LMI). 	As a certificated employee, 	Charging
Party is 	represented by the Los Angeles County Education
Association 	(Association). 	Prior to September 1998, 	Charging
Party apparently filed a Worker's Compensation claim against 	the
LACOE as the facts described herein, 	reference a worker's
compensation claim.
On September 22, 	1998, 	Charging Party was met in her classroom by
Buena Vista Principal Ms. 	Hopko and LACOE's Worker's Compensation
coordinator, 	Janice Whittle. 	Ms. 	Hopko informed Charging Party
that because Charging Party had not provided a doctor's release
for her to return to work, 	she would have to leave campus
immediately. 	As there was only 30 minutes left in the school
day, 	Charging Party asked to stay until 	the end of the day.
Charging Party also requested written confirmation from Ms. 	Hopko
1 Specifically, 	Charging Party alleges 	in Section 6(b) 	of
the unfair practice charge form: 	"Suspension-Censorship-
Expulsion-Coercion to engage 	in child endangerment 	activities and
other illegal activities. 	Harassment, 	invalid grievance
procedure-Criminal Activity, Discrimination, 	etc."
r
•

Warning Letter
LA-CE-4046
Page 2
that 	she was being told to leave the campus prior to the end of
the school day.
Ms. 	Hopko refused to allow Charging Party to stay until 	the end
of 	the 	school 	day and refused to provide written documentation.
As 	Charging 	Party walked towards 	the 	classroom telephone 	to
contact her union representatives, 	Ms. 	Hopko stated she had
already spoken with LACEA President, 	John Kohn. 	Charging Party
then telephone LACEA site representative Doug Jockinson, 	seeking
his advice. 	Mr. 	Jockinson then attempted to contact another
LACEA representative. 	During this time, 	Ms. Hopko and Ms.
Whittle 	stationed themselves 	outside Charging Party's 	classroom
door.
After several minutes had passed, 	Ms. 	Hopko telephoned campus
security who refused to remove 	Charging Party from the 	school
grounds. 	Eventually, 	the school day ended and Charging Party
gathered her things to leave the classroom. 	Before she could
leave, 	however, 	Charging Party and Ms. 	Hopko engaged in a verbal
confrontation. 	Charging Party ended the 	conversation stating she
would return the 	following day to receive written confirmation of
her removal 	from the 	classroom.
After leaving school grounds, 	Charging Party met with Association
representative Andrea Wakefield. 	Ms. 	Wakefield telephoned Mr.
Kohn and confirmed that Mr. 	Kohn had been informed of Charging
Party's 	situation prior to her removal 	from the classroom.
Charging Party voiced her anger over Mr. 	Kohn's 	failure to inform
her of the impending events. 	Ms. 	Wakefield then telephoned the
District's Labor Relations Officer and secured his word that
Charging Party would receive written confirmation of 	the days
events the next day.
Charging Party and Ms. 	Wakefield returned to school grounds on
the following day. 	Ms. 	Hopko was not present at the time, 	thus
Charging Party waited outside. 	When Ms. 	Hopko finally arrived,
3 0 minutes late, 	Charging Party secured her letter and left the
campus.
Based on the above stated facts, 	the charge as presently written,
fails to state a prima facie case of discrimination, 	for the
reasons provided below.
To demonstrate a violation of EERA section 3543.5(a), 	the
charging party must 	show that: 	(1) 	the employee exercised rights
under EERA; 	(2) 	the employer had knowledge of the exercise of
those rights; 	and 	(3) 	the employer imposed or threatened to
impose reprisals, 	discriminated or threatened to discriminate,
or otherwise 	interfered with, 	restrained or coerced the employees
because of the exercise of those rights. 	(Novato Unified School
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Warning Letter
LA-CE-4046
Page 3
District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	210; 	Carlsbad Unified School
District 	(1979) 	PERB Decision No. 89. Department of Developmental
Services 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	228-S; 	California State
University 	(Sacramento) 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	211-H.)
Facts provided demonstrate Charging Party and Ms. 	Hopko exchanged
harsh words over Charging Party's refusal 	to leave 	the classroom
and Ms. 	Hopko's 	failure to provide Charging Party with written
confirmation. 	However, 	facts provided do not demonstrate Ms.
Hopko discriminated against 	Charging Party because of her
protected 	activity.
Charging Party's only protected activity came after Ms. 	Hopko
ordered her out of the classroom. 	It was at that time that
Charging Party contacted LACEA representatives. 	There 	is nothing
in the charge to demonstrate that any of Ms. 	Hopko's actions were
motivated by Charging Party's decision to contact 	the union.
Instead, 	it seems Ms. 	Hopko's actions were in response to
Charging Party's unilateral 	decision to remain in the classroom.
As such, 	the charge fails to demonstrate a prima facie case of
discrimination.
Additionally, 	Charging Party alleges Ms. 	Hopko violated Charging
Party's contractual rights. 	However, 	facts provided do not
demonstrate any contractual violations.
For these reasons the charge, 	as presently written, 	does not
state a prima facie case. 	If there are any factual 	inaccuracies
in this 	letter or additional 	facts which would correct 	the
deficiencies explained above, 	please amend the charge. 	The
amended charge 	should be prepared on a standard PERB unfair
practice charge 	form, 	clearly labeled First Amended Charge,
contain all the facts and allegations you wish to make, 	and
be signed under penalty of perjury by the charging party. 	The
amended charge must have the case number written on the top right
hand corner of the charge form. 	The amended charge must be
served on the 	respondent's 	representative 	and the original proof
of service must be filed with PERB. 	If I do not receive an
amended charge or withdrawal from you before April 5, 	1999, 	I
shall dismiss your charge. 	If you have any questions, 	please
call me at 	(415) 	439-6940.
Sincerely,
Kristin L. Rosi
Regional Attorney