Los Angeles County Education Association, CTA/NEA (Burton) (PERB 1358E)

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION 	OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
LILLIAN H. 	BURTON,
Charging 	Party,
v.
LOS ANGELES 	COUNTY EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION, 	CTA/NEA,
Respondent.
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) 	Case No. 	LA-CO-793
PERB Decision No. 	1358
October 	27, 	1999
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Appearance: 	Lillian H. 	Burton, 	on her own behalf.
Before Caffrey, 	Chairman; 	Dyer and Amador, 	Members.
DECISION
DYER, 	Member: 	This 	case comes before the Public Employment
Relations Board 	(Board) 	on appeal by Lillian H. 	Burton 	(Burton)
from a Board agent's 	dismissal 	(attached) 	of her unfair practice
charge.
On March 20, 	1999,l Burton filed a charge alleging that 	the
Los Angeles 	County Education Association, 	CTA/NEA violated her
rights 	by not 	representing her when 	she was 	ordered 	to 	leave
campus on September 22, 	1998.
Following a March 26 	warning 	letter 	from the 	Board agent,
which 	indicated 	that 	the 	charge 	did not 	state a prima 	facie 	case,
Burton 	filed an amended 	charge 	on April 	6. 	In both the 	original
and amended 	charges, 	Burton 	failed to allege 	that 	any specific
section of 	the Educational 	Employment Relations Act 	(EERA)2 had
lA11 dates 	refer to 	1999 	unless 	otherwise noted.
2EERA is 	codified at Government 	Code 	section 	3540 	et 	seq.

been violated. 	A review of 	the 	charges 	by 	the 	Board agent
demonstrated 	that 	they 	should be 	analyzed as 	an alleged violation
of EERA section 3543.6(b).3
The 	Board has 	reviewed 	the 	entire 	record 	in 	this 	case,
including the unfair practice 	charge, 	the warning and dismissal
letters 	and Burton's 	appeal. 	The Board 	finds 	the warning and
dismissal 	letters 	to be 	free 	from prejudicial 	error and adopts
them as 	the 	decision of 	the Board 	itself.
ORDER
The unfair practice charge 	in Case No. 	LA-CO-793 	is hereby
DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE 	TO AMEND.
Chairman 	Caffrey and Member Amador 	joined 	in 	this 	Decision.
3Section 3543.6 provides, 	in relevant part:
It 	shall 	be unlawful 	for an employee
organization to:
(b) 	Impose or threaten to 	impose reprisals
on employees, 	to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against 	employees, 	or otherwise
to 	interfere with, 	restrain or coerce
employees because 	of 	their exercise 	of 	rights
guaranteed by 	this 	chapter.
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STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	GRAY DAVIS, Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
San Francisco Regional Office
177 Post Street, 9th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94108-4737
(415) 439-6940
June 9, 	1999
Lillian H. 	Burton
Re: 	DISMISSAL OF CHARGE/REFUSAL TO ISSUE COMPLAINT
Lillian H. 	Burton v. 	Los Angeles County Education
Association, CTA/NEA
Unfair Practice Charge No. 	LA-CO-793
Dear Ms. Burton:
The above-referenced unfair practice charge, 	filed March 20,
1999, 	alleges the Los Angeles County Education Association 	(LACEA
or Association) 	violated your due process rights by ordering you
to leave campus on September 22, 	1998.1 Charging Party does not
allege any specific section of the Educational Employment
Relations Act 	(EERA or Act) 	has been violated. 	A review of the
charge demonstrates, 	however, 	the charge should be analyzed as a
violation of Government Code section 3543.6 (b).
I 	indicated to you, 	in my attached letter dated March 26, 	1999,
that 	the above-referenced charge did not 	state a prima facie
case. 	You were advised that, 	if there were any factual
inaccuracies or additional 	facts which would correct 	the
deficiencies explained in that 	letter, 	you should amend the
charge. 	You were further advised that, 	unless you amended the
charge to state a prima facie case or withdrew it prior to April
5, 	1999, 	the charge would be dismissed.
On April 	6, 	1999, 	Charging Party filed a first amended charge.
The first amended charge contains a six 	(6) 	page hand-written
narrative, 	and included a binder of attachments totaling nearly
100 pages. 	A summary of those documents and Charging Party's
allegations 	follow.
1 Specifically, 	Charging Party alleges in Section 6(b) 	of
the unfair practice charge form: 	"Suspension-Censorship-
Expulsion-Coercion to engage 	in child endangerment 	activities and
other illegal activities. 	Harassment, 	invalid grievance
procedure-Criminal Activity, Discrimination, etc."

( r
Dismissal 	Letter
LA-CO-793
Page 2
Charging 	Party provides 	numerous 	documents 	regarding 	a 	1996
incident 	involving 	student 	Ruben Martinez. 	Apparently Charging
Party provided 	such 	information 	to 	demonstrate 	the 	District's
treatment 	of 	her. 	Such 	information 	also 	included police reports
filed against 	Charging 	Party. 	Additionally, 	Charging 	Party
provided 	several 	documents 	regarding 	her 	1997 	grievances 	against
the 	District 	over her disciplinary suspension. 	Included 	in 	this
information 	are 	letters 	between 	Charging 	Party 	and 	the
Association which date back to 	1997. 	It 	appears 	Charging 	Party
was 	not 	satisfied with the 	representation 	she 	received 	in 	1997.
Charging 	Party 	also 	includes 	a 	section 	entitled 	"Child
Endangerment" 	in which 	she 	includes 	more 	information 	regarding
what 	she believes 	are unsafe 	conditions 	at 	the District 	dating
back to 	1997. 	It 	is 	unclear how such 	information relates 	to her
removal 	from the 	classroom in 	September 	1998 	or 	the Association's
involvement.
In the only section devoted to 	the Association, 	Charging 	Party
presents 	documentation and 	a 	narrative 	regarding 	the
Association's 	failure 	to handle 	a 	1996 	grievance 	to her
satisfaction. 	Over the next 	two years, 	Charging Party contacted
several 	Association 	representatives 	on both 	a 	local 	and national
level 	to resolve her concerns. 	In essence, 	Charging Party
believed 	false 	criminal 	complaints 	had been 	filed 	against 	her 	in
1996, 	and wanted the Association to 	look into the matter and into
her 	subsequent 	suspension, 	which had been grieved and 	settled.
On November 7, 	1996, 	the Association filed a grievance on
Charging Party's behalf. 	On January 7, 	1997, 	the District 	denied
the grievance at Level 	I. 	On January 17, 	1997, 	the Association
appealed the decision to Level 	II. 	On February 24, 	1997, 	the
Association 	represented Charging 	Party 	in a Level 	II 	hearing. 	On
March 3, 	1997, 	the District 	issued its Level 	II 	response,
sustaining in part, 	and denying in part, 	Charging Party's
grievance. 	On March 14, 	1997, 	Charging Party wrote to her
Association 	representative 	seeking 	a 	clarification 	of 	the 	remedy
provided by the District. 	On March 17, 	1997, 	the Association
provided 	Charging 	Party with 	the 	clarification 	she 	sought 	and
further 	informed her 	that 	it 	would not 	be 	appealing 	the 	grievance
to Level 	III 	as 	Charging Party 	"prevailed on the 	issues 	that 	were
grieved."
•
On March 26, 	1997, 	Charging Party requested the Association take
her grievance 	to Level 	III, 	as 	she did not prevail 	on the 	issue
of 	"disciplinary suspension." 	On March 27, 	1997, 	then-
Association President, 	Kathleen O'Neil, 	informed Charging Party
that 	the Association would not 	be 	taking 	the 	grievance 	to 	Level
III, 	as 	it believed it had prevailed on the 	issues. 	Further, 	the
Association 	informed 	Charging 	Party 	that 	it 	did not 	believe 	she
( 	l

Dismissal 	Letter
LA-CO-793
Page 3
had been 	suspended 	in violation of 	the 	contract, 	as 	Charging
Party remained on pay status. 	Additionally, 	Ms. 	O'Neil 	informed
Charging 	Party of 	her right 	to 	see 	an attorney. 	On April 	7,
1997, 	Charging Party responded to Ms. 	O'Neil's 	letter by
requesting 	that 	the 	Association's 	Executive 	Board hear 	her
concerns 	and 	reconsider 	the Association's 	decision not 	to pursue
the grievance 	to Level 	III. 	On May 9, 	1997, 	Charging Party sent
another 	letter to Ms. 	O'Neil, 	as 	she had not 	received any return
communication from the Association. 	On May 13, 	1997, 	Ms. 	O'Neil
sent 	Charging 	Party 	another 	letter, 	again reiterating 	the
Association's 	position 	that 	it 	would not 	take 	her 	sustained
grievance 	to Level 	III. 	Charging Party was 	further 	informed that
Charging 	Party's 	legal 	concerns 	regarding 	the 	Child 	Endangerment
allegations 	needed 	to be 	pursued 	outside 	the 	contract's 	grievance
procedure.
Charging Party wrote 	letters 	to 	the Association in 	1996, 	1997 	and
early 	1998 	requesting 	further 	assistance 	regarding 	her 	grievance.
After 	several 	meetings with Charging 	Party, 	the Association
provided 	Charging 	Party with 	a 	one-hour meeting with 	a 	CTA
attorney 	in 	approximately April 	1998. 	Charging 	Party was
provided with 	legal 	assistance 	and was 	told by 	the 	attorney 	to
file 	a report 	with the police 	if 	she believed a 	criminal 	law had
been violated. 	It 	is 	unclear whether Charging 	Party 	followed
this 	advice. 	It 	also 	appears 	the Association did not pursue 	the
matter any 	further, 	nor does 	Charging 	Party note 	any contact 	with
the Association after April 	1998. 	In January 1999, 	Charging
Party 	"ran into" 	Association representative 	Kathleen O'Neil, 	who
again 	refused 	to 	consider 	Charging 	Party's 	grievance 	issues.
Although not 	fully discussed 	in 	the 	amended 	charge, 	Charging
Party also 	contends 	the Association 	failed 	to 	represent 	her on
September 22, 	1998, 	when she was asked to leave her classroom.
Based on 	the 	facts 	provided 	in 	the 	original 	and 	first 	amended
charges, 	the 	charge 	fails 	to 	state 	a prima 	facie 	case under the
EERA, 	and thus 	is 	dismissed for the 	reasons provided below.
With regard to 	the 	allegations 	concerning the 	1996 	grievance, 	the
allegation is untimely. 	Government 	Code 	section 3541.5(a) (1)
prohibits 	the 	Board 	from issuing 	a 	complaint 	in respect 	of 	any
charge 	based upon 	an 	alleged unfair 	practice 	occurring more 	than
six months prior to 	the 	filing of 	the 	charge. 	The 	statute 	of
limitations begins 	to 	run on the date 	the 	employee, 	acting with
reasonable diligence, 	knew or 	should have 	known that 	further
assistance 	from the 	union was 	unlikely. 	(Los Rios 	Federation of
Teachers 	(1991) 	PERB Decision No. 	889.) 	Repeated refusals to
process 	a 	grievance 	over a 	recurring 	issue 	do not 	start 	the
limitations 	period anew. 	(California 	State 	Employees'
Association 	(Callowav) 	(1985) 	PERB Decision No. 	497-S.)
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Dismissal 	Letter
LA-CO-793
Page 4
Facts presented herein demonstrate 	that 	Charging Party spent
nearly two years attempting to get 	the Association to review her
settled grievance and the 	issues underlying the grievance.
During 1997 and early 1998, 	the Association provided her with,
some assistance, 	but ultimately informed her that she needed to
file a police report. 	The Association unequivocally stated in
April and May of 	1997, 	that it would not pursue the grievance
further. 	Thus, 	Charging Party knew in May 1997, 	that the
Association would not provide her further assistance 	in this
matter. 	As the charge was filed on March 19, 	1999, 	the
allegation is untimely.
Charging Party also alleges 	that 	the Association owed her a duty
of 	representation when she was asked to leave her classroom in
September 1998.
Charging Party has 	alleged that 	the exclusive 	representative
denied Charging Party the 	right 	to fair representation guaranteed
by EERA section 3544.9 and thereby violated section 3543.6(b).
The duty of 	fair representation imposed on the exclusive
representative extends to grievance handling. 	(Fremont Teachers
Association 	(King) 	(1980) 	PERB Decision No. 	125; United Teachers
of Los Angeles 	(Collins) 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	258.) 	In
order to state a prima facie violation of this section of EERA,
Charging Party must 	show that 	the Association's conduct was
arbitrary, 	discriminatory or in bad faith. 	In United Teachers
of Los Angeles 	(Collins), 	the Public Employment Relations Board
stated:
Absent bad faith, 	discrimination, 	or
arbitrary conduct, 	mere negligence or poor
judgment 	in handling a grievance does not
constitute a breach of the union's duty.
[Citations.]
A union may exercise 	its discretion to
determine how far to pursue a grievance in
the employee's behalf as long as 	it does not
arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or
process a grievance in a perfunctory fashion.
A union is 	also not 	required to process an
employee's grievance if the chances for
success are minimal.
In order to state a prima facie case of arbitrary conduct
violating the duty of 	fair representation, 	a Charging Party:
" . . . 	must 	at 	a minimum include an assertion
of 	sufficient 	facts 	from which it becomes
apparent how or in what manner the exclusive
( ( 	'

Dismissal 	Letter
LA-CO-793
Page 5
representative's action or 	inaction was
without 	a rational basis or devoid of honest
judgment. 	(Emphasis added.)" 	[Reed District
Teachers Association, 	CTA/NEA 	(Reyes) 	(1983)
PERB Decision No. 	332, p. 	9, 	citing Rocklin
Teachers 	Professional Association 	(Romero)
(1980) 	PERB Decision No. 	124.]
Charging Party alleges the Association violated the EERA by-
failing to 	inform her the District would be asking her to leave
the classroom. 	As noted in my March 26, 	1999, 	letter, 	Charging
Party presents no case law to support 	the assertion that 	a union
has a duty to notify its members of 	impending visits by school
officials or impending bad news. 	Moreover, 	Association
representative 	Wakefield provided Charging 	Party with assistance
during and after the meeting. 	As such, 	facts presented fail to
demonstrate 	the Association acted arbitrarily or in bad 	faith.
Right to Appeal
Pursuant to Public Employment Relations Board regulations, 	you
may obtain a review of this dismissal 	of 	the charge by filing
an appeal 	to the Board itself within twenty 	(20) 	calendar days
after service of this dismissal. 	(Cal. 	Code Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32635(a).) 	Any document 	filed with the Board must 	contain
the case name and number, 	and the original and five 	(5) 	copies of
all documents must be provided to the Board.
A document 	is 	considered 	"filed" 	when actually received before
the close of business 	(5 p.m.) 	on the last day set for filing or
when mailed by certified or Express United States mail, 	as 	shown
on the postal receipt or postmark, 	or delivered to a common
carrier promising overnight delivery, 	as 	shown on the carrier's
receipt, 	not later than the last day set for filing. 	(Cal. 	Code
Regs., tit. 8, sec. 32135(a); see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8,
sec. 32130.)
A document 	is 	also considered 	"filed" 	when received by facsimile
transmission before the close of business on the 	last day for
filing together with a Facsimile Transmission Cover Sheet which
meets the requirements of Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, sec. 32135(d),
provided the filing party also places the original, 	together with
the required number of copies and proof of service, 	in the U.S.
mail. 	(Cal. Code. Regs., 	tit. 	8, 	secs. 32135(b), 	(c) 	and (d) ;
see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 	8, 	secs. 32090 and 32130.)
The Board's address is:
Public Employment Relations Board
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Dismissal Letter
LA-CO-793
Page 6
Attention: Appeals Assistant
1031 	18th Street
Sacramento, 	CA 	95814-4174
FAX: 	(916) 327-7960
If you file a timely appeal of the refusal 	to issue a complaint,
any other party may file with the Board an original 	and five
copies of a statement in opposition within twenty (2 0) calendar
days following the date of service of the appeal. 	(Cal. 	Code
Regs., tit. 8, sec. 32635 (b) .)
Service
All 	documents 	authorized to be 	filed herein must 	also be 	"served"
upon all parties to the proceeding, 	and a 	"proof of service"
must 	accompany each copy of a document 	served upon a party or
filed with the Board itself. 	(See Cal. 	Code Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32140 	for the required contents and a sample form.) 	The
document 	will 	be 	considered properly 	"served" 	when personally
delivered or deposited in the first-class mail, 	postage paid and
properly addressed. 	A document 	filed by facsimile 	transmission
may be 	concurrently served via 	facsimile 	transmission on all
parties to the proceeding. 	(Cal. Code Regs., 	tit. 	8, 	sec.
32135(c) .)
Extension of Time
A request 	for an extension of time, 	in which to file a document
with the Board itself, 	must be 	in writing and filed with the
Board at 	the previously noted address. 	A request 	for an
extension must be filed at least three 	(3) 	calendar days before
the expiration of the time required for filing the document.
The request must indicate good cause for and, 	if known, 	the
position of each other party regarding the extension, 	and shall
be accompanied by proof of 	service of the request upon each
party. 	(Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, sec. 32132.)
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Dismissal Letter
LA-CO-793
Page 7
Final Date
If no appeal 	is filed within the specified time limits, 	the
dismissal will become final when the time limits have expired.
Sincerely,
ROBERT THOMPSON
Deputy General 	Counsel
By Kristin L. 	Rosi
Regional Attorney
Attachment
CC:

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	GRAY DAVIS, Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
San Francisco Regional Office
177 Post Street, 9th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94108-4737
(415) 439-6940
March 26, 	1999
Lillian H. 	Burton
Re: 	WARNING LETTER
Lillian H. 	Burton v. 	Los Angeles County Education
Association, CTA/NEA
Unfair Practice Charge No. 	LA-CO-793
Dear Ms. Burton:
The above-referenced unfair practice charge, 	filed March 20,
1999, 	alleges the Los Angeles County Education Association 	(LACEA
or Association) 	violated your due process rights by ordering you
to leave campus on September 22, 	1998.1 Charging Party does not
allege any specific 	section of the Educational Employment
Relations Act 	(EERA or Act) 	has been violated. 	A review of the
charge demonstrates, 	however, 	the charge should be analyzed as a
violation of Government Code section 3543.6 (b).
Investigation of the charge revealed the 	following. 	Charging
Party is a Special 	Education teacher with the Los Angeles County
Office of Education 	(LACOE) 	at La Merced Intermediate School
(LMI). 	As a certificated employee, 	Charging Party is represented
by the Association. 	Prior to September 1998, 	Charging Party
apparently filed a Worker's 	Compensation claim against 	the LACOE
as the facts described herein, 	reference a worker's compensation
claim.
On September 22, 	1998, 	Charging Party was met in her classroom by
Buena Vista Principal Ms. 	Hopko and LACOE's Worker's Compensation
coordinator, 	Janice Whittle. 	Ms. 	Hopko informed Charging Party
that because Charging Party had not provided a doctor's release
for her to return to work, 	she would have to leave campus
immediately. As there was only 3 0 minutes left in the school
day, 	Charging Party asked to stay until 	the end of the day.
Charging Party also requested written confirmation from Ms. 	Hopko
1 Specifically, 	Charging Party alleges in Section 6(b) 	of
the unfair practice charge form: 	"Suspension-Censorship-
Expulsion-Coercion to engage 	in child endangerment 	activities and
other illegal activities. 	Harassment, 	invalid grievance
procedure-Criminal Activity, Discrimination, etc."
,

Warning Letter
LA-CO-793
Page 2
that 	she was being told to leave the campus prior to the end of
the school day.
Ms. 	Hopko refused to allow Charging Party to stay until 	the end
of 	the school 	day and refused to provide written documentation.
As 	Charging Party walked towards 	the 	classroom telephone 	to
contact her union representatives, 	Ms. 	Hopko stated she had
already spoken with LACEA President, 	John Kohn. 	Charging Party
then telephoned LACEA site representative Doug Jockinson, 	seeking
his advice. 	Mr. 	Jockinson then attempted to contact another
LACEA representative. 	During this time, 	Ms. Hopko and Ms.
Whittle 	stationed themselves outside Charging Party's 	classroom
door.
After several minutes had passed, 	Ms. 	Hopko telephoned campus
security who refused to remove 	Charging Party from the 	school
grounds. 	Eventually, 	the school day ended and Charging Party
gathered her things to leave the classroom. 	Before she could
leave, 	however, 	Charging Party and Ms. 	Hopko engaged in a verbal
confrontation. 	Charging Party ended the 	conversation stating she
would return the 	following day to receive written confirmation of
her removal 	from the classroom.
After leaving school grounds, 	Charging Party met with Association
representative Andrea Wakefield. 	Ms. 	Wakefield telephoned Mr.
Kohn and confirmed that Mr. 	Kohn had been informed of Charging
Party's 	situation prior to her removal 	from the 	classroom.
Charging Party voiced her anger over Mr. 	Kohn's 	failure to inform
her of the impending events. 	Ms. 	Wakefield then telephoned the
District's Labor Relations Officer and secured his word that
Charging Party would receive written confirmation of 	the days
events the next day.
Charging Party and Ms. 	Wakefield returned to school grounds on
the following day. 	Ms. 	Hopko was not present at the time, 	thus
Charging Party waited outside. 	When Ms. 	Hopko finally arrived,
3 0 minutes late, 	Charging Party secured her letter and left the
campus.
Based on the above stated facts, 	the charge as presently written,
fails to state a prima facie violation of 	the duty of 	fair
representation, 	for the reasons provided below.
Charging 	Party has 	alleged that 	the exclusive representative
denied Charging Party the 	right 	to 	fair representation guaranteed
by EERA section 3544.9 and thereby violated section 3543.6(b).
The 	duty of 	fair representation imposed on the exclusive
representative extends to grievance handling. 	(Fremont Teachers
Association 	(King) 	(1980) 	PERB Decision No. 	125; United Teachers
of Los Angeles 	(Collins) 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	258.) 	In
(

Warning Letter
LA-CO-793
Page 3
order to state a prima facie violation of 	this section of EERA,
Charging Party must 	show that 	the Association's conduct was
arbitrary, 	discriminatory or in bad faith. 	In United Teachers
of Los Angeles 	(Collins), 	the Public Employment Relations Board
stated:
Absent bad faith, 	discrimination, 	or
arbitrary conduct, 	mere negligence or poor
judgment 	in handling a grievance does not
constitute a breach of the union's duty.
[Citations.]
A union may exercise 	its discretion to
determine how far to pursue a grievance in
the employee's behalf as long as it does not
arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or
process a grievance in a perfunctory fashion.
A union is 	also not 	required to process 	an
employee's grievance if the chances for
success are minimal.
In order to state a prima facie case of arbitrary conduct
violating the duty of fair representation, 	a Charging Party:
" . . . must at 	a minimum include an assertion
of 	sufficient 	facts 	from which it becomes
apparent how or in what manner the exclusive
representative's action or inaction was
without a rational basis or devoid of honest
judgment. 	(Emphasis added.)" 	[Reed District
Teachers Association, 	CTA/NEA 	(Reyes) 	(1983)
PERB Decision No. 332, p. 	9, citing Rocklin
Teachers 	Professional Association 	(Romero)
(1980) 	PERB Decision No. 	124.]
Charging Party alleges the Association engaged in arbitrary acts
when its President, 	Mr. 	Kohn, 	failed to contact Charging Party
prior to Ms. 	Hopko's entry into the classroom. 	However, 	Charging
Party presents no case law to support the assertion that a union
has a duty to notify its members of 	impending visits by school
officials or impending bad news. 	Moreover, 	Association
representatives Wakefield and Jockinson provided Charging Party
with assistance during and after the crisis. 	As such, 	facts
provided 	fail 	to demonstrate 	the Association acted arbitrarily or
in bad faith.
For these reasons the charge, 	as presently written, 	does not
state a prima facie case. 	If there are any factual 	inaccuracies
in this letter or additional 	facts which would correct 	the
deficiencies explained above, 	please amend the charge. 	The
I 	(

Warning 	Letter
LA-CO-793
Page 4
amended charge 	should be prepared on a 	standard PERB unfair
practice charge form, 	clearly labeled First Amended Charge,
contain all 	the facts and allegations you wish to make, 	and
be 	signed under penalty of perjury by the charging party. 	The
amended charge must have the case number written on the top right
hand corner of the charge form. 	The amended charge must be
served on the 	respondent's 	representative and the original proof
of service must be filed with PERB. 	If I do not receive an
amended charge or withdrawal 	from you before April 5, 	1999. 	I
shall dismiss your charge. 	If you have any questions, 	please
call me at 	(415) 	439-6940.
Sincerely,
Kristin L. 	Rosi
Regional Attorney