North Orange County Community College District (PERB 1268E)

PERB Decision No. 1268ECalperb18 de jun. de 1998

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STATE 	OP 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION 	OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
ELIZABETH KISZELY,
Charging 	Party,
v.
NORTH 	ORANGE 	COUNTY 	COMMUNITY
COLLEGE DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Case No. 	LA-CE-3837
PERB Decision No. 	1268
June 18, 	1998
Appearances: 	Elizabeth Kiszely, 	on her own behalf; 	Parker,
Covert & Chidester by Margaret A. 	Chidester, 	Attorney, 	for North
Orange 	County 	Community 	College 	District.
Before Caffrey, 	Chairman; 	Dyer and Amador, 	Members.
DECISION AND 	ORDER
CAFFREY, 	Chairman: 	This case is before the Public
Employment Relations Board 	(Board) 	on appeal 	by Elizabeth Kiszely
(Kiszely) 	of a Board agent's dismissal 	(attached) 	of her unfair
practice charge. 	In the charge, 	Kiszely alleged that the North
Orange County Community College District 	(District) 	violated the
Educational Employment Relations Act 	(EERA) 	section 3543.5(a) 	and
(b)1 by retaliating 	against 	her 	for her participation 	in
1EERA 	is 	codified at Government Code 	section 	3540 	et 	seq.
Section 3543.5 	states, 	in pertinent part:
It 	shall be unlawful 	for 	a public 	school
employer to do 	any of 	the 	following:
(a) 	Impose or threaten to impose reprisals
on employees, 	to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against employees, 	or otherwise
to interfere with, 	restrain, 	or coerce
employees because 	of their exercise of 	rights
guaranteed by this chapter. 	For purposes of
this subdivision, 	"employee" 	includes an
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protected 	activities.
The Board has 	reviewed the entire record 	in this 	case,
including Kiszely's 	original 	and 	amended unfair 	practice 	charge,
the Board agent's warning and dismissal 	letters, 	Kiszely's 	appeal
and the District's response. 	The Board 	finds 	the warning and
dismissal 	letters to be 	free of prejudicial 	error 	and adopts 	them
as the decision of the Board 	itself.
The unfair practice charge in Case No. 	LA-CE-3 837 	is hereby
DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND.
Members 	Dyer 	and Amador 	joined 	in this 	Decision.
applicant 	for 	employment 	or reemployment.
(b) 	Deny to employee organizations rights
guaranteed to them by this 	chapter.
22
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	PETE WILSON, Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
Los Angeles Regional Office
3530 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 650
Los Angeles, CA 90010-2334
(213)736-3127
February 27, 	1998
John R. Marshall
Law Office of Robert D. 	Coveillo
3 Imperial Promenade, Suite 42 0
Santa Ana, 	CA 92707
Re: 	Elizabeth Kiszely v. 	North Orange County Community College
District
Unfair Practice Charge No. 	LA-CE-3837, 	First Amended Charge
DISMISSAL AND REFUSAL TO 	ISSUE A COMPLAINT
Dear Mr. Marshall:
Elizabeth Kiszely alleges 	the North Orange 	County Community
College District 	(District) 	violated the Educational Employment
Relations Act 	(EERA) 	§ 3543.5 	(a) 	and 	(b) 	by retaliating against
her for her participation in protected activities.
I indicated to you, 	in my attached letter dated February 6, 	1998,
that 	the above-referenced charge did not state a prima facie
case. 	You were advised that, 	if there were any factual
inaccuracies or additional 	facts which would correct 	the
deficiencies explained in that 	letter, 	you should amend the
charge. 	You were further advised that, 	unless you amended the
charge to state a prima facie case or withdrew it prior to
February 18, 199 8, the charge would be dismissed. I later
extended that deadline to February 20, 	1998, 	and then to
February 21, 	1998. 	On February 21, 	1998, 	Kiszely filed an
amended charge by certified mail.
The original 	charge 	included several allegations which I listed
in the warning letter as 	(a) 	- 	(h). 	Those allegations are that
the District: 	(a) 	threatened reprisals against Kiszely in
August; 	(b) 	accused Kiszely of unprofessional conduct in August
and September 1995; 	(c) 	threatened Kiszely during a Department
meeting on September 26, 	1995; 	(d) 	"propound[ed] 	to third parties
a derogatory, 	defamatory correspondence" 	in December 1995; 	(e)
accused Kiszely of having behavioral problems 	in January 1996;
(f) 	conspired to obtain negative and derogatory statements about
Kiszely in February 1996; 	(g) 	disseminated false statements in
March 1996; 	and 	(h) 	issued a notice of unprofessional conduct
against Kiszely in June 1996.
My February 6, 	1998, 	Warning Letter indicated the above-
referenced charge should be dismissed for the 	following reasons:
(1) allegations (a) 	- 	(e) were untimely; 	(2) allegations (f),
(g), 	and 	(h) 	were untimely because they were not tolled by the
Charging Party's grievance; 	(3) allegations 	(f), 	(g), and (h)
LA-CE-3837
Dismissal 	Letter
Page 2
were untimely even if 	they were 	tolled; 	and 	(4) 	the 	charge 	failed
to 	factually 	demonstrate 	a 	prima 	facie 	discrimination violation.
The 	amended 	charge 	included approximately 	one 	hundred pages 	and
alleged 	the 	charge 	was 	timely 	filed and 	factually demonstrated a
prima 	facie violation.
The 	amended 	charge 	failed 	to 	state 	a prima 	facie violation 	of 	the
EERA within 	the 	jurisdiction 	of 	PERB 	for 	the 	reasons 	that 	follow.
As 	stated in the warning 	letter, 	EERA § 	3541.5(a)(1) 	provides 	the
Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board shall 	not, 	"issue 	a 	complaint
in 	respect 	of 	any 	charge 	based upon an 	alleged unfair practice
occurring more 	than six months 	prior 	to 	the 	filing 	of 	the 	charge.
The 	amended 	charge 	does 	not 	provide 	facts 	indicating 	the 	charge
was 	timely 	filed. 	Kiszely 	filed 	the 	original 	Unfair 	Practice
Charge LA-CE-3837 	on September 2, 	1997. 	Therefore unfair
practices 	occurring before March 2, 	1997, 	are untimely and
outside 	the 	jurisdiction of 	PERB. 	All 	of 	the 	charge's
allegations 	occurred 	prior to March 2, 	199 7, 	and would be
considered 	untimely 	absent 	tolling.
The 	charge 	does 	not 	provide 	any 	facts 	indicating 	Kiszely 	filed a
grievance regarding allegations 	(a) 	- 	(e). 	Thus, 	the statute of
limitations 	regarding 	those allegations 	was 	not 	tolled, 	and 	they
must 	be 	dismissed as 	untimely.
As 	the 	original 	and amended 	charges 	allege 	a 	grievance 	was 	filed
regarding allegations 	(f) 	- 	(h), 	these allegations are addressed
separately from allegations 	(a) 	- 	(e). 	Allegations 	(f) 	- 	(h)
occurred in January 1996, 	March 1996, 	and July 3, 	1996,
respectively. 	These 	allegations 	were 	originally the 	subject 	of
unfair practice 	charge 	LA-CE-3699, 	but were dismissed and
deferred 	to arbitration on January 24, 	1997. 	Kiszely reiterated
these allegations 	in LA-CE-3837, 	filed on September 2, 	1997, 	and
argued the grievance 	she 	filed on October 8, 	199 6, 	tolled the
statute of 	limitations period. 	The February 6, 	199 8, 	Warning
Letter stated that 	the October 	8, 	1996, 	grievance did not 	toll
the 	statute 	of 	limitations 	period because 	the 	grievance 	did not
allege 	the District's 	conduct violated Article 	4.4.2, 	which 	is
the 	contract's 	nondiscrimination 	clause 	citing 	the 	EERA.1
1Section 4.4.2 	of 	the 	CBA states:
No Unit 	Member 	shall 	be 	in any way
discriminated against, 	intimidated,
restrained 	or 	coerced because 	of 	affiliation
with or participation 	in the Association, 	or
the 	exercise 	of 	rights 	guaranteed by 	Chapter
10.7, 	sections 	3540-3549 	of 	the Government
LA-CE-3 83 7
Dismissal 	Letter
Page 3
The warning 	letter noted, 	Kiszely's 	grievance 	did not 	allege 	a
violation 	of 	Article 	4.4.2 	and 	therefore 	failed 	to put 	the
District 	on notice 	that 	Kiszely was 	alleging 	the 	District
retaliated 	against 	her 	for 	her participation 	in 	activities
protected by 	the 	EERA. 	In 	the 	amended 	charge, 	Kiszely argues:
The District 	was 	indeed notified 	of 	all 	of
the alleged violations. 	The October 8, 	1996,
formal 	grievance puts 	the 	District 	on notice
the 	grievance 	includes 	"any other practice,
procedures, 	policies, 	and articles that may
apply." 	Article 	4.4.2 	applies, 	as 	does 	all
of Article 	4.4.
However 	the 	facts 	of 	this 	charge 	indicate, 	and 	the warning 	letter
noted, 	the 	grievance 	did not 	include any 	reference 	to Article
4.4.2. 	The 	inclusion of 	the 	"other practices" 	language does 	not
remedy this 	problem. 	Since 	the 	grievance 	did not 	refer 	to
Article 	4.4.2, 	it 	would be unlikely that 	the District was 	on
notice 	that 	Kiszely 	intended 	to allege 	a violation 	of 	that
article. 	The 	facts 	of 	this 	charge do not 	indicate 	the 	grievance
was 	ambiguous. 	The grievance made 	specific 	reference 	to seven
other articles 	of 	the 	CBA, 	without making any 	reference 	to
Article 	4.4.2. 	The 	omission of 	this article, 	when coupled with
the 	inclusion 	of 	seven 	other 	specific 	articles 	further 	indicates
the 	District 	was 	not 	put 	on notice 	that 	the 	grievance 	concerned
District 	discrimination 	based 	on 	activity protected by 	the 	EERA.
Moreover, 	the grievance 	cited Article 	4.4.1, 	but 	omitted the
contract's next article, 	Article 4.4.2. 	This 	suggests 	that
Kiszely was 	aware 	of Article 	4.4.2, 	and decided not 	to allege 	a
violation of 	that article. 	The 	facts 	fail 	to demonstrate 	the
District 	was 	on notice 	that 	the 	grievance 	included an allegation
that 	the District violated Article 4.4.2. 	Thus, 	the October 	8,
1996, 	grievance did not 	toll 	the 	statute 	of 	limitations period,
and 	the 	charge must 	be 	dismissed as 	untimely and 	outside 	the
jurisdiction of 	PERB.
Right 	to Appeal
Pursuant 	to 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board 	regulations, 	you
may 	obtain a 	review of 	this 	dismissal 	of 	the 	charge by 	filing
an appeal 	to 	the 	Board 	itself within twenty 	(20) 	calendar days
after service of this dismissal. 	(Cal. 	Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32635(a).) 	To be 	timely 	filed, 	the 	original 	and five 	copies
Code.
LA-CE-3837
Dismissal 	Letter
Page 	4
of 	such appeal 	must 	be 	actually 	received by 	the 	Board 	itself
before 	the 	close of business 	(5 p.m.) 	or sent by telegraph,
certified 	or 	Express 	United 	States 	mail 	postmarked 	no 	later
than the last date set 	for filing. 	(Cal. 	Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32135.) 	Code of Civil 	Procedure 	section 1013 	shall apply.
The Board's 	address 	is:
Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board
1031 	18th Street
Sacramento, 	CA 95814
If 	you 	file 	a 	timely appeal 	of 	the 	refusal 	to 	issue 	a 	complaint,
any 	other party may 	file 	with 	the 	Board an 	original 	and 	five
copies 	of 	a 	statement 	in opposition within 	twenty 	(20) 	calendar
days 	following the date of 	service of 	the appeal. 	(Cal. 	Code of
Regs., tit. 	8, 	sec. 32635(b).)
Service
All 	documents 	authorized 	to be 	filed herein must 	also be 	"served"
upon all 	parties 	to 	the proceeding, 	and a 	"proof 	of 	service"
must 	accompany 	each 	copy 	of 	a 	document 	served upon a 	party 	or
filed with the Board itself. 	(See Cal. 	Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32140 	for the 	required contents and a sample 	form.) 	The
document 	will 	be 	considered properly 	"served" 	when personally
delivered or deposited 	in 	the 	first-class mail, 	postage paid and
properly 	addressed.
Extension of 	Time
A request 	for an extension of 	time, 	in which to 	file a document
with 	the 	Board 	itself, 	must 	be 	in writing 	and 	filed with 	the
Board at 	the 	previously noted address. 	A request 	for an
extension must 	be 	filed at 	least 	three 	(3) 	calendar days before
the 	expiration 	of 	the 	time 	required 	for 	filing 	the 	document.
The 	request must 	indicate good cause 	for and, 	if known, 	the
position 	of 	each 	other party regarding 	the 	extension, 	and 	shall
be 	accompanied by proof 	of 	service 	of 	the 	request 	upon 	each
party. 	(Cal. 	Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8, 	sec. 	32132.)
LA-CE-3837
Dismissal 	Letter
Page 5
Final Date
If no appeal 	is filed within the specified time limits, 	the
dismissal will become final when the time limits have expired.
Sincerely,
ROBERT THOMPSON
Deputy General 	Counsel
By Tammy 	L.Samsel
Regional Director
Attachment
cc: 	Margaret Chidester
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	PETE WILSON. Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
Los Angeles Regional Office
3530 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 650
Los Angeles, CA 90010-2334
(213) 736-3127
February 6, 	199 8
John R. 	Marshall
Law Office 	of 	Robert D. 	Coveillo
3 	Imperial 	Promenade, 	Suite 42 0
Santa Ana, 	CA 92 707
Re: 	Elizabeth Kiszely v. 	North Orange 	County Community College
District
Unfair 	Practice 	Charge No. 	LA-CE-3837
Warning 	Letter
Dear Mr. 	Marshall:
Elizabeth 	Kiszely alleges 	the 	North Orange 	County 	Community
College 	District 	(District) 	violated 	the 	Educational 	Employment
Relations Act 	(EERA) 	§ 	3543.5 	(a) 	and 	(b) 	by retaliating against
her 	for her participation 	in protected activities.
My 	investigation 	revealed 	the 	following 	information.
On July 30, 	1996, 	Kiszely 	filed unfair practice 	charge LA-CE-3699
alleging 	the 	District 	retaliated against 	her 	for 	her
participation in protected activities. 	On November 21, 	1996, 	I
issued a 	warning 	letter 	regarding 	the 	allegations 	in unfair
practice charge LA-CE-3699. 	On January 24, 	1997, 	I dismissed and
deferred 	to 	arbitration 	the 	following 	allegations 	of 	adverse
action by the District: 	letters 	of 	complaint by department
members 	and 	the 	College 	President 	in January and March 1996, 	and
a July 3, 	1996 	notice 	of 	unprofessional 	conduct.1 A complaint
issued on other allegations 	in 	the 	charge, 	and were 	settled and
withdrawn on June 10, 	1997.
On September 2, 	1997, 	Kiszely 	filed unfair practice 	charge LA-CE-
3837. 	The charge indicates 	"agents" 	of the District: 	(a)
threatened reprisals against 	Kiszely in August; 	(b) 	accused
Kiszely of 	unprofessional 	conduct 	in August 	and September 	1995;
1Section 4.4.2, 	of 	the 	collective bargaining agreement
states:
No Unit Member 	shall 	be 	in any way
discriminated against, 	intimidated,
restrained 	or 	coerced because 	of 	affiliation
with or participation 	in the Association, 	or
the 	exercise 	of 	rights 	guaranteed by 	Chapter
10.7, 	sections 	3540-3549 	of 	the Government
Code.
LA-CE-3837
Warning 	Letter
February 6, 19 9 8
Page 2
(c) 	threatened 	Kiszely during 	a 	Department 	meeting 	on 	September
26, 	1995; 	(d) 	"propound[ed] 	to third parties a derogatory,
defamatory correspondence" 	in December 1995; 	(e) 	accused Kiszely
of having behavioral problems 	in January 1996; 	(f) 	conspired to
obtain 	negative 	and derogatory 	statements 	about 	Kiszely 	in
February 199 6; 	(g) 	disseminated 	false statements 	in March 199 6;
and 	(h) 	issued a notice 	of 	unprofessional 	conduct 	against 	Kiszely
in June 1996. 	Allegations 	(f), 	(g), 	and 	(h) 	reiterate the
allegations 	I 	dismissed and 	deferred 	to 	arbitration 	in Unfair
Practice 	Charge 	LA-CE-3699.
The 	above-stated allegations 	do 	not 	state 	a prima 	facie violation
within 	the 	jurisdiction of 	PERB 	for 	the 	reasons 	that 	follow.
As 	an 	initial 	matter, 	the 	Board's 	jurisdiction 	is 	limited by a
six month 	statute 	of 	limitations 	period. 	EERA 	§ 	3541.5(a)(1)
provides 	the 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board 	shall 	not, 	"issue
a 	complaint 	in 	respect 	of 	any 	charge 	based upon an 	alleged unfair
practice 	occurring more 	than 	six months 	prior 	to 	the 	filing 	of
the 	charge." 	It 	is your burden, 	as 	the charging party to
demonstrate 	the 	charge has 	been 	timely 	filed. 	(See 	Tehachapi
Unified School 	District 	(1993) 	PERB Decision No. 	1024.)
Kiszely 	filed Unfair 	Practice 	Charge 	LA-CE-3837 	on
September 2, 	1997. 	Therefore unfair practices 	occurring before
March 2, 	1997, 	are untimely and outside 	the jurisdiction of 	PERB.
Allegations 	(a) 	through 	(e) 	occurred prior to March 2, 	1997, 	and
are 	therefore 	untimely. 	As 	no 	grievance was 	filed 	regarding
these allegations, 	tolling is not appropriate. 	Thus, 	allegations
(a) 	through 	(e) 	are outside 	the 	jurisdiction of 	PERB and must be
dismissed.
Under 	the 	above-stated 	statute 	of 	limitations 	analysis
allegations 	(f), 	(g) 	and 	(h) 	would also be untimely because they
also occurred prior to March 2, 	1997. 	However, 	under EERA §
3541.5(a)(2) 	the 	statute 	of 	limitations 	period may be 	tolled
during 	the 	time 	it 	took 	the 	charging party 	to 	exhaust 	the
grievance machinery. 	Allegations 	(f), 	(g), 	and 	(h) 	occurred in
January 1996, 	March 1996, 	and July 3, 	1996, 	respectively. 	Thus,
the 	six month 	statute 	of 	limitations 	period began 	to 	run 	on 	those
dates. 	The 	charge 	indicates 	Kiszely 	filed a grievance 	on
October 	8, 	199 6 	and that 	therefore 	the 	statute 	of 	limitations may
have 	been 	tolled 	through 	the 	arbitration which 	concluded 	on
May 30, 	1997. 	However, 	the statute of 	limitations 	should not be
tolled 	in this 	case 	for 	the 	reasons 	that 	follow.
LA-CE-3837
Warning 	Letter
February 6, 	199 8
Page 3
As 	previously 	stated, 	section 4.4.2 	of 	the 	CBA states:
No Unit 	Member 	shall 	be 	in any way
discriminated against, 	intimidated,
restrained 	or 	coerced because 	of 	affiliation
with or participation in the Association, 	or
the 	exercise 	of 	rights 	guaranteed by 	Chapter
10.7, 	sections 	3540-3549 	of the Government
Code.
Kiszely's 	grievance 	indicates 	the 	District 	violated 	sections
24.2.3; 	24.7; 	4.6; 	24.3.4.3; 	4.6.2; 	4.7.3.2; 	and 4.4.1 of the
CBA. 	The arbitration award 	indicates 	Kiszely's 	October 	8, 	1996
grievance 	alleged 	the 	Notice 	of 	Unprofessional 	violated 	the
following sections of the CBA: 	4.4.1; 	4.6; 	4.6.2; 	4.7.3.2; 	and
24.3.4.3. 	Based on this 	information it 	does not 	appear that 	the
October 	8, 	1996, 	grievance alleged the District violated section
4.4.2. 	Accordingly 	it 	would be 	inappropriate 	to 	toll 	this unfair
practice 	charge 	because 	the 	District 	was 	not 	on notice 	that 	the
Charging 	Party 	was 	alleging 	the 	District 	discriminated 	against
her 	for 	her 	participation 	in 	activities 	protected under 	the 	EERA.
Thus, 	the 	filing of 	that 	grievance did not 	toll 	the 	statute 	of
limitations 	period. 	Without 	tolling, 	the 	statute 	of 	limitations
period for allegations 	(f), 	(g), 	and 	(h) 	expired in July 1996,
September 1996, 	and January 3, 	1997, 	respectively. 	Since this
charge was not 	filed until 	September 2, 	199 7, 	the 	charge 	is
untimely 	and 	outside 	the 	jurisdiction of 	PERB.
Even if 	the October 8, 	199 6, 	grievance tolled the statute of
limitations period, 	allegations 	(f), 	(g), 	and 	(h) 	are still
untimely filed. 	As previously stated, 	allegations 	(f), 	(g), 	and
(h) 	occurred in January 1996, 	March 1996, 	and July 3, 	1996,
respectively. 	Subtracting 	the 	number of months 	the 	grievance was
being processed 	from the 	total 	amount 	of 	time 	elapsed 	since 	the
alleged violations, 	it appears more 	than six months 	remain.
Thus, 	the 	allegations 	are untimely 	filed and outside 	the
jurisdiction 	of 	PERB.
Even if 	the 	charge 	is 	timely 	filed, 	the 	charge as presently
written does 	not 	state a prima 	facie violation of 	the 	EERA.
To demonstrate a violation of 	EERA section 3543.5(a), 	the
charging party must 	show that: 	(1) 	the 	employee 	exercised rights
under EERA; 	(2) 	the employer had knowledge of 	the exercise of
those 	rights; 	and 	(3) 	the 	employer imposed or threatened to
impose 	reprisals, 	discriminated or 	threatened 	to discriminate,
or 	otherwise 	interfered with, 	restrained or 	coerced 	the 	employees
because 	of 	the 	exercise 	of 	those 	rights. 	(Novato Unified School
District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	210; 	Carlsbad Unified School
LA-CE-3837
Warning 	Letter
February 6, 19 9 8
Page 4
District 	(1979) 	PERB Decision No. 	89; 	Department 	of Developmental
Services 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	228-S; 	California State
University 	(Sacramento) 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	211-H.)
Although 	the 	timing 	of 	the 	employer's 	adverse 	action 	in 	close
temporal 	proximity 	to 	the 	employee's 	protected 	conduct 	is 	an
important 	factor, 	it does not, 	without more, 	demonstrate the
necessary 	connection or 	"nexus" 	between the 	adverse 	action and
the protected 	conduct. 	(Moreland 	Elementary School 	District
(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	227.) 	Facts 	establishing one or more
of 	the 	following additional 	factors must 	also be present:
(1) 	the employer's disparate treatment of the employee; 	(2) 	the
employer's 	departure 	from established procedures 	and 	standards
when dealing with the employee; 	(3) 	the employer's 	inconsistent
or contradictory justifications 	for its actions; 	(4) 	the
employer's 	cursory 	investigation 	of 	the 	employee's 	misconduct;
(5) 	the 	employer's 	failure 	to 	offer the 	employee 	justification at
the 	time 	it 	took action or the 	offering of 	exaggerated, 	vague, 	or
ambiguous 	reasons; 	or 	(6) 	any other facts which might 	demonstrate
the 	employer's 	unlawful motive. 	(Novato Unified School 	District,
supra; 	North Sacramento School 	District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision
No. 	264.) 	As presently written, 	this 	charge fails 	to demonstrate
any of 	these 	factors 	and therefore does 	not 	state 	a prima 	facie
violation of 	EERA section 3543.5(a).
As 	stated in the November 21, 	1996, 	Warning Letter in Unfair
Practice Charge No. 	LA-CE-3699, 	which first addressed these
allegations, 	the January 1996, 	letter of 	complaint 	signed by
faculty members 	does 	not 	demonstrate 	conduct 	attributable 	to 	the
District. 	The letter, 	on its 	face, 	indicates 	it was signed by
full-time 	tenured 	faculty. 	The 	charge does 	not 	bear any
endorsement 	by an agent 	of 	the District. 	The 	Charging 	Party
indicated 	in our discussions, 	prior to 	the 	filing of 	a Notice 	of
Appearance 	form by her attorney, 	that 	one 	of 	the 	signatories
lives with Dean Janet 	Portolan. 	Despite that 	fact, 	the 	charge
does 	not 	demonstrate Dean Janet 	Portolan 	or any 	other agent 	of
the District 	is 	responsible 	for 	the January 	1996, 	letter of
complaint. 	Thus, 	this allegation does not 	state a prima facie
violation.
Nor does 	the 	charge 	demonstrate 	the 	requisite nexus 	for any of
the 	alleged acts 	of 	discrimination. 	My telephone 	call 	on
January 15, 	1998, 	to John R. 	Marshall 	requesting more 	information
regarding nexus 	was 	not 	returned.
For these 	reasons 	the charge, 	as presently written, 	does not
state 	a prima 	facie 	case. 	If 	there 	are 	any 	factual 	inaccuracies
in 	this 	letter 	or additional 	facts 	which would 	correct 	the
deficiencies 	explained above, 	please amend the 	charge. 	The
'
LA-CE-3837
Warning 	Letter
February 6, 199 8
Page 5
amended charge 	should be prepared on a standard PERB unfair
practice charge form, 	clearly labeled First Amended Charge,
contain all 	the facts and allegations you wish to make, 	and
be signed under penalty of perjury by the charging party. 	The
amended charge must be served on the 	respondent and the original
proof of service must be filed with PERB. 	If I do not receive an
amended charge or withdrawal from you before February 18. 	1998. 	I
shall dismiss your charge. 	If you have any questions, 	please
call me at 	(213) 	736-3127.
Sincerely,
Tammy L. 	Samsel
Regional Director

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