Vallejo City Unified School District * * * OVERRULED IN PART by Fresno County In-Home Supportive Services Public Authority (2015) PERB Decision No. 2418-M, as recognized in Oakland Unified School District (2024) PERB Decision No. 2906, p. 18 * * * (PERB 1015E)

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
VALLEJO 	CITY UNIFIED 	SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Charging 	Party,
v.
VALLEJO EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
CTA/NEA,
Respondent.
)
)
)
) 	Case No. 	SF-CO-437
PERB Decision No. 	1015
September 	29, 	1993
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Appearances: 	Kronick, 	Moskovitz, 	Tiedemann & Girard by John L.
Bukey, 	Attorney, 	for Vallejo City Unified School District;
California Teachers Association by A. 	Eugene Huguenin, 	Jr.,
Attorney, 	for Vallejo Education Association, 	CTA/NEA.
Before Caffrey, 	Carlyle and Garcia, 	Members.
DECISION AND 	ORDER
CARLYLE, 	Member: 	This 	case 	is before 	the Public Employment
Relations 	Board 	(Board) 	on appeal 	by the Vallejo City Unified
School 	District 	(District) 	of 	a Board agent's 	dismissal 	(attached
hereto) 	of 	their unfair practice 	charge. 	The District alleged
that 	the Vallejo Education Association, 	CTA/NEA 	(Association)
violated section 3543.6(c) 	and 	(d) 	of 	the Educational 	Employment
Relations Act 	(EERA)1 by engaging in numerous acts 	in violation
of 	their rights.
1EERA is 	codified at Government 	Code 	section 3540 	et 	seq.
Section 3543.6 	states, 	in pertinent part:
It 	shall 	be unlawful 	for an employee
organization to:
(c) 	Refuse 	or fail 	to meet and negotiate 	in
good 	faith with a public 	school 	employer of
any of 	the 	employees 	of which it 	is 	the
exclusive 	representative.
(d) 	Refuse 	to participate 	in good faith in
the 	impasse procedure 	set 	forth 	in Article 	9
(commencing with Section 3548).
* * * OVERRULED IN PART by Fresno County In-Home Supportive Services Public Authority
(2015) PERB Decision No. 2418-M, as recognized in Oakland Unified School District (2024)
PERB Decision No. 2906, p. 18 * * *

The 	Board has 	reviewed 	the warning and dismissal 	letters,
the original 	and amended charge, 	the District's appeal 	and the
Association's 	response 	thereto.2 The 	Board 	finds 	the 	Board
agent's 	dismissal 	to be 	free of prejudicial 	error and adopts 	it
as 	the decision of 	the Board 	itself.
The unfair practice 	charge 	in Case No. 	SF-CO-437 	is 	hereby
DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE 	TO AMEND.3
Members 	Caffrey and Garcia 	joined 	in 	this 	Decision.
2The District 	filed a brief 	responding 	to 	the Association's
response 	to 	their appeal. 	The Association opposed this 	filing as
not 	conforming with PERB 	regulations. 	(PERB 	regulations 	are
codified at California Code of Regulations, 	title 	8, 	section
31001 	et 	seq.) 	However, 	PERB regulations do not provide for nor
preclude the 	filing of. additional briefs, 	and the Board has
discretion to review the materials 	submitted. 	In this 	case, 	the
District's 	brief 	did not 	contain newly discovered evidence, 	newly
discovered law, 	nor an explanation why 	its 	brief 	should be
reviewed by the Board. 	For these reasons, 	the Board did not
consider 	the District's 	brief 	in 	reaching 	its 	determination.
3Member Garcia would additionally note 	that 	he 	finds 	County
Sanitation Dist. 	No. 	2 v. 	Lo---s Angele-----s County--Employees- ' 	Assn.
(1985) 	38 Cal.3d 564 	[214 Cal.Rptr. 	424], 	to be dispositive of
this 	case and while 	he 	joins 	in the decision he does 	not 	adopt
the Board agent's 	rationale.
N2

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	PETE WILSON. Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
Office of the General Counsel
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814-4174
(916) 323-8015
May 13, 	1993
John L. 	Bukey, 	Esquire
Kronick, 	Moskovitz, 	Tiedemann, 	& Girard
770 	"L" Street, 	Suite 1200
Sacramento, 	CA 	95 814
Re: 	Vallejo City Unified School 	District v. 	Vallejo 	Education
Association, 	CTA/NEA
Unfair Practice Charge No. 	SF-CO-437
DISMISSAL AND 	REFUSAL 	TO 	ISSUE 	COMPLAINT
Dear Mr. 	Bukey:
The 	above-referenced 	charge 	alleges 	that 	the Vallejo 	Education
Association, 	CTA/NEA 	(Association) 	threatened to strike, 	gave
notice 	to 	strike, 	and struck against 	the Vallejo 	City Unified
School District 	(District). 	This conduct 	is alleged to violate
Government Code sections 3543.6(c) 	and 	(d) 	of the Educational
Employment Relations Act 	(EERA).
I 	indicated 	to you 	in my attached letter dated March 23, 	1993
that 	the 	above-referenced 	charge 	did not 	state 	a prima 	facie
case. 	You were 	advised that 	if 	there were any 	factual
inaccuracies 	or 	additional 	facts 	which would 	correct 	the
deficiencies 	explained 	in that 	letter, 	you 	should amend 	the
charge. 	You were 	further advised that 	unless you 	amended 	the
charge 	to state a prima 	facie 	case or withdrew it prior 	to
March 30, 	1993, 	the charge would be dismissed. 	On March 2 6 and
March 29, 	1993 	you 	requested and were granted extensions 	of 	time
in which to 	file 	the 	first 	amended charge. 	The 	first 	amended
charge was 	filed on April 	12, 	1993. 	The Association's 	opposition
was 	filed on April 	26, 	1993, 	the District's 	reply to 	the
opposition was 	filed on May 3, 	1993, 	and the Association's
response 	to 	the 	reply to the opposition was, 	filed on May 10,
1993. The first amended charge incorporates the initial unfair practice
charge, 	request 	for injunctive 	relief and 	contains 	the 	following
addition information: 	On the 	two days 	of 	strike, 	March 	16 	and
17, 	approximately 100 	teachers 	reported for work. 	Average

teacher attendance 	on a normal 	work day is 	795 	teachers 	out 	of
862. 	Student 	attendance during these 	two days 	averaged
approximately 54 	percent, 	with the absence 	rate being
particularly high 	for Hispanic 	children. 	During 	the 	two day
strike, 	the 	resources 	specialist and speech 	therapy programs 	were
unavailable 	to 	students; 	individual 	education plan and student
study 	team meetings 	were 	cancelled; 	and 	the program quality
review assessment 	at 	one 	elementary school 	was 	cancelled. 	The
charge also alleges various 	forms 	of 	teacher misconduct,
including 	statements 	to 	students 	that 	attendance 	during 	the
strike would not 	count and 	students' 	grades 	would 	suffer 	if 	they
attended school. 	In addition, 	parents were 	contacted by teachers
and 	told not 	to 	send 	their 	children to 	school.
The Association's 	opposition 	includes 	legal 	argument 	and
declarations 	concerning 	the 	two days 	of 	strike 	at 	11 	elementary
schools, 	three junior high schools, 	two senior high schools, 	and
three 	other district 	schools. 	The declarations 	assert 	that:
(1) 	a 	large number of 	teachers did not 	report 	to work on the 	days
of 	the strike; 	(2) 	that almost all 	teachers who went on strike
were replaced by substitute 	teachers; 	(3) 	student attendance was
significantly impacted by the 	strike, 	and 	(4) 	student attendance
on 	the 	first 	day 	following 	the 	strike was 	slightly lower 	than
normal.
Based 	on all 	the 	information provided and legal 	theories 	argued,
the District's 	charge must 	be dismissed as 	failing 	to 	state 	a
prima 	facie 	case based on the 	reasons 	contained 	in my March 23,
1993 	letter and which 	follow.
This 	charge 	involves 	a 	two-day strike by District 	employees 	who
are members 	of 	the 	bargaining unit 	exclusively 	represented by 	the
Association. 	The Association and the District are parties 	to a
collective bargaining agreement with a 	term of 	September 2, 	1991
to June 30, 	1994. 	The strike occurred after the Association and
the District 	were unable 	to 	reach agreement 	over provisions 	of
the 	agreement 	which were 	reopened for negotiations 	in June 	1992.
The 	parties 	participated 	in 	the 	impasse procedures 	with a
factfinder's 	report 	issued on February 10, 	1993 	and they
unsuccessfully 	engaged 	in post 	factfinding 	negotiations 	on
March 4. 	The 	strike 	occurred on March 16 and 17, 	following the
completion by 	the 	Association and 	the 	District 	of 	impasse
procedures.
The 	legal 	issues 	concerning a post-impasse 	strike were 	presented
to 	the 	Board 	in 	Compton Unified School 	District 	(1987) 	PERB 	Order
No. 	IR-50. 	In that 	case, 	the majority of the Board found
reasonable 	cause 	to 	believe 	that 	an unfair practice 	had been
committed where 	the 	strike 	causes 	"a 	total 	breakdown of 	two
discrete 	activities 	that 	are 	guaranteed by statute 	and 	case 	law:
(1) 	basic education for students and 	(2) 	negotiations 	free 	from
N
	2

coercive 	tactics 	that hold hostage that 	education." 	(Id.: 	see
concurring 	opinion 	of 	Member Hesse.)
Compton 	involved a prolonged 	series 	of 	work stoppages 	lasting
from one 	to 	five days each, 	for a total 	of 	sixteen days. 	The
work 	stoppages 	began 	in 	early November 	1986 	and 	continued 	through
March 	1987. 	The District was unable to replace 	the 	striking
teachers 	with 	substitutes 	to 	any significant 	degree 	(average
number of 	teachers 	on strike was 	898 	out 	of approximately 	1400
bargaining unit members, 	with only 43 	substitutes.) 	Student
attendance was 	down approximately 	70 	percent 	from normal 	pre-
strike attendance. 	Moreover, 	attendance was well below average,
even on days 	when no 	strike was 	in progress 	(40 	percent 	during
entire 	four month period.) 	Consequently, 	the Compton majority
found 	that 	a 	considerable 	number of 	the District's 	students
received 	little 	or no meaningful 	education 	for 	the 	entire period
during which 	teachers 	engaged 	in 	intermitted work 	stoppages.
Based upon these 	facts, 	the 	Compton majority determined 	that 	the
- -	work 	stoppages 	resulted 	in a 	"total 	breakdown in education"
satisfied 	the 	two-part 	test described above, 	and 	constituted
reasonable 	cause 	to believe 	that violations 	of 	EERA section
3543.6 (c) 	and 3540 had occurred.
The 	allegations made 	in 	the present 	case do no 	satisfy the
standards 	described 	in Compton, 	Although only 	100 	District
teachers 	out 	of 	a normal 	day attendance 	of 	approximately 	800
arrived for work, 	the District was 	able 	to 	recruit 	a 	large number
of 	substitutes. 	It appears there was at least one substitute
available 	to 	replace 	each striking 	teacher. 	Student 	attendance
at 	the 	District 	schools 	was 	approximately half 	of 	normal 	during
the 	two 	strike days. 	The 	first 	day following the 	strike
witnessed a 	large 	increase 	in student 	attendance. 	There has been
no 	evidence presented which indicates 	that 	the 	two days 	of 	strike
had an 	impact 	on 	student 	attendance beyond 	the week of 	the
strike.
The 	District 	generally asserts 	that 	the 	resource 	specialist 	and
speech 	therapy programs 	were 	unavailable 	to 	students 	and meetings
for 	individual 	education plans 	and 	student 	study 	teams 	were 	also
cancelled. 	However, 	it 	is not 	clear how many students were
involved 	in 	these programs 	nor 	to what 	extent 	these problems
continued after 	the 	strike was 	ended. 	Based on this 	information,
it 	does 	not 	appear 	that 	the 	strike 	in 	the Vallejo district 	caused
the 	type 	of 	problems 	which were witnessed 	in Compton. 	Nor does
it 	appear 	that 	the 	evidence presented by 	the District meets 	the
requirement 	of 	the 	Compton 	case 	of 	a 	total 	breakdown 	in 	the
educational 	process.
The 	second part 	of 	the 	test 	under Compton requires 	that 	there be
a breakdown 	in 	negotiations 	free 	from coercive 	tactics 	that 	hold
hostage 	the educational process. 	Here, 	the parties had completed
the 	factfinding process 	with a 	report 	issuing 	on 	February 	10,
33

1993, 	and had engaged 	in one unsuccessful 	post-factfinding
negotiations 	on March 4, 	1993. 	There is no evidence 	that 	either
party 	sought 	to 	continue 	negotiating 	or 	requested 	negotiations
during 	the 	time period in which the 	strike 	occurred. 	Thus, 	there
is 	no 	evidence 	showing 	that 	there was 	a breakdown 	in 	the
negotiations process. 	Accordingly, 	charging party's 	failure 	to
meet 	either aspect 	of 	the 	Compton test 	requires 	that 	this 	charge
be 	dismissed 	for 	failure 	to state a prima 	facie 	case.
Right 	to Appeal
Pursuant 	to 	Public 	Employment Relations Board regulations, 	you
may obtain a 	review of 	this 	dismissal 	of 	the 	charge by 	filing
an appeal 	to 	the Board 	itself within 	twenty 	(20) 	calendar days
after service of this dismissal. 	(Cal. 	Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32635(a).) 	To be timely filed, 	the original and five 	copies
of 	such appeal 	must 	be 	actually 	received by 	the 	Board 	itself
before 	the 	close of business 	(5 p.m.) 	or sent by telegraph,
certified 	or 	Express 	United States mail 	postmarked no 	later
than the last date set 	for filing. 	(Cal. 	Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32135). 	Code of Civil 	Procedure section 1013 	shall apply.
The Board's 	address 	is:
Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board
1031 	18th Street
Sacramento, 	CA 95814
If you 	file 	a 	timely appeal 	of 	the 	refusal 	to 	issue a 	complaint,
any 	other party may 	file 	with 	the 	Board an 	original 	and 	five
copies 	of 	a 	statement 	in opposition within 	twenty 	(20) 	calendar
days 	following the date of service of the appeal. 	(Cal. 	Code of
Regs., tit. 8, sec. 32635(b).)
Service
All 	documents 	authorized 	to be 	filed herein must 	also be 	"served"
upon all parties 	to 	the proceeding, 	and a 	"proof 	of 	service"
must 	accompany each 	copy of 	a document 	served upon a party 	or
filed with the Board itself. 	(See Cal. 	Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32140 	for the 	required contents and a 	sample 	form.) 	The
document 	will 	be 	considered properly 	"served" 	when personally
delivered or deposited 	in 	the 	first-class mail, 	postage paid and
properly 	addressed.
Extension 	of 	Time
A request 	for an 	extension of 	time, 	in which to 	file a document
with 	the 	Board 	itself, 	must be 	in writing 	and 	filed with 	the
Board at 	the previously noted address. 	A request 	for an
extension must be 	filed at 	least 	three 	(3) 	calendar days before
the 	expiration of 	the 	time 	required 	for 	filing 	the 	document.
4

The request must 	indicate good cause 	for and, 	if known, 	the
position 	of 	each 	other party regarding 	the 	extension, 	and 	shall
be 	accompanied by proof 	of 	service 	of 	the 	request 	upon 	each
party. 	(Cal. 	Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8, 	sec. 	32132.)
Final 	Date
If no appeal 	is 	filed within the 	specified time 	limits, 	the
dismissal 	will 	become 	final 	when the 	time 	limits 	have 	expired.
Sincerely,
Robert 	Thompson
Deputy General 	Counsel
Attachment
cc: 	A. 	Eugene Huguenin, 	Jr.
California 	Teachers 	Association
1705 	Murchison Drive
Burlingame, 	CA 	94010
5
j
5

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	PETE WILSON, Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
Office of the General Counsel
1031 18th Street
Sacramento, CA 95814-4174
(916) 323-8015
PERB
March 23, 	1993
John L. 	Bukey, 	Esq.
Kronick, Moskovitz, 	Tiedemann, 	and Girard
770 L Street, 	No. 	1200
Sacramento, 	California 	95814
Re: 	Vallejo City Unified School District v. 	Vallejo Education
Association
Unfair Practice Charge No. 	SF-CO-437
WARNING 	LETTER
Dear Mr. 	Bukey:
The 	above-referenced 	charge alleges 	that 	the Vallejo
Education Association, 	CTA/NEA 	(Association) 	threatened to
strike, 	gave notice 	to strike and struck against 	the Vallejo City
Unified School District 	(District). 	This 	conduct 	is alleged to
violate sections 	3543.6 	(c) 	and 	(d) 	of the Educational Employment
Relations 	Act 	(EERA).
My 	investigation 	revealed the 	following 	information. 	The
District 	and the Association are parties 	to a collective
bargaining agreement with the 	term of September 2, 	1991 	to June
30, 	1994. 	This agreement provides for the re-opening of 	the
wages, 	health and welfare benefits, 	and two additional 	items
selected by either party during the 	term of 	the 	agreement. 	In
June 	1992, 	the parties 	re-opened the agreement 	for negotiations.
After resolving 	four 	issues, 	the Association and the District
jointly 	filed 	for an 	impasse 	determination which 	PERB 	granted 	on
July 	1, 	1992. 	Mediation took place during the month of July and
the mediator 	certified 	the dispute 	to 	factfinding 	on August 	1,
1992. 	Factfinding 	occurred during December 	1992 	and January 	1993
and the 	factfinders' 	report 	issued on February 10, 	1993. 	The
factfinder 	recommended acceptance 	of 	the District's 	final
proposal 	on the 	two 	issues presented to 	factfinding, 	wages and
health and welfare benefits. 	A lengthy dissent 	was 	filed by
Chuck Davies, 	the Association's 	representativ,. e 	on the 	factfinding
panel. 	The parties 	engaged 	in post 	fact-finding negotiations 	on
March 4, 	but were unsuccessful.
On March 9, 	the District Board adopted a resolution which:
(1) 	Reduced salaries by 2.175% effective March 1, 	(2) 	reduced

John L. 	Bukey, 	Esq.
SF-CO-437
March 23, 	1993
Page 2
the work year by one day, 	(3) 	capped the District's 	contribution
for medical 	programs 	at 	the 	1991-92 	school 	year contribution
level, 	and 	(4) 	adopted seven tentative agreements 	reached by the
District 	and 	the Association during bargaining.
On March 	11, 	the Association circulated an action memorandum
informing 	teachers 	to 	remove all 	of 	their personal 	belongings 	and
other materials 	from their 	classroom by the 	end 	of 	Friday, 	March
12. 	It stated, 	in addition, 	"leave only those essential
materials 	that 	you 	can remove easily 	(in a box) 	once you have
been notified of 	the 	specific 	STRIKE day or days." 	At 	6:30 	a.m.
on Sunday, 	March 14, 	the Association gave written notice to the
District 	superintendent 	that 	the 	strike would commence 	on
Tuesday, 	March 16. 	The strike began on March 16. 	The teachers
returned 	to work on March 	18.
Based on the 	information provided above, 	this 	charge does
not 	state 	a prima 	facie violation of 	the 	EERA for the 	reasons
which 	follow.
The District 	argues 	four theories 	under which 	the 	facts
stated above would be a violation of 	the EERA: 	(1) 	A strike 	is
an illegal, 	unilateral 	change in the negotiable subject 	of hours
because teachers refuse to appear and conduct classes, 	(2) 	a
strike 	is 	an unfair negotiating pressure 	tactic because 	the
District 	serves 	school children who, 	generally, 	have no
educational alternatives, 	(3) 	teacher strikes are, 	per se, 	a
violation 	of 	the 	EERA as 	evidenced by the 	specific 	exclusion of
the 	applicability of 	Labor Code 	section 923 	contained 	in
Government Code section 3549, 	(4) 	teachers' 	strikes are illegal
because 	they 	constitute 	an 	imminent 	threat 	to 	the health and
safety of 	the public under County Sanitation District No. 	2 	v.
Los Angeles County Employees' 	Association 	(1985) 	38 Cal.3d 564.
The 	first 	three 	theories 	presented by the District 	are based
on Member 	Porter's 	opinion 	in Compton Unified School 	District
(1987) 	PERB Order No. 	IR-50. 	These theories were not adopted by
the 	concurring opinion of 	Chairperson Hesse and, 	therefore, 	did
not 	form a basis 	for 	the 	Board's 	decision 	in the 	case. 	These
theories 	have 	not been adopted by PERB or California 	courts. 	In
fact, 	the 	California 	Supreme 	Court has 	repeatedly rejected 	the
notion 	that 	all 	strikes by public 	employees 	such as 	teachers 	are
illegal. 	(See 	San Diego Teachers Association v. 	Superior Court
(1979) 	24 	Cal.3d 1; 	El Rancho Unified School District v. 	National
Education Association 	(1983) 	33 	Cal.3d 946); 	and County
Sanitation District No. 	2 v. 	Los Angeles County Employees'
Association 	(1985) 	38 	Cal.3d 564 	where 	the 	Court 	had stated at
page 571:

John L. Bukey, 	Esq.
SF-CO-437
March 23, 	1993
Page 3
[w]ith 	the 	exception 	of 	firefighters 	(Lab.
Code section 1962), 	no statutory prohibition
against 	strikes 	by public 	employees 	in 	this
state exists.
In addition, 	the 	Supreme Court 	in County Sanitation specifically
rejected 	the 	argument 	that 	non-applicability 	of 	Labor 	Code
section 923 	constitutes 	a prohibition on the 	right 	to 	strike.
The plurality stated at page 573:
...an 	examination of 	other California
statutes 	governing public 	employees makes 	it
perfectly 	clear 	that 	section 3509 	was 	not
included 	in MMBA as 	a means 	for prohibiting
strikes.
Based on 	the 	lack of 	statutory and case 	law support 	the
District's 	first 	three 	theories must be 	rejected as 	not 	stating a
prima 	facie violation of 	the EERA.
The District's 	fourth 	theory is based on language 	in County
Sanitation which 	states:
...strikes 	by public 	employees 	are 	not
unlawful 	unless 	or until 	it 	is 	clearly
demonstrated that 	such a 	strike 	creates 	a
substantial 	and 	imminent 	threat 	to 	the 	health
or safety of 	the public. 	This 	standard
allows 	exceptions 	in 	certain essential 	areas
of public employment 	(e.g., 	the prohibition
against 	firefighters 	and 	law enforcement
personnel). 	It also requires the courts to
determine 	on a 	case-by-case basis 	whether 	the
public 	interest 	overrides 	the basic 	right 	to
strike.
Thus, 	the 	Supreme 	Court developed a 	standard which 	foresaw only
two general 	exceptions, 	that is, 	firefighters and law enforcement
personnel. 	All 	other public 	employee 	strike 	cases would be
assessed on a 	"case-by-case basis" 	to determine whether 	the
strike 	constitutes 	a 	substantial 	and 	imminent 	threat 	to 	the
health or safety of 	the public. 	In City of Santa Ana v. 	Santa
Ana Police Benevolent Association 	(1989) 	2.07 Cal.App. 3d 1568, 	a
California 	Court 	of 	Appeal 	applied the 	County Sanitation rule 	to
sick-outs 	by police 	officers 	during 	labor negotiations. 	They
found 	that 	such 	strikes 	by police 	officers 	should be 	enjoined.
However, 	teachers are not police officers and, 	therefore, 	any
finding that 	a 	teachers' 	strike 	constitutes 	a substantial 	and
. '

John L. 	Bukey, 	Esq.
SF-CO-437
March 23, 	1993
Page 4
imminent 	threat 	to 	the health or safety of 	the public must 	be
made 	on a 	case-by-case basis.
The 	Board 	adopted a 	similar 	test 	in 	Compton Unified 	School
District, 	supra, 	PERB Order No. 	IR-50 where a majority of 	the
- -Board 	found 	that 	reasonable 	cause 	to 	find a violation 	of 	the 	EERA
existed where 	a 	strike 	caused a 	total 	breakdown of 	two 	discreet
activities 	that 	are 	guaranteed by the 	statute and 	case 	law: 	1)
basic 	education for students 	and 2) 	negotiations 	free 	from
coercive 	tactics 	that 	hold hostage 	that 	education.
No evidence was 	presented 	in this 	case 	that 	there was 	a
total 	breakdown of 	either basic 	education 	for students 	or
negotiations 	between the District 	and the Association.
Accordingly, 	no prima 	facie violation of 	the 	EERA has 	been
stated.
For these reasons 	the charge, 	as presently written, 	does not
state 	a prima 	facie 	case. 	If 	there are any factual 	inaccuracies
in 	this 	letter or additional 	facts 	which would correct 	the
deficiencies 	explained above, 	please amend the 	charge. 	The
amended 	charge 	should be 	prepared 	on a 	standard 	PERB 	unfair
practice 	charge 	form, 	clearly labeled First Amended Charge,
contain all 	the 	facts and allegations you wish to make, 	and
-be 	signed under penalty of perjury by the 	charging party. 	The
amended charge must 	be 	served on the 	respondent 	and 	the 	original
proof 	of 	service must be 	filed with PERB. 	If 	I 	do not 	receive an
amended charge or withdrawal 	from you before March 30, 	I 	shall
dismiss your charge. 	If you have any questions, 	please 	call me
at 	(916) 	323-8015.
Sincerely,
Robert 	Thompson
Deputy 	General 	Counsel
. '