California State Employees Association (Hackett, et al.) (PERB 0979S)

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
CATHY R. 	HACKETT, 	ET AL.,
Charging Parties,
v.
CALIFORNIA 	STATE 	EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
Case No. 	S-CO-147-S
PERB Decision No. 	979-S
March 10, 	1993
Appearances: 	Carlos M. 	Alcala, 	Attorney, 	for Cathy R. 	Hackett,
et al; 	Howard Schwartz, 	Attorney, 	for California State Employees
Association.
Before Blair, 	Chair; 	Hesse and Caffrey, 	Members.
DECISION AND 	ORDER
HESSE, 	Member: 	This 	case 	is before the Public Employment
Relations Board 	(Board) 	on appeal by Cathy R. 	Hackett, 	et al.
(Hackett) 	of a Board agent's dismissal 	(attached hereto) 	of 	the
unfair practice 	charge. 	Hackett alleged 	that 	the 	California
State 	Employees Association 	(CSEA) 	violated sections 	3512,
3515.5, 	3519.5(b) 	and 3515.6 	of the Ralph C. 	Dills Act 	(Dills
Act)1 by discriminating and imposing reprisals against members 	of
1The Dills Act 	is 	codified at 	Government 	Code 	section 	3512
et 	seq. 	Unless 	otherwise 	indicated, 	all 	statutory references
herein are 	to the Government 	Code. 	Sections 	3512 	and 3515.6 	of
the Dills Act 	set 	forth the purposes 	of 	the Dills Act 	and the
right 	of 	employee 	organizations 	to have membership dues,
initiation 	fees, 	membership benefit programs and general
assessments deducted. 	Section 3515.5 	states:
Employee 	organizations 	shall 	have 	the 	right
to 	represent 	their members 	in their
employment 	relations with the state, 	except
that 	once 	an employee 	organization 	is
recognized as 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	of
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______________ !

the Unit 	1 Bargaining Unit 	Committee. 	It 	is also alleged that
CSEA violated 	its 	duty of 	fair 	representation.
an appropriate unit, 	the 	recognized employee
organization 	is 	the 	only organization 	that
may 	represent 	that 	unit 	in employment
relations with the 	state. 	Employee
organizations 	may 	establish 	reasonable
restrictions 	regarding who may 	join and may
make 	reasonable provisions 	for 	the dismissal
of 	individuals 	from membership. 	Nothing 	in
this 	section shall 	prohibit 	any employee 	from
appearing 	in his 	own behalf 	in his 	employment
relations with the 	state.
Section 3519.5 	states, 	in pertinent part:
It 	shall 	be unlawful 	for an employee
organization to:
(b) 	Impose 	or threaten to 	impose 	reprisals
on employees, 	to discriminate 	or threaten to
discriminate against 	employees, 	or otherwise
to interfere with, 	restrain, 	or coerce
employees 	because 	of 	their exercise 	of 	rights
guaranteed by 	this 	chapter.
The 	Board has 	reviewed 	the 	charge and the appeal. 	We 	find
that 	no prima 	facie 	case has been stated. 	Finding 	the Board
agent's 	warning and dismissal 	letters 	to be 	free 	of 	prejudicial
error, 	the Board adopts 	them as 	the decision of 	the Board itself.
The unfair practice 	charge 	in Case No. 	S-CO-147-S 	is 	hereby
DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE 	TO AMEND.
Chair Blair and Member Caffrey 	joined 	in 	this 	Decision.
22

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	* 	PETE WILSON, Governor
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
Sacramento Regional Office
1031 18th Street, Room 102
Sacramento, CA 	95814-4174
(916) 322-3198
PERD
September 22, 	1992
Cathy 	Hackett
Re: 	Cathy Hackett et al. 	v. 	California State Employees
Association. 	Case No. 	S-C0-147-S
DISMISSAL 	LETTER
Dear Ms. 	Hackett:
On June 23, 	1992, 	you filed a charge in which you allege that the
California 	State 	Employees Association 	(CSEA) 	violated Government
Code sections 3512, 	3515.5, 	3519.5 and 3515.6 	(the Dills Act).
On June 30, 	1992, 	you filed an amended charged alleging that CSEA
1
violated sections 	3515, 	3515.5 and 3519.5(b) 	of 	the Dills Act l
by
discriminating and 	imposing 	reprisals 	against members 	of 	the
Unit 1 Bargaining Unit Committee 	(BUNC). 	Specifically, 	you
allege 	that 	CSEA violated 	its 	duty of 	fair 	representation by
suspending the CSEA memberships of 	Cathy R. 	Hackett, 	Jim Hard,
David J. 	Weston, 	Sam Jurado and Doyle Harris 	and denying Hackett
and Weston 	the 	right 	to 	run 	for CSEA Civil 	Service Division
offices. 	In addition, 	your charge alleges 	that 	CSEA violated
section 3519.5(b) 	of 	the Dills Act by mailing out 	the last, 	best
and 	final 	offer from the 	State 	of 	California 	(State) 	to 	rank and
file members 	of Bargaining Unit 	1 without 	the approval 	of 	the
BUNC. 	You also allege 	that 	CSEA, 	by suspending 	the memberships
of Hackett, 	Hard, 	Weston, 	Jurado and Harris for ten 	(10) 	days
without 	a 	hearing and without 	an expedited procedure, 	imposed an
unreasonable membership provision 	on 	them 	in violation 	of 	section
3515.5 	of 	the Dills Act.
I 	indicated to you, 	in my attached letter dated July 9, 	1992,
that 	the 	above-referenced 	charge 	did not 	state a prima 	facie
case. 	You were advised that, 	if there were any factual
•"•Sections 3512 	and 3515.6 	of 	the Dills Act 	respectfully, 	set
forth the purposes 	of 	the Dills Act 	and the 	right 	of 	employee
organizations to have membership dues, 	initiation fees,
membership benefit 	programs 	and general 	assessments 	deducted.
Charging 	Parties 	original 	and amended 	charges 	fail 	to 	contain any
allegations which demonstrate violations 	of 	these 	sections.
-----

inaccuracies 	or additional 	facts 	which would 	correct 	the
deficiencies 	explained in that 	letter, 	you 	should amend the
charge. 	On July 20, 	1992, 	you filed a Second Amended Charge
containing 45 	Exhibits. 	I 	have 	thoroughly reviewed your Amended
Charge 	and all 	the 	Exhibits 	which 	contained additional 	material
regarding the protected nature of 	the 	Charging Parties' 	conduct.
However, 	even assuming the 	Charging 	Parties 	engaged in protected
activity, 	there are 	insufficient 	facts 	contained 	in your Amended
Charge 	to demonstrate 	a nexus 	between 	the protected activity and
the 	adverse 	actions 	taken by 	the Association against 	Charging
Parties. 	Accordingly, 	this 	charge must be dismissed for the
reasons 	contained in this 	letter and my July 9, 	1992 	letter.
September 22, 	1992
Page 2
Right 	to Appeal
Pursuant 	to 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board regulations, 	you
may 	obtain a 	review of 	this 	dismissal 	of 	the 	charge by 	filing
an appeal 	to 	the Board itself within twenty 	(20) 	calendar days
after service of this dismissal. 	(Cal. 	Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32635(a).) 	To be timely filed, 	the original and five 	copies
of 	such appeal 	must 	be actually 	received by 	the Board 	itself
before the close of business 	(5 p.m.) 	or sent by telegraph,
certified 	or 	Express 	United 	States 	mail 	postmarked no 	later
than the last date set for filing. 	(Cal. 	Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32135.) 	Code of Civil 	Procedure section 1013 	shall apply.
The Board's address 	is:
Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board
1031 	18th Street
Sacramento, 	CA 95814
If you 	file a 	timely appeal 	of 	the 	refusal 	to issue a 	complaint,
any 	other party may 	file 	with 	the 	Board an 	original 	and 	five
copies 	of 	a statement 	in opposition within twenty 	(20) 	calendar
days 	following the date of service of 	the appeal. 	(Cal. 	Code of
Regs., tit. 8, sec. 32635(b).)
Service
All 	documents 	authorized 	to be 	filed herein must 	also be 	"served"
upon all parties 	to the proceeding, 	and a 	"proof 	of 	service"
must 	accompany each 	copy of 	a document 	served upon a party or
filed with the Board itself. 	(See Cal. 	Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8,
sec. 	32140 	for the 	required contents and a sample 	form.) 	The
document 	will 	be 	considered properly 	"served" 	when personally
delivered or deposited in the 	first-class mail, 	postage paid and
properly 	addressed.

September 22, 	1992
Page 3
Extension of 	Time
A request 	for an extension of 	time, 	in which to 	file a document
with 	the 	Board 	itself, 	must be 	in writing and 	filed with 	the
Board at 	the previously noted address. 	A request 	for an
extension must be 	filed at 	least 	three 	(3) 	calendar days before
the 	expiration of 	the 	time 	required 	for 	filing 	the 	document.
The request must 	indicate good cause 	for and, 	if known, 	the
position of 	each other party regarding 	the 	extension, 	and shall
be 	accompanied by proof 	of 	service 	of 	the 	request 	upon each
party. 	(Cal. 	Code of Regs., 	tit. 	8, 	sec. 	32132.)
Final 	Date
If no appeal 	is 	filed within the 	specified time 	limits, 	the
dismissal 	will become 	final 	when the 	time 	limits 	have 	expired.
Sincerely,
JOHN W. 	SPITTLER
General 	Counsel
By Michael E. 	Gash
Regional 	Attorney
Attachment
cc: 	Carlos Alcala
f

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	PETE WILSON, Governor
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
Sacramento Regional Office
1031 18th Street, Room 102
Sacramento, CA 	95814-4174
(916) 322-3198
July 9, 	1992
Cathy 	Hackett
Re: 	Cathy Hackett et al. 	v. California State Employees
Association. 	Case No. 	S-CO-147-S
WARNING 	LETTER
Dear Ms. 	Hackett:
On June 23, 	1992, 	you filed a charge in which you allege that 	the
California State 	Employees Association 	(CSEA) 	violated Government
Code sections 3512, 	3515.5, 	3519.5 and 3515.6 	(the Dills Act).1
On June 	30, 	1992, 	you filed an amended charged alleging that 	CSEA
violated sections 	3515, 	3515.5 	and 3519.5(b) 	of the Dills Act by
discriminating and 	imposing 	reprisals 	against members 	of 	the
Unit 1 Bargaining Unit Committee 	(BUNC). 	Specifically, 	you
allege 	that 	CSEA violated 	its 	duty of 	fair 	representation by
suspending the CSEA memberships 	of 	Cathy R. 	Hackett, 	Jim Hard,
David J. 	Weston, 	Sam Jurado and Doyle Harris 	and denying Hackett
and Weston 	the 	right 	to 	run 	for CSEA Civil 	Service Division
offices. 	In addition, 	your charge alleges 	that CSEA violated
section 3519.5(b) 	of the Dills Act by mailing out 	the last, 	best
and final 	offer from the State of California 	(State) 	to rank and
file members 	of 	Bargaining Unit 	1 without 	the approval 	of 	the
BUNC. 	You also allege 	that 	CSEA by suspending 	the memberships 	of
Hackett, 	Hard, 	Weston, 	Jurado and Harris for ten 	(10) 	days
without 	a hearing, 	and without 	an expedited procedure 	imposed an
unreasonable membership provision 	on 	them 	in violation 	of 	section
3515.5 	of 	the Dills Act. 	My 	investigation revealed the 	following
facts.
1Sections 3512 	and 3515.6 	of 	the Dills Act 	respectfully, 	set
forth the purposes 	of 	the Dills Act and the 	right 	of 	employee
organizations 	to have membership dues, 	initiation fees,
membership benefit 	programs 	and general 	assessments 	deducted.
Charging 	Parties' 	original 	and amended 	charges 	fail 	to 	contain
any allegations which demonstrate violations 	of 	these 	sections.
-----

. . .
July 9, 	1992
Page 2
CSEA is 	a 	recognized employee 	organization 	that 	is 	the 	exclusive
representative 	for state employees 	in Bargaining Units 	1, 	3, 	4
11, 	14, 	15. 	17, 	20 and 21. 	Charging Parties are elected members
of 	the BUNC. 	Hackett 	is 	the elected Chairperson and Hard is 	the
elected Vice 	President 	of 	Bargaining Unit 	1.
On or about May 25, 	1992, 	CSEA reached a tentative agreement with
the State 	for new MOUs 	in Bargaining Units 	4 	and 15. 	Shortly
thereafter, 	tentative agreements 	for new MOUs were 	reached in
Bargaining Units 	20 	and 21. 	In accordance with 	its 	ground rules
and 	internal 	procedures, 	CSEA commenced a 	contract 	ratification
vote 	and 	recommended 	that 	these 	agreements 	be 	accepted by 	the
membership of 	the respective units.2
On June 23, 	1992, 	CSEA temporarily suspended the memberships 	of
Hackett, 	Hard, 	Weston, 	Jurado and Harris 	in accordance with CSEA
Policy File Section 1001.04.3 On June 29, 	1992, 	the CSEA Civil
Service Division met 	in Burbank, 	California 	to 	conduct 	elections
for Civil 	Service Division officers. 	Hackett and Weston were
2Paragraph 14 	of 	the ground rules 	states
If 	the parties 	reach tentative 	agreement 	on
the 	total 	agreement 	the Union, 	including 	its
paid 	staff 	and negotiating 	team members,
shall 	recommend acceptance 	to 	its membership.
3CSEA Policy 	File 	Section 	1001.04 	states
Suspension of Member of 	the Association
When, 	in the opinion of the president, 	the
actions 	of 	a member are 	such as 	to pose an
immediate 	threat 	to 	the welfare 	of 	the
Association, 	the president may summarily
suspend 	the member until 	the procedure
established 	in Policy 	File 	Section 	1001.06 	or
1001.07 	is 	concluded. 	If written charges are
not 	filed within 10 days, 	the suspension is
terminated.
However, 	if 	the suspension is brought within
90 	days 	immediately prior to General 	Council,
the written 	charges must 	be 	ratified by a
majority of 	the officers, 	and filed within 10
days 	or the 	suspension 	is 	terminated.

ineligible 	to participate 	in these 	elections 	due 	to 	their
suspended 	status.
July 9, 	1992
Page 3
On July 2, 	1992, 	CSEA filed formal 	charges against Hackett, 	Hard,
Weston, 	Jurado and Harris 	and they were 	informed that 	their
suspensions 	would 	remain 	in effect 	until 	the 	conclusion 	of 	CSEA's
disciplinary proceedings. 	Based upon the above 	facts 	I 	find 	that
you have 	failed 	to 	establish a prima 	facie 	case 	that 	CSEA has
violated 	its 	duty of 	fair 	representation.
Your 	charge 	challenges 	CSEA's 	internal 	disciplinary procedures.
Generally, 	the 	Public 	Employment Relations 	Board 	(PERB 	or Board)
has 	not 	read the Dills Act 	as authorizing PERB 	to 	intervene 	in
internal 	union affairs. 	In Service 	Employees 	International
Union. 	Local 99 	(Kimmett) 	(1979) 	PERB Decision No. 	106, 	at
pp. 	15-17, 	the Board explained as follows:
The EERA gives 	employees 	the 	right 	to 	"join
and participate 	in activities 	of 	employee
organizations" 	(sec. 	3543) 	and employee
organizations 	are 	prevented 	from 	interfering
with employees because 	of 	the 	exercise 	of
their rights 	(sec. 	3543.6(b)). 	Read broadly,
these 	sections 	could be 	construed as
prohibiting 	any 	employee 	organization 	conduct
which would prevent 	or 	limit 	employee's
participation in any of 	its activities. 	The
internal 	organization 	structure 	could be
scrutinized as 	could 	the 	conduct 	of 	elections
for union officers 	to 	ensure 	conformance with
an 	idealized participatory 	standard. 	However
laudable 	such a result might be, 	the Board
finds 	such 	intervention 	in union affairs 	to
be beyond 	the 	legislative 	intent 	in enacting
the EERA. 	There 	is nothing in the EERA
comparable 	to 	the 	Labor-Management 	Reporting
and Disclosure Act of 	1959, 	which regulates
certain 	internal 	conduct 	of unions 	operating
in the private 	sector. 	The EERA does not
describe 	the 	internal 	working 	or 	structure 	of
employee 	organization nor does 	it 	define 	the
internal 	rights 	of organization members. 	We
cannot believe 	that by the use 	of 	the phrase
"participate 	in the activities 	of 	employee
organizations 	. 	. 	. 	for the purpose of
representation on all matters 	of 	employer-
employee relations" 	in section 3543, 	the

Legislature 	intended 	this 	Board 	to 	create 	a
regulatory 	set 	of 	standards 	governing 	the
solely 	internal 	relationship between a union
and its members. 	Rather, 	we believe that 	the
Legislature 	intended 	in 	the 	EERA to grant 	and
protect employees' 	rights 	to be represented
in 	their employment 	relations 	by 	freely
chosen employee 	organizations. 	[Footnotes
omitted.]
July 9, 	1992
Page 	4
'
At 	the 	same 	time, 	PERB has 	recognized an exception to 	the general
principle of 	non-intervention, 	where 	the 	internal 	activities 	of
an 	employee 	organization 	have 	such a 	substantial 	impact 	on
employees' 	relationship with their employer as 	to give 	rise 	to
the duty of 	fair representation. 	The present 	charge 	fails 	to
allege 	or demonstrate 	that 	the 	internal 	activities 	of 	CSEA have
such a 	substantial 	impact 	on 	Charging 	Parties' 	relationship with
their employer as 	to give 	rise 	to the duty of 	fair
representation.
PERB has 	also recognized two other exceptions 	to 	the principle 	of
non-intervention. 	In California School 	Employees Association and
its Shasta College Chapter #381 	(Parisot) 	(1983) 	PERB Decision
No. 	280, 	at p. 	11, 	PERB recognized its 	"jurisdictional power to
determine 	whether an 	employee 	organization has 	exceeded 	its
authority under subsection 3543.1(a) 	to dismiss 	or otherwise
discipline 	its members." 	That 	subsection of 	the 	EERA provides 	in
relevant part as 	follows:
Employee 	organizations 	may 	establish
reasonable 	restrictions 	regarding who may
join and may make 	reasonable provisions 	for
the 	dismissal 	of 	individuals 	from membership.
Thus, 	in questions of membership, 	PERB will examine the
reasonableness 	of 	restrictions 	or dismissals. 	See also Union of
American Physicians and Dentists 	(Stewart) 	(1985) 	PERB Decision
No. 	539-S 	and California 	Correctional 	Peace Officers Association
(Colman) 	(1989) 	PERB Decision No. 	755-S.
In this 	case, 	CSEA suspended Charging Parties 	for ten 	(10) 	days
pending the 	filing of 	formal 	charges. 	On July 2, 	1992, 	formal
charges 	were 	filed and Charging 	Parties 	were 	informed 	that 	their
suspensions 	would 	remain 	in effect pending 	the 	completion of
4EERA Section 3543.6(b) 	is 	identical 	to section 3519.5(b) 	of
the Dills Act.

CSEA's disciplinary procedures, 	which includes 	the 	right 	to a
hearing, 	the right to be represented, 	the right 	to introduce
evidence and the 	right 	to 	cross-examine witnesses. 	Charging
Parties 	have 	failed 	to demonstrate 	that 	CSEA's 	procedures 	for
suspending members and filing charges, 	under this 	situation, 	was
unreasonable.
July 9, 	1992
Page 5
In California State Employees' 	Association 	(O'Connell) 	(1989)
PERB Decision No. 	753-H, 	at p. 	9, 	PERB also explicitly recognized
its 	statutory authority 	to 	inquire 	into 	the 	internal 	activities
of 	an employee 	organization when it 	is 	alleged that 	the
organization has 	imposed 	reprisals 	on employees 	because 	of 	their
exercise 	of protected rights. 	This 	decision was based on the
statutory authority of Government 	Code 	section 3571.1(b) 	of 	the
Higher Education Employer-Employee Act. 	The 	same 	statutory
language appears 	in section 3519.5(b) 	of 	the Dills Act. 	See also
California Association of 	Psychiatric Technicians 	(Long) 	(1989)
PERB Decision No. 	745-S 	and California School 	Employees
Association 	(Petrich) 	(1989) 	PERB Decision No. 	767.
In California State Employees' 	Association 	(O'Connell). 	supra,
the 	Board 	stated 	that
An 	inquiry must 	go 	forth under 	Carlsbad
Unified School 	District 	(1979) 	PERB Decision
No. 	89 	and/or Novato Unified School District
(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	210, 	as to whether
the 	actions 	were motivated by a 	charging
party's 	exercise of protected activity. 	(At
pp. 	9-10.) 	(Emphasis 	in original.)
Under Novato. 	a 	charging party must 	show an engagement 	in
protective activity, 	that 	the 	respondent 	had knowledge 	of 	such
activity and 	that 	the 	respondent's 	harmful 	action against 	the
charging party was motivated by an unlawful 	intent. 	The
respondent 	then must 	put 	forward a defense 	as 	to whether 	there
was 	any 	legitimate business 	concern 	sufficient 	to 	cause 	the
action against 	the 	charging party. 	If 	there 	is both a lawful 	and
an unlawful motive present, 	the Board will 	determine whether 	the
respondent would have 	taken 	its 	action had 	the 	charging party not
engaged 	in protected 	activity.
Charging 	Parties 	have 	failed 	to demonstrate 	that 	CSEA's 	conduct
was motivated by protected activity. 	Charging 	Parties' 	amended
charge 	alleges 	that 	they have 	been discriminated against 	and have

been 	subject 	to 	reprisals 	for dissenting against 	the 	proposed
contract. 	Charging Parties were 	requested to set 	forth clearly
and 	concisely 	the protective 	activity 	they 	engaged 	in and 	the
nexus 	between CSEA's 	conduct 	and 	their protective 	activity.
Charging 	Parties' 	Supplemental Authorities merely states
July 9, 	1992
Page 6
As 	is 	shown by the Declaration of 	Cathy
Hackett 	(Ex 1) 	the activity that 	she was
involved 	in was protected by the Act. 	The
Nexus 	that 	is present here 	is 	the same
alluded 	to 	In Novato Unified School 	District
(1982) 	Perb 210. 	In novato the Board found
there must 	be 	a nexus 	between 	the protected
activity and the suspension, 	(sic)
Charging 	Parties' 	statement 	fails 	to provide 	sufficient 	facts 	to
demonstrate 	that 	Charging 	Parties 	engaged 	in protected activity
or 	that 	CSEA's 	action was 	motivated by protected activity.
Even assuming 	Charging 	Parties 	engaged 	in protected activity,
Charging 	Parties 	have 	failed to demonstrate 	that 	CSEA's 	actions
were motivated by protected conduct. 	CSEA contends 	that 	Charging
Parties were 	suspended because 	they, 	after being warned not 	to
interfere 	with 	the 	ratification votes 	for other bargaining units,
distributed fliers, criticized the agreements that had been reached
in 	other bargaining units 	and disrupted 	ratification meetings 	in
an effort 	to discourage Bargaining Units 4, 	15, 	20 and 21 members
from voting 	to accept 	and 	ratify 	the 	tentative 	agreements 	in
their 	respective bargaining units.
Expect 	for one 	sentence 	in Hackett's Declaration of July 3, 	1992,
Charging 	Parties 	have 	failed 	to mention 	that 	flyers 	were
published and distributed by them.5 Furthermore, 	Charging
Parties have not alleged that 	this 	conduct 	is protected activity,
nor have 	they 	cited any 	legal 	authority which suggests 	that 	this
conduct 	is protected activity. 	Therefore, 	Charging Parties have
failed to demonstrate 	the 	elements 	of 	a prima facie 	case.
5Sackett's Declaration states 	on p.5, 	at paragraphs 	24-27
Unit 	1 	did publish 	flyers 	that 	communicated
in 	the 	same way CSEA did with workers 	in 	from
[sic] 	of buildings but these 	flyers were
identified as 	Bargaining Unit 	1 	flyers.

July 9, 	1992
Page 	7
For these reasons the charge, 	as presently written, 	does not
state a prima facie 	case. 	If 	there are any factual 	inaccuracies
in 	this 	letter 	or additional 	facts 	which would 	correct
the deficiencies explained above, please amend the charge. The
amended 	charge 	should be 	prepared 	on a 	standard 	PERB unfair
practice 	charge 	form, 	clearly labeled Second Amended Charge,
contain all 	the 	facts and allegations you wish to make, 	and
be 	signed under penalty of 	perjury by 	the 	Charging 	Party. 	The
amended 	charge must 	be 	served on the Respondent 	and 	the 	original
proof 	of 	service must be 	filed with PERB. 	If 	I do not 	receive an
amended charge or withdrawal 	from you before July 16, 	1992, 	I
shall dismiss your charge. 	If you have any questions, 	please
call me at 	(916) 	322-3198.
Sincerely,
michael G. Gack
Michael E. 	Gash
Regional 	Attorney
cc: 	Carlos Alcala