Compton Community College District (PERB 0790E)

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
COMPTON COMMUNITY COLLEGE
FEDERATION OF 	EMPLOYEES,
Charging 	Party,
v.
COMPTON COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT,
Respondent.
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) 	Case No. 	LA-CE-2393
PERB Decision No. 	790
February 6, 	1990
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Appearances: 	Lawrence Rosenzweig, 	Attorney, 	for Compton
Community College Federation of Employees; 	Jones 	& Matson by
Urrea C. 	Jones, 	Jr., 	Attorney, 	for Compton Community College
District.
Before: 	Hesse, 	Chairperson; 	Craib and Shank, 	Members.
DECISION
SHANK, 	Member: 	This 	case 	is 	before the Public 	Employment
Relations 	Board 	(PERB or Board) 	on exceptions 	filed by the
Compton Community College District 	(District) 	to 	the proposed
decision of a PERB administrative 	law judge 	(ALJ). 	The case
arose 	out 	of 	an unfair practice 	charge 	filed by 	the 	Compton
Community College Federation of 	Employees 	(Federation) 	against
the District alleging violations of section 3543.5(a), 	(b), 	(c),
(d) 	and 	(e) 	of the Educational Employment Relations Act 	(EERA or
Act). 	A complaint was then issued by PERB alleging violation of
EERA section 3543.5(c) 	and, 	derivatively 	(a) 	and 	(b).1
1JEERA	EERA 	is 	codified at Government Code 	section 	3540 	et 	seq.
Unless 	otherwise 	indicated, 	all 	statutory references 	herein are
to the Government Code. 	Section 3543.5(a), 	(b) 	and 	(c) 	states:
It 	shall be unlawful 	for a public 	school
employer to:

The 	Federation alleges 	the 	District violated 	the Act 	by:
(1) 	unilaterally 	changing 	its 	policy regarding the 	attendance 	(on
paid time) 	of 	Federation Co-President McManus 	at District board
of trustees meetings; 	(2) 	unilaterally distributing and
implementing 	a 	1986-87 	instructional 	calendar without 	negotiating
the decision or its 	effects; 	and 	(3) 	refusing to comply in a
timely manner with 	the 	Federation's 	requests 	for 	information.
After a hearing on the matter, 	the ALJ found that: 	(1) 	the
District unilaterally 	changed 	its 	previous 	attendance policy; 	(2)
the 	District 	complied with 	its 	duty 	under EERA to 	give 	the
Federation notice 	and 	an opportunity 	to 	bargain 	over 	the
instructional 	calendar 	at 	a 	time when meaningful 	negotiations
were 	still possible; 	(3) 	the District did not provide the names
and addresses 	of part-time unit members 	in a timely manner; 	and
(4) 	the 	District did not 	fail 	to provide data regarding
expenditures 	for attorney 	services.
We have reviewed the 	entire record 	in this 	case, 	including
the 	District's 	exceptions 	to 	the proposed decision 	and 	the
(a) 	Impose or threaten to 	impose reprisals
on employees, 	to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against 	employees, 	or otherwise
to interfere with, 	restrain, 	or coerce
employees 	because 	of 	their exercise 	of 	rights
guaranteed by this 	chapter.
(b) 	Deny to employee organizations 	rights
guaranteed 	to 	them by this 	chapter.
(c) 	Refuse or 	fail to meet and negotiate 	in
good 	faith with 	an exclusive 	representative.
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Federation's 	response thereto and, 	finding the ALJ's 	findings 	of
fact 	and conclusions 	of 	law to be 	free 	of prejudicial 	error, 	we
adopt 	the 	attached proposed decision as 	the 	decision of 	the 	Board
itself. 	The District's 	exceptions will be addressed 	in the
following 	discussion.
DISCUSSION
The 	District 	filed 	two 	exceptions 	to 	the ALJ's 	proposed
decision. 	The Federation responded to the District's 	exceptions,
but 	did 	not 	otherwise 	except 	to 	the 	proposed decision.
First, 	the District 	excepted to the ALJ's 	conclusion that
the 	District 	unilaterally 	changed 	an 	established policy 	of
attendance 	at District board of 	trustees 	meetings. 	The 	Distric. . .
t
asserts 	that 	neither party 	may 	unilaterally 	establish 	a 	policy
regarding paid release 	time 	for attendance 	at board 	of 	trustees
meetings. 	Furthermore, 	it asserts 	that the Federation failed to
prove 	that 	the 	District 	"consciously yielded" 	or 	"intentionally
relinquished" 	its 	right 	to bargain paid release 	time 	for McManus.
The ALJ 	correctly 	noted 	that 	an 	established policy may 	be
embodied 	in the 	terms 	of 	a 	collective bargaining agreement 	(Grant
Joint Union High School District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	196),
or, 	where a contract is 	silent or ambiguous, 	it may be determined
from past practice 	or bargaining history 	(Rio 	Hondo 	Community
College District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	279). 	The case at hand
involves 	a 	unilateral 	change 	in 	established policy where 	the
collective bargaining agreement 	is 	silent.
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District 	administrators 	responsible 	for 	supervising McManus
testified that they did not remember or, had no knowledge 	of 	his
frequent 	attendance 	at 	trustee 	meetings 	on paid release 	time.
However, 	the evidence 	shows 	that prior to May 	1986, 	McManus 	had
been allowed 	to 	attend 	governing board meetings 	on paid 	time 	in
his 	capacity as 	Federation co-president. 	No 	formal 	restrictions
on his 	attendance were 	imposed 	other than 	that 	his 	work unit 	be
informed of his whereabouts. 	On May 	19, 	1986, 	the District
issued 	a 	directive 	changing 	the 	above practice 	by prohibiting
McManus 	from attending board meetings 	on District 	time.
In arguing that 	it did not waive 	the 	right 	to bargain
release 	time 	for McManus, 	the District 	simply ignores 	the ample
evidence 	in the 	record 	showing 	that 	a practice 	developed whereby
McManus 	was 	allowed 	to 	attend District 	board of 	trustees 	meetings
on paid 	time. 	Whether 	that practice 	developed 	through 	District
consent 	or merely its 	acquiescence 	is 	immaterial. 	Once
established, 	the attendance policy became part of 	the 	status 	quo
which 	could 	not be 	changed unilaterally. 	Consequently, 	we 	find
no merit 	in the District's 	exception to 	the ALJ's 	findings 	and
determination of 	a unilateral 	change.
The 	District also excepted to the ALJ's 	findings 	and
conclusion that 	it did not 	comply with 	the 	Federation's 	request
for names 	and 	addresses 	of part-time unit members 	in a 	timely
manner. 	The 	District 	asserts 	that 	it did 	comply with the
Federation's 	request without unreasonable delays 	and there 	is 	no
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evidence 	that 	the 	Federation 	ever 	communicated 	dissatisfaction
with 	the partial 	information provided by 	the District.
The 	record 	shows 	that 	the 	Federation made 	oral 	and written
requests 	for the 	above 	information 	for the purpose 	of 	enforcing
an agency 	fee provision 	in the 	existing collective bargaining
agreement. 	The oral 	requests were made by Federation Co-
President Thorpe 	in early January, 	1986 	and at 	the District board
of trustees 	meeting on January 28, 	1986. 	A written request was
made on January 	7, 	1986. 	The Federation received a partial 	list
of 	old and new employees 	in mid-March or April. 	However, 	the
requested 	information was 	not 	completely 	furnished 	until 	May 	27,
1986.
The ALJ 	found 	that 	the 	District did 	not 	comply with 	the
Federation's 	request 	in a 	timely way. 	The 	information was 	not
completely 	furnished until 	almost 	five months 	after 	the 	initial
request. 	Given the 	fact that the 	information was 	relevant and
necessary 	to 	the 	Federation's 	enforcement 	of 	the 	agency 	fee
provision, 	the general 	statement by the District's personnel
director 	that 	his 	department's 	workload was 	heavy does 	not
explain why 	the 	clerical 	task of 	gathering 	all 	the 	information
could not be 	completed 	for almost 	five months. 	Although 	the
record 	indicates 	that the 	District 	supplied 	a partial 	list 	in
March or April, 	a 	complete 	list was 	not 	supplied until 	May 	27,
1986. 	As 	the 	issue 	is whether the information was provided 	in a 	.
timely manner, 	the 	District's 	argument 	that 	the 	Federation 	failed
to 	communicate 	dissatisfaction with 	the partial 	list 	is
un
	5

irrelevant. 	Therefore, 	we 	find that 	the ALJ was 	correct 	in
finding 	that 	the 	District 	did 	not 	comply with 	the 	Federation's
request 	in a 	timely manner.
ORDER
Upon the foregoing 	findings 	of 	fact, 	conclusions 	of 	law and
the 	entire 	record 	in this 	case, 	we 	find that the 	Compton
Community College District 	violated 	section 	3543.5 (c) 	and,
derivatively, 	(a) 	and 	(b) 	of the Educational Employment Relations
Act.
It 	is 	hereby ORDERED that the District, 	its 	governing board
and 	its 	representatives 	shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
(1) 	Failing and refusing 	to 	give 	advance 	notice 	and 	an
opportunity 	to 	negotiate 	to 	the 	Compton Community College
Federation of Employees 	(Federation) 	over decisions, 	and effects
of decisions, 	to 	change 	its practices 	regarding the provision of
paid 	release 	time 	for 	attendance 	at 	governing 	board 	meetings 	by
Federation officials.
(2) 	Failing to provide 	the 	Federation with accurate
information 	regarding part-time 	bargaining 	unit 	members 	in 	a
timely 	manner.
B. 	TAKE 	THE 	FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS 	DESIGNED 	TO
EFFECTUATE 	THE 	POLICIES 	OF 	THE 	EDUCATIONAL 	EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS ACT:
(1) 	Restore the 	status 	quo ante by reinstating the
policy 	existent 	immediately prior 	to 	May 	1986 	regarding
attendance 	of 	Federation officials 	at 	governing board 	meetings.
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That 	status 	quo 	shall be maintained until 	the 	District has 	met
its 	statutory 	notice 	and 	bargaining 	obligations 	with 	respect 	to
changes 	in the attendance/release 	time policy.
(2) 	Make Bruce McManus whole 	for any 	losses he may
have 	suffered resulting 	from the District's 	change 	in policy, 	by
crediting 	him with 	vacation and/or 	"comp." 	time 	in an amount
commensurate with 	that which 	he 	lost 	by 	attending 	governing 	board
meetings 	after May 	19, 	1986. 	If McManus 	is 	no 	longer in active
employment with the 	District, 	the 	employer 	shall 	compensate
McManus 	by 	tendering 	him a 	monetary 	sum 	in 	an 	amount 	equivalent
to the value of the 	lost vacation or 	"comp." 	time, 	including
interest 	thereon at 	10 percent per annum.
(3) 	Within thirty-five 	(35) 	days 	following the date
this 	Decision is 	no 	longer 	subject 	to reconsideration, 	post at
all 	locations 	at 	the 	Compton Community College where 	notices 	to
employees 	are 	customarily placed, 	copies 	of 	the Notice 	attached,
signed by an authorized 	agent 	of 	the 	District. 	Such posting
shall 	be 	maintained 	for a period of 	thirty 	(30) 	consecutive
workdays. 	Reasonable 	steps 	shall be taken to 	insure that 	this
Notice 	is 	not reduced in size, 	defaced, 	altered, 	or covered by
any other material.
(4) 	Written notification of the actions 	taken to
comply with 	this 	Order 	shall 	be made 	to 	the Los Angeles 	Regional
Director 	of 	the 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board 	in accordance
with her 	instructions.
Chairperson Hesse 	and 	Member Craib 	joined 	in this 	Decision.
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APPENDIX
NOTICE 	TO 	EMPLOYEES
POSTED 	BY ORDER OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
An Agency 	of 	the 	State 	of 	California
- 	-- - 	-------,----- - 	- 	- 	-
After a hearing 	in Unfair Practice Case No. 	LA-CE-2393,
Compton Community College 	Federation of 	Employees 	v. 	Compton
Community College 	District, 	in which all parties 	had the 	right 	to
participate, 	it has 	been found 	that 	the Compton Community College
District violated Government Code section 3543.5(a), 	(b) 	and 	(c).
.
As 	a 	result 	of 	this 	conduct we 	have 	been 	ordered 	to post
this Notice, 	and will abide by the 	following. 	We will:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
(1) 	Failing 	and refusing to give 	advance 	notice 	and 	an
opportunity 	to 	negotiate 	to 	the 	Compton Community 	College
Federation of Employees 	(Federation) 	over decisions, 	and effects
of 	decisions, 	to 	change 	its practices 	regarding the provision of
paid 	release 	time 	for attendance 	at 	governing 	board 	meetings 	by
Federation officials.
(2) 	Failing 	to provide 	the 	Federation with 	accurate
information 	regarding part-time 	bargaining unit members 	in a
timely 	manner.
B. 	TAKE 	THE 	FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS 	DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE 	THE 	POLICIES 	OF 	THE 	EDUCATIONAL 	EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONS ACT:
(1) 	Restore the 	status 	quo ante by reinstating the
policy 	existent 	immediately prior 	to 	May 	1986 	regarding
attendance 	of 	Federation officials 	at 	governing board meetings.
That 	status 	quo 	shall be maintained until 	the 	District 	has 	met
its 	statutory 	notice 	and 	bargaining 	obligations 	with 	respect 	to
changes 	in the 	attendance/release 	time policy.
(2) 	Make 	Bruce McManus whole 	for any 	losses 	he may
have 	suffered resulting 	from the 	District's 	change 	in policy, 	by
crediting him with vacation and/or 	"comp." 	time 	in an amount
commensurate with 	that which 	he 	lost 	by 	attending 	governing 	board
meetings 	after May 	19, 	1986. 	If McManus 	is 	no longer in active
employment with the 	District, 	the 	employer 	shall 	compensate
McManus 	by 	tendering 	him a 	monetary 	sum 	in 	an 	amount 	equivalent
to the value of the 	lost vacation or 	"comp." 	time, 	including
interest 	thereon at 	10 percent per 	annum.
Dated: 	Compton Community 	College 	District
By
Authorized 	Agent
THIS 	IS AN OFFICIAL 	NOTICE. 	IT MUST REMAIN POSTED 	FOR AT 	LEAST
THIRTY 	(30) 	CONSECUTIVE WORKDAYS 	FROM THE 	DATE 	OF 	POSTING AND
MUST NOT BE 	REDUCED 	IN SIZE, 	DEFACED, 	ALTERED OR COVERED BY ANY
MATERIAL.

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
COMPTON 	COMMUNITY COLLEGE 	FEDERATION
OF 	EMPLOYEES,
Charging 	Party,
v.
COMPTON COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT,
R e s p o n d e n t .
)
) 	Unfair 	Practice
Case No. 	LA-CE-2393A
PROPOSED DECISION
(11/16/87)
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Appearances; 	Lawrence Rosenzweig, 	Attorney for Compton
Community College Federation of Employees; 	Jones 	& Matson by
Urrea C. 	Jones, 	Jr., 	Attorney for Compton Community College
District.
Before Manuel M. 	Melgoza, 	Administrative Law Judge.
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The 	Compton 	Community College 	Federation 	of 	Employees
(Union 	or Charging 	Party) 	filed 	the 	above-entitled Unfair
Practice Charge on May 27, 	1986, 	alleging 	that 	the Compton
Community College District 	(District, 	Respondent, 	or Employer)
committed 	various 	violations 	of 	the 	Educational 	Employment
Relations Act 	(EERA or Act).1 The Union filed 	amendments 	to
the Charge on June 30, 	1986. 	A Second Amended Unfair 	Practice
Charge was 	filed 	by 	the 	Charging 	Party on 	about
October 	8, 	1986. 	A Third Amended Unfair 	Practice Charge was
filed on about November 24, 	1986.
1The 	EERA is codified at Government Code section 3540, 	et
seq. 	Unless otherwise 	indicated, 	all 	statutory references 	are
to the Government Code.
This proposed decision has been appealed to the
Board i t s e l f and may not be cited as precedent
unless the decision and i t s rationale have been
adopted by the Board.
)

By letter dated November 24, 	1986, 	the Public Employment
Relations Board 	(PERB or Board), 	through its General Counsel's
office, 	issued 	a 	partial 	dismissal 	of 	the Third Amended
Charge. 	The 	specific 	allegations 	dismissed were 	that 	the
District: 	(a) 	refused to allow Union co-president,
Bruce McManus, 	to 	attend District 	governing 	board meetings 	in
reprisal 	for 	his 	engaging 	in protected 	activities 	and; 	(b)
interfered with 	the 	internal 	operations 	of 	the Union.
On the same date 	(November 24, 	1986), 	the PERB issued a
Complaint 	on the 	remaining 	allegations 	in the Charge. 	It
alleged 	that 	the District 	violated 	the EERA by: 	(a)
•unilaterally changing 	its 	policy 	regarding 	the 	attendance 	(on
paid 	time) 	at 	District 	board meetings 	of Union Co-President
McManus; 	(b) 	unilaterally distributing 	and 	implementing 	a
1986-87 	instructional 	calendar 	without 	negotiating 	the 	decision
or 	its effects; 	and 	(c) 	refusing 	to comply in a 	timely manner
with 	the Union's 	requests 	for 	information.
On about 	December 	8, 	1986, 	the Charging Party appealed 	the
General 	Counsel's 	partial dismissal 	to 	the Board 	itself. 	No
decision on 	that 	appeal 	has 	been 	rendered 	as 	of 	this 	date.
The District 	filed 	an Answer 	to 	the November 	24, 	1986
Complaint, 	denying 	any violations 	of 	the EERA and 	asserting
affirmative defenses.
An informal conference, 	held on January 20, 	1987, 	failed to
result 	in a 	settlement 	of 	the underlying disputes. 	A
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pre-hearing 	conference was 	held 	on March 18, 1987, 	before
Administrative Law Judge 	Barbara 	E. 	Miller.
- . .4 . 	Thereafter, 	the 	Charging 	Party moved 	to 	amend 	the 	Complaint
on March 23, 	1987. 	During the ensuing 	formal hearing,
conducted 	before Administrative Law Judge Miller 	on April 	8 	and
9, 	1987, 	the Motion was granted. 	The amendment 	alleged a
unilateral 	implementation of 	two 	"inter-sessions." 	After 	the
Complaint was 	amended 	the Respondent 	answered, 	admitting 	the
inter-sessions 	allegations.
On June 23, 	1987, 	after the hearing but before completion
of 	the post-hearing 	briefing 	schedule, 	the Charging 	Party
requested 	a 	bifurcation 	of 	the 	inter-session 	issue 	from the
remaining 	issues. 	The District did 	not 	oppose 	the 	bifurcation
and, 	accordingly/it was 	granted on June 29, 	1987. 	A Proposed
Decision 	on 	that 	issue was 	rendered 	by Administrative 	Law 	Judge
Miller on June 	30, 	1987. 	That decision was 	not 	appealed.
By letter dated September 	4, 	1987, 	the 	remaining 	case was
transferred, 	for 	proposed decision, 	to Administrative Law Judge
Manuel M. 	Melgoza. 	This decision follows.
II. 	FACTS
A. 	The 	Policy Regarding Attendance 	at 	Governing 	Board Meetings
1. 	Background
The California 	School 	Employees Association, 	Chapter 	#45
(CSEA) 	was 	recognized by the District 	as 	the exclusive
representative 	of 	a 	unit 	of 	permanent 	classified 	employees 	on
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September 20, 	1977.2 Bruce McManus, 	a classified employee,
served 	as 	president 	of 	the 	CSEA chapter 	until 	CSEA was
decertified, 	subsequent 	to 	a PERB election on June 	15, 	1985,
and 	replaced 	as 	exclusive 	representative 	by the Charging
Party. 	Shortly after 	the CSEA was 	decertified, 	the 	classified
employees 	voted Bruce McManus 	as 	their 	president.
The 	Charging 	Party had 	previously 	been 	certified 	(on
November 	16, 	1978) 	by PERB as 	the exclusive representative of 	a
certificated unit 	in the 	same District. 	It 	has 	remained 	so 	to
date. 	Darwin Thorpe was 	its 	president. 	Therefore, 	by the end
of 	the 	summer of 	1985, 	McManus 	and Thorpe were co-presidents 	of
the Compton Community College 	Federation 	of 	Employees.
2. 	Attendance 	at 	Board Meetings
Since 	about 	January 	1980, 	McManus 	had been an 	instructional
media 	technician 	for 	the District. 	His work schedule was
- . . .
Monday through Thursday 	from 1:00 	p.m. 	to 	9:30 	p.m. 	and 	Fridays,
from 8:00 	a.m. 	to 	4:30 	p.m. 	McManus 1 duties were dictated 	by
the needs 	of 	the District's Learning Center. 	The District's
governing 	board 	scheduled 	its 	regular 	(bi-monthly) 	meetings 	on
Tuesday evenings, 	usually commencing 	at 	6:00 	p.m.
During McManus' 	tenure 	as 	officer of 	CSEA, 	he had 	attended
those board meetings 	in his 	official 	capacity on 	a 	fairly
regular 	basis. 	Whether 	he 	attended depended 	on his 	assessment
2Official 	Notice 	is 	taken of 	PERB's 	representation
files LA-R-348 	and LA-R-827.
A4

that 	something 	on 	the 	board's 	agenda 	touched upon 	classified
employee concerns. 	He 	also 	attended 	for 	the purpose of
addressing 	grievance issues. 	On 	a 	few occasions, he 	helped 	set
up media 	equipment 	(projectors, 	etc.) 	for 	others who made
audio-visual 	presentations 	during 	the meetings* 	In 	some 	cases,
he made oral 	presentations 	to 	the governing 	board. 	After 	he
was 	elected 	co-president 	of 	the 	Compton 	Community College
Federation of 	Employees 	in 	1985, 	he continued 	to 	attend 	as
before. 3
...
Prior to May 19, 	1986, 	McManus' 	attendance at the board
meetings was 	at 	District 	expense 	- 	he was 	paid 	his 	regular wage
while attending, 	akin to 	release time. 	When this practice
began, 	his 	supervisor was 	Joan Clinton, 	then an associate dean
in charge of 	the Learning 	Center. 	McManus would 	typically
notify her 	that 	he 	needed 	to 	attend 	because 	of 	some 	item on 	the
board's 	agenda. 	She told him it was 	all 	right, 	so 	long 	as 	he
let 	the 	staff 	in the Learning 	Center 	know where he was. 	On 	some
occasions when McManus was 	not 	able 	to 	reach her, 	he would
follow 	a practice 	of 	informing 	the Learning Center 	staff 	of 	his
whereabouts. 	Since Clinton 	attended 	all 	board meetings, 	and
never questioned McManus' 	right 	to 	attend 	even 	on 	those
occasions when he was 	unable 	to 	reach her 	prior 	to 	the meeting,
he continued 	to 	attend without 	objection. 	McManus 	never
. .
3 Based 	upon a 	summary of 	the board's minutes, 	McManus
attended twelve times 	in 1984, 17 	times 	in 1985, 	and 	12 	times
in 1986.
5
3eased
5

requested or 	received blanket 	permission 	to 	attend 	all 	board
meetings. 	Neither was 	he questioned 	about 	his 	right 	to 	attend
on duty time, or 	given 	restrictions 	on the 	types 	of, meetings 	he
could attend, 	until May 1986.
After Clinton ceased 	to 	be McManus' 	immediate 	supervisor,
Floyd"Smith 	assumed 	that 	responsibility 	in 	September 	1985.
Smith continued 	to 	allow McManus 	to 	attend without
restriction. 	According 	to 	Smith, 	he was 	"continuing 	previously
established 	policy 	apparently 	approved 	by 	his 	former
supervisor." 	(See 	Respondent 	Exhibit 	1.)
In early May 1986, 	Smith 	informed McManus 	that, 	immediately
after McManus' 	attendance at 	a board meeting 	in 	late April 	at
which McManus 	addressed 	the 	board, 	Dean 	Ida 	Frisby had 	begun to
inquire 	about 	his 	attendance 	at board meetings. 	At 	a
subsequent meeting, 	held on May 13, 	1986, 	McManus 	submitted a
request 	to 	address 	the 	governing 	board. 	Shortly 	after 	the
beginning of 	the meeting, 	McManus 	delivered a 	letter 	to 	the
board members 	and 	stated 	that 	the 	session was 	illegal 	because
it 	had not 	been properly posted. 	He 	asked 	that 	the meeting 	be
cancelled. 	The board went 	into 	closed 	session 	and, 	upon
returning, 	granted McManus' 	request.
A few days 	later, 	McManus 	received 	the 	following 	memorandum
from Floyd Smith, 	dated May 19, 	1986:
Mr. McManus:
I 	have 	been 	informed 	by my 	superior 	that 	you
may not 	attend 	Board 	meetings 	on 	District
time, 	but 	that you may use vacation time 	for
this purpose.
6
6

From this, 	I 	conclude that you may also
attend on 	"comp" 	time, 	if 	the extra hours
are worked 	in advance.
If you have any questions, 	please feel 	free
to contact me.
When McManus 	asked 	Smith 	for 	an explanation, 	the 	latter
stated 	that 	he had 	been 	instructed by his 	superior, 	Ida 	Frisby,
to write the memo 	and 	that, 	if 	he wanted 	to 	attend board
meetings 	in the future, 	he would have to use either 	"comp" 	time
or 	vacation 	time4. 	Neither 	Smith, 	nor 	any other 	District
representative, 	told McManus 	of 	any exceptions 	to 	the new
requirements.
McManus 	attended board meetings 	on May 20, 	June 	10 	and
June 24, 	1986. 	However, 	he was 	able to do so only after after
submitting 	vacation 	requests. 	He 	attended on vacation 	time.
The documents 	in the 	record 	indicate 	that 	Frisby was 	in 	the
process 	of 	examining McManus' 	attendance 	at board meetings 	in
early May, 	at which point 	she 	asked 	Smith what 	policy he
4 As 	noted earlier, 	dismissal 	of 	the 	allegation that 	the
District 	denied McManus 	the 	right 	to 	attend 	board meetings 	on
paid 	time 	in 	retaliation 	for 	his 	protected 	activities 	is 	under
appeal 	and that 	allegation 	is 	not 	a 	subject of 	this 	decision.
Frisby 	testified 	that 	she 	also 	attended 	board meetings 	in
the 	85-86 	school year 	and was 	cognizant 	of McManus'
attendance. 	She 	testified 	that 	Smith told her 	that 	he would
explain 	to McManus 	that 	he 	could 	still 	attend 	on 	paid 	time 	for
the purposes 	of 	"union business," 	such 	as 	presenting
grievances, 	or to set up media equipment. 	However, 	that
information was 	never 	conveyed to McManus. 	Frisby 	received 	a
copy of 	the May 19 	memo 	to McManus, 	and 	Smith did not 	tell
Frisby 	that 	he 	had 	conveyed 	any 	information 	to McManus 	other
than what was 	conveyed 	in 	the memo. 	Smith was 	not 	called 	to
testify.
77

(McManus) was 	attending under. 	On May 16, 	1986, 	Frisby wrote
to 	Smith, 	directing 	that 	"Bruce McManus 	may not 	attend 	Board
meetings 	on District 	time. 	If he has 	the 	approval of 	his
supervisor, 	he may use vacation time 	for 	this 	purpose." 	No
mention of 	any exceptions was made therein. 	On June 	11, 	1986,
Smith wrote 	a 	reply to 	Frisby's 	inquiry regarding 	the
attendance policy. 	By then, 	McManus 	had 	already been 	issued
the directive not 	to 	attend 	on District 	time.
During 	the 	time 	Frisby 	and 	other 	District 	supervisors 	were
examining 	the 	attendance policy, 	the Union was 	not 	consulted or
advised 	that 	a 	change was 	contemplated. 	None of 	the District
administrators 	notified 	the Union 	prior 	to 	sending 	out 	the 	new
directive to McManus, 	nor did they check to 	see whether 	the
issue 	should 	be 	negotiated.
B. 	The 	School 	Calendar
The parties' 	1983-85 	collective bargaining 	agreement
provided 	that 	"work calendars 	shall 	be 	negotiated 	and 	such
negotiations 	shall 	take 	place 	no 	later 	than thirty 	(30)
calendar days 	before 	submission to 	the Board 	of 	Trustees." 	In
practice, 	and with 	rare exception, 	the parties 	negotiated
agreements 	on work calendars 	prior 	to 	any 	instructional
calendar/schedule 	being 	distributed 	to 	students 	and 	the 	general
community.
At 	the end of May or 	the 	beginning of 	June 	1986, 	Union
co-president Thorpe 	(certificated unit) 	happened upon 	a 	stack
of 	instructional 	schedules 	in the Employer's 	records 	office.
8

The 	schedules 	covered, 	inter 	alia, 	the 	beginning 	and 	ending
dates 	for 	the 	fall 	semester 	of 	1986 	and 	the 	spring 	semester 	of
1987. 	Events 	such 	as 	registration, 	the 	first 	day of
instruction, 	holidays 	and 	recesses 	were 	included. 	A prefatory
comment 	stated 	that:
Class 	sections 	offered, 	together with other
matters 	contained herein, 	are 	subject 	to
change without 	notice 	by 	the 	administration
for 	reasons 	related 	to 	student 	enrollment,
level 	of 	financial 	support 	of 	for 	any other
reason, 	at the discretion of the district.
The 	evidence 	in the 	record 	is 	somewhat 	limited 	as 	to
whether 	the 	schedule was 	distributed 	to 	the 	students 	and 	the
community. 	It 	is 	evident 	that 	stacks 	of 	the documents were
made 	available 	at 	the 	records 	office 	and 	that 	they were 	printed
for 	the 	purpose 	of 	distribution. 	Apparently because 	the
1986-87 	schedule's 	cover bore 	a picture of 	a palm tree, 	it was
referred 	to 	as 	"the palm tree 	schedule."
When Thorpe 	saw the 	stack of 	schedules, 	he took one. 	Prior.
to 	this 	date, 	the District 	had not 	taken 	steps 	to 	initiate
bargaining on a work calendar. 	In fact, 	the parties were at
impasse 	in negotiations 	over 	a 	successor 	contract, 	and 	none 	of
the 	enumerated 	impasse 	issues 	included 	the work calendar.
However, 	the District's 	governing 	board had not yet 	acted 	to
adopt 	a 	final 	calendar.
On about June 12, 	1986, 	Joan Clinton, 	who 	also 	served as
the District's 	negotiating 	team 	leader, 	wrote 	to Thorpe,
requesting 	to 	negotiate 	the work calendar 	and 	attaching 	a 	copy
9
9

of 	a 	proposed 	1986-87 work calendar. 	She 	asked Thorpe 	to
respond 	by July 	16, 	1986. 	An 	attached 	proposed work calendar
included 	some 	of 	the same data 	as 	had 	the palm tree 	schedul	
.. 	e 	-
e.g., 	the beginning date of 	instruction, 	holidays 	and
recesses. 	In addition, 	however, 	it contained events unique to
the employees, 	such as orientation, 	"floating holidays" 	and
staff 	development 	days.
Rather 	than 	responding 	to Clinton, 	Thorpe 	sent 	a
July 15, 	1986 	letter to Superintendent Edison 0. 	Jackson, 	in
which 	he 	stated:
On June 	16 we 	received 	a 	June 	12 	letter 	from
Dr. 	Joan Clinton 	asking 	the Federation to
notify her 	of 	its 	plans 	to 	comply with
negotiating 	the work calendar 	for 	the
1986-87 	academic year. 	At 	a 	point 	prior 	to
this 	letter, 	the district 	issued 	its
academic work calendar 	for 	the 	period
indicated, 	thus 	adding 	to 	the growing 	list
of 	district 	violations 	of 	our Agreement 	and
the ERRA 	[sic], 	and making our 	requested
reply pointless. 	Our union 	animous 	[sic]
charge, 	LA-CE-2393 	has 	been amended
accordingly.
Apart 	from this 	letter, 	there 	is 	no evidence that 	the Union
communicated with 	District 	representatives 	about 	either 	the
"palm tree 	schedule" 	or 	about 	negotiations 	(or 	lack thereof)
over 	the coming work year. 	In explanation of 	his 	reasons 	for
concluding 	that 	it would 	be 	"pointless" 	to 	reply to 	Clinton's
June 	12 	letter, 	Thorpe testified essentially that, 	by issuing
the 	palm tree 	schedules, 	the 	District's 	proposed 	calendar was
really 	an 	accomplished 	fact 	because 	once 	the 	community 	is 	given
10

one 	set 	of dates 	(such as 	starting 	and ending dates), 	if 	the
Union seeks 	to change them, 	it 	gets 	blamed 	for 	any problems
that 	arise. 	In other words, 	the Union 	leadership believed 	that;
the District would not be 	able 	to 	"un-do" 	the 	"advertising" 	it
had 	undertaken without 	causing 	problems 	that 	would 	be
attributed 	to 	the Union.
'
Clinton did not 	receive 	a 	copy of 	Thorpe's 	letter 	to
Jackson. 	She 	therefore wrote 	a 	second 	time to Thorpe on
August 4, 	1986, 	noting the 	latter's 	failure to 	reply, 	and
making 	another 	request 	to 	negotiate 	the 	calendar. 	She
explained 	that 	it was 	critical 	to 	have 	an 	approved 	calendar 	in
place to 	"firm up" 	activities 	relating 	to 	the 	new school 	term,
and 	that 	the Union 	should 	approve 	the 	proposed work calendar 	or
recommend changes. 	Although Thorpe 	received Clinton's August 	4
correspondence, 	he did not 	reply.
On September 2, 	1986, 	six days 	prior 	to the first day of
classes, 	the District's 	governing 	board 	adopted 	a 	1986-87
calendar. 	That 	calendar was 	not 	the 	"palm tree 	schedule."
Rather, 	what was 	adopted 	differed 	from both 	the 	palm tree
schedule 	and 	the 	proposed 	calendar 	submitted 	for 	the 	Union's
review 	in 	June 	19865. 	Faculty members 	attended 	an
5 The ending 	dates 	of 	the 	fall 	1986 	and 	spring 	1987
semesters were changed, 	as were 	the beginning dates 	of 	the
spring 	1987 	semester. 	Staff 	development 	dates 	differed 	between
the 	proposed work calendar 	and 	the 	adopted 	calendar. 	The
starting 	and 	ending 	dates 	for 	academic 	year 	1986-87 were
different 	from those 	for 	the 	previous 	year.
11

orientation meeting 	on 	September 	4 	and 	classes 	began 	on
September 8, 	1986.
The 	Charging 	Party 	proffered 	evidence 	that 	the 	District
changed 	the 	calendar 	it 	had 	adopted 	in 	September.
Specifically, 	a 	staff 	development 	day 	(meeting 	at which 	faculty
develop curriculum, 	discuss 	teaching strategies, 	etc.) 	was
switched from February 25, 	1987 to March 11 and 12, 	1987.
Classes 	for 	February 25 were 	to 	be 	cancelled 	in order 	to
maximize 	faculty attendance. 	However, 	on or 	about February 	16
and 23, 	1987, 	the 	faculty were notified that 	the previously
scheduled 	staff 	development 	day was 	to 	be postponed. 	Classes
which had 	been cancelled 	for 	February 25 	(Wednesday) 	were
reinstated 	and classes 	for March 	11 	(also 	a Wednesday) 	were
cancelled. 	Thorpe testified that, 	as 	a 	result of 	the
cancellation of 	classes 	on March 	11, 	part-time 	faculty 	lost 	pay
for 	that day. 	There was 	no 	advance notice 	to 	or 	an
opportunity 	to 	bargain with 	the Union 	over 	the 	"switch."
C. 	The Requests 	for 	Information
1. 	Names 	and Addresses
In early January 	1986, 	Thorpe verbally 	requested 	from
Personnel Director Margie Miles, 	the names 	and 	addresses 	of
part-time 	certificated 	bargaining 	unit 	members 	hired 	for 	the
spring 	1986 	semester. 	He 	also made 	a written 	request 	for 	that
information on January 7, 	1986.
In 	addition 	to 	facilitating 	communications 	between unit
members 	and 	the Union 	and 	allowing 	the 	latter 	to 	better
12

represent 	employees, 	the 	information was 	requested 	for 	the
purpose 	of 	enforcing 	an 	agency fee 	provision 	in 	the 	existing
collective 	bargaining 	agreement 	between 	the 	District 	and 	the
Charging 	Party. 	Article 	III 	of 	that 	agreement 	imposed upon the
District 	the 	additional 	requirement 	of 	providing 	the Union with
the names 	and addresses 	of unit members" on a quarterly basis."
The District's 	representatives 	were 	ill 	prepared 	to 	respond
in 	a 	speedy fashion. 	When confronted with the Union's 	protests
to the 	lack of 	a 	response, 	the District's 	personnel 	staff
indicated 	that 	the 	problems 	originated 	from managers' 	failure
to 	submit 	the 	information to 	the personnel 	office, 	especially
for 	those part-time 	instructors 	hired 	at 	off-campus 	sites.
Not 	having 	received 	the 	requested 	information, 	the Union
members 	appeared 	en masse 	before 	a 	District 	governing 	board
meeting 	on January 28, 	1986. 	Among 	the 	issues 	that 	the Union
addressed was 	the 	failure 	to 	receive 	the names 	and 	addresses 	of
new part-time unit 	members 	in 	a 	timely 	fashion.
In February, 	District 	Superintendent 	Jackson ordered Miles
to 	secure 	and 	furnish 	the 	requested 	information 	to 	the Union
and 	to devise 	a 	system for 	the 	gathering 	of 	such 	information 	in
a 	timely manner. 	Miles 	explained 	to 	Jackson 	that 	the 	personnel
department 	had 	a 	heavy workload, 	but 	that 	he would 	comply.
Some 	information 	that 	the 	Union 	had 	previously 	requested
regarding 	the 	fall 	1985 	semester was 	turned over 	to 	Thorpe via
memo dated February 10, 	1986. 	In March or April, 	1986, 	the
13

Union 	received 	a 	list of 	names 	and 	addresses, 	which was
defective 	in 	that 	it 	left 	out 	the 	names 	and 	addresses 	of
part-time 	employees 	working 	at 	off-campus 	sites 	and 	some
working 	at on-campus 	sites, 	and mixed names 	of 	old 	and new
employees 	in 	such 	a way that 	the Union was 	unable 	to 	purge 	the
list 	to 	obtain only names 	of 	new part-time 	employees 	hired 	for
the 	spring 	semester. 	A complete computer 	printout, 	with names
and 	addresses, 	of 	such employees was 	not 	furnished 	to 	the Union
until about May 27, 	1986.6
Indicative 	of 	the problems 	resulting 	from the 	late
provision of 	names 	of 	part-time unit 	members 	was 	Thorpe's
testimony 	that 	the Union 	could 	not 	effectively 	communicate with
large numbers 	of 	unit members 	because 	it had no 	knowledge of
who 	they were 	or where 	they 	lived. 	Under 	the 	agency 	fee
6This 	finding 	is 	supported 	by 	the 	testimony of 	Union
witness 	Darwin Thorpe 	and District witness Margie Miles. 	Miles
testified 	that 	he was 	unable 	to 	provide 	the 	information 	because
of 	the heavy workload 	in his 	department. 	Thorpe 	testified 	that
he did not 	receive 	reliable data 	until 	the 	end of May. 	Sheila
Moore's 	testimony 	that Miles 	provided 	the 	information 	in
February 1986 was 	based 	on 	a 	hearsay 	statement 	allegedly made
by Miles. 	The 	statement was 	unsupported 	by competent 	evidence
and 	indeed 	conflicted with Miles' 	own 	account. 	Moore 	testified
that 	she did 	not 	have personal 	knowledge 	that 	the 	information
was 	actually given 	to 	the Union. 	The 	testimony of Moore 	and
Miles 	indicated that, 	if 	the District had turned over 	a
complete 	spring 	1986 	roster 	to 	the Union, 	a copy would have
been 	in the District's 	files. 	The District did 	not 	produce 	the
document, 	except 	that which was 	furnished 	to 	the Union 	at 	the
end of May 	1987. 	The Respondent 	failed 	to 	rebut 	credible
evidence that 	the data was 	not 	provided 	until 	late May.
Viewing 	the entire 	record, 	Moore 	appeared 	to 	be 	confusing 	the
provision of 	a complete 	roster of 	part-time employees, 	with a
partial 	list 	of 	fall 	1985 	part-time 	employees 	furnished 	to 	the
Union on about February 10, 	1986 	(Respondent's Exhibit 	11).
14

provision of 	the parties' 	collective bargaining agreement, 	a
new employee 	could 	file 	a 	dues 	deduction 	form 	and 	allow 	the
District 	to deduct 	dues. 	However, 	if 	new employees 	did not do
that, 	it was 	up 	to 	the Union 	to 	send 	them 	letters 	informing
them of 	the 	requirement 	that 	they either 	join 	the 	Union 	or 	pay
a 	service 	fee. 	It was 	then up 	to 	the Charging 	Party to 	collect
the 	fees 	and 	to 	enforce 	that 	section of 	the contract.
According to Thorpe, 	without 	a complete 	list 	of names 	and
addresses 	of 	all unit members, 	the Union could 	not 	serve 	its
members 	and 	lost months' worth of 	service 	fees 	due 	to 	the
delays.
2. 	Attorney Fees
Sometime 	in mid to 	late February 1986, 	Thorpe made 	a
request 	to 	the District 	for 	information 	about 	the 	District's
expenditures 	for 	attorney services. 	The 	exact 	date 	and 	the
specific 	request 	are 	not 	clearly 	ascertainable 	from the
record. 	Thorpe 	initially testified 	that 	he made 	such 	a 	request
in February, 	and 	later 	added that 	the 	request was made via 	a
late 	February memorandum. 	The memorandum was 	not 	produced.
Thorpe described 	the written 	request 	as 	one 	seeking 	information
about District 	"payments 	for 	services 	by 	(attorney) 	Urrea
Jones."
The Union's 	request was 	made 	for 	the 	purpose 	of
ascertaining what 	monies 	were 	available 	in 	the 	District 	budget
for 	salary 	increases. 	The 	parties were 	in mediation over 	this
and other 	bargaining 	issues, 	and 	the Union needed 	to 	understand
15

the District's 	budget 	and 	financial 	position.
At 	some unspecified 	later date, 	the District 	responded 	to
the Union's 	request 	by submitting 	the hourly rates, for Jones'
services 	to 	the District, 	one 	figure 	indicating 	the hourly 	rate
paid 	for 	negotiation 	services 	and 	one 	indicating 	the 	rate 	paid
for 	other 	legal 	services. 	The District 	did not 	articulate 	any
objection to 	the provision of 	this 	type of 	data.
The 	Charging 	Party was 	not 	satisfied 	with 	the 	District's
response 	because 	it wanted 	not 	only 	the 	hourly 	rate 	paid 	to
Jones, 	but the total expenditures 	from July 1, 	1985 	to date, 	so
as 	to have 	a 	clearer 	picture 	of what monies 	had 	actually been
expended 	(as 	opposed 	to 	budgeted) 	and what monies were yet
available 	for 	salaries 	or wages 	to unit members. 	Therefore,
via a March 21, 	1986 	letter to Superintendent Jackson, 	the
Union 	requested:
The 	hourly 	stipend 	or 	other 	payment 	for
services 	by Attorney Urrea 	Jones, 	and 	the
accumulated 	amounts 	he 	has 	been 	paid 	for
services 	from July 1, 	1985, 	to date.7
In response to the March 21 	letter, 	the District, 	on
March 25, 	1986, 	forwarded 	the 	following memorandum to Thorpe:
In 	response 	to your 	request 	regarding 	the
hourly 	stipend 	or 	other 	payments 	for
services 	by Attorney Urrea 	Jones 	and 	the
accumulated 	amounts 	paid 	from July 	1, 	1985
to date, 	the following 	is offered:
7There 	is 	no 	evidence 	in 	the 	record 	from which 	to
conclude 	that 	any 	additional, 	more 	specific 	and/or more
comprehensive 	request was 	made 	on 	the 	topic 	other 	than 	those
already noted 	above.
16

A. 	The 	hourly 	stipend 	for 	collective
bargaining 	is 	$90.00 	per hour.
B. 	Regular 	services 	- 	$110.00 	per hour.
C. 	The 	cost 	for 	collective 	bargaining 	is
$17,032.50 	as of 	this date.
D. 	The cost 	for 	"other" 	legal 	services 	is
$37,708.50.
Should 	you 	need 	additional 	information,
please feel 	free 	to 	call.
The Union's 	co-presidents were 	aware 	that 	the 	county
provided 	the 	District with 	computer 	readouts 	called 	"POL"
forms, 	showing 	actual expenditures. 	Early in the 	1985-86
school year, 	it was 	not 	clear 	to 	either 	president 	that 	the
voluminous 	document 	contained 	expenditures 	for 	legal 	services.
However, 	by January or February of 	1986, 	co-president McManus
became 	aware 	that 	the 	"POL" 	forms 	indeed 	contained 	expenditures
for 	attorney fees. 	At 	some point 	after 	this, 	h	- + 	e went 	through
the POL 	forms 	provided by the District 	to 	the Union, 	made 	a
listing 	of 	such 	relevant expenditures, 	and 	shared 	it with
Thorpe.
There were 	some 	problems 	with using 	only the 	POL 	forms.
For 	example, 	it was 	not 	possible to determine what 	portion of
the 	legal 	expenditures 	were 	reimbursable 	to 	the District 	by the
State, 	and 	thus 	potentially available 	for 	salary increases.
Also, 	the 	information on the 	forms 	did not 	specify whether 	the
legal 	services paid for were 	for negotiations, 	litigation, 	or
other 	legal 	services. 	The 	record does not 	indicate, 	however,
17

whether 	the Union 	ever 	requested 	that 	the 	District 	clarify
those POL 	figures. 	McManus 	testified 	that 	the District's
business 	services director, 	Ben Lett, 	did participate 	in a 	long
meeting 	with Union 	representatives 	for 	the 	purpose 	of
explaining many 	line 	items 	on the POL's. 	However, 	he could not
recall 	if 	anyone 	asked 	about 	expenditures 	for 	attorneys 	fees.
There 	is 	no 	evidence 	of 	any communications 	between District
and Union 	representatives 	about 	the 	attorney 	fee 	data 	request
subsequent to 	the District's March 25, 	1986 	response.
III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Unilateral 	Changes
It 	is 	a 	settled principle that, 	when an employer
unilaterally changes 	an 	established 	policy 	regarding 	a
negotiable 	subject 	matter 	without 	affording 	the 	exclusive
representative 	a 	reasonable 	opportunity 	to 	bargain 	over 	the
change, 	the employer 	is 	held 	to have violated 	its 	duty to
negotiate 	in good 	faith. 	Butte Community College 	District
(1985) 	PERB Decision No. 	555, 	citing Pajaro Valley Unified
School District 	(1978) 	PERB Decision No. 	51, 	and NLRB v. 	Katz
(1962) 	369 U.S. 	736 	[50 LRRM 2177].
Notice of 	proposed 	changes 	must 	be 	given to 	an official 	of
the 	employee 	organization 	in 	a manner which clearly 	informs 	the
recipient 	of 	the 	proposed 	change. 	Victor Valley Union High
School District 	(1986) 	PERB Decision No. 	565, 	at p. 	5. 	In the
absence of 	formal 	notice, 	proof 	of 	actual 	notice must 	be
established.
18

Likewise, 	the employer has 	an obligation to give 	an
exclusive 	representative 	notice 	and 	an 	opportunity 	to 	bargain
over 	the 	negotiable 	effects 	of 	an 	otherwise non-negotiable
decision. 	Oakland Unified 	School 	District 	(1985) 	PERB Decision
No. 540.
An 	established 	policy may be 	embodied 	in 	the 	terms 	of 	a
collective 	bargaining 	agreement 	(Grant 	Joint 	Union 	High 	School
District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	196) 	or, 	where a contract 	is
silent 	or 	ambiguous, 	it may be determined 	from past 	practice or
bargaining 	history 	(Rio 	Hondo 	Community College 	District 	(1982)
PERB Decision No. 	279).
1. 	Attendance of 	Union Officers 	at 	Governing 	Board
Meetings
In Healdsburg Union High School District, 	et 	al. 	(1984)
PERB Decision No. 	375, 	the Board 	found that matters 	such as
release 	time 	for 	employees who 	are union officers 	to 	"conduct
necessary 	(union) 	business" 	are within the 	scope of
representation. 	It 	reasoned 	that 	these 	topics 	are mandatorily
negotiable 	because 	they directly concern hours 	of 	employment,
which 	is 	specifically enumerated 	in 	section 	3543.2 	of 	the
EERA.8 In Anaheim Union High 	School 	District 	(1981) 	PERB
8 The 	pertinent 	part 	of 	that 	section 	reads:
(a) 	The 	scope of 	representation 	shall 	be
limited to matters 	relating 	to wages, 	hours
of 	employment, 	and other 	terms 	and
conditions 	of 	employment. 	"Terms 	and
conditions 	of 	employment" 	mean health 	and
welfare 	benefits 	as 	defined 	by
19

Decision No. 	177, 	the Board held that paid 	release time 	is 	also
negotiable because 	it 	is 	related 	to wages. 	Similarly, 	in the
private 	sector, 	the courts 	and the National Labor Relations
Board 	have 	outlawed 	the 	unilateral 	elimination 	(by 	employers)
of 	privileges 	formerly extended 	to union officers, 	such 	as 	paid
time off to conduct union business. 	See	- . 	, 	e.g., 	NLRB v. 	BASF
Wyandotte Corp. 	(CA 5, 	1986) 	798 F.2d 849 	[123 LRRM 2320].9
In the case at hand, 	prior to May 1986, 	McManus 	had been
afforded 	the 	privilege 	of 	attending 	governing 	board 	meetings 	on
paid 	time 	in his 	capacity 	as Union co-president. 	There were no
formal 	restrictions 	on his 	attendance other 	than 	that 	his work
unit be 	informed of 	his whereabouts, 	nor was 	he questioned
about his 	right 	to 	attend on duty time, 	despite his 	superiors'
awareness 	of 	such 	attendance.
Section 53200, 	leave, 	transfer and
reassignment policies, 	safety conditions of
employment, 	class size, 	procedures to be
used 	for 	the 	evaluation of 	employees,
organizational 	security 	pursuant 	to
Section 3546, 	procedures 	for processing
grievances 	pursuant 	to 	Sections 	3548.5,
3548.6, 	3548.7, 	and 3548.8, 	and the layoff
of 	probationary 	certificated 	school 	district
employees, 	pursuant to Section 44959.5 of
the Education Code.
9The 	construction of 	provisions 	of 	the National 	Labor
Relations Act (NLRA), 	as amended, 	29 U.S.C. 	151, 	et seq., 	is
useful 	guidance 	in 	interpreting 	parallel 	provisions 	of 	the
EERA. 	See 	San Diego Teachers Assn. 	v. 	Superior Court 	(1979)
24 Cal.3d 1, 	12-13; 	Firefighters Union v. 	City of Vallejo
(1974) 	12 Cal.3d 608, 	616.
20

Suddenly, 	and without 	giving 	the 	Charging 	Party notice 	or
an opportunity to 	bargain, 	the Employer 	issued 	a directive 	on
May 19, 	1986, 	changing 	the 	above practice by prohibiting
McManus 	from attending 	board meetings 	on District 	time.
Henceforth, 	he would be 	required 	to 	use vacation 	time 	or 	"comp
time" 	and, 	according to District witnesses, 	he would be allowed,
to 	attend only 	if 	his 	superiors 	felt 	"assured" 	that McManus'
job duties 	"had 	been covered."
The 	"new" 	policy impacted 	not 	only on McManus 1 hours 	of
work and on his wages, 	but 	also 	reduced 	his vacation 	and/or
"comp 	time." 	By changing 	its 	previous 	attendance policy
without 	first 	giving 	the Union 	notice 	and 	an 	opportunity 	to
bargain on the change and 	on 	its 	effects, 	the District 	violated
EERA section 3543.5(c) 	and, 	derivatively, 	sections 	3543.5(a)
and (b).
2. 	Calendar
The 	PERB has 	held 	that 	employee calendars 	- 	including 	the
work year 	starting 	and ending dates, 	holidays, 	vacations 	and
extra-hours 	assignments 	- 	are a negotiable 	subject. 	See, 	e.g.,
Lake Elsinore School District 	(1986) 	PERB Decision No. 	606, 	at
p. 	8, 	citing 	Palos Verdes 	Peninsula Unified School
District/Pleasant 	Valley 	School 	District 	(1979) 	PERB Decision
No. 	96. 	However, 	an employer does not commit 	an unfair
practice 	by unilaterally 	adopting 	a 	student 	(rather 	than 	an
employee) 	calendar. 	Lake Elsinore School District, 	supra.
21

(a) 	The Calendar 	in General
In the present case, 	the 	record 	shows 	that, 	on about 	late
May 1986, 	the District 	adopted 	a 	student 	schedule, 	which 	in
some ways, 	such 	as 	starting 	and ending dates, 	also 	related 	to
the employee work year. 	The 	record 	also 	shows, 	however, 	that
the 	calendar 	adopted was 	tentative 	and was 	primarily 	a
mechanism to 	facilitate 	the 	upcoming 	school 	year 	student
registration process. 	This 	is 	evidenced by the 	fact 	that 	the
schedule 	itself 	indicated 	that 	it was 	subject 	to change, 	and
the District's June 	12, 	1986 	offer to negotiate on a complete
"work" 	calendar 	that 	included data 	of 	particular 	interest 	to
employees 	(rather than students). 	In addition, 	the District
described 	its work calendar 	as 	a 	"proposed 	calendar" 	and
offered 	to 	negotiate over 	it 	prior 	to 	formal 	adoption.
Finally, 	the 	fact 	that 	the calendar which was 	formally adopted
in 	about 	early 	September 	differed 	from 	any previous 	schedules
also 	indicates 	that 	the 	"palm tree 	schedule" 	(as 	it 	impacted
employees) 	was 	alterable via 	the negotiation process.
Thus, 	although 	the Union's 	rationale 	for 	rejecting 	the
District's 	offer 	to 	negotiate was 	grounded upon 	a 	belief 	that
it was 	now useless 	to 	bargain over what was perceived 	as 	a 	fait
accompli, 	such a 	conclusion 	is 	not 	supported 	by the evidence.
Nor did 	the 	formulation 	of 	the 	"palm tree 	schedule" 	relieve 	the
Union of 	the 	responsibility 	to 	enter 	into 	the 	negotiations
process 	in order 	to 	preserve 	its 	right 	to 	bargain over 	the
22

issue. 	If 	the Charging 	Party questioned 	the 	proposed work
calendar which was 	attached 	to 	the District's 	June 	12 	offer 	to
bargain, 	or 	if 	it 	suspected the the 	"palm tree schedule" was 	a
veiled 	attempt 	to 	implement 	a work calendar, 	the Union could
have 	sought 	clarification.10	10 It 	could 	also 	have 	attempted 	to
10Compare 	with 	Regents 	of 	the University of 	California
(1985) 	PERB Decision No. 	520-H, 	wherein a Union's belief 	that
further 	bargaining would 	be 	futile was 	supported 	by 	ample
evidence, 	including 	the 	fact 	that 	it 	had met 	for 	the purpose of
clarifying 	the 	opponent's 	proposals.
The 	undersigned 	does 	not 	herein 	imply that 	the 	PERB 	has
imposed 	a 	duty upon 	a 	party 	to 	clarify proposals 	under 	facts
similar 	to 	those 	in this 	case. 	The Board has 	usually 	imposed
such' a duty upon 	an employer 	in the context where 	an employer
has 	outright 	refused to 	bargain on 	the ground 	that 	a Union's
demand 	to 	negotiate 	included 	items 	outside 	the 	scope 	of
representation. 	See, 	e.g., 	Healdsburg Union High School
District, 	supra----· 	---·, 	at p. 	8; 	State of California 	(Department of
Personnel Administration) 	(1986) 	PERB Decision No. 	574-S; 	and
Kern Community College District 	(1983) 	PERB Decision No. 	337.
The underlying 	rationale 	for 	imposing 	the duty, 	however, 	has
persuasive 	force 	to 	the 	issues 	herein.
In the 	above cases, 	the Board has 	reasoned that, 	faced with
a decision 	as 	to whether 	to 	enter 	bilateral 	negotiations 	upon
an opposing 	party's 	ambiguous 	request, 	a party must do more
than 	simply 	refuse 	to 	bargain 	in order 	to 	preserve 	its 	legal
position. 	Where 	there 	is 	sufficient 	ambiguity over whether 	a
Union's 	proposals 	are partly or 	totally outside 	the 	scope 	of
representation, 	the Board 	requires 	an employer 	to 	seek
clarification before 	relying 	on 	a 	defense 	of 	non-negotiability.
The duty to 	bargain, 	upon which these principles 	are based,
is 	a mutual one. 	Analogously, 	absent factual evidence that
there 	is 	no 	duty to 	bargain 	(whether 	it 	be 	based upon 	an 	"out
of 	scope" 	defense or upon circumstances 	indicating 	that 	a
"proposed" 	change was 	really a 	fait 	accompli), 	the appropriate
course 	for 	both parties 	is 	to 	do more 	than merely 	sit 	back 	and
refuse to negotiate. 	Here, 	the record indicates that, 	at a
minimum, 	there was 	sufficient 	ambiguity as 	to 	the 	issue of
whether 	the 	"palm tree 	schedule" 	was 	indeed meant 	to 	be 	a 	final
work 	schedule 	and 	over whether 	there was 	sufficient 	time 	to
23

"unveil" 	the District's 	plan through bargaining. 	It chose
instead 	not 	to 	respond 	directly 	to 	Clinton's 	requests 	of
June 	12 	and August 	4, 	but 	to 	file 	an unfair practice charge.
There 	is 	also 	an 	absence of 	factual 	evidence 	to 	support 	the
Union's 	subjective 	opinion 	that 	entering 	into 	bilateral
negotiations 	on 	the 	proposed 	calendar 	in 	June would 	only have
served 	to denigrate 	the Union 	in 	the 	eyes 	of 	the 	community.
In summary, 	the District's 	formulation 	and distribution of
the 	"palm tree 	schedule" 	did not 	amount 	to 	the 	adoption of 	a
final work calendar. 	The District 	complied with 	its 	duty to
give 	the Union 	notice 	and 	an 	opportunity 	to 	bargain 	over 	the
work calendar 	at 	a 	time when meaningful 	negotiations were 	still
possible. 	The Charging 	Party chose 	not 	to 	avail 	itself 	of 	that
opportunity. 	Hence, 	the District was 	free to 	implement 	its
work calendar 	for 	the 	1986-87 	academic year 	under 	the
circumstances without 	running 	afoul 	of 	the EERA.
(b) 	The 	Switch 	in the 	Scheduled 	Staff 	Development 	Days
In San Jose Community College District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision
No. 	240, 	the Board held that, 	absent 	a 	showing that 	a matter
within the scope of bargaining 	(i.e., 	hours, wages, 	etc.) was
meaningfully bargain over 	the work calendar 	to 	require 	the
Union to 	seek clarification. 	Not 	having 	preserved 	its 	legal
position by either 	accepting 	the 	offer 	to 	negotiate 	or 	seeking
to 	clarify the 	status 	of 	the 	calendar 	issue or 	the District's
proposal, 	the Union cannot 	support 	its 	conclusion 	that
bargaining was 	now pointless 	and 	that 	the District 	breached 	its
duty to 	bargain.
24

affected, 	the 	substitution of 	teaching 	days 	for 	inservice days
did not 	constitute 	an unlawful 	unilateral 	change. 	See 	also
Lake Elsinore 	School 	District 	(1986) 	PERB Decision No. 	606.
Here, 	the Charging 	Party 	similarly failed 	to 	present 	evidence
that 	the District's 	switching 	of 	a 	staff 	development 	day 	from
February 25, 	1987 to March 11 and 	12, 	1987 	affected a matter
within 	scope.
Although 	there was 	testimony 	that 	the 	substitution caused
part-time 	faculty to 	lose pay for March 	11, 	it 	appears 	that 	the
switch caused 	them to gain pay 	(February 25) 	that 	they
otherwise would 	not 	have made but 	for 	the 	switch. 	In other
words, 	what 	they lost on March 11, 	they gained on February 25,
both being Wednesdays. 	The 	record does 	not 	support 	a 	finding
of 	any other 	impact 	on matters 	within 	scope 	related 	to 	the
event. 	Accordingly, 	the allegation that 	this 	switch
constituted 	an unlawful 	unilateral 	change must 	be dismissed.
B. 	The Duty to Provide 	Information
The duty of 	public 	school 	employers 	to meet 	and 	negotiate
with exclusive 	representatives 	under 	EERA 	section 	3543.3 	is
analogous 	to 	the 	duty to 	bargain 	imposed 	upon private 	sector
employers 	by the NLRA. 	Intertwined with 	that 	statutory
obligation 	is 	the duty on 	the part 	of 	the 	employer 	to 	supply
the employee organization, 	upon request, 	with sufficient
information 	to 	enable 	it 	to 	understand 	and 	intelligently
discuss 	the 	issues 	raised 	in bargaining. 	Morris, 	the
25

Developing Labor Law, 	Bureau of National Affairs, 	1971, 	at
pp. 	309-310	.... . 	This duty is based on the premise that, 	without
'such 	information, 	employee organizations would 	be unable 	to
properly perform their 	duties 	as 	bargaining 	agents 	and,
therefore, 	no bargaining could take place. 	Ibid. 	An
employer's 	refusal 	to 	supply information 	is 	as 	much 	a 	violation
of 	the duty to bargain as 	if 	it 	had 	failed 	to meet 	and
negotiate with 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	in 	good 	faith.
Ibid. 	The 	representative's 	right 	to 	such 	information 	is 	so
fundamental 	to 	its 	role 	and duty vis-a-vis 	its 	members 	that 	it
has 	been held 	to 	be 	a 	statutory 	right 	notwithstanding whether 	a
statute expressly so 	provides. 	Timken Roller Bearing Co. 	v.
NLRB 	(6th Cir. 	1963) 	325 F.2d 746 	[54 LRRM 2785].
The 	exclusive 	representative 	is 	entitled 	to 	all 	information
that 	is 	necessary 	and 	relevant 	to 	collective 	bargaining 	and
contract 	administration. 	Stockton Unified 	School 	District
(1980) 	PERB Decision No. 	143; Mann Theatres Corp. 	of Calif.
(1978) 	234 NLRB No. 	124 	[97 LRRM 1412]; 	Timken v. 	NLRB, 	supra.
The 	refusal 	to 	furnish 	requested 	information meeting 	these
standards 	is, 	in itself, 	an unfair practice, 	and may also
support 	an 	independent 	finding 	of 	surface 	bargaining. 	K-Mart
Corp. 	v. 	NLRB 	(9th Cir. 	1980) 	626 F.2d 704 	[105 LRRM 2431].
Relevance must 	be determined 	by 	a 	standard more 	liberal
than that normally applied 	in hearings, 	more 	akin to 	a
discovery-type 	standard. 	Ibid., 	citing 	San Diego Newspaper
26
<~-·

Guild 	(9th Cir. 	1977) 	548 F.2d 863 	[94 LRRM 2923]. 	Information
is 	not made 	irrelevant 	simply because 	a union 	is 	able to
negotiate 	a 	contract without 	the 	requested data. 	NLRB v.
Fitzgerald Mills Corp. 	(2nd Cir. 	1963) 	313 F.2d 260 	[52 LRRM
2174], 	enforcing 133 NLRB 877 	[48 LRRM 1745] 	(1961) 	cert. 	den.,
375 U.S. 	834 	[54 LRRM 2312] 	(1963).
It 	is well 	settled 	that wage 	and 	related 	data 	concerning
bargaining 	unit 	employees 	is 	presumptively 	relevant 	and must 	be
provided upon request. 	Salem Village I. 	Inc. 	(1981) 	256 NLRB
No. 	141 	[107 LRRM 1364], 	A union is not 	required to show the
precise 	relevance 	of 	such 	information unless 	the 	employer 	has
submitted evidence 	sufficient 	to 	rebut 	the 	presumption 	of
relevance. 	Salem Village 	I. 	Inc.. 	supra: 	Grand 	Islander Health
Care Center. 	Inc. 	(1981) 	256 NLRB No. 	189 	[107 LRRM 1447]; 	and
Stockton USD, 	supra, 	at p. 	13. 	If the information is of
potential 	or probable 	relevance, 	the party seeking production
of 	the data 	need not make 	a 	showing 	that 	the 	information 	is
clearly dispositive 	of 	the 	negotiations 	issues 	between 	the
parties. 	Salem Village I. 	Inc., 	supra; 	Curtis-Wright
Corporation 	(3d Cir. 	1965) 	347 F.2d at 69 	[59 LRRM 2433]; 	and
Western Massachusetts Electric Company 	(1977) 	228 NLRB No. 	66
[95 	LRRM 	1605].
1. 	Names 	and Addresses 	of 	Part-time Unit Members
Types 	of 	data 	that 	have 	been 	found 	to 	be 	presumptively
relevant 	include 	documentation 	necessary 	for 	a 	union 	to 	police
27

organizational 	security provisions 	in 	a 	collective 	bargaining
agreement: 	e.g., 	W-2 	forms; 	documents 	in personnel 	files
reflecting merit 	pay 	increases; 	payroll 	documents 	reflecting
wages, overtime, 	hours 	and benefits; 	and wage histories 	of unit
members. 	Mann Theatres. supra; Globe-Union, 	Inc. 	(1977) 	233
NLRB No. 	211 	[97 LRRM 12211: 	All 	Brand Printing Corp. 	(1978)
235 NLRB No. 	14 	[98 LRRM 1392]; 	Food Employer Council. 	Inc.
(1972) 	197 NLRB No. 	98 	[80 LRRM 1440]. 	In Mt. 	San Antonio
Community College District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	224, 	the
Board 	ordered 	an employer 	to 	provide 	the 	union with 	names 	and
addresses 	of 	part-time 	instructors, 	reasoning 	that 	such
information was 	necessary 	for 	the 	organization 	to 	fulfill 	its
statutory duty 	to 	represent 	those 	potential 	unit 	members.
In this 	case, 	the Charging Party has 	established 	that 	its
request 	for 	the names 	and 	addresses 	of 	part-time unit members
hired 	for 	the 	spring 	1986 	semester was 	necessary 	and 	relevant
for 	contract 	administration 	and 	representational 	purposes. 	The
fact 	that 	the Employer 	also 	bound 	itself 	to 	provide 	such 	names
by contract 	is 	not 	a 	prerequisite 	to 	finding 	such 	a 	duty,
inasmuch as 	it 	arises 	independently, 	from the EERA itself.
There 	is 	no 	claim by the 	Respondent 	that 	the 	requested 	data was
irrelevant. 	Its 	contractual 	agreement 	to provide 	such data
indicates otherwise. 	Absent 	a valid defense, 	the Respondent
herein would 	be 	in violation of 	the EERA 	in 	refusing 	to 	comply
with the Union's 	request 	in 	a 	timely way.
28

An 	employer 	is 	required 	to 	supply 	relevant 	information 	to
the 	requesting 	union with 	the 	same 	diligence 	and 	thoroughness
exercised 	in other business 	affairs 	of 	importance.. 	See Kohler
Co. (1960) 	128 NLRB No. 	122 	[46 LRRM 1389]. 	Reasonable
promptness will 	depend upon the circumstances 	of 	each case. 	In
Colonial Press. 	Inc. 	(1973) 	204 NLRB No. 	126 	[83 LRRM 1648],
the NLRB 	found 	that 	a 	two-month delay 	in 	providing 	requested
information was 	unlawful. 	A delay of 	similar 	length was 	found
unlawful 	in K & K Transportation Corp. 	(1981) 	254 	NLRB No. 	87
[106 	LRRM 1138]. 	Delays 	in providing 	such 	information have
also 	been 	found 	inconsistent 	with 	an 	employer's 	duty to 	bargain
in 	good 	faith 	under 	the 	California 	Agricultural 	Labor 	Relations
Act 	(Labor Code section 1150, 	et seq.), 	a statute closely
analogous 	to the EERA. 	See Cardinal Distributing Corp.. 	Inc.
v. 	Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. 	(1984) 	159 Cal.App.3d 758;
205 Cal.Rptr. 	860.
The 	District 	failed 	to 	offer 	substantial 	evidence 	showing
that 	it 	could not 	comply with the Union's 	request. 	Miles'
general 	statement 	that 	his 	department's 	workload was 	heavy does
not 	explain why 	the 	clerical 	task of 	gathering 	the 	information
required until 	the end 	of May to 	be completed. 	There 	is 	no
evidence 	showing 	that 	the 	Employer 	did 	not 	have 	the 	time 	and
resources necessary to compile the data 	in 	a more timely
manner. 	Belated compliance 	(near 	the end 	of 	the 	academic/work
year) 	is not 	sufficient 	to 	cure the earlier 	failure 	to 	supply
29

the 	information. 	Interstate Food Processing Corp.(1987) 	283
NLRB No. 	46 	[124 LRRM 1284]. 	In sum, 	the Employer 	failed to
make 	a 	reasonable effort 	to 	secure 	the 	information. 	It must
therefore 	be 	concluded 	that 	the 	District 	violated 	EERA
section 3543.5(c) 	and, derivatively, 	3543.5(a) 	and (b), 	by its
conduct 	in this 	regard.
2. 	Data 	Regarding 	District 	Expenditures 	for Attorneys
Services .
The 	Respondent 	herein did 	not 	dispute 	the 	relevance 	or
necessity of 	the data 	requested by the Union 	as 	it 	related 	to
expenditures 	for 	legal 	services 	at 	any time 	surrounding 	the
solicitation. 	Unlike 	its 	conduct 	in failing 	to 	provide 	the
data 	regarding 	part-time 	employees, 	the District 	reasonably
complied with 	the Union's 	requests 	for 	information 	regarding
legal expenditures.
The 	Charging 	Party established 	that 	it 	made 	a 	demand 	for
information 	about 	District 	payments 	for 	services 	by 	attorney
Urrea 	Jones 	sometime 	in February 	1986. 	The District 	responded,
at 	a 	time unspecified 	in the 	record, 	by submitting Jones'
hourly 	rates 	charged 	to 	the District. 	When the Union
articulated 	its 	dissatisfaction with 	the 	information 	provided
and 	further 	clarified 	its 	request 	through 	correspondence 	dated
March 21, 	1986, 	the District promptly responded on
March 25, 	1986. 	The 	reply addressed the 	request 	as 	clarified
in 	the Union's 	last 	correspondence.
30

The 	Union 	put 	on 	testimony 	indicating 	that 	it 	received 	less
than 	full 	information because 	it 	received 	no 	further
information 	related 	to 	attorney 	fee 	expenditures 	after March 	25
and 	that 	it 	needed more 	than what was 	provided 	at 	that 	time.
However, 	it 	failed to produce evidence 	from which one might
conclude 	that 	more 	detailed 	information was 	requested 	or 	that
it 	informed 	the District 	that 	its March 	25 	response was 	still
inadequate 	or 	incomplete. 	Although there was 	testimony that
the 	related 	information 	available 	through 	"POL 	forms" 	was
misleading 	and confusing, 	the 	record 	indicates 	that 	the
District made 	its 	business 	services 	director 	available 	to
explain 	the 	forms 	and 	that 	the Union 	availed 	itself 	of 	that
opportunity. 	But 	there 	is 	no evidence that 	the Union sought
further clarification of 	such data 	after March 21, 	1986. 	It
must 	be 	concluded 	that 	the 	District 	did 	not 	fail 	to 	provide
this 	type of data, 	as 	requested by the Union, 	and therefore did
not 	violate 	the EERA 	in this 	regard.
"... . - .*.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Based on the 	foregoing, 	it 	is 	determined 	that 	the
Respondent 	engaged 	in per 	se 	violations 	of 	EERA 	section
3543.5(c) 	and, 	derivatively, 	3543.5(a) 	and 	(b) 	by unilaterally
changing 	its 	policy 	regarding 	attendance 	of Union 	officials 	at
governing 	board meetings 	on 	paid 	time without 	first 	performing
its 	notice 	and bargaining 	obligations. 	It 	is 	also 	concluded
that 	the Respondent's 	conduct 	in 	failing 	to provide 	the Union
in 	a 	timely way with names 	and 	addresses 	of 	part-time
31

bargaining 	unit 	members 	for 	the 	spring 	1986 	semester
constitutes 	an 	independent 	violation 	of 	EERA 	section 	3543.5(c)
and, 	derivatively 3543.5(a) 	and 	(b). 	The 	remaining 	allegations
are 	hereby dismissed.
V. 	REMEDY
The 	PERB 	is 	empowered 	to 	issue 	a 	decision 	and 	order
directing 	an 	offending 	party to 	take 	such 	affirmative 	action 	as
will 	effectuate 	the 	policies 	of 	the EERA. 	Government 	Code
section 3541.5(c). 	Accordingly, 	the Respondent will be ordered
to 	cease 	and 	desist 	from 	failing 	and 	refusing 	to 	give 	advance
notice 	and 	an 	opportunity to 	negotiate 	to 	the Union over 	its
decisions, 	and affects of 	its decisions, 	to change its
practices 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	provision 	of 	paid 	release 	time
for Charging 	Party's 	officials' 	attendance 	at 	governing 	board
meetings. 	It 	is 	also appropriate to order 	the Respondent 	to
restore 	the 	status 	quo 	ante 	by 	reverting 	to 	the 	attendance
policy existent 	immediately prior 	to May 	1986, 	as 	described 	in
the 	factual 	findings 	in this decision. 	That 	status 	quo 	shall
be maintained 	until 	the 	Respondent 	has 	met 	its 	statutory notice
and 	bargaining 	obligations 	with 	respect 	to 	changes 	in 	the
attendance/release 	time 	policy.
Because Bruce McManus 	lost vacation time 	as 	a 	result 	of
Respondents' 	improper change in practice, 	an order to make him
whole 	for 	such 	losses 	is warranted. 	Accordingly, 	Respondent 	is
ordered 	to 	credit McManus with 	any vacation 	and/or 	"comp" 	time
32

that 	he 	lost 	due 	to 	his 	attendance 	at 	governing 	board meetings
from May 	1986 	up 	to 	the date 	the Respondent 	restores 	the 	status
quo 	ante. 	If McManus 	is 	no 	longer 	in 	active employment with
the Respondent, 	the Employer 	shall 	compensate 	him monetarily,
in 	an 	amount 	equivalent 	to 	the value of 	the 	lost 	vacation or
comp 	time, 	including 	interest 	thereon 	at 	10 	percent 	per 	annum.
With 	regard 	to 	the Respondent's 	duty 	to 	furnish
information, 	the District 	is 	ordered 	to 	cease 	and desist 	from
failing 	to 	provide 	the 	Charging 	Party with 	accurate 	information
regarding 	part-time 	bargaining 	unit 	members.
It 	is 	appropriate that 	the District 	be 	required 	to post 	a
Notice 	incorporating 	the 	terms 	of 	this Order. 	The Notice
should 	be 	subscribed 	by 	an 	authorized 	agent 	of 	the Employer
indicating 	that 	it will 	comply with 	the 	terms 	thereof. 	The
Notice 	shall 	not be 	reduced 	in size, 	defaced, 	altered or
covered 	by any other material. 	Posting 	such 	a Notice will
provide 	employees with notice 	that 	the Employer 	has 	acted 	in 	an
unlawful 	manner 	and 	is 	being 	required 	to 	cease 	and desist 	from
this 	activity. 	It 	effectuates 	the purposes 	of 	the Act 	that
employees 	be 	informed 	of 	the 	resolution 	of 	the 	controversy 	and
will 	announce 	the Employer's 	readiness 	to 	comply with 	the
ordered 	remedy. 	See 	Placerville Union 	School 	District 	(1978)
PERB Decision No. 	69. 	In Pandol 	and Sons v. 	Agricultural Labor
Relations Bd. 	(1979) 	98 Cal.App.3d 580, 	587 the California
District 	Court 	of Appeals 	approved 	a 	similar 	posting
. .
33

- -
requirement. 	See 	also NLRB v. 	Express 	Publishing Co. 	(1941)
312 U.S. 426 	[8 LRRM 415].
VI. 	PROPOSED ORDER
Upon 	the 	foregoing 	findings 	of 	fact 	and conclusions 	of 	law,
and the entire 	record 	in this case, 	and pursuant 	to EERA
section 3541.5(c), 	it is hereby ORDERED that the District, 	its
governing 	board 	and 	its 	representatives 	shall:
A. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
(1) 	Failing 	and 	refusing 	to 	give 	advance notice 	and 	an
opportunity 	to 	negotiate 	to 	the 	Compton Community College
Federation of Employees 	(Union) 	over decisions, 	and effects 	of
decisions, 	to change 	its 	practices 	regarding 	the provision of
paid 	release 	time 	for 	attendance 	at 	governing 	board meetings 	by
Union officials.
(2) 	Failing 	to 	provide the Union with 	accurate
information 	regarding 	part-time 	bargaining 	unit 	members 	in 	a
timely 	manner.
B. 	TAKE 	THE 	FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE ACTIONS DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE THE 	POLICIES OF THE ACT:
(1) 	Restore the 	status 	quo 	ante by reinstating 	the
policy existent 	immediately prior 	to May 	1986 	regarding
attendance 	of Union officials 	at 	governing 	board meetings.
That 	status 	quo 	shall 	be maintained 	until 	the 	Respondent 	has
met 	its 	statutory notice 	and 	bargaining 	obligations 	with
respect 	to 	changes 	in that 	attendance/release 	time 	policy.
34

(2) 	Make Bruce McManus whole 	for 	any 	losses 	he may
have 	suffered 	resulting 	from 	the 	District's 	change 	in 	policy,
by crediting 	him with vacation 	and/or 	"comp" 	time 	in 	an 	amount
commensurate with 	that which 	he 	lost 	by 	attending 	governing
board meetings 	after May 19, 	1986. 	If McManus 	is 	no 	longer 	in
active 	employment with 	the Respondent, 	the Employer 	shall
compensate McManus 	by tendering 	him 	a 	monetary 	sum 	in 	an 	amount
equivalent 	to 	the value 	of 	the 	lost 	vacation or 	comp 	time,
including 	interest 	thereon 	at 	10 	percent 	per 	annum.
. . . . . '
- . . . . 	: - .. .
(3) 	Sign 	and post 	copies 	of 	the 	attached Notice marked
"Appendix" 	in conspicuous 	places where notices 	to employees 	are
customarily placed 	at 	its 	headquarters 	office 	and 	at 	each of
its work sites 	for 	thirty 	(30) 	consecutive workdays. 	Copies of
this 	Notice, 	after 	being 	duly signed by an 	authorized 	agent 	of
the District, 	shall be posted within ten 	(10). workdays from
service of 	the 	final 	decision 	in this matter. 	Reasonable 	steps
shall 	be 	taken 	to 	insure 	that 	the Notice 	is 	not 	reduced 	in
size, 	altered, 	defaced or covered by any other materials.
(4) 	Upon 	issuance of 	a 	final decision, 	make written
notification 	of 	the 	actions 	taken 	to 	comply with 	this 	Order 	to
the Los Angeles 	Regional 	Director 	of 	the Public Employment
Relations 	Board 	in 	accordance with his 	instructions.
Pursuant 	to California Administrative Code, 	title 	8,
part 	III, 	section 32305, 	this 	Proposed Decision and Order 	shall
become 	final 	unless 	a party files 	a 	statement 	of 	exceptions
35

with 	the 	Board 	itself 	at 	the 	headquarters 	office 	in 	Sacramento
within 20 days 	of 	service of 	this 	Decision. 	In 	accordance with
PERB Regulations, 	the statement of exceptions 	should 	identify
by page 	citation or 	exhibit 	number 	the 	portions 	of 	the 	record,
if 	any, 	relied upon for 	such exceptions. 	See California
Administrative Code, 	title 8, 	part III, 	section 32300. 	A
document 	is 	considered 	"filed" 	when 	actually 	received 	before
the close of 	business 	(5:00 	p.m.) 	on 	the 	last 	day set 	for
filing, 	". 	. 	. o r when sent 	by telegraph or certified or
Express 	United 	States mail, 	postmarked 	not 	later 	than 	the 	last
day 	set 	for 	filing 	. . . " 	See 	California 	Administrative 	Code,
title 8, 	part 	III, 	section 32135. 	Code of Civil Procedure
section 	1013 	shall 	apply. 	Any statement 	of 	exceptions 	and
supporting 	brief 	must 	be 	served 	concurrently with 	its 	filing
upon each party to 	this 	proceeding. 	Proof 	of 	service 	shall
accompany each 	copy 	served 	on 	a 	party or 	filed with 	the 	Board
itself. 	See California Administrative Code, 	title 8, 	part 	III,
sections 32300, 	32305 and 32140.
,
Dated: 	November 	16, 	1987
Manuel 	M. 	Melgoza
Administrative 	Law 	Judge
36