State of California (Department of Forestry) (PERB 0690S)

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
CALIFORNIA 	STATE 	EMPLOYEES'
ASSOCIATION,
Charging 	Party,
v.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	(DEPARTMENT OF
FORESTRY),
Respondent.
)
)
)
) 	Case 	No. 	SF-CE-77-S
PERB 	Decision 	No. 	690-S
June 	30, 	1988
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Appearances: 	Robert M. 	Shames, 	Labor Relations Representative,
for California State Employees' 	Association; 	Edumund K. 	Brehl,
Attorney, 	for 	State of 	California 	(Department of Forestry).
Before Hesse, 	Chairperson; 	Craib and Shank, 	Members.
DECISION
CRAIB, 	Member: 	This 	case 	is before 	the Public Employment
Relations 	Board 	(PERB) 	on 	exceptions 	filed by 	the 	California
State 	Employees' 	Association 	(CSEA) 	to the 	attached proposed
decision of 	a PERB administrative 	law 	judge 	(ALJ). 	The ALJ
dismissed 	CSEA's 	charge 	that 	the 	State 	of 	California
(Department 	of 	Forestry) 	unlawfully denied 	union 	representation
to 	an 	employee 	at 	an 	investigatory 	interview which 	the 	employee
reasonably believed 	could 	result 	in 	disciplinary 	action. 	The
ALJ 	determined 	that 	the 	employee 	was 	not 	denied 	representation
because she did not, 	in fact, 	request 	representation.
We have 	reviewed 	the 	entire 	record, 	including 	the 	proposed
decision, 	the 	exceptions 	thereto and 	the 	response 	to 	the
exceptions. 	We 	find 	the ALJ's 	findings 	of 	fact 	and 	conclusions
________ )

of 	law 	to be 	free 	from prejudicial 	error 	and we 	adopt 	them as
our 	own, 	with 	the 	exception of 	the ALJ's 	discussion 	regarding
deferral 	to arbitration, 	which we 	find 	to be unnecessary 	to 	the
resolution 	of 	this 	case.
ORDER
Based 	upon 	the 	entire 	record, 	the 	unfair practice 	charge 	in
Case No. 	SF-CE-77-S 	is hereby DISMISSED.
Chairperson 	Hesse 	and Member 	Shank 	joined 	in 	this 	Decision.
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STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
CALIFORNIA 	STATE 	EMPLOYEES'
ASSOCIATION,
Charging 	Party,
v.
STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA 	(DEPARTMENT
OF 	FORESTRY),
Respondent.
Unfair 	Practice
Case No. 	SF-CE-77-S
PROPOSED 	DECISION
(7/24/87)
Appearances: 	Robert M. 	Shames, 	Representative, 	for California
State Employees Association; 	Edmund K. 	Brehl, 	Attorney, 	for
State of 	California 	(Department of Forestry).
Before; 	Fred D'Orazio, 	Administrative Law Judge.
PROCEDURAL 	HISTORY
This 	unfair 	practice 	charge was 	filed 	by 	the 	California
State Employees' 	Association 	(hereafter 	CSEA or Charging 	Party)
against 	the 	State 	of 	California 	(Department 	of 	Forestry)
(hereafter Respondent or State) 	on January 22, 	1987. 	The
charge 	alleges 	that 	an 	employee was 	denied 	union 	representation
at 	an 	investigatory 	interview which 	the 	employee 	reasonably
believed 	could 	result 	in disciplinary 	action, 	in violation 	of
section 3519 	(a) 	and 	(b) 	of 	the Ralph C. 	Dills Act 	(hereafter
A c t ) . 1
1The 	Act 	is 	codified 	at 	Government 	Code 	section 	3512
et.seq. 	Unless 	otherwise 	indicated, 	all 	statutory 	references
in this 	decision 	are to 	the Government Code. 	Section 	3519 	(a)
and 	(b) 	provides 	that 	it 	shall 	be unlawful 	for 	the State to:
This proposed decision has been appealed to the
Board itself and may not be cited as precedent
unless the decision and its rationale have been
adopted by the Board.

The 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board 	(hereafter 	PERB 	or
Board) 	General 	Counsel 	issued 	a 	complaint 	on February 24,
1987. 	Respondent 	filed its 	answer on March 23, 	1987, 	denying
that 	it 	violated 	the Act 	and 	offering 	several 	affirmative
defenses. 	Denials 	and defenses will 	be dealt with below as
appropriate. 	The 	settlement conference on April 	3, 	1987 did
not 	resolve 	the dispute.
A 	formal 	hearing 	was 	conducted 	by 	the 	undersigned 	in 	San
Francisco on June 4, 	1987. 	The post-hearing 	briefing 	schedule
was 	completed on July 16, 	1987.
STATEMENT 	OF 	FACTS
The October 	31 Meeting
On October 31, 	1986, Ms. 	Delynn Banfill, 	an employee at the
Eel River Conservation Camp 	in Redway, 	California, 	was 	ordered
by 	Supervisor 	Carl 	Vogt 	to 	attend 	an 	investigatory 	interview.
Present 	at 	the meeting 	in 	addition to Vogt 	and 	Banfill were
Fire Captain Wendy Windsor, 	Supervisor Virgil 	Harvey and
Forestry Department 	Representative 	Fred 	Imhoff. 	Imhoff 	was 	the
investigator 	assigned 	to 	lead 	the 	questioning. 	This 	was 	his
first 	experience 	in 	conducting 	such 	interviews.
(a) 	Impose or 	threaten to 	impose 	reprisals
on employees, 	to discriminate or 	threaten to
discriminate 	against employees, 	or otherwise
to 	interfere with, 	restrain, 	or coerce
employees 	because of 	their 	exercise 	of
rights 	guaranteed 	by this 	chapter.
(b) 	Deny to employee organizations 	rights
guaranteed 	to 	them by 	this 	chapter.
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Vogt 	and Harvey attended 	as 	supervisors. 	Windsor, 	a
rank-and-file employee, 	attended as 	a witness.
The 	purpose of 	the meeting was 	to 	determine 	if 	the 	employer
had 	reason 	to 	pursue criminal 	charges 	against 	Banfill 	for
personal 	use of 	State postage. 	At 	the 	time 	she was 	called
Banfill 	did 	not 	know the 	subject 	of 	the meeting.
The 	meeting 	on October 	31 was 	recorded 	and 	a 	transcript was
received 	as 	a 	joint 	exhibit. 	There 	is 	no dispute 	regarding 	the
accuracy of 	the 	transcript. 	The 	following 	occurred:
Imhoff: 	Hi, 	why don't you have 	a 	seat with us 	please.
Delynn, 	we want 	to 	ask you 	some questions 	on a
particular matter, 	and 	as you can 	see we have
some tapes 	going. 	I want you to 	acknowledge that
fact. 	And, 	also before we 	start 	anything up,
just 	to make 	it more 	formal, 	I'm advised 	to 	read
you 	some 	rights, 	okay? 	You have the 	right 	to
remain 	silent, 	anything you 	say can 	and will 	be
used 	against you 	in 	a 	court 	of 	law, 	you have 	the
right 	to 	talk to 	a 	lawyer 	and have 	him present
with you while you 	are 	being 	questioned. 	If 	you
cannot 	afford him, 	if you cannot 	afford 	to 	hire 	a
lawyer, 	one will 	be 	appointed for you 	to
represent 	you 	before 	any questioning 	if 	you wish.
Banfill: 	Does that mean 	. 	. 	. 	direct 	from my CSEA or does
that mean 	an 	attorney?
Imhoff: 	That will be 	an attorney, 	okay? 	Okay, 	do you
understand 	these 	rights?
Banfill: 	Yes Sir.
Immediately 	thereafter 	Banfill 	signed 	a 	waiver 	of 	her Miranda
rights 	to 	remain 	silent 	or 	to 	proceed with 	the 	benefit 	of 	legal
representation, 	and 	the 	interview proceeded.
After 	a 	few questions 	it 	became 	clear 	that 	the 	questions
were directed 	at 	the 	illegal 	use of 	State postage. 	The
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interview 	lasted 	about 	thirty minutes.
2
After 	the 	interview
ended 	Banfill was 	released. 	However, 	about 	fifteen minutes
later 	she 	returned 	alone 	to 	the meeting 	room with 	stamps 	she
had 	just 	purchased 	from 	the post 	office. 	Upon her 	return she
volunteered 	the 	following:
About 	a week ago, 	when 	I 	took an audit of 	the
postage, 	it was 	about $44 	too short. 	Like I 	said
previously, 	on my time off, 	I usually turned
those over to Virgil 	and Carl, 	maybe 	it didn't
get 	posted or 	an addition error 	or 	something, 	but
here 	is your 	$44 	in postage 	I 	just purchased 	to
make 	the 	total 	valid.
The 	interview 	ended 	shortly 	thereafter. 	At 	the 	end 	Banfill
maintained 	that 	she did 	not 	steal 	the 	stamps. 	She 	attributed
the missing 	stamps 	to 	an error 	in 	record 	keeping, 	but 	she did
not 	concede 	that 	the error was 	hers.
Three witnesses 	testified 	concerning 	the 	events 	at 	the
October 	31 meeting. 	Banfill's 	testimony was 	entirely
consistent with 	the 	transcript 	of 	the meeting 	described 	above.
Windsor, 	who 	testified on behalf of 	Banfill, 	did not have 	a
clear 	recollection of 	the October 	31 meeting. 	Instead, 	her
testimony was 	based 	largely on 	a 	statement 	she 	gave 	to 	Banfill
on February 11, 	1987, 	in preparation 	for 	this unfair practice
hearing. 	Windsor's 	statement 	describes 	the 	sequence 	of 	events
as follows:
1) 	Imhoff, 	advised Delynn Banfill OA II 	of 	her 	"Miranda"
Rights.
2Banfill was 	eventually demoted 	one 	step. 	As 	of 	the 	time
of 	the 	hearing 	in 	this 	matter 	Banfill's 	disciplinary 	action was
before 	the 	State 	Personnel 	Board.
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2) 	She waived 	them and 	signed 	a written waiver.
3) 	Delynn Banfill 	asked 	"What 	about 	CSEA?" 	FPO 	Imhoff's
response was negative, 	and as 	I 	remember 	stated, 	"That
would 	be 	unnecessary.
In 	response 	to 	a 	question 	from the ALJ 	about 	Imhoff's 	comment
that 	a 	CSEA 	representative would 	be 	"unnecessary," 	Windsor
testified 	"That was 	not 	the 	precise 	language used. 	It was 	just
that 	I 	remember 	something 	stated 	to 	that 	fact." 	The 	following
exchange 	accurately 	captures 	the 	extent 	of Windsor's
recollection:
Q. 	(By Mr. 	Shames) 	Okay. 	Wendy, 	going to your
statement 	again, 	not the whole thing, 	but
item 3, 	is 	it true that 	as you 	say here 	that
it was 	your understanding 	that 	Delynn 	asked
what 	about 	CSEA?
A. 	It was words 	to that effect. 	At 	the time 	I
wrote 	this 	on 	February 	11 we would have
approximately what, 	three or 	four months 	had
passed by and 	I 	do have good 	recall, 	but 	as
this 	stands 	it 	all 	happened 	pretty much
simultaneously. 	Mr. 	Imhoff 	read her her
rights 	and when he got 	through, 	Delynn 	asked
well, 	what 	about CSEA or 	something 	to 	that
effect 	or 	do you mean 	an 	attorney or what?
And that's, 	but he gave 	a negative 	response
and 	that's what 	I 	recalled 	three months
later, 	that it was 	a negative response. 	I
couldn't 	remember exactly how he 	said 	it, 	it
was 	just 	that 	it was 	a negative 	response.
Finally, 	Windsor 	testified 	that 	Banfill was 	extremely upset
when 	asked 	to 	sign 	the waiver.
Imhoff 	did 	not 	dispute 	the 	version 	of 	the October 	31
meeting 	as 	described 	above 	in 	the 	transcript. 	He 	testified
that 	he 	intended 	to 	give Banfill Miranda warnings, 	and he
understood 	her 	reference 	to 	CSEA 	representation 	to 	be 	a
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request 	for clarification of 	the Miranda warnings. 	If 	Banfill
had 	asked 	for 	a 	lawyer, 	Imhoff 	said, 	he would have 	stopped 	the
interview 	and 	made 	arrangements 	to 	satisfy her 	request.
Regarding 	any 	request 	for 	union 	representation, 	Imhoff
testified 	as 	follows.
Q. 	(By Mr. 	Brehl) 	Now, 	if Ms. 	Banfill had asked for 	a
union 	representative 	at 	that 	time, 	if 	she had clearly
said 	I want 	a CSEA representative 	in here, 	what would
you 	have done?
A. 	I 	would have 	stopped 	the 	interview.
Q. 	For what 	purpose?
A. 	Not 	having done 	this 	before, 	it would have been the,
just 	to make things 	totally legal, 	I would have had 	a
representative there, 	seen 	that 	she would have wanted,
it would 	have 	keyed me 	to 	think 	that maybe we 	should
have 	one there 	just 	to make 	it more 	kosher.
Based on the foregoing, 	I 	conclude that the events 	as
reflected 	in 	the 	transcript 	of 	the meeting 	are 	accurate. 	Both
Banfill 	and 	Imhoff 	accepted 	this 	version. 	To 	the 	extent 	that
Windsor's 	testimony varies 	from the 	transcript, 	it 	is
discredited 	because 	her 	recollection was 	not 	as 	specific 	as
either 	Imhoff's 	or 	Banfill's, 	and 	it was 	largely based on 	a
written 	statement 	she gave 	to 	Banfill 	three months 	after 	the
meeting 	and 	in preparation 	for 	this 	hearing.
THE 	COLLECTIVE 	BARGAINING AGREEMENT
The 	collective 	bargaining 	agreement 	between 	CSEA 	and 	the
State 	contains 	the 	following 	clause.
2.1 	Steward 	Designation
a. 	The State 	recognizes 	and 	agrees 	to deal
with designated 	stewards, 	bargaining 	unit 	council
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members 	or 	CSEA 	staff 	on 	the 	following:
(1) 	The 	administration of 	this 	contract;
(2) 	Employee discipline cases;
(3) 	Informal 	settlement 	conferences 	or
formal 	hearings 	conducted 	by 	the 	Public
Employment 	Relations 	Board;
(4) 	Matters 	scheduled 	for 	hearing 	by the
Board of Control;
(5) 	Matters 	pending 	before 	the 	State
Personnel 	Board.
The 	agreement 	also 	contains 	a 	binding 	arbitration 	provision 	as
the mechanism 	for 	resolving 	disputes 	under 	the 	contract. 	There
was 	no 	evidence 	of 	bargaining 	history presented.
CSEA did 	not 	timely 	file 	a 	grievance 	about 	the denial 	of
representation 	at 	the October 	31 meeting. 	The Respondent 	has
refused 	to waive 	procedural 	defenses 	and 	proceed 	to 	binding
arbitration.
ISSUE
Was 	Banfill 	unlawfully denied union 	representation 	at 	the
investigatory 	interview on October 	31, 	1986?
DISCUSSION
In NLRB v. Weingarten. 	Inc. 	(1975) 420 U.S. 	251,
[88 LRRM 2689], 	the Supreme Court upheld the 	right of 	an
employee 	to 	have 	a union 	representative present 	at 	an
investigatory 	interview with 	the 	employer 	which 	the 	employee
reasonably believes 	may 	result 	in discipline. 	The 	Board 	has
held 	that 	the 	same 	right 	exists 	in 	section 	3543 	of 	the
Educational 	Employment Relations Act, 	a 	section virtually
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identical 	to 	section 3515.3 Marin Community College District
(1980) 	PERB Decision No. 	145. 	However, 	representation is
granted 	under 	California 	labor 	statutes 	such 	as 	the Dills Act,
absent 	the 	discipline 	element, 	only 	in 	"highly unusual
circumstances." 	Redwoods 	Community College District 	v. 	PERB
(1984) 	139 Cal.App.3d 617, 	205 Cal.Rptr. 	523.
The 	employer's 	obligation 	to 	honor 	this 	representational
right 	must 	be 	triggered 	by 	an 	employee 	request 	for 	union
representation. 	As 	the 	Supreme Court pointed out, 	"the 	right
arises 	only 	in 	situations 	where 	the 	employee 	requests
representation. 	In other words, 	the employee may forego his
guaranteed 	right 	and, 	if he prefers, 	participate 	in an
interview unaccompanied 	by his 	union 	representation." 	NLRB 	v.
Weingarten. 	Inc., 	supra, 420 U.S. 251, 256-257; see also,
Lennox Industries. 	Inc. 	(1979) 	244 NLRB 607, 	[102 LRRM 1298].
PERB 	adopted 	the 	requirement 	that 	an 	employee must 	request
representation 	in Regents 	of 	the University of 	California
(1983) PERB Decision No. 	310-H, ALJ opinion, 	p. 	31.
It 	is 	not 	disputed 	that 	the 	interview which has 	given 	rise
to 	this 	case 	is 	the 	type 	of 	investigatory 	interview
3The 	construction of 	similar 	or 	identical 	provisions 	of
the NLRA, 	as amended, 	29 U.S.C. 	151 et 	seq., 	may be used to
guide 	interpretation of 	the Act. 	See e.g. 	San Diego 	Teachers
Association v. 	Superior Court 	(1979) 	12 Cal.3d 1, 	12-13; 	Fire
Fighters Union v. City of Vallejo 	(1974) 	12 Cal.3d 	608, 	616.
Compare 	section 3515 	of 	the Act with 	section 	7 	of 	the NLRA
concerning 	representational 	rights 	of 	employees. 	Rio 	Hondo
Community College District 	(1982) 	PERB Decision No. 	260.
8

contemplated 	by Weingarten. 	Although 	Banfill 	initially did 	not
know why she was 	called 	to 	the meeting, 	Imhoff 	gave 	her Miranda
warnings 	at 	the 	start 	and 	in the 	first 	series 	of 	questions 	the
purpose of 	the 	investigation 	(i.e. 	illegal use of 	State
postage) 	was explained. 	Thus, 	since Banfill was 	put on notice
at 	the 	start 	that 	she was 	being 	investigated 	regarding 	a
criminal matter, 	it 	follows 	that 	she was 	aware that 	the
investigation might 	lead 	to 	disciplinary action. 	The 	central
question to be 	answered then 	is whether Banfill, 	in fact,
requested 	union 	representation 	at 	the 	interview on October 	31.
Banfill's 	response 	to 	Imhoff 	after 	the Miranda 	warnings
were given was 	confusing 	and 	ambiguous 	at 	best: 	"Does 	that
mean 	. 	. 	. 	direct from my CSEA or does that mean an attorney?"
These words 	do 	not 	constitute 	a 	request 	for union
representation; 	they simply 	ask 	if 	Imhoff's 	statement 	of 	the
Miranda warnings 	included 	a 	reference 	to 	union 	representation.
Imhoff 	correctly 	interpreted 	this 	as 	a 	request 	for
clarification of 	the Miranda warnings. 	Since 	he was 	concerned
only with giving Miranda warnings, 	having 	not 	even considered
union 	representation, 	Imhoff 	told 	Banfill 	that 	he meant 	"an
attorney." 	Banfill 	told 	Imhoff 	that 	she understood 	"these
rights," 	and voluntarily signed 	a waiver of her Miranda 	rights.
The 	Charging 	Party 	argues 	that 	Imhoff 	should 	have 	informed
Banfill 	of 	her 	right 	to CSEA 	representation. 	I 	am aware 	of 	no
cases 	under 	the Weingarten progeny which 	stand 	for 	the
9

proposition 	that 	the 	employer 	has 	the 	affirmative 	obligation 	to
inform employees 	of Weingarten 	rights. 	Indeed, 	the Board 	has
held 	that 	there 	is 	no 	"labor 	relations 	analogue" 	to 	the Miranda
warning 	principle. 	Regents 	of 	the University of 	California.
supra. 	Although 	informing 	employees 	of 	all 	representational
-
rights 	at 	investigatory 	interviews 	may 	reflect 	an 	enlightened
personnel 	policy, 	Imhoff 	had no obligation to 	give Banfill 	such
notice. 	See Montgomery Ward 	and Company. 	Inc. 	(1981)
254 NLRB 826, 	831, 	[106 LRRM 1148]. 	The Miranda warnings he
gave were 	certainly enough 	to 	alert 	her 	to 	the 	seriousness 	of
the 	investigation 	and 	the 	likely need 	for 	representation. 	See
Sears v. 	Department of 	Navy 	(CA 1 	1981) 	680 F.2d 863, 	[110 LRRM
2777].
In 	any event, 	Banfill 	obviously was 	aware 	that 	she 	had 	a
right 	to 	union 	representation 	since 	she was 	the 	one who 	raised
the matter 	in the 	first 	place, 	yet 	she 	stopped 	short 	of
requesting 	such 	representation, 	choosing 	instead 	to 	begin 	the
interview unaccompanied 	by either 	an 	attorney or 	a 	CSEA
representative. 	As 	the 	hearing 	progressed 	and 	the 	seriousness
of 	the 	investigation became 	increasingly clear, 	Banfill 	still
made 	no 	request 	for 	union 	representation. 	After 	the 	interview
was 	over Banfill was 	released. 	However, 	she 	returned 	a 	short
time 	later 	on 	her 	own volition 	and 	sought 	to 	continue 	the
interview, 	presenting 	the 	recently purchased 	postage 	to
reimburse 	the 	State. 	Her decision to 	return to 	the meeting
room unrepresented 	is 	further 	evidence 	that 	Banfill 	chose 	to
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forego 	representation 	and proceed on her 	own. 	Therefore, 	it
must 	be 	concluded 	that 	she 	consciously decided 	to 	forego
representation 	entirely.
As 	further 	support 	for 	the 	conclusion 	that 	Banfill 	did 	not
request 	CSEA 	representation 	is 	the 	finding, 	based on 	Imhoff's
persuasive 	testimony at 	the hearing, 	that 	he was 	not 	opposed 	to
granting 	such 	rights. 	He was 	open to 	such a 	request, 	and
Banfill 	would 	have 	been 	afforded 	the 	opportunity 	to 	secure
union 	representation had 	she 	asked. 	Imhoff 	testified 	he was
new 	at 	conducting 	investigatory 	interviews, 	and 	the 	record
shows 	he 	apparently proceeded with 	great 	caution. 	Although 	he
was 	unclear 	as 	to 	the extent 	of 	Banfill's 	right 	to 	consult 	a
CSEA 	representative, 	Imhoff 	convincingly 	testified 	that 	he
would 	have 	stopped 	the 	interview 	and 	acceded 	to 	any 	request 	for
CSEA 	representation 	just 	to make 	things 	"totally 	legal." 	The
request 	never 	came.
The 	collective 	bargaining 	agreement 	places 	an obligation 	on
the 	employer 	to 	"deal" 	with CSEA 	representatives 	on 	"employee
discipline 	cases." 	The 	Board 	has 	no 	authority to 	enforce
agreements 	between 	the 	parties 	unless 	the 	alleged 	violation
also 	constitutes 	a violation of 	the Act.4 Assuming 	that 	this
4Section 3514.5(b) 	states:
The 	board 	shall 	not 	have 	authority to
enforce 	agreements 	between the parties, 	and
shall 	not 	issue 	a 	complaint 	on 	any charge
based 	on 	alleged 	violation 	of 	such 	an
agreement 	that 	would 	not 	also 	constitute 	an
unfair 	practice under 	this 	chapter.
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provision was 	breached 	at 	the meeting 	on October 	31, 	the
appropriate 	forum to 	remedy the breach was 	the 	negotiated
grievance procedure. 	In this 	case 	the charging 	party has 	not
timely 	filed 	a 	grievance 	and 	the 	respondent 	has 	refused 	to
waive 	procedural 	defenses 	and 	proceed 	to 	binding 	arbitration.
Dry Creek Joint 	Elementary School 	District 	(1980) 	PERB Order
No. 	Ad-81a; 	Collyer Insulated Wire 	(1971) 	192 NLRB 837, 	[77
LRRM 1931]. 	Under these circumstances, 	it would be
inappropriate 	in 	this 	proceeding 	to 	reach 	any purely
contractual 	violation. 	To 	the 	extent 	that 	the Respondent's
actions 	on October 	31 might 	also 	constitute 	an unfair 	practice
under 	the Act, 	this 	allegation has 	been disposed 	of 	above.
CONCLUSION AND 	ORDER
Based 	on 	the foregoing, unfair 	practice 	charge 	SF-CE-77-S 	is
dismissed 	in 	its 	entirety.
Pursuant 	to California Administrative Code, 	title 	8,
part 	III, 	section 32305, 	this 	Proposed Decision and Order 	shall
become 	final 	unless 	a party files 	a 	timely statement 	of
exceptions 	with 	the Board 	itself 	at 	the 	headquarters 	office 	in
Sacramento within 20 days 	of 	service of 	this 	Decision. 	In
accordance with PERB Regulations, 	the 	statement 	of 	exceptions
should 	identify 	by page 	citation 	or 	exhibit 	number 	the 	portions
of 	the 	record, 	if 	any, 	relied upon for 	such exceptions. 	See
California Administrative Code title 	8, 	part 	III,
section 	32300. 	A document 	is 	considered 	"filed" 	when actually
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received before 	the close of 	business 	(5:00 	p.m.) 	on the 	last
day set 	for 	filing, 	". 	. 	. o r when sent by telegraph or
certified 	or 	Express United 	States 	mail, 	postmarked 	not 	later
than 	the 	last 	day 	set 	for 	filing 	. . . " 	See 	California
Administrative Code, 	title 8, 	part III, 	section 32135. 	Code of
Civil 	Procedure 	section 	1013 	shall 	apply. 	Any 	statement 	of
exceptions 	and 	supporting 	brief 	must 	be 	served 	concurrently
with 	its 	filing upon each party to 	this 	proceeding. 	Proof 	of
service 	shall 	accompany each 	copy 	served 	on 	a 	party or 	filed
with 	the 	Board 	itself. 	See 	California Administrative Code,
title 8, 	part III, 	sections 32300, 	32305, 	and 32140.
Dated: 	July 24, 	1987 Fred 	D'Orazio
Administrative Law Judge
. . .
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