California State Employees Association (Lemmons and Lund) (PERB 0545S)

STATE OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
JOHN R. 	LEMMONS AND ROBERT G. 	LUND,
Charging 	Parties,
v.
CALIFORNIA STATE EMPLOYEES'
ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
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) 	Case 	No. 	S-CO-50-S
PERB 	Decision 	No. 	545-S
December 	13, 	1985
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Appearance; 	Robert 	G. 	Lund 	representing himself 	and John 	R.
Lemmons.
Before Hesse, 	Chairperson; Jaeger, Morgenstern, 	Burt and Porter,
Members.
DECISION
This 	case 	is 	before 	the Public 	Employment Relations 	Board
on appeal 	by 	charging parties 	of 	the 	Board 	agent's 	dismissal,
attached hereto, 	of 	their 	charge 	alleging 	that 	the 	California
State Employees' 	Association violated section 3519.5 	of 	the
State Employer-Employee Relations Act 	(Gov. 	Code sec. 	3512 et
seq.).
We have 	reviewed 	the dismissal 	and 	finding 	it 	free 	from
prejudicial error, 	adopt 	it as 	the Decision of 	the Board
itself, 	in that, 	as 	indicated in the Board agent's 	letter, 	the
charge 	failed 	to state a prima 	facie 	case.
ORDER
The unfair practice 	charge 	in Case 	No. 	S-CO-50-S 	is
DISMISSED WITHOUT 	LEAVE 	TO AMEND.
By 	the 	BOARD.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA 	. 	GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN, Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
SACRAMENTO REGIONAL OFFICE
1031 18TH STREET, SUITE 102
SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 	95814
(916) 322-3198
September 23, 	1985
Robert G. 	Lund
John R. 	Lemmons
Re: 	Lemmons 	and 	Lund v. 	California 	State Employees' 	Association
Unfair 	Practice 	Charge No. 	S-CO-50-S. 	First Amended 	Charge
Dear Mr. 	Lemmons and Mr. 	Lund:
The 	above-referenced 	charge 	alleges 	that 	the 	California 	State
Employees' 	Association 	(Association or CSEA) 	failed 	to properly
represent 	three 	employees 	by refusing 	to 	pursue 	their
grievances 	to arbitration. 	This 	conduct 	is alleged 	to violate
section 	3519.5 	of 	the 	State 	Employer-Employee 	Relations Act
(SEERA).
I 	indicated 	to you 	in my 	letter dated August 	23, 	1985 	that 	the
above-referenced 	charge did 	not 	state 	a 	prima 	facie 	case, 	and
that unless you amended 	the 	charge 	to 	state a 	prima 	facie 	case,
or withdrew it prior to August 	30. 	1985. 	it would be
dismissed. 	More specifically. 	I 	informed you 	that 	if 	there
were 	any 	factual 	inaccuracies 	or 	additional 	facts which would
correct 	the 	deficiencies 	explained 	in that 	letter, 	you 	should
amend 	the 	charge 	accordingly.
On August 	30. 	1985. 	Mr. 	Lund called and 	left a message
indicating 	that 	he wished 	to have 	an extension 	of 	time 	in order
to 	file an amended 	charge. 	Pursuant 	to a 	conversation on
September 	6. 	an 	extension of 	time was 	granted 	and 	an amended
charge was 	filed 	on September 	9.

Robert G. 	Lund
John R. 	Lemmons
September 23, 	1985
The 	amended 	charge 	contains 	the 	following 	facts 	not 	contained
in the 	original 	charge.
Lund 	Grievance
On June 24, 1980. 	Mr. 	Lund 	filed 	an out-of-class 	grievance
which was 	rejected 	at 	the director's 	level 	on October 	24.
1980. 	On November 	10, 	1980, 	a 	similar 	claim was 	filed with the
State 	Board 	of 	Control 	which was 	subsequently 	sent 	to 	the 	State
Personnel Board 	(SPB) 	for 	jurisdictional 	reasons. 	On
September 21, 1981. 	Rick Weyuker. 	a CSEA field 	representative,
wrote 	to 	the 	SPB 	to 	schedule a meeting 	to 	provide 	further
information. 	Mr. 	Weyuker was 	present 	for 	the November 	1981
meeting with the SPB. 	During a November 	13. 	1981 	conversation.
Mr. 	Lund 	alleges 	that 	CSEA chief 	job steward 	B. 	Gingrich
related 	that 	CSEA didn't 	have 	the 	time 	to 	represent 	people 	in
grievances. 	At about this 	time, 	Larry Attenger. 	a CSEA
official, 	allegedly related to Mr. 	Lund 	that CSEA
representatives 	didn't 	have 	time 	to 	handle 	grievances 	and 	that
he 	should 	get 	a 	good 	job 	steward.
On September 	2, 	1982, 	SPB 	informed Mr. 	Lund that 	there was 	no
support for his claim. 	On October 	12, 	1982, 	Mr. 	Lund appealed
to the 	full 	SPB. 	On November 	19, 	Mr. 	Lund made a request 	to a
CSEA representative, 	S. 	Hunt, 	for 	representation by an attorney
at 	the 	SPB hearing. 	This 	request was 	denied 	and Mr. 	Lund 	then
made 	a 	similar 	appeal 	to 	CSEA chief 	counsel 	Ben Allemano who
responded 	on November 	22 	that 	because 	no 	legal 	dispute 	existed,
no 	lawyer would 	be 	present 	to 	represent him, 	but 	rather 	he
would 	be 	represented 	by a 	field 	representative.
On January 26, 	1983, 	CSEA representative A. 	Riola was 	present
when Mr. 	Lund 	presented 	his 	case 	to 	the 	SPB. 	SPB denied 	his
claim on March 	30, 	1984 with Mr. 	Riola 	requesting Chief 	Counsel
Allemano 	to 	review the matter 	on April 25, 1984. 	On July 	6.
1984. 	Mr. 	Lund 	and Mr. 	Lemmons met with CSEA attorney
Brad 	Booth regarding 	a 	law suit 	concerning 	the 	out-of-class
claim. 	Mr. 	Booth explained 	that 	legal 	precedent was
unfavorable 	to 	such a 	law suit. 	This 	issue was 	discussed
further 	in Booth's July 12 	letter 	to Mr. 	Rund. 	On July 	19, 	Mr.
Lund 	appealed Mr. 	Booth's 	denial 	to 	the 	Representative Appeals
Panel which met 	on October 	19 	and 	rejected 	the 	appeal 	on
October 	31. 	A request of November 	17 	to 	raise 	the matter
before 	the General 	Counsel 	of 	CSEA was 	also 	denied.
In addition, 	Mr. 	Lund 	states that on two occasions 	in 1984.
Carl Silvia, 	a unit 1 area manager of CSEA, 	failed to
investigate 	contracting 	out 	allegations 	and 	that 	on August 	27,
1985, 	Mr. 	Lund was decertified as 	a 	job steward.
Page 2
•

Robert G. 	Lund
John R. 	Lemmons
September 	23, 	1985
Page 3
Evans 	Grievance
On August 7. 	1984, 	Mr. 	Evans filed two grievances, 	one claiming
he 	had 	been 	required 	to work 	out-of-class 	and 	another 	that 	he
had been unduly reprimanded. 	On December 	5, 	1984, 	the
out-of-class 	grievance was 	denied 	at 	the 	fourth 	level. 	On
December 12, 	1984, 	the reprimand/reprisal grievance was denied
at 	the fourth level. 	On January 14, 	1985, 	CSEA denied
Mr. 	Evans' 	request 	to 	arbitrate 	the 	reprimand/reprisal
grievance. 	This 	denial 	was 	based 	on 	the 	failure 	to 	provide
proof 	of 	prior 	protected 	activity and 	a 	nexus 	between 	the
activity and 	the 	reprimand 	in question. 	On January 	22,
Mr. 	Evans 	appealed 	this 	decision 	to 	the CSEA Central 	Appeals
Committee. 	The committee met on February 26, 	1985 and
considered written material 	submitted 	by Mr. 	Evans. 	A 	letter
denying his appeal was 	sent to Mr. 	Evans on February 27, 	1985.
Based 	on the 	facts 	stated 	above, 	and 	those contained 	in my
August 23, 	1985 	letter 	(attachment 	1 ) . 	the first amended charge
in 	this 	case 	fails 	to 	state a 	prima 	facie violation of 	the
SEERA for 	the 	rationale 	contained 	in 	that 	letter 	as well 	as 	the
reasons which 	follow.
Lund 	Grievance
1. 	Section 3514.5(a) 	of 	the SEERA reads 	in pertinent part:
Any employee, 	employee organization, 	or
employer 	shall 	have 	the right 	to 	file an
unfair 	practice charge, 	except 	that 	the
board 	shall 	not 	do 	either 	of 	the 	following:
(1) 	issue a 	complaint 	in respect of any
charge 	based 	upon 	an 	alleged 	unfair 	practice
occurring more 	than 	six months 	prior 	to 	the
filing of 	the 	charge;
Considering 	the 	facts 	presented 	by 	the Charging 	Party 	in 	the
light most 	favorable 	to 	it, 	the 	latest 	request 	to 	proceed with
the 	out-of-class 	claim was 	made 	and 	denied 	on November 	17,
1984. 	This 	is more than six months 	prior 	to 	the 	filing 	of 	this
charge on July 2, 	1985 	and 	thus 	is 	barred 	by the 	statute 	of
limitations.
2. 	Although the Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board 	(PERB) 	has
ruled 	that 	the 	duty of 	fair 	representation applies 	to 	the
handling of 	contractual 	grievances, 	there's 	no 	case which
concerns 	itself with 	the 	employee 	organization's 	duty 	to 	pursue

Robert G. 	Lund
John R. 	Lemmons
September 23. 	1985
Page 4
extra-contractual 	remedies. 	Such a question, 	however, 	has 	been
considered 	by 	the 	federal 	court 	system.1
In Hawkins v. 	Babcock and Wilcox Co. 	(1980) 	(U.S.D.C., 	N. 	Ohio)
105 	LRRM 3458. 	a 	case 	involving an employee who 	alleged 	that
the 	union 	should 	have 	advised 	him regarding 	administrative 	and
judicial 	remedies 	to 	alleged 	discriminatory conduct 	by 	his
employers, 	the District Court 	ruled:
The National 	Labor 	Relations Act,
authorizing unions 	to 	represent 	employees 	in
the 	creation 	and 	administration 	of
collective 	bargaining 	agreements 	with
employers, 	together with the 	correlative
duty of fair representation, 	however, 	is
limited 	to 	the 	collective 	bargaining
process. 	Outside of 	the employer-employee
relationship, 	the union has 	no 	authority 	to
represent union members, 	nor 	duty to 	advise
those members 	of 	their 	extra-contractual
legal 	rights. 	The union's 	duty of 	fair
representation 	is 	restricted 	to 	the 	context
of 	the 	collective 	bargaining 	agreement 	and
does 	not 	extend 	to 	legal 	remedies 	available
outside 	the employment 	context. 	See
International 	Brotherhood 	of 	Electrical
Workers v. 	Foust 442 U.S. 	42. 	101 LRRM 2365
(1979); Vaca v. 	Sipes 386 U.S. 	171. 	64 LRRM
2369 	(1967); Humphrey v. Moore 375 U.S. 	335.
55 LRRM 2031 	(1964); 	Ford Motor Co. 	v.
1The 	California 	Supreme 	Court 	in Firefighters 	Union v.
City of Vallejo 	(1974) 	12 Cal.3d 	608. 	stated 	that where the
National 	Labor 	Relations 	Act 	does 	not 	contain 	specific wording
comparable to the 	state act. 	if 	the 	rationale that 	generated
the 	language 	"lies 	embedded 	in 	the 	federal 	precedent under 	the
NLRA" 	and
the 	federal 	decisions 	effectively 	reflect
the 	same 	interests 	as 	those 	that 	promoted
the 	inclusion 	of 	the 	[language 	in the
SEERA], 	[then] federal precedent provides
reliable 	if 	analogous 	authority on 	the 	issue.

Robert 6. 	Lund
John R. 	Lemmons
September 23. 	1985
Page 5
Huffman 345 U.S. 	330. 	331 LRRM 2548 	(1952);
Steele v. 	Louisville 	and Nashville Rail 	Co.
323 U.S. 	192. 	15 LRRM 708 	(1948).
In the 	present 	case, 	the defendant union was
not 	under 	any 	duty 	to 	advise 	the 	plaintiff
of 	his 	legal 	rights 	outside 	the 	context 	of
the 	collective 	bargaining 	agreement. 	The
union had 	no duty to 	act 	as 	an attorney at
law advising 	the 	plaintiff 	of 	all 	possible
alternatives 	of 	legal 	recourse. 	The 	court
therefore 	finds 	that 	the 	defendant 	did 	not,
in fact, 	inadequately represent 	the
plaintiff 	by not advising 	the 	plaintiff 	of
all 	possible 	administrative 	and 	judicial
remedies 	available. 	The 	plaintiff's 	claim,
consequently, 	that 	the defendant 	BNW
violated 	29 U.S.C, 	section 	151 	et 	seq.,
relating 	to unfair 	labor 	practices 	because
of 	the 	union's 	alleged 	inadequate
representation 	is 	hereby dismissed. 	Hines
v. Anchor Motor Freight. 	424 U.S. 	554. 	91
LRRM 2481 	(1976); 	Baldini v. 	Local Union
No. 	1095. 	581 F.2d 	145 	90 LRRM 2535 	(7th
Cir. 	1978); 	Smart v. 	Ellis Trucking Company
Inc. 	580 F.2d 215. 	99 LRRM 2059 	(6th Cir.
1978).
Thus, Mr. 	Lund's 	request 	for 	assistance 	in pursuing his
out-of-class 	claims 	before the State Board 	of Control, 	the
State 	Personnel 	Board, 	and possible 	courts 	of 	competent
jurisdiction 	is 	outside 	of 	the Association's 	duty of 	fair
representation.
3. 	Even assuming that Mr. 	Lund's 	charges were timely and
covered 	by 	the 	duty of 	fair 	representation, 	this 	charge 	fails
to 	state 	evidence which 	shows 	clearly and 	concisely 	that 	CSEA
has 	acted 	arbitrarily, 	discriminatorily, 	or 	in bad 	faith.
Fremont 	Unified 	School 	District 	Teachers 	Association. 	CTA/NEA
(King) 	(1980) 	PERB Decision No. 	125; 	Board Rule 32615(a)(5).
4. 	The 	statement 	that Mr. 	Lund was 	decertified 	as 	a 	job
steward 	by the Association on August 	27, 	1985 	does 	not without
more 	state 	a 	prima 	facie violation 	of 	the Association's 	duty 	of
fair 	representation. 	The 	issue 	of Mr. 	Lund's 	decertification
was 	the 	subject 	of 	unfair 	practice 	charge 	number 	S-CO-46-S
which was 	dismissed on May 10, 	1985. 	Although the 	final
decision to decertify Mr. 	Lund 	had 	not 	been made 	at 	that 	time,
a 	hearing 	had 	been held 	by an Association 	panel 	pursuant 	to 	its

Robert G. 	Lund
John R. 	Lemmons
September 23, 	1985
Page 6
policy. 	Based 	on 	the 	facts 	presented 	in 	the 	present 	charge 	as
well 	as 	those 	presented 	in charge 	number 	S-CO-46-S. 	Charging
Party has 	failed 	to 	demonstrate 	that 	the 	decertification 	had
substantial 	impact 	on the 	relationship 	of 	unit 	members 	to 	their
employer and 	that 	it was done for arbitrary, 	capricious, 	or
discriminatory reasons. 	Kimmett 	(1979) 	PERB Decision No. 	106.
Mr. Evans
With respect 	to 	the one grievance which Mr. 	Evans 	requested
CSEA to 	appeal 	to 	arbitration under 	the 	grievance 	procedure,
there 	are 	no 	facts 	indicating 	that 	CSEA has 	acted 	arbitrarily,
capriciously, 	discriminatorily, 	or 	in bad 	faith. 	Without such
facts, 	a prima 	facie violation of 	the duty of 	fair
representation has 	not 	been presented.
Mr. Chiu
Although 	I 	indicated 	in ray August 	23 	letter 	that 	there was
inadequate 	information 	to 	establish 	that 	the 	CSEA 	had 	violated
it's 	duty of 	fair 	representation with regard 	to Mr. 	Chiu's
grievance, 	no 	new information was 	presented 	in the 	first
amended 	charge which would 	allow a 	complaint 	to 	issue.
Accordingly, 	this allegation is 	also dismissed.
Pursuant 	to 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board 	regulation
section 32635 	(California Administrative Code, 	title 	8,
part 	III), 	you may appeal 	the refusal 	to 	issue a 	complaint
(dismissal) 	to the Board 	itself.
Right 	to Appeal
You may obtain a 	review of 	this 	dismissal 	of 	the 	charge 	by
filing 	an 	appeal 	to 	the 	Board 	itself 	within 	twenty 	(20)
calendar 	days 	after 	service 	of 	this 	dismissal
(section 32635(a)). 	To be timely filed, 	the original 	and 	five
(5) 	copies 	of 	such appeal 	must 	be 	actually received 	by 	the
Board 	itself 	before the 	close of 	business 	(5:00 p.m.) 	on
October 	13, 	1985. 	or 	sent by telegraph or 	certified United
States mail 	postmarked 	not 	later 	than October 	13, 	1985,
(section 32135). 	The Board's address 	is:
Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board
1031 	18th Street
Sacramento. 	CA 95814
If you 	file a 	timely appeal 	of 	the 	refusal 	to 	issue 	a
complaint, 	any 	other 	party may 	file with 	the 	Board 	an 	original
and 	five 	(5) 	copies 	of 	a 	statement 	in opposition within 	twenty

Robert G. 	Lund
John R. 	Lemmons
September 23. 	1985
Page 	7
(20) 	calendar 	days 	following 	the date 	of 	service 	of 	the 	appeal
(section 32635(b)).
Service
All 	documents 	authorized 	to 	be 	filed 	herein must 	also 	be
"served" 	upon all 	parties 	to 	the proceeding, 	and 	a 	"proof 	of
service" 	must 	accompany each copy of 	a 	document 	served upon a
party or 	filed with 	the 	Board 	itself 	(see 	section 	32140 	for 	the
required contents 	and a 	sample form). 	The document will 	be
considered 	properly 	"served" 	when 	personally 	delivered 	or
deposited 	in 	the 	first-class 	mail 	postage 	paid 	and 	properly
•	addressed.
Extension of 	Time
A request 	for 	an 	extension of 	time 	in which to 	file 	a 	document
with 	the Board 	itself 	must 	be 	in writing 	and 	filed 	with 	the
Board 	at 	the 	previously 	noted 	address. 	A request 	for 	an
extension must 	be 	filed 	at 	least 	three 	(3) 	calendar 	days 	before
the 	expiration of 	the 	time 	required 	for 	filing 	the 	document.
The 	request must 	indicate 	good 	cause 	for 	and, 	if 	known, 	the
position of 	each other 	party regarding 	the 	extension, 	and 	shall
be 	accompanied 	by 	proof 	of 	service 	of 	the 	request 	upon 	each
party 	(section 32132).
Final 	Date
If 	no 	appeal 	is 	filed within the 	specified 	time 	limits, 	the
dismissal will 	become 	final 	when 	the 	time 	limits 	have 	expired.
Very 	truly yours.
JEFFREY 	SLOAN
Acting 	General 	Counsel
By Robert 	Thompson
Regional 	Attorney
2660d

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA 	GEORGE DEUKMEJIAN. Governor
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
SACRAMENTO REGIONAL OFFICE
1031 18TH STREET. SUITE 103
SACRAMENTO. CALIFORNIA 	95814
(916) 322-3198
August 23, 	1985
John R. 	Lemmons
Re: 	Lemmons v. 	California 	state 	Employees' 	Association
Unfair practice Charge 	N O . 	S-CO-50-S
Dear Mr. Lemmons:
The 	above-referenced 	charge 	alleges 	that 	the 	California 	State
Employees' 	Association 	(Association) 	failed to properly
represent 	three 	employees 	by 	refusing 	to 	pursue 	their
grievances 	to arbitration. 	This 	conduct 	is 	alleged 	to violate
section 	3519.5 	of 	the 	State 	Employer-Employee 	Relations 	Act
(SEERA).
My 	investigation 	revealed 	the 	following 	facts. 	This 	case
involves grievances 	filed by 	three 	employees, 	Robert 	Lund,
Robert Evans, 	and 	Charles 	Chiu. 	Charging 	Party was 	requested
to 	provide 	information 	on 	these 	grievances 	concerning 	their
substance, 	date of 	filing, 	and the date on which 	the
Association 	refused 	to 	process 	them 	to 	arbitration.
Information was 	received 	on 	only 	Mr. 	Chiu's 	grievance. 	That
information shows that on September 11, 	1984, 	Mr. 	Chiu
instituted 	the 	grievance 	procedure 	regarding 	an 	alleged
unjustified 	denial 	of 	a 	merit 	salary 	adjustment. 	After 	the
grievance was 	denied 	at 	the 	staff 	levels 	of 	the 	grievance
procedure, 	Mr. 	Chiu 	requested 	the Association proceed 	to
arbitration on his 	behalf. 	Mr. 	Chiu was 	notified 	by
January 11, 	1985 	letter 	from the Association 	that: 	(1) 	there
was 	insufficient 	evidence 	to 	support 	his 	grievance, 	and 	(2) 	the
grievance was not 	timely 	filed. 	In addition, 	he was 	notified
that he had 	ten 	days 	to 	appeal 	this 	decision 	to 	the 	arbitration
appeals 	committee. 	After 	filing an appeal, 	Mr. 	Chiu was
notified by an Association 	letter 	of 	February 	14 	that 	a 	hearing
by 	the 	arbitration 	appeals 	committee 	would 	be 	held 	on
February 	26 	at which 	time 	he 	could 	submit written 	argument 	or 	a
ten-minute oral 	presentation. 	Mr. 	Chiu was 	then 	notified by
Association letter 	dated February 27, 	1985, 	that after
consideration 	of 	all 	the 	facts 	the 	committee 	upheld 	the 	staff
decision 	to 	deny 	arbitration.
In 	addition 	to 	the 	information 	requested 	of 	Charging 	Party
above, 	this 	investigator 	also 	asked 	charging 	Party 	to 	provide
evidence 	that 	would 	demonstrate 	that 	the 	Association's 	conduct
Attachment 	1

in 	denying 	arbitration 	of 	these 	grievances was 	discriminatory,
arbitrary, 	or 	capricious. 	To date no evidence has been
presented.
John R. 	Lemmons
August 23, 	1985
Page 	2
Based on 	the 	facts 	described above, 	this 	charge 	fails 	to 	state
a 	prima 	facie 	violation 	of 	the 	SEERA 	for 	the 	reasons 	which
follow.
Although 	SEERA 	does 	not 	contain 	a 	specific 	section 	specifying
an 	employee organization's 	duty of 	fair 	representation, 	such 	a
duty 	can be 	implied 	from the 	fact 	that 	the 	SEERA 	provides 	for
exclusive 	representation. 	Government Code sections 	3513(b),
3515.5, 	Noorgard v. 	California State Employees' 	Association
(1984) 	PERB Decision No. 	451-S.
To make out a prima 	facie violation 	of 	this 	duty, 	charging
party must 	set 	forth 	a 	clear 	and 	concise 	statement 	of 	facts
demonstrating 	that 	the 	employee 	organization 	acted 	arbitrarily,
discriminatorily or 	in 	bad 	faith. 	Fremont 	Unified 	School
District Teachers Association, 	CTA/NEA 	(King) 	(1980) 	PERB
Decision No. 	125; 	Board Rule 32615(a)(5). 	Charging Party has
failed 	to meet 	this burden 	in two ways: 	(1) 	there 	is 	no
evidence 	showing when 	and 	how 	the 	Association 	refused 	to
arbitrate the grievances of Mr. 	Lund and Mr. 	Evans, 	(2) 	even
assuming 	such 	facts 	exist, 	there has 	been no 	demonstration 	that
the Association's 	conduct 	in 	denying 	these 	requests 	for
arbitration 	is 	arbitrary, 	capricious or 	in bad 	faith.
For 	these reasons, 	charge number 	S-CO-50-S, 	as 	presently
written, 	does 	not state a prima 	facie 	case. 	If 	you 	feel 	that
there 	are 	any 	factual 	inaccuracies 	in 	this 	letter 	or 	any
additional 	facts 	which 	would 	correct 	the 	deficiencies 	explained
above, 	please 	amend 	the 	charge 	accordingly. 	The 	amended 	charge
should 	be 	prepared 	on 	a 	standard 	PERB 	unfair 	practice 	charge
form clearly 	labeled 	First 	Amended 	charge, 	contain 	all 	the
facts 	and 	allegations 	you wish 	to make, 	and be 	signed 	under
penalty of 	perjury 	by 	the 	charging 	party. 	The 	amended 	charge
must be 	served 	on 	the 	respondent 	and 	the 	original 	proof 	of
service must be 	filed with 	PERB. 	If 	I 	do 	not 	receive 	an
amended charge or 	withdrawal 	from you before August 	30, 	1985, 	I
shall 	dismiss 	your 	charge. 	If 	you 	have 	any questions 	on 	how 	to
proceed, please call me at 	(916) 	322-3198.
Sincerely yours,
Robert 	Thompson
Regional 	Attorney