California State Employees Association (Graham) (PERB 0434S)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
DECISION OF 	THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
DAVID 	KELLER GRAHAM,
Charging 	Party,
v.
CALIFORNIA 	STATE 	EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION,
Respondent.
Case No. 	S-CO-28-S
PERB Decision No. 	434-S
November 19, 	1984
Appearance: 	David Keller 	Graham, 	on his own behalf.
Before Jaeger, Morgenstern and Burt, Members.
DECISION
MORGENSTERN, 	Member: 	David Keller Graham 	(Charging Party)
appeals 	the dismissal of his charge alleging 	that 	the California
State Employees' Association 	(CSEA) 	violated 	section 	3519.5(b)
of the State Employer-Employee Relations Act 	(SEERA or Act)1
by denying his 	request to make 	a 	charitable contribution 	in
1SEERA 	is codified at Government Code 	section 3512 	et 	seq.
All 	statutory references 	herein are 	to 	the Government 	Code
unless 	otherwise 	indicated.
Section 3519.5 provides, 	in pertinent part:
It 	shall be unlawful 	for 	an employee
organization to:
(b) 	Impose or 	threaten to 	impose 	reprisals
on employees, 	to discriminate or 	threaten to
discriminate against employees, 	or otherwise
to interfere with, 	restrain, 	or coerce
employees 	because 	of 	their 	exercise of 	rights
guaranteed 	by this chapter.
)
)
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. 	. . . . . . 	. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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lieu of payment of a fair 	share fee, 	pursuant to section
3515.7(c).2
For 	the reasons discussed below, 	the Public Employment
Relations Board 	(PERB or Board) 	affirms 	the dismissal of 	the
charge.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL 	SUMMARY
On September 	27, 	1983, 	Charging Party filed an unfair
practice charge 	in which he alleged, 	in essence, 	that he
qualified 	for 	a 	religious 	exemption 	from 	the payment 	of 	fair
share 	fees on the basis of his 	"individual conscience,"
notwithstanding his 	assertions 	that he was unable 	"to name 	a
religious 	organization to which 	[he] 	belongs" 	or 	to 	"affirm its
teachings 	against 	joining 	or 	supporting 	the 	activities 	of 	a
union."
The charge states, 	in pertinent part, as follows:
My conscience 	is 	based on an 	authority 	far
higher 	than 	that of any religious group or
2Section 3515.7(c) 	provides:
Notwithstanding subdivision 	(b), 	any employee
who 	is a member of a 	religious body whose
traditional 	tenets or 	teachings 	include
objections 	to joining 	or 	financially
supporting 	employee 	organizations 	shall 	not
be 	required 	to 	financially 	support 	the
recognized 	employee 	organization. 	That
employee, 	in lieu of a membership fee or a
fair share fee deduction, 	shall 	instruct the
employer 	to deduct and pay sums 	equal 	to 	the
fair 	share fee to a nonreligious, 	nonlabor
organization, 	charitable 	fund approved by
the 	State 	Board of Control 	for 	receipt of
charitable 	contributions 	by payroll
deductions.
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its hierarchy [sic]--higher 	even 	than that of
the church 	itself. 	It 	is based on nothing
less 	than God's own Word, 	which teaches
separation of walk 	from the world 	(2
Corinthians 6:14-18), 	as well as subjection
to the government 	(Romans 13:1-2) 	and to
employers 	(1 Peter 2:18). 	Of course, 	none of
these principles are 	compatible 	[sic] 	with
union principles. 	Again, 	on the authority of
God's Word, 	the group of Christians, 	with
which 	I am associated, 	does not have a
name--does not acknowledge 	any name other
than that of Christ Himself 	(Matthew 18:20).
So, 	my conscience on this matter 	is very
real, 	indeed, and rests on the highest
authority possible, 	but has no protection
under 	this law, 	whose very purpose is to
protect 	it.
On October 13, 	1983, 	a PERB agent dismissed the charge. 	The
PERB agent determined that, 	on its face, 	section 3515.7(c)
establishes 	two requirements 	for 	a 	religious exemption 	to the
payment of a fair share fee: 	(1) 	the employee must be a member
of a religious body; 	and 	(2) 	the traditional tenets or 	teachings
of 	the religious body must 	include objections 	to 	joining or
financially 	supporting employee 	organizations. 	Because
"Charging Party concedes 	that he does not meet 	the 	statutory
requirements," 	she 	found no prima facie violation of 	the Act.
On October 24, 	1983, 	Graham appealed PERB's dismissal,
affirming 	the 	sincerity of his 	individual conscience 	and
arguing solely that 	the legislative 	intent and 	the 	"spirit" 	of
section 3515.7(c) 	is to protect individuals who are not members
of religious bodies but object, 	on their own conscience, 	to
joining 	or 	financially 	supporting 	employee 	organizations.
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DISCUSSION
The Board 	has 	not previously had 	occasion 	to consider 	the
religious 	exemption 	to 	the payment of 	fair 	share 	fees contained
in section 3515.7(c) 	of SEERA or 	the 	identical language of
section 3546.3 	of 	the Educational 	Employment Relations 	Act
(EERA, Government Code section 3540 et seq.).3
In so doing here, we find, 	as did the PERB agent, 	that the
language of section 3515.7(c) 	is clear 	and unambiguous on 	its
3Compare 	section 	19 	of 	the National Labor 	Relations Act
(NLRA). 	Originally enacted 	in 	1974 	to apply only to employees
of nonprofit health care 	institutions, 	the section was amended
in 	1980 	to apply to all employees covered by the NLRA. 	Section
19 	provides 	in pertinent part:
Any employee who 	is 	a member 	of 	and adheres
to established and 	traditional 	tenets 	or
teachings of a bona fide religion, 	body, 	or
sect which 	has 	historically 	held conscientious
objections 	to 	joining or 	financially
supporting 	labor 	organizations 	shall 	not be
required 	to 	join or 	financially 	support 	any
labor 	organization as a 	condition of
employment; 	except 	that such employee may be
required 	in a contract between 	such employee's
employer 	and 	a labor 	organization 	in lieu of
periodic dues and initiation fees, 	to pay sums
equal to such dues and 	initiation fees 	to 	a
nonreligious, 	nonlabor organization charitable
fund exempt 	from 	taxation 	under 	section
501(c) (3) 	of title 26 of the Internal Revenue
Code, 	chosen by such employee from a list of
at least three such funds, 	designated in such
contract or 	if the contract fails 	to designate
such funds, 	then to any such fund chosen by
the employee. 	If such employee who holds
conscientious objections pursuant 	to 	this
section 	requests 	the 	labor 	organization 	to
use 	the 	grievance-arbitration procedure 	on
the employee's behalf, 	the labor 	organization
is authorized 	to charge 	the 	employee 	for 	the
reasonable cost of 	using 	such 	procedure.
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face, 	and that Charging Party's 	allegations 	fail to satisfy the
requirements 	of 	that 	subsection.
Moreover, 	contrary to Charging Party's contention, 	we find
the 	legislative 	intent clear 	from the 	face of 	the Act.
Therefore, 	under 	established rules of statutory construction,
we need not 	turn 	to 	extrinsic 	evidence 	to assist 	in 	its
interpretation. 	People v. 	Stanley 	(1924) 	193 Cal. 	428, 	431;
People v. 	Knowles 	(1950) 	35 C.2d 175, 	182-183.
Thus, 	the Legislature clearly 	intended to limit the
exemption 	from payment of 	the 	fair 	share 	fee 	to
any employee who 	is a member 	of 	a 	religious
body whose 	traditional 	tenets 	or 	teachings
include 	objections 	to 	joining 	or 	financially
supporting 	employee 	organizations.
This language, 	carefully crafted by the Legislature, 	simply
does not permit 	the 	interpretation 	sought by Charging 	Party,
that 	is, 	an exemption for any 	individual who conscientiously
objects 	to the support of employee organizations, 	regardless of
whether 	the objection 	is 	founded on personal religious,
economic, political, 	ideological or other grounds. 	Indeed,
such 	interpretation would 	render 	the 	fair 	share 	fee provision a
nullity and would defeat 	its 	purpose 	of 	stabilizing 	employer-
employee 	relations 	by compelling 	financial 	support 	for 	the
representational 	activities 	of 	an employee 	organization 	by 	all
who 	benefit 	from them. 	King City Joint Union High 	School
District 	(3/3/82) 	PERB Decision No. 	197, 	rev. pending 1 Civ.
A016723; 	Ellis v. 	Brotherhood of Railway, 	Airline and Steamship
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Workers 	(1984) 	U.S. 	[80 L.Ed.2d 428]; 	Abood v. 	Detroit
Board of Education 	(1977) 	431 U.S. 	209 	[95 LRRM 2411].
Here, 	Charging Party claims 	that he 	is 	"associated" 	with a
"group of Christians." 	Even assuming that his 	"group" 	is a
"religious body" 	under 	the 	law and 	that his association with 	it
constitutes membership, 	Charging Party 	failed 	to allege 	that
this 	religious body is one 	"whose 	traditional 	tenets or
teachings 	include 	objections 	to 	joining 	or 	financially
supporting employee 	organizations." 	Although he asserts 	that
his personal conscience, 	based on his 	interpretation of certain
passages of the Bible, 	is 	inconsistent with union principles,
he does not allege that his conscience, 	or his 	interpretation
of the Bible, 	is derived 	from the 	traditional tenets or
teachings of 	the religious body of which he 	is a member.
Because 	Charging 	Party has 	failed 	to allege 	facts 	sufficient
to 	show that he had 	a 	statutory 	right 	to be 	exempted 	from the
payment of the fair 	share 	fee, 	CSEA's refusal to grant such
exemption does 	not constitute 	a prima 	facie violation 	of 	the
Act.
ORDER
The 	charge 	filed by David 	Keller 	Graham in Case
No. 	S-CO-28-S 	is hereby DISMISSED.
Member 	Burt 	joined 	in 	this 	Decision. 	Member 	Jaeger's
concurrence 	is on page 7.
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Jaeger, 	concurring: 	The sincerity of Mr. 	Graham's objection
is 	not 	in 	dispute. 	The 	sole question before 	the Board 	is whether
he has 	alleged facts which, 	if true, 	support his 	claim that he
is 	covered by the 	exemption provision of 	section 	3515.7(c).
In his 	appeal, 	he 	continues 	to base his claim on his
"individual 	conscience" which he 	argues 	"rests 	on 	the highest
authority possible but has 	no 	protection 	under 	this 	law."
The 	language 	of 	section 	3515.7(c) 	leaves 	no 	doubt 	that 	the
Legislature 	intended to 	limit 	the exemption 	to members 	of
religious 	bodies whose 	tenets or 	teachings 	oppose 	the 	financial
support of labor organizations. 	Graham does 	not claim that
Christianity, 	per se, 	is such a religious body. 	Nor does he
identify a 	religious body 	to which he 	belongs whose 	tenets 	or
teachings 	include 	such opposition.
In essence, 	Mr. 	Graham asserts 	that the Act is 	inadequate
and demands 	that 	this Board 	rewrite 	it 	to 	afford 	the 	exemption
to 	those 	employees whose 	opposition 	to 	the 	financial 	support of
labor organizations 	is based on personal 	religious 	convictions.
I 	concur in the 	dismissal of this 	charge.
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