Los Angeles Community College District (Watts) * * * OVERRULED IN PART by Santa Ana Unified School District (2017) PERB Decision No. 2514 (PERB 0331E)

OVERRULED IN PART by Santa Ana Unified School District
(2017) PERB Decision No. 2514
STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION 	OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
HOWARD O. 	WATTS,
Complainant,
v.
LOS 	ANGELES 	COMMUNITY 	COLLEGE
DISTRICT,
Respondent.
)
)
) 	Case 	No. 	LA-PN-37
PERB 	Decision No. 	331
August 	15, 	1983
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
_____________________ )
Ap~earances: 	Howard 	O. 	Watts, 	representing 	himself:
Ro 	ert J. 	Henry, 	Attorney 	for 	Los 	Angeles 	Community College
District.
Before Tovar, 	Jaeger 	and 	Burt, 	Members.
DECISION AND 	ORDER
JAEGER, 	Member: 	Howard o. 	Watts 	has 	appealed 	the 	hearing
officer's 	dismissal 	of 	his 	public 	notice 	complaint, 	in 	which 	he
alleged 	that 	the 	Los 	Angeles 	Community College 	District
violated 	Government 	Code 	subsection 	3547(b) 	of 	the 	Educational
Employment 	Relations 	Act.l
lSubsection 	3547(b) 	of 	the 	California Government 	Code
provides:
. . 	. 	. 	. 	. 	. 	. 	. 	. 	. 	. 	. 	. 	. 	. 	. 	. 	. 	. . .
(b) 	Meeting 	and 	negotiating 	shall 	not 	take
place 	on 	any 	proposal 	until 	a 	reasonable
time 	has 	elapsed 	after 	the 	submission 	of 	the
proposal 	to 	enable 	the 	public 	to 	become
informed 	and 	the 	public 	has 	the 	opportunity
to 	express 	itself 	regarding 	the 	proposal 	at
a 	meeting 	of 	the 	public 	school 	employer.

Watts 	argues 	that 	the 	hearing 	officer's 	dismissal 	of 	his
complaint 	in 	this 	case 	is 	a 	denial 	of 	procedural 	due 	process,
as 	he 	has 	a 	right 	to 	a 	hearing 	once 	the 	regional 	director 	has
issued 	a 	complaint 	and 	set 	a 	date 	for 	a 	hearing. 	After
considering 	the 	entire 	record 	in 	light 	of 	the 	appeal, 	the 	Board
affirms 	the 	hearing 	officer's 	findings 	and 	conclusions 	of 	law
(attached 	hereto} 	and 	ORDERS 	the 	complaint 	DISMISSED without
leave 	to 	amend. 	2
Members 	Tovar 	and 	Burt 	joined 	in 	this 	Decision.
2This 	case 	arises 	from 	the 	same 	factual 	situation 	as 	PERB
Decision No. 	330. 	Watts 	alleges 	that 	at 	the 	May 	20, 	1981,
meeting 	of 	the 	Los 	Angeles 	Community College 	District
(District}, 	the 	District's 	five-minute 	time 	limit 	policy
interfered 	with 	the 	public's 	right 	to 	have 	an 	opportunity 	to
address 	the 	collective 	bargaining 	issues 	on 	the 	District's
agenda. 	(The 	five-minute 	restriction 	has 	been 	found 	not 	to 	be
a 	per 	se 	violation 	of 	subsection 	3547(b} 	by 	the 	Board 	in Los
Angeles 	Community College 	District 	(12/31/80) 	PERB 	Decision
No. 	153). 	Exhibits 	offered 	by Watts 	with 	his 	amended 	complaint
indicate 	that 	the 	collective 	bargaining 	items 	which 	he 	wished
to 	address 	were 	on 	the 	agenda 	for 	public 	discussion on
May 	6, 	1981. 	He 	makes 	no 	allegation 	that 	the 	public 	was 	not
given 	a 	sufficient 	opportunity 	at 	that 	time 	to 	"express 	itself
regarding 	the 	proposal 	at 	a 	meeting 	of 	the 	public 	school
employer" 	(subsection 	3547(b}}. 	Thus, 	after 	receiving 	a 	motion
to 	dismiss 	from 	the 	District 	for 	lack 	of 	a 	prima 	facie 	case,
and 	allowing 	time 	for 	submission 	and 	consideration 	of Watts'
arguments, 	the 	hearing 	officer 	ruled 	in 	favor 	of 	the 	District
and 	dismissed 	the 	complaint.
2

STAT·s 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELA'rIONS 	BOi-\RD
HOWARD 	O. 	WATrrs,
Complainant,
v.
LOS 	ANGELES 	COMi"'!UNITY 	COLLEGE
DISTRICT,
Respondent.
)
)
) 	Case No. 	LA-PN-37
ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO
DISMISS 	WITHOUT
LEAVE 	TO 	AMEND
}
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
------------------)
~ppearances: 	Howara 	o. 	Watts, 	representing 	himself; 	Mary
Dowell, 	representing 	Los 	Angeles 	Community 	College 	District.
Before: 	Robert 	R. 	Bergeson, 	Hearing -Officer.
This 	case 	presents 	the 	procedural 	question of 	whether 	a
complainan~ 	is 	entitled 	to 	a 	hearing 	once 	the 	regional 	director
hds 	determined 	his 	complaint 	states, 	in 	part, 	a 	prima. 	facie
case. 	It 	also 	presents 	the 	question 	of 	whether 	a 	fiva minute
speakirig 	limitation 	may 	violate 	the 	public 	notice 	provisions 	of
J?ROCEDURAL 	HISTORY
The 	instant 	public 	notice 	complaint 	was 	filed 	with 	the
Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board 	(PERB 	or 	Board) 	on 	June
18, 	1981 	alleging 	numerous 	violations 	of 	section 	35,p 	(a), 	(bj,
(c), 	(d) 	and 	(e) 	of 	the Act 	by 	the 	Los 	Angeles 	Community
l•rhe- ?:ERA 	is 	cod·P.:ied 	at 	Governm2nt 	Code 	s,::ctin'.1 	J':40 	e".:
seq. 	All 	section 	:~f.2r~nces 	au~ 	to 	'.:h~ 	Gov,?r:-:1:n?nt 	:od2 	·1:1l. 0
?s::;
otherwise 	stated.
\...
Wt1;;&-.....11ill'&~~~.1JD1tt~~~~

College 	District 	(LACCD 	or 	District). 	On 	August 	10, 	1981, 	the
Los 	Angeles 	regional 	direct'or 	of 	PERB 	dismissed 	the 	complaint
with 	leave 	to 	amend.
An 	amendment 	to 	the complaint 	was 	filed 	on August 	20,
1981. 	Thereafter, 	on 	October 	13, 	1981, 	a 	Board 	agent, 	acting
on 	behalf 	of 	the 	regional 	director, 	dismissed 	the 	majority 	of
the 	complaint 	without 	leave 	to 	amend 	but:
•.. 	determined 	that 	the 	following 	portions
of 	the 	complaint 	state 	a 	prima 	facie
violation 	of 	Government 	Code 	section 	3547:
Allegations 	(1) 	and. 	(2): 	The 	contention 	that
the 	District's 	five 	minute 	rule 	interfered
with 	complainant's 	right 	to 	express 	his
views 	on 	the 	District's 	initial 	proposal 	for
the 	College 	Safety 	and 	Police Service Unit,
and 	on 	its 	Proposed 	Amendments 	to 	the
Maintenance 	and 	Operations 	Unit, 	Unit 	2,
Agreement 	and 	to 	the 	Technical 	Clerical
Unit, 	Unit 	No. 	1, 	Agreement, 	since 	all of
these 	items 	were 	on 	the May 	20, 	1981 	agenda
meeting 	and 	he 	was 	allowed 	only 	five 	minutes
total 	speaking 	time.
Dismissal 	in 	Part 	Without 	Leave 	to 	Amend, 	p. 	3.
An 	informal 	settlement 	conference 	conducted 	by 	the regional
director 	on 	July 	9, 	1982 	failed 	to 	resolve 	the 	complaint 	and
the 	case 	was 	thereafter 	assigned 	to 	the 	undersigned 	Board 	agent
by 	the 	PERB 	director 	of 	representation.
Prior 	to 	commencement 	of 	the 	formal 	hearing 	(calendared 	for
August 	31, 	1982), 	the 	District 	moved 	to 	dismiss 	the 	case August
4, 	1982 	on 	·'-'	t...ne 	groun	. 	d ~0 	tna	' 	t 	1.ne	'- ' 	comp_LaE1.c	1 	• 	• 	"'".:::t :L l ·=".:- 	·'"vJ·
prima 	facie 	violation 	of 	section 	3547. 	On 	August 	20, 	1982, 	the
Complainant, 	Howard 	0. 	Watts, 	after 	having 	been 	granted 	an
2

extension 	of 	time to 	do 	so, 	responded 	to 	th~ motion 	by
supporting 	the 	determination 	of 	the 	regional 	director 	th~t 	he
had 	stated 	a 	prima 	facie 	case. 	Further, 	the 	complainant's
position 	was 	that 	once 	the 	regional 	director 	had 	determined
that 	his 	case 	stated 	a 	prima 	facie 	violation 	and 	a 	notice 	of
hearing 	had 	been 	issued, 	it 	would 	be a 	denial 	of 	due 	process
and 	a 	violation 	of 	PERB 	regulations 	not 	to 	afford 	him 	the
opportunity 	of 	a 	hearing. 	On 	this 	basis, 	the 	complairiant
requests 	the 	motion 	be 	denied.
DISCUSSION
Hearing 	Officer's 	Authority 	to
Grant 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss
As 	the 	District 	suggests, 	in 	Los·Angeles 	Community 	College
District 	(6/16/80) 	PERB 	Dec. 	No. 	Ad-91 	and 	Los 	Angeles
Community 	College 	District 	(12/31/80), 	PERB 	Dec. 	No. 	153, 	the
Board 	its elf 	af fir.med 	on 	appeal 	the 	regional 	director 1 s
dismissal 	of 	a 	complaint 	subsequent 	to 	the conduct 	of 	an
informal 	conference 	and 	the 	setting 	of 	a 	formal 	hearing.
However, 	the 	instar1t 	cas12 	is 	fac tua:..ly 	d::.si: i nguish:ible 	i.n 	th2t
in 	neither 	of 	the 	just-cited 	cases 	had 	the 	regional 	director
previously 	determined 	that 	a 	prima 	facie 	case had 	been 	stated,
nor 	did 	the 	Complainant 	assert 	on 	appeal 	that 	his 	due 	process
rights 	and 	PERB 	regulations 	required 	a 	hearing. 	To 	that
extent, 	the 	instant 	case 	appears 	to 	be 	one of 	first 	impression
for 	the 	PERB.
3

In 	Sweetwater 	Union 	High 	School 	District 	(11/23/76) 	EERB
Dec. 	No. 	4, 2 	the 	Board, 	citing 	Firefighters 	Union 	v. 	Citv 	of
Vallejo 	(1974) 	12 	C.3d 	608, 	said 	that 	in 	interpreting 	the 	EERA,
cognizance 	should 	be 	taken 	of 	decisions 	of 	other 	governmental
agencies 	which 	administer 	statutes 	identical 	or 	similar 	to 	the
BERA. 	In 	the 	absence 	of 	on-point 	PERB 	case 	law 	regarding 	the
instant 	procedural 	issue, 	the 	undersigned 	Board 	agent 	will
follow.this 	direction.
Though 	California's 	public 	notice 	laws 	are 	unique,3 	the
processing 	of 	a 	public 	notice 	complaint 	by 	PERB 	is 	similar 	to
the 	processing 	of 	an 	unfair 	labor 	practice 	charge 	by 	the
National 	Labor 	Relations 	Board 	(NLRB). 	An 	NLRB 	employee,
acting 	as 	an 	agent 	of 	the 	regional 	director, 	screens 	incoming
unfair 	labor 	practice 	charges 	and:
• 	if 	it 	appears 	to 	the 	regional director
that 	formal 	procee<lings 	in 	respect 	thereto
should 	be 	instituted, 	he 	shall 	issue 	and
cause 	to 	be 	served 	on 	all 	the other 	parties
a 	formal 	complaint 	in 	the 	name 	of 	the Board
stating 	the 	unfair 	labor 	practices 	and
containing 	a 	notice 	of 	hearing 	betore an
administrative 	law 	judge ••.
Section 	102.15. 	Rules 	and 	Regulations 	of 	the 	National
Labor 	Relations 	Board.
2The 	PERB 	was 	formerly 	referred 	to 	as 	the Educational
Employment 	Relations 	Board.
3Similar 	provisions 	exist 	only 	in 	two 	other 	statutes
administered 	by 	PERB: 	the 	Higher 	Education 	Employer-Employee
Relations 	Act 	(Gov't 	Code 	section 	3595) 	and 	the 	State
Employer-Employee 	ReJ.ations 	Act 	(se".!tion 	3S23).
4

The
	administrative
	law
	judge
	is
	assigned
	oy
	the 	chief
administrative
	law
	judge 	in
	performing
	adjudi~atory 	functions
for
	the
	NLRB,
	while
	the
	charging
	party
	is
	represented
	at
	the
hearing	
by	
an
	agent
	of 	the 	general 	counsel's
	office.
Public
	notice
	complaints
	filed
	with
	PERB
	are
	initially
screened
	by
	a
	Board
	agent
	acting 	for
	the 	regional
	director.
Similar
	to
	N.LRB
	procedures,
	if
	a
	pr
irna
	facie 	violation
	is
	found
to
	exist
and
	the
	complaint
	has
	not
	been
	settled
	or
	withdrawn,
	a
hearing
	is 	set
	before
	a
	hearing
	officer
	assigned	
by	
the
director
	of
	representation.
	PERB
	regulations
	37030-37070.
4
The
	only
	substantive 	differences
	between
	the
	two
	procedures
are 	that
	PERB's
	regulations
	provide 	for
	the
	possibility
	of
	an
informal
	settlement
	conference
	prior 	to
	hearing
	and
	the
	NLRB
charging
	party
	is
	represented	
by	
an
	agent 	of
	the 	general
counsel's
	office
	once
	a
	prima
	facie 	violation
	is
	determined.
Case
	processing
	is,
	then,
	substantially 	similar.
There
	exists
	a
	long
	line
	of
	NLRB
	decisions
	upholding
	the
prima
	facie	
by	
the 	general 	counsel. 	In 	the 	seminal
	case,
Cherry
	Rivet
	Company
	(1951)
	97
	NLRB
	No.
	212,
	29
	LR."tt.~
	1237,
	the
general 	counsel
	had
	issued
	a
	complaint
	on 	an
	unfair 	labor
practice
	charge 	by	
the
	United
	Auto 	Workers
	International
	Union,
CIO,
	against 	the
	employer. 	Subsequent
	to 	the 	general 	counsel's
presentation 	of 	the 	charging
	party's
	evidence,
	tje 	trial
4PERB
	rules 	are 	codified 	at 	California 	AdministrativeCode,
	title
	8, 	section
	31000
	et 	seq.
5

examiner 	(now 	referred 	to 	as 	an 	administrative 	law 	judge), 	upon
motion 	of 	the 	respondent, 	dismissed 	certain 	allegations 	of 	the
complaint 	for 	failing 	to 	state 	a 	prima 	facie 	case. 	The 	general
counsel 	and 	the 	union 	filed 	exceptions 	to 	the 	ruling 	with 	the
full 	board 	on 	the 	grounds 	that 	the 	trial 	examiner bad 	no 	power
to 	dismiss 	any 	part 	of 	the 	complaint 	prior 	to 	both 	sides'
presentation 	of 	their 	cases 	(once 	the 	general 	counsel 	had 	ruled
that 	a 	prima 	facie 	violation 	had 	been 	stated). 	The 	board,
after 	agreeing 	with 	the 	trial 	examiner's 	decision 	on 	the
merits, 	went 	on 	to 	say 	the 	following 	about 	the 	procedural 	issue:
.• 	~ we 	find 	nothing 	in 	either 	the
Administrative 	Procedure Act 	or 	our 	own
Rules 	and 	Regulations 	which 	prevents 	the
Trial 	Examiner 	from 	dismissing 	a 	complaint
under 	such 	circumstances. 	Such 	dismissals
are 	well 	established 	judicial 	and
administrative 	practice, 	and 	are 	in 	the
interest 	of 	speedy 	administration 	of 	law.
Cherry 	Rivet 	Company, 	supra, 	at 	p. 	1304 	(footnote 	1).
Applying 	the 	same 	logic, 	in 	AAUP 	v. 	Penn. 	Labor 	Relations
Board 	(CtComPls, 	19'74) 	a-; 	LRRM 	3114, 	a 	Pennsylvania 	cCJurt
upheld 	the 	right 	of 	that 	state's 	Labor 	Relations 	Board 	to
dismiss 	a 	case 	prior 	to 	commencement 	of 	a 	hearing 	despite 	the
fact 	that 	the 	secretary 	to 	the 	board 	had 	determined 	that 	the
complaint 	stated 	a 	prima 	facie 	violation 	of 	the 	pertinent
statute.
California 	civil 	procedure 	can 	also 	be 	loo~ed 	~o 	for
gaidance. 	The 	District 1 s 	motion 	to 	~ismiss 	is 	prop2cly 	tn 	th~
form 	of 	a 	motion 	for 	judgment 	on 	the 	pleadings. 	Witkin,
California 	Procedure 	(2d 	ed. 	1970) 	at 	p. 	2816. 	There 	appears
6

to 	be 	no 	case 	law 	restriction 	regarding 	the 	ti~ing 	of 	filing 	of
such 	a 	motion 	with 	a 	California 	court. 	Id 	at 	p. 	2820.
Finally, 	it 	is 	a 	basic 	precept 	of 	administrative 	law 	that 	a
"trial" 	(i.e. 	hearing) 	is 	required 	only 	when 	~aterial 	facts 	are
in 	dispute. 	Davis, 	Administrative 	Law 	Text 	(3~a 	ed. 	1972) 	pp.
157, 	159. 	Where, 	as 	here, 	the 	issue 	is 	one 	of 	law 	only, 	due
process 	is 	served 	where 	the 	parties 	have 	been 	granted 	the 	right
of 	"argument" 	(i.e. 	written 	brief}. 	Ibid. 	In 	the 	instant
case, 	this 	requirement 	has 	been 	met.
Relative 	to 	PERB's 	internal 	regulations, 	the 	Complainant
paraphrases 	PERB 	regulation 	37070 	as 	providing 	that 	n[aJ
hearing 	must 	be 	called 	on 	the 	Complaint" 	(if 	the 	complaint 	is
not 	withdrawn 	by 	the 	complainant 	or 	is 	not 	dismissed 	by 	the
regional 	director) 	and 	the 	District's 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	is
"illegal" 	because 	it 	was 	not 	made 	until 	the 	case 	was 	set 	for
hearing. 	However, 	regulation 	37070 	says 	that 	the 	complaint
" ••• 	shall 	be 	resolved 	through 	the 	hearing 	procedures
descr:i.bed 	in 	'.')ivision 	I, 	Chapter 	3 	(commencing with 	Section
32165} 	of 	[the 	PERB's] 	regulations." 	The 	District's 	motion 	was
filed 	pursuant 	to 	PERB 	regulation 	32190(a) 	of 	Division 	I,
Chapter 	3. 	It 	is 	therefore 	found 	to 	be 	a 	proper 	motion 	and, 	as
such, 	can 	be 	ruled 	upon 	by 	the 	hearing 	officer.
For 	the 	foregoing 	reasons, 	it 	is 	determined 	that 	the 	motion
is 	procedurally 	proper 	and 	the 	he':l.ri;:.,.g 	ofEicec 	0_?e3 	':cave
authority 	to 	grant 	the 	District's 	motion 	to 	di3miss
7

irrespective 	of 	a 	prior 	finding 	by 	the 	regio~al 	director 	that
certain 	parts 	of 	the 	complaint 	state 	a 	prima 	facie 	violation.
Whether 	Complaint 	States 	a 	Prima 	Facie Violation
An 	agent 	for 	the 	Los 	Angeles 	regional 	director 	of 	the 	PERB
has 	previously 	rulea 	that 	those 	parts 	of 	the 	instant 	complaint
which 	allege. that 	the 	District's 	five 	minute 	speaking 	rule
uinterfered" 	with 	his 	right 	to 	express 	himself 	constitute 	a
prima 	facie 	violation 	of 	section 	3547. 	See 	page 	2, 	su~.
Although. the 	complainant, 	Howard 	o. 	Watts, 	alleges
violation 	of 	section 	3547 1 	subsections 	{a) 	through 	(e), 	only
subsection 	(b) 	provides 	for 	the 	public's 	ability 	to 	respond 	to
submission 	of 	initial 	proposals. 	Therefore, 	subsections 	{a),
(c), 	(d) 	and 	(e) 	could 	not 	have 	been 	violated 	by 	the 	District
under 	the 	facts 	alleged 	by 	the 	complaint. 	Those 	parts 	of 	the
complaint 	which 	have 	not 	already 	been 	dismissed 	that 	allege
violations 	of 	these 	subsections 	of 	section 	3547 	are 	therefore
DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE 	TO AMEND.
Subsection 	{b) 	provides 	in 	pertinent 	part 	as 	follows:
(b) 	Meeting 	and 	negotiating 	shall 	not 	take
place 	on 	any 	proposal 	until 	•.. 	the 	public
has 	the 	opportunity 	to 	express 	itself
regarding 	the 	proposal 	at 	a 	meeting 	of 	the
public 	school 	employer.
The 	complainant 	alleges 	that 	the 	District's 	rule 	limiting
speakers 	to 	five 	minutes 	time 	to 	speak 	to 	all 	agenda 	items
"interfered" 	with 	his 	ability 	to 	express 	hi~se~f
collective 	bargaining 	proposals 	on 	the 	agenda 	of 	the 	May 	20,
1981 	LACCD 	board 	of 	trustees 	meeting.
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However, 	Exhibit 	No. 	2 of 	Mr .. 	Watt's 	amended 	complaint
indicates 	that 	the 	initial 	subjects 	of 	meeting 	and 	negoti~ting
which 	he 	spoke 	to 	on 	May 	20, 	1981 	had 	already 	been 	placed 	on
the 	board 	agenda 	on 	May 	6, 	1981 	for 	public 	response. 	Exhibit
No. 	2 	indicates 	that 	they 	were 	on 	the 	May 	20 	agenda 	for 	board
adoption 	pursuant 	to 	section 	3547(c), 	not 	for 	public 	response
in 	accordance 	with 	section 	3547(b).
Subsection 	(b) 	mandates 	only 	that 	initial 	proposals 	be
agendaed 	for 	public 	response 	at 	"a" 	(i.e. 	one} 	meeting 	of 	the
public 	school 	employer. 	This 	was 	done. 	As 	the 	District's
motion 	points 	out, 	when 	initial 	proposals 	are 	being 	agendaed
for 	board 	adoption 	(such 	as 	at 	the 	District's 	May 	20 	meeting)
the EERA does 	not 	obligate 	the 	public 	school 	employer 	to 	allow
members 	of 	the 	public 	to 	speak 	at 	all. 	Whether 	Mr. 	Watts'
rights 	were 	"interfered" 	with 	by 	limiting 	him 	to 	five 	minutes
is.thus 	irrelevant. 	Therefore, 	it 	is 	found 	that 	the 	complaint
does 	not 	state 	a 	prima 	facie 	violation 	of 	section 	3547(b), 	nor
can 	it 	be 	ame~ded 	to do 	so.
District 	Request 	for 	Attorney's 	Fees
and 	Cease 	and 	Desist 	Order
The Board 	has 	previously 	upheld 	the 	decision 	of 	the
regional 	director 	to 	dismiss 	with 	leave 	to 	amend 	allegations
similar 	to 	that 	made 	in 	the 	instant 	case 	relative 	to 	LACCD's
five-minute 	speaking 	limitation. 	Los 	Angeles 	Community 	College
District 	{4/29/81), 	PERB 	Dec. 	No. 	lS0a. 	I~ 	~as 	Angeles 	Unified
School 	District 	(2/22/82), 	PERB 	Dec. 	No. 	181a, 	the 	Boar.a
admonished 	Mr. 	Watts 	to" ... 	cease 	and 	desist 	from 	filing
complaints 	which 	merely 	raise 	facts 	and 	questions 	of 	law 	which
the 	Board 	has 	already 	fully 	considered" 	and 	warned 	Mr. 	Watts
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that 	if 	he 	persisted 	in 	so 	doing 	the 	Board 	would 	consider
compelling 	him 	to 	pay 	the 	respondent's 	legal 	expenses.
Accordingly, 	the 	District 	asks 	for 	attorneys' 	fees 	and 	a 	cease
and 	desist 	order 	against 	the 	Complainant. 	However, 	the 	instant
complaint 	was 	filed 	prior 	to 	the 	issuance of 	PERB 	Dec. 	No.
181a. 	Further, 	the 	existing 	portions 	of 	the 	complaint 	were
previously 	determined 	by 	the 	Los 	Angeles 	regional 	office 	of 	the
PERB 	to 	state 	a 	pr ima 	facie 	case~ 	It 	would 	therefore 	be 	unfair
to 	the 	Complainant 	to 	subject 	him 	to 	the 	District's 	requested
remedy 	at 	this 	point 	in 	the 	processing 	of 	the 	complaint.
CONCLUSION
The 	instant 	complaint 	does 	not 	state 	a 	prima 	facie
violation 	of 	the 	Act. 	It 	cannot 	be 	amended 	to 	do 	so. 	Hence,
the 	Motion 	to 	Dismiss 	is 	granted 	and 	the 	complaint 	is 	DISMISSED
WITHOUT 	LEAVE 	TO AMEND. 	The 	hearing 	set 	for 	August 	31, 	1982 	is
therefore 	hereby 	cancelled.
An 	appeal 	of 	this 	decision 	may 	be 	made 	to 	the Board 	itself
within 	10 	(ten) 	calendar 	days 	following 	the 	date 	of 	service of
this 	decision 	by 	filing 	a 	statement 	of 	the 	facts 	upon 	which 	the
appeal 	is 	based 	with 	the Executive Assistant 	to 	the Board 	at
1031 	18th 	Street, 	Sacramento, 	California 	95814. 	Service 	and
proof 	of 	service of 	the 	appeal 	are 	required 	pursuant 	to 	PERB
regulation 	32140.
1	
Robert 	R. 	Bergeson
Hearing 	Officer
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