Pittsburg Unified School District (PERB 0318E)

STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION 	OF 	THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
CALIFORNIA 	SCHOOL 	EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION 	and 	its 	PITTSBURG
CHAPTER NO. 	44,
Charging 	Party,
v.
PITTSBURG 	UNIFIED 	SCHOOL 	DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Case No. 	SF-CE-235
PERB Decision No. 	318
June 10, 	1983
Appearances; Madalyn J. 	Frazzini, 	Attorney for California
School Employees Association 	and 	its 	Pittsburg Chapter 	No. 	44;
Mark W. 	Goodson, 	Attorney 	(Breon, Galgani & Godino) 	for
Pittsburg 	Unified 	School 	District.
Before Tovar, Jaeger, and Burt, Members.
DECISION
TOVAR, 	Member: 	This case 	is 	before 	the 	Public Employment
Relations 	Board 	(PERB or 	Board) 	on exceptions 	filed 	by 	the
Pittsburg Unified School District 	(District) 	to 	the proposed
decision by PERB's Administrative Law Judge 	(ALJ). 	The ALJ
ruling 	on 	charges 	filed 	by 	the 	California 	School 	Employees
Association and 	its 	Pittsburg Chapter 	No. 	44 	(CSEA) 	held 	that
the District violated subsections 3543.5 (a), 	(b) 	and 	(d) 	of the
Educational Employment 	Relations Act 	(EERA) 	by 	unilaterally
reducing 	the work 	year 	of 	certain classified 	employees. 	He
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dismissed 	CSEA's 	subsection 	3543.5(c) 	allegation.1 CSEA did
not 	file exceptions.
FACTS
The 	District 	did 	not 	base 	its 	exceptions 	on 	any 	claimed
error 	of 	fact 	by 	the ALJ. 	We 	have 	reviewed 	his 	factual
findings 	and 	find 	them 	free 	of 	prejudicial 	error. 	The ALJ's
decision 	is 	incorporated 	herein. 	We 	have 	summarized 	the
essential facts, 	infra.
1gERA 	is 	codified 	at 	Government 	Code 	section 	3540
et 	seq. 	All 	statutory references 	are 	to 	the Government Code
unless 	otherwise 	indicated. 	Subsections 	3543.5 (a) 	through 	(d)
provide 	as 	follows:
It 	shall 	be 	unlawful 	for 	a public 	school
employer 	to:
(a) 	Impose or 	threaten 	to 	impose 	reprisals
on employees, 	to discriminate or 	threaten 	to
discriminate against employees, 	or 	otherwise
to interfere with, 	restrain, 	or 	coerce
employees 	because 	of 	their 	exercise 	of
rights 	guaranteed 	by 	this 	chapter.
(b) 	Deny 	to employee organizations 	rights
guaranteed 	to 	them by 	this 	chapter.
(c) 	Refuse or 	fail 	to meet 	and 	negotiate 	in
good 	faith 	with 	an 	exclusive 	representative.
(d) 	Dominate 	or 	interfere with 	the
formation or 	administration 	of 	any 	employee
organization, or 	contribute 	financial or
other 	support 	to 	it, 	or 	in any way 	encourage
employees 	to 	join 	any 	organization 	in
preference 	to another.
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CSEA was 	voluntarily 	recognized 	as 	the 	exclusive
representative 	of 	two 	units 	of 	classified 	employees 	in 	the
District, 	an aides 	unit and a clerical/support 	unit, 	in
December 	of 1976. 	During 	the 	fall of 	1977, 	the District
commissioned 	its 	business manager, 	Robert Padilla, 	to perform a
study of clerical services. 	In that 	study, 	which was presented
to 	the 	board on October 	26, 	1977, 	Padilla 	informed 	the District
that 	a 	savings 	of 	between 	$30,000 	and 	$60,000 	could 	be 	realized
if 	the clerical work 	year 	was 	reduced 	from 12 	to 	10 	or 	11
months. 	He pointed 	out 	that 	Pittsburg 	was 	the 	only 	school
district 	in 	its 	geographic 	area 	with 	a 	total 	12-month clerical
service. 	It does 	not 	appear 	that 	the 	District 	ever 	informed
CSEA 	that 	it was 	contemplating 	reduction 	of 	the 	work 	year 	nor
that 	it 	provided 	CSEA with 	notice 	or 	an opportunity 	to
negotiate 	regarding 	such 	a plan.
It was 	the 	practice 	in 	the 	District 	to negotiate 	jointly
with CSEA for 	both 	units, 	and 	to enter 	into a 	collective
bargaining 	agreement 	covering 	both 	units. 	The 	1977-78
agreement 	is 	silent on 	the length of 	the work year, 	although 	it
contains 	language 	regarding 	length of work week, 	workday, 	lunch
periods, rest periods, duty time, overtime, compensatory time,
shift differential, 	vacations, 	and sick and other 	leave, 	all
matters 	pertaining 	to 	the 	amount 	and 	increments 	of 	working 	time.
On March 	30, 	1978, 	two different employee organizations
filed 	decertification petitions 	in 	the 	operations/support
3
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unit. 	One 	was 	filed by United 	Public Employees 	Local 	390,
Service Employees 	International Union 	(SEIU), 	the other 	by
Public Employees Union Local 1 	(Local 1 ) . 	SEIU's 	petition was
supported 	by 	a 	showing 	of 	interest 	of 	not 	less 	than
30 percent. 	Local 1's petition was 	initially 	supported 	by 	an
insufficient 	showing. 	The 	PERB 	regional director 	gave 	Local 	1
an additional 	10 days 	in which 	to perfect 	its 	showing, 	and 	it
did so. 	In early May, 	1978, 	the 	regional director 	ordered a
decertification 	election 	involving 	the 	incumbent 	and 	both
petitioners. 	At 	that 	time, 	SEIU sought 	a stay of 	election,
filing 	an 	administrative 	appeal 	with 	the 	Board 	itself 	of 	the
regional director's grant 	of 	10 	days 	to Local 	1 	to perfect 	its
showing. 	On May 	26, 	1978, 	the PERB 	itself 	stayed 	the election
pending 	resolution 	of 	the 	underlying 	appeal. 	(Pittsburg
Unified School District 	(5/26/78) 	PERB Order No. 	34.) 	During
mid-May 	the 	District met with CSEA, 	SEIU, 	and Local 1 	to
discuss 	the 	problems 	posed 	by 	the 	decertification petitions 	and
the 	imminent 	expiration of 	the 	contract. 	The District 	told
CSEA 	that 	it 	had 	a 	good 	faith 	doubt 	of 	CSEA's 	representative
status 	in 	the 	operations/support 	unit, 	and 	could 	not 	bargain
with 	it 	for 	a new 	contract 	in 	that 	unit.2
2PERB 	rules 	required 	that 	a 	decertification petition 	be
accompanied 	by a 	30-percent 	showing 	of 	support. 	This 	does 	not
mean, however, 	that, 	because two petitions were filed,
60 percent 	of 	the 	unit 	had 	indicated 	a 	desire 	to decertify
CSEA. 	An employee 	could 	have 	signed 	more 	than 	one
4

The 	three 	unions 	were 	unable 	to 	agree 	on coalition
bargaining 	or 	any 	other 	manner 	of 	settlement 	of 	the 	problem.
The 	District 	took 	the 	position 	that 	CSEA could 	administer 	its
contract 	through 	the June 	30 	expiration date 	and 	that 	it 	would
maintain 	the 	status 	quo 	thereafter 	regarding 	matters 	within
scope.
CSEA did 	not 	object 	to 	the 	District's 	refusal 	to 	negotiate
towards 	a 	new contract 	for 	the 	operations/support 	unit 	during
pendency 	of 	a 	real question concerning 	representation. 	It did
assert 	its 	continued 	right 	to 	administer 	its 	existing 	contract.
During 	the 	spring of 	1978, 	the 	District began 	to make
preparations 	to deal 	with 	the 	budgetary 	shortfalls 	which 	it
anticipated 	would 	result 	from 	the 	expected 	passage 	of
Proposition 13 	in 	the June 	election. 	It 	solicited 	voluntary
work year 	reductions 	from clericals, 	and 	some 	clericals 	acceded
to such a reduction. 	On May 10, 	1978, 	the 	school board adopted
a 	resolution 	approving 	these 	voluntary 	work year 	reductions.
Also at 	that meeting, 	several 	aide, 	gardener 	and custodial
positions 	were 	eliminated 	involuntarily. 	CSEA did 	not 	object
to or 	demand 	to negotiate 	over 	these 	actions. 	The 	record
indicates 	that most, 	if 	not 	all, 	of 	the custodial and gardening
decertification petition. 	Employees 	from 	the 	blue 	collar
segment 	of 	the 	unit 	had 	reported 	to District management 	their
dissatisfaction with CSEA, 	although 	it 	is 	unclear 	how many did
so.
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slots eliminated were vacant 	at 	the 	time of 	the 	action, 	and
that 	the 	aides 	affected 	were 	able 	to 	transfer 	into other 	vacant
positions, 	so 	that 	it was CSEA's 	belief 	that no 	incumbent
employees 	were 	adversely 	affected 	by 	the 	involuntary 	reductions,
At 	the June 14, 	1978 school board meeting, 	the board
approved 	the 	cancellation of 	summer 	school 	for 	1978. 	Also 	at
that 	meeting, 	a 	resolution was 	passed which purported 	to lay
off or 	reassign clerk-typist 	Debbie Riso, 	pursuant 	to 	the
reduction or 	discontinuance 	of 	services 	undertaken 	by 	the
District on May 10, 	1978. 	Majorie Ott, 	a CSEA field
representative, 	spoke to this resolution, 	demanding
negotiations 	over 	the 	reduction 	in Riso's wages 	and 	hours. 	On
June 19, 	1978, 	a letter 	from the District 	informed Riso 	that
"due 	to 	lack 	of work 	and/or 	lack 	of 	funds 	under 	section 	45298
of 	the 	Education Code" 	her 	work 	year 	was 	being 	reduced 	from 	12
to 	10 months. 	CSEA protested 	this 	action 	by 	letter 	dated
June 	29, 	1978, 	and demanded negotiations over 	the 	reduction 	in
wages 	and 	hours.
At the June 	28, 	1978 school board meeting, 	the District
passed resolution No. 	78-9 	(C.P.'s Exhibit 	6 ) . 	That 	resolution
provided, 	inter 	alia, 	that 	the work year 	and 	salary of 	some 	30
clerical 	employees 	was 	to be 	reduced. 	The 	resolution 	imposed
cuts 	in 	several other 	areas of 	the 	budget, 	indicating 	that 	it
was 	a 	response 	to 	the 	budgetary 	estimate 	that 	the 	District
6

would 	suffer 	a 	13.1 percent 	reduction 	in 	revenue 	due 	to 	the
passage 	of 	Proposition 	13.
The 	record 	is 	inconclusive 	as 	to 	the 	basis 	for 	selection of
those whose work 	year 	was 	reduced. 	The 	resolution 	basically 	is
an 	adoption 	of 	the 	Board 	of 	Education Accounting 	Committee
Report 	for 	Proposed Budget Changes, 	presented 	to 	the District
board on June 28, 	1978.
Regarding 	the 	basis 	for 	selection within 	the 	job
classifications 	listed 	in 	the 	resolution, 	it 	should be 	noted
that 	the 	resolution 	instructs 	the 	superintendent 	to 	take 	the
" . . . 	necessary 	steps, 	according 	to law, 	to 	reduce 	the
following clerical positions 	. 	. 	. 	." 	There was no evidence 	in
the 	record 	to demonstrate 	that, 	at 	least 	within 	the 	job
classifications 	listed, 	the 	selection of 	those 	to be 	reduced
was made 	on 	grounds other 	than 	strict 	seniority. 	It 	is 	clear
that 	not 	all 	clerical employees 	suffered 	reductions 	in 	their
work year. 	In 	the 	transcript of 	the June 	28 school board
meeting, 	submitted 	in 	evidence 	by CSEA and 	not 	challenged 	as
inaccurate by 	the District, 	it was 	indicated 	that 	the work year
of 	secretaries 	for 	certain 	administrators 	who 	themselves 	would
continue working 	a 	12-month 	year 	would 	not 	be 	reduced.
CSEA demanded 	negotiations 	over 	the 	reduction 	in work 	year
at 	negotiating 	sessions 	regarding 	a 	new 	contract 	for 	aides 	on
June 	29, 	and 	in subsequent 	sessions. 	The District 	took 	the
7
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position 	that 	it would 	not negotiate 	over 	the decision, 	because
it was 	a 	type 	of 	layoff 	and 	thus 	not 	within 	scope. 	The
District 	further 	alleges 	that, 	at 	the 	several 	negotiating
sessions 	in June 	and July of 	1978, 	it 	raised 	the defense 	that
it 	need 	not, 	and 	indeed could 	not, 	negotiate with CSEA over
issues 	regarding 	the 	operations/support 	services 	unit. 	CSEA
denies 	that 	this 	position was 	overtly 	raised 	in 	negotiating
sessions. 	As 	the ALJ points 	out, 	such 	a position was 	raised 	by
the 	District prior 	to 	the 	negotiations 	and 	it 	is 	thus
reasonable 	to resolve 	this 	conflict 	in 	favor 	of 	the 	District's
account, 	because 	such would 	be 	consistent 	with 	its 	formerly
expressed 	and 	continually 	held position. 	Despite 	its
unwillingness 	to 	negotiate 	regarding 	operations/support 	unit
issues 	even 	after 	resolution 	of 	the 	pending 	decertification
petition, 	the District did 	discuss 	issues 	arising 	from 	the
effects 	of 	the 	work 	year 	reduction 	such 	as 	health 	benefits,
manner 	of payment, 	eligibility 	for 	unemployment 	insurance, 	and
vacations. 	However, 	the 	District maintained 	that 	a 10-month
work 	year 	was 	the 	status 	quo 	even 	though 	the 	reduction 	in 	the
12-month work 	year 	was 	unilaterally 	implemented 	by 	the 	District.
The 	CSEA contract 	governing 	the 	operations/support 	services
unit 	expired 	on June 	30, 	1978. 	The work year 	reductions 	took
effect after 	that date.
In October 	of 	1978, 	PERB 	issued 	Pittsburg 	Unified School
District 	(10/20/78) 	PERB Order No. 	49, 	dismissing both
8

decertification petitions. 	Following 	that 	event, 	negotiations
for 	the 	operations/support 	unit 	resumed 	and 	CSEA presented 	a
proposal 	on 	work 	year 	duration which 	set 	forth 	a 	particular
number 	of workdays per 	year 	for 	employees 	in various
classifications. 	The District 	responded 	that 	the 	contract
should 	remain 	silent 	on actual number 	of work year 	days, 	with
the work 	year 	to 	be 	established 	by 	past practice. 	The District
unilaterally 	changed 	the 	status 	quo 	for 	clerical 	employees 	from
a 	12-month work 	year 	to a 	10-month 	year 	and 	then 	took 	a
bargaining 	position 	that 	a 	10-month 	year 	was 	in 	fact 	the 	status
quo. 	But 	it 	sought 	to maintain 	the 	1977-78 	status quo 	for 	all
the 	other 	issues.
THE ALJ'S 	DECISION
The ALJ 	found 	that 	the 	reduction 	in work 	year 	at 	issue 	here
was 	a 	subject within 	scope 	because 	it 	constituted 	a reduction
in wages 	and hours, 	items enumerated 	in subsection 3543.2(a).3
3subsection 	3543.2(a) 	provides 	as 	follows:
(a) 	The 	scope of 	representation 	shall be
limited 	to matters 	relating 	to wages, 	hours
of 	employment, 	and other 	terms 	and
conditions 	of employment. 	"Terms 	and
conditions 	of 	employment" 	mean health 	and
welfare 	benefits 	as 	defined 	by 	Section
53200, leave, 	transfer 	and reassignment
policies, 	safety conditions of employment,
class size, 	procedures 	to be 	used 	for 	the
evaluation of employees, 	organizational
security pursuant 	to Section 	3546,
procedures 	for 	processing 	grievances
pursuant to Sections 3548.5, 	3548.6, 	3548.7,
and 	3548.8, 	and 	the 	layoff of probationary
certificated 	school 	district 	employees,
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Although 	noting 	that 	under 	established 	PERB 	precedent 	an
employer 	may 	unilaterally 	determine 	that 	a 	layoff 	is 	necessary,
the ALJ 	held 	that 	the 	reduction 	in work 	year 	at 	issue 	here 	was
not 	a layoff. 	He held, 	further, 	that 	the District had 	a
reasonable 	good 	faith doubt 	as 	to CSEA's 	majority 	status 	at 	the
time 	it changed 	the work year 	and, 	thus, 	that 	the District had
no obligation to negotiate with CSEA at 	that 	time. 	However, 	he
found 	that 	the 	District 	did 	have 	an 	obligation 	to maintain
terms 	and 	conditions 	of 	employment 	at 	their 	then current 	level
when 	faced 	with 	a question 	concerning 	representation 	raised 	by
petitions 	filed 	by 	competing 	labor 	organizations. 	He 	found
that 	the 	unilateral 	reduction 	of 	work 	year 	violated 	that
obligation of 	strict 	neutrality. 	As 	a 	remedy 	for 	that
unilateral change, 	he ordered 	the 	District 	to 	reinstate 	the
status 	quo ante, 	make all 	affected 	employees whole 	for 	earnings
pursuant 	to Section 	44959.5 	of 	the Education
Code. 	In addition, 	the exclusive
representative 	of 	certificated 	personnel 	has
the 	right 	to consult on 	the 	definition of
educational objectives, 	the determination of
the content of 	courses 	and curriculum, 	and
the 	selection 	of 	textbooks 	to 	the 	extent
such matters 	are 	within 	the 	discretion 	of
the 	public 	school 	employer 	under 	the 	law.
All 	matters 	not 	specifically 	enumerated 	are
reserved 	to 	the 	public 	school 	employer 	and
may 	not 	be 	a subject 	of meeting 	and
negotiating, 	provided 	that 	nothing 	herein
may 	be 	construed 	to 	limit 	the 	right 	of 	the
public 	school 	employer 	to consult with 	any
employees 	or 	employee 	organization on 	any
matter 	outside 	the 	scope 	of 	representation.
10

lost 	due 	to 	the 	reduction 	in work 	year,4 and 	post 	an
appropriate 	notice 	informing 	employees 	of 	the 	results 	of 	the
decision.
CSEA filed 	no exceptions. 	The 	District 	excepts 	to 	the
finding 	that 	the decision to 	". 	. 	. 	layoff classified employees
by a reduction 	in hours 	is mandatorily negotiable 	. 	. 	.", 	to
the 	finding 	that 	the 	District 	was 	obligated 	to maintain 	the
status 	quo 	regarding 	matters 	within 	scope 	during 	the 	pendency
of 	a 	question concerning 	representation, 	and 	to 	the 	finding
that 	backpay 	would 	be 	the 	appropriate 	remedy 	even 	if 	the Board
were 	to 	find 	a violation predicated 	upon 	the 	unilateral 	change
in work year.
DISCUSSION
A reduction 	in 	work 	year 	directly 	affects 	items 	enumerated
in subsection 3543.2(a), 	supra, 	because 	it reduces wages and
hours. 	We 	affirm 	the ALJ's 	finding 	that duration of 	the 	work
year 	is 	a 	subject within 	scope. 	Such 	finding 	is 	in accord 	with
prior 	Board 	decisions 	holding 	that 	the 	number 	of 	workdays 	in
the work year 	is 	a subject within 	scope. 	See 	North Sacramento
School District 	(12/31/81) 	PERB Decision No. 	193; 	Pittsburg
4 The ALJ 	provided 	that 	back 	pay 	would 	be mitigated 	if, 	in
the compliance 	stage of 	the proceedings, 	the District could
demonstrate 	that 	it 	suffered 	sufficient 	actual 	lack 	of 	work 	or
funds 	to justify work year 	reductions 	in 	lieu of 	layoffs 	in 	the
years 	after 	1978.
11

Unified School District 	(3/15/82) 	PERB Decision No. 	199; 	Palos
Verdes 	Peninsula 	Unified 	School 	District/Pleasant 	Valley 	School
District 	(7/16/79) 	PERB Decision No. 	96; 	San Jose Community
College District 	(9/30/82) 	PERB Decision No. 	240.
The 	District 	does 	not 	dispute 	the 	finding 	that 	the 	length
of work year 	is within 	the 	scope 	of 	representation. 	Rather,
the 	District 	asserts 	that 	it may 	unilaterally 	reduce 	the 	work
year 	due 	to 	lack 	of work 	or 	lack 	of 	funds 	as 	a 	form of 	layoff,
pursuant 	to 	the Education Code. 	It 	asserts 	that 	the 	same 	rules
PERB has 	established 	for 	negotiations 	regarding 	layoff 	should
apply to 	its conduct here 	and, 	thus, 	that 	it should 	be
privileged 	to unilaterally reduce 	the 	work year, 	in lieu of
layoff, 	negotiating 	only 	over 	the 	effects 	of 	such 	action.5
In support of 	its position, 	the District cites 	two
California 	appellate 	decisions, 	CSEA v. 	Pasadena 	Unified School
-
District 	(1977) 	741 Cal.App.3d 	318 	and CSEA v. 	King City Union
Elementary School District 	(1981) 	116 Cal.App.3d 	695, 	for 	the
proposition 	that 	a 	reduction 	in hours 	and work 	year 	is 	the
equivalent 	of 	layoffs 	under 	the Education Code. 	We 	find 	that
neither 	of 	those cases 	is 	dispositive 	of 	the 	issue presented 	by
the 	instant case, 	for 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	infra.
55There	There 	is 	no 	allegation 	in 	this 	case 	that 	the 	District
refused 	to negotiate over 	the 	effects 	of 	layoff. 	Thus, 	that
issue 	is 	not 	before 	us.
12

In Pasadena, 	supra, 	CSEA filed 	for 	a writ of mandate,
alleging 	that 	the 	District 	violated 	the Education Code 	by,
inter 	alia, 	reducing 	the work 	hours of 	certain employees. 	The
trial court 	treated 	the 	district's 	general 	denial 	as 	a
demurrer, 	and 	dismissed CSEA's 	petition without 	leave 	to
amend. 	The 	Court 	of Appeals 	was 	ruling 	on CSEA's 	appeal of
that dismissal, 	and 	not on 	the ultimate merits 	of 	the 	case.
Regarding 	the 	reduction 	in hours 	of 	classified 	employees,
the Court characterized CSEA's 	argument 	as 	being 	that 	the
Education 	Code 	strictly prohibited 	districts 	from 	reducing 	the
hours 	of 	employees 	in any manner. 	At 	issue was 	the 	language 	of
Education Code 	section 	13580.1(g) 	(now Education Code 	section
41505 (g)) 	which provides, 	in pertinent part, 	that
. 	. 	. 	layoff 	for 	lack of 	funds or 	layoff 	for
lack 	of 	work 	includes 	any 	reduction 	in 	hours
of 	employment 	or 	assignment 	to a class or
grade 	lower 	than 	that 	in which 	the 	employee
has permanence, 	voluntarily consented 	to by
the 	employee, 	in order 	to avoid 	interruption
of 	employment 	by 	layoff. 	[Emphasis 	added.]
The Court 	of Appeals 	clarified 	the 	opinion 	of 	the Attorney
General in 58 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 	357 	(1975) 	which held that
the 	hours 	of 	classified 	employees may 	not 	be 	reduced 	except
with 	the 	employee's 	consent 	in order 	to 	avoid 	interruption of
employment 	by 	layoff. 	The Court 	perceived 	that 	the Attorney
General's 	opinion 	implied 	that 	" . . . 	because 	such 	reductions
cannot 	be made except 	with 	the 	employee's 	consent 	in 	lieu 	of
layoff, 	therefore 	they cannot 	be made 	at all." 	[Emphasis 	in
original.]
13

While 	acknowledging 	that 	the 	pertinent 	Education Code
sections 	" . . . 	clearly 	imply 	that 	the 	school 	district may
reduce 	the 	time 	assignments 	of 	specific 	employees 	within 	a
classification only with 	their 	consent, 	in 	lieu of
layoff 	. . . " 	[emphasis 	added] 	the Court 	of Appeals 	went 	on 	to
state 	that
. 	. 	. 	this does not mean 	that 	there 	is no way
for 	a 	school 	district 	to 	accomplish 	the
objective 	of 	reducing 	the 	time 	assignments 	of
individual 	employees 	within a
classification. 	The 	school district would
comply 	with 	the 	statute 	by 	offering 	the
reduced 	assignments 	to 	the 	employees 	who
would 	otherwise 	be 	laid 	off. 	The 	practical
effect 	of 	the 	statutory 	scheme 	is 	simply 	that
the 	employees 	whose 	time 	assignments 	are 	to
be 	reduced must 	be 	selected 	in 	the 	same 	order
they 	would 	have 	been 	selected 	for 	layoff
under 	section 	13746. 	(Length 	of 	service 	in
class plus 	higher 	classes.)
The District cites Pasadena, 	supra, 	for 	the proposition
that 	under 	the Education Code 	a 	school 	employer 	may 	reduce
classified 	employees' 	hours 	without 	their 	consent 	so 	long 	as 	it
selects 	employees 	for 	hours 	reduction 	according 	to 	the 	same
criteria 	set 	forth 	in 	the Education Code 	for 	layoff 	selection.
We 	reject 	that 	interpretation of 	the Court's 	holding. 	First,
such 	a ruling 	would 	render 	the 	language 	in 	the Education Code
regarding 	voluntary 	acceptance 	of 	a 	reduction 	in 	hours 	a
nullity. 	Second, 	the Court does 	not 	expressly state 	that 	the
employer 	is 	free 	to reduce hours 	involuntarily; 	rather, 	it
simply 	states 	that 	the 	employer 	may 	offer 	hours 	reduction 	to
14

individual 	employees 	as 	an alternative 	to 	laying 	them off.
Nowhere 	does 	it 	state 	that 	employees 	are 	obligated 	to 	accept
such an offer. 	Further, 	in 	the posture 	of 	the 	case 	before 	the
Court 	of Appeals, 	it 	is 	impossible 	to 	state precisely what 	the
district 	did 	in Pasadena. 	Since 	no 	facts 	had yet 	been
developed, 	it 	is 	unclear 	what personnel action 	the 	District
actually 	took. 	There 	is 	some 	indication 	in 	the 	decision 	that,
due 	to 	subsequent 	budgetary 	decision, 	all 	employees 	on behalf
of 	whom CSEA was 	suing 	had 	actually 	been 	retained.
In our 	view, 	the 	Pasadena decision 	stands only 	for 	the
obvious 	proposition 	that, 	when faced 	with 	a 	bona 	fide 	lack 	of
funds 	or 	lack 	of work, 	an employer 	may 	offer 	to employees 	the
option 	of 	accepting 	a 	reduction 	in 	their 	hours 	in 	lieu 	of
layoff, 	so long 	as 	it 	selects 	those 	to whom 	it 	tenders 	such
offers 	by 	the 	same 	manner 	prescribed 	in 	the 	Education Code 	for
selection 	for 	layoff. 	It does 	not 	expressly or 	impliedly hold
that 	the Education Code 	enables 	school 	employers 	to 	reduce 	the
hours 	of employees 	in lieu of 	layoff without 	their 	consent, 	nor
does 	it 	hold 	that 	an 	involuntary 	reduction 	in hours 	is 	the
equivalent 	of 	a 	layoff 	by Education Code 	definition. 	For 	these
reasons, 	and others discussed 	infra, 	we do 	not 	find Pasadena 	to
be 	authority 	for 	the 	District's argument 	in the 	instant 	case.
In King City, supra, 	(1981) 	116 Cal.App.3d 695, 	the
District 	laid 	off 	the 	entire 	class 	of 	teachers' 	aides 	for 	two
15

weeks 	(the 	first 	and last week of 	the 	1976-77 	school year).
That 	practice was 	reinstituted 	in 	the 	1977-78 	school year, 	and
was 	not 	complained of 	until February 	8, 	1978. 	The Court 	found
that 	subsection 	45101(g) 	of 	the Education Code posed 	no
impediment 	to 	this 	involuntary work 	year 	reduction. 	It held
that 	the 	District's 	action was 	a 	temporary 	layoff 	of 	an 	entire
class, 	not a reduction 	in hours of 	selected 	employees, 	and 	thus
that 	the 	section did 	not 	apply. 	The 	Court 	found 	that 	the
purpose 	of 	subsection 	45101(g) 	was 	to protect 	the 	return 	rights
of 	employees 	who 	voluntarily 	assent 	to 	reduced 	hours 	in 	lieu 	of
layoff. 	According 	to 	the Court, 	the 	employees 	in King City
were 	protected 	under 	the 	return 	rights 	sections 	applicable 	to
laid-off 	employees. 	The District 	urges 	that 	the 	employer
action 	in King 	City was 	identical 	in nature 	to 	its 	conduct
herein. 	Thus, 	it argues, King City establishes 	that work year
reductions 	are 	temporary 	layoffs 	under 	the Education Code, 	and
thus may 	be 	undertaken 	unilaterally.
King 	City 	is 	distinguishable 	from 	the 	instant 	case. 	In
King 	City 	the 	reduction 	in work 	year 	was 	keyed 	to 	the 	reduction
in 	funding 	for 	a 	specific program 	in which 	the 	affected
employees 	had worked. 	In 	the 	instant 	case 	the 	decision 	to
reduce 	the 	work year 	was 	based 	upon 	the 	Padilla 	report 	received
by 	the District 	in October 	of 	1977, 	which 	recommended almost
exactly 	the 	work year 	reductions 	later 	undertaken 	by 	the
District. 	The 	evidence 	indicates 	expressly 	that 	the 	reductions
16

in work 	year 	were 	not 	tied 	to 	the 	cancellation 	of 	summer
school. 	No evidence 	was presented 	to 	indicate 	that 	clerical
work 	year 	reductions 	were 	tied 	to 	any other 	program
cancellation, 	or 	that 	the 	reductions were 	otherwise motivated
by lack of work. 	Rather, 	it appears 	that, 	based upon a
projected monetary 	shortfall, 	the 	District 	imposed 	as 	an
"emergency" 	measure 	a work 	year 	reduction which 	had 	been within
its 	contemplation 	for 	the previous eight months, 	and which 	it
had 	never 	discussed 	with CSEA. 	A more 	crucial 	difference 	is
that, 	in King City, 	the 	reduction 	in work year 	was 	undertaken
only 	for 	one 	year 	and 	reinstituted 	separately 	for 	a 	second
year, 	unlike 	the work year 	reduction 	in the 	instant case, 	which
purported 	to alter 	the 	work 	year 	for 	time 	immemorial,
establishing 	a 	new 	status 	quo.
Both 	King 	City 	and 	Pasadena 	rose 	in 	a 	substantially
different context. 	In each of 	those cases, 	the courts 	focused
upon 	whether 	the 	employers 	could 	lawfully 	accomplish 	the
personnel actions 	they 	took at 	all, 	in 	light of applicable
Education Code 	procedural 	requirements 	regarding 	return 	and
bumping 	rights, 	selection and 	timing 	of 	layoff, 	etc. 	A court
determination 	that 	a given personnel 	action 	is 	Procedurally
valid 	under 	the Education Code 	is 	not 	dispositive 	of 	the EERA
question 	as 	to 	whether 	such 	action may 	be 	taken 	unilaterally.
The 	reduction 	in work year 	in 	the 	instant 	case must 	be 	examined
17

on 	its own merits, 	in light 	of 	PERB and other 	labor 	law
precedent 	to determine whether 	it 	fits 	into 	the 	rationale 	for
PERB's 	holding 	that 	the 	decision 	to lay 	off 	for 	lack 	of 	funds
or 	lack 	of work may 	be made 	unilaterally or 	whether 	it 	is
governed 	by 	PERB 	decision mandating 	negotiation 	regarding 	the
decision 	to 	alter 	the work year.
PERB's 	prior 	decisions 	on layoff 	have 	dealt with more
classic 	layoff 	circumstances, 	in which 	employees 	selected 	by
Education Code 	criteria 	regarding 	classification, 	seniority,
etc., 	suffer 	total 	separation 	from service 	but 	have 	specific
statutory 	return 	rights. 	Said 	layoffs 	have 	been open-ended.
(In other 	words, 	there 	has 	been no definite 	indication as 	to
when or 	if 	employees laid 	off would 	be called 	back.) 	See, 	for
example, 	Newman-Crows 	Landing 	Unified School District 	(6/30/82)
PERB Decision No. 	223; 	Newark Unified School District 	(6/30/82)
PERB Decision No. 	225; 	and Solano County Community College
District 	(6/30/82) 	PERB Decision No. 	219.
In Newman-Crows Landing, 	supra, 	the Board 	held 	that 	school
employers may 	unilaterally make 	the 	decision 	to 	lay 	employees
off 	but must 	negotiate 	over 	the 	effects 	of 	that 	decision
insofar 	as 	they 	affect matters 	within scope. 	This 	decision was
reaffirmed 	in Newark, 	supra, 	in which we held that 	only 	the
decision 	that 	a 	layoff 	is 	necessary may 	be made 	unilaterally,
and 	that 	a district must 	not 	implement 	a layoff 	in such 	a
manner 	as 	to 	affect matters 	within 	scope 	prior 	to negotiating
18

fully over 	those 	effects. 	Thus, 	the 	right of public 	school
employers 	to 	unilaterally decide 	to 	layoff 	is 	a 	limited
exception 	to 	the principle 	that 	all 	decisions 	affecting 	wages
and 	hours 	must 	be 	negotiated. 	The 	exception 	exists 	because
PERB has 	recognized management's 	prerogative 	to 	determine
unilaterally 	that 	insufficient 	work 	or 	funds 	are 	available 	to
support 	the current level of 	employees. 	This prerogative,
coupled 	with 	the 	Education Code's 	enabling 	provisions 	which
allow 	school 	employers 	to lay 	off 	employees 	for 	lack 	of 	work 	or
lack 	of 	funds, means 	employers may 	unilaterally decide 	to 	lay
employees 	off. 	Contract 	proposals 	which 	seek 	to place
limitations 	on 	the 	employer's 	ability 	to 	initiate 	layoffs 	by
defining 	lack 	of 	funds 	or 	which would 	allow 	the Association 	to
analyze 	a claimed 	financial 	justification, 	are 	non-negotiable.
In accordance 	with 	the 	above holdings, 	school 	employers 	are
free 	to determine 	unilaterally 	that 	layoffs, 	as 	defined 	in 	the
Education Code 	and 	cases 	decided 	thereunder, 	are 	necessary.
With 	respect 	to workdays, 	PERB precedent 	is 	clear.
PERB 	has 	held 	that 	involuntary 	reduction 	in 	hours may 	not
be 	unilaterally 	undertaken. 	In North 	Sacramento School
District 	(12/31/81) 	PERB Decision No. 	193, 	the language of
Education 	Code 	subsection 	45101(g) 	equating 	voluntary 	reduction
of 	hours 	with layoffs did 	not 	apply. 	In 	that case, 	PERB stated
that 	the 	decision 	to 	reduce 	hours 	(absent 	the 	enabling 	language
19

of 	the Education Code) 	may 	not 	be 	undertaken unilaterally. 	In
accord 	is 	Pittsburg 	Unified School 	District 	(3/15/82) 	PERB
Decision No. 	199, 	in which 	the Board 	found 	that 	unilateral
reduction of 	an 	employee's 	hours 	violated 	subsection 	3543.5(c)
of EERA.
PERB has 	addressed 	the 	issue 	of whether 	the 	number 	of
workdays 	in 	the work 	year 	is 	a 	subject 	within 	scope 	in 	two
cases. 	In Palos Verdes 	Peninsula 	Unified School
District/Pleasant Valley School District, 	supra, 	the Board held
that 	the 	beginning 	and 	ending 	date 	of 	certificated 	service 	for
the 	school year, 	vacation 	and 	holiday dates 	for 	certificated
employees, 	and 	extra hour 	assignments 	are 	all matters within
the 	scope 	of 	representation. 	In San Jose Community College
District, 	supra, 	PERB reaffirmed 	the mandatory 	negotiability of
school 	calendar 	insofar 	as 	it 	affected 	the 	number 	of 	workdays
in 	the 	school year. 	Neither 	of 	those 	cases 	involved 	an attempt
by 	a District 	to 	reduce 	its 	ultimate 	labor 	cost 	by 	reduction of
the 	number 	of paid days worked 	by 	employees. 	Each 	stands 	for
the proposition 	that 	the 	decision 	as 	to 	the 	number 	of workdays
in 	the 	year 	is 	within scope 	because 	it 	affects 	wages 	and 	hours
of 	employees.
In 	this 	case 	the 	District 	altered 	the 	status quo 	as 	to 	the
number 	of 	work 	days 	for 	the 	1977-78 	year 	and 	all 	subsequent
years. 	In deciding 	to 	alter 	the 	status quo 	regarding 	work
year, 	the District 	ventured 	beyond 	the 	realm of 	the 	current
perceived 	funding 	crisis 	and 	unilaterally 	adopted 	a 	new 	policy
20

for 	all 	time 	regarding 	a matter 	(work 	year) 	which has 	been
explicitly 	found 	to 	be within 	the 	scope 	of 	representation.
Because 	the District's 	action purported 	to 	establish 	a 	new
status quo as 	to work year 	for 	all 	time, 	we 	find 	that 	it
amounted 	to 	a 	unilateral 	change 	regarding 	a 	matter 	within
scope, 	as opposed 	to a layoff.
Unilateral Change 	in Work Year 	During 	the 	Pendency of 	a
Question 	Concerning 	Representation
We 	have 	concluded 	that 	the 	change 	in work 	year 	was 	a
unilateral change 	in a matter 	within 	scope. 	The 	District
argues 	that, 	even 	if 	its 	action herein affected 	a matter 	within
scope, 	it was 	free 	to undertake such 	a unilateral change 	under
the 	factual 	circumstances 	presented 	herein.
The 	factual 	context 	in which 	the 	unilateral 	change 	took
place may 	be 	summarized 	as 	follows: 	prior 	to 	the 	filing 	of 	the
decertification petitions 	at 	the 	end 	of March of 	1978, 	CSEA was
the 	voluntarily 	recognized 	exclusive 	representative 	of 	the
classified 	employees 	in an 	aides 	unit 	and 	in the
operations/support 	unit 	at 	issue 	here. 	CSEA and 	the 	District
entered 	into 	a 	collective 	bargaining 	agreement 	covering 	both
units, which expired on June 30, 	1978. 	The unilateral change
in work year, 	though 	announced while 	the 	contract was 	in
effect, 	was made 	effective 	following 	the 	expiration of 	that
contract. 	The 	District's good 	faith 	doubt as 	to CSEA's
majority 	status 	arose 	in late March 	of 	1978 	and 	continued 	until
21

October 	of 	1978, 	at which 	time PERB dismissed 	the
decertification petitions 	and 	the 	District 	and 	CSEA resumed
negotiations 	for 	a 	new 	contract 	for 	the 	operations/support
services 	unit.
Two 	facts 	were 	thus 	operating 	to change 	the CSEA's
representative 	status 	and 	the 	District's 	obligations 	between
March 	and October 	of 	1978. 	First, 	a question concerning
representation 	(QCR) 	was 	pending. 	This 	had 	the 	effect of
invoking 	a 	requirement 	of 	neutrality 	upon 	the 	District. 	The
former 	rule, 	established 	by 	the National Labor 	Relations Board
(NLRB), 	in Shea Chemical Corporation 	(1958) 	121 NLRB 1027 and
extended 	in Telautograph Corporation 	(1972) 	199 NLRB 	892, 	was
that 	the 	pendency 	of 	a QCR raised 	by 	a decertification petition
relieved 	the 	employer 	of 	the 	obligation 	to 	negotiate 	with 	the
incumbent 	and, 	in 	fact, 	constrained 	the 	employer 	from doing
so. 	The 	rationale 	for 	this 	rule was 	that 	the 	employer 	should
refrain 	from 	extending 	any 	support 	to 	either 	competing 	union
while 	a 	real 	question concerning 	representation 	existed.
Midwest Piping 	and Supply Co., 	Inc. 	(1945) 	63 NLRB 1060.6 In
Dresser 	Industries, 	Inc. 	(1982) 	264 NLRB No. 	145 	[111 LRRM
1436] , 	the NLRB overruled Telautograph, 	holding 	that 	the mere
filing of 	a decertification petition, 	without more, 	would 	no
6 PERB 	held 	that 	this 	requirement 	was 	applicable 	to public
school 	employers 	in Sacramento City USD 	(4/30/82) 	PERB Decision
No. 214.
22

longer 	justify 	the 	employer 	in 	its 	refusal 	to 	bargain with 	the
incumbent. 	However, 	the NLRB did 	not 	apply 	this new 	rule of
law 	retroactively. 	Thus, 	no violation was 	committed 	by 	the
respondent 	in that case, 	because 	its 	refusal to bargain was 	in
conformity 	with 	previously 	valid 	NLRB 	precedent.
The 	NLRB 	indicated 	that 	a decertification petition, 	without
more, 	only raises a real QCR; 	it does 	not by 	itself give 	rise
to 	a 	reasonable 	good 	faith 	doubt 	as 	to 	the 	union's 	rebuttably
presumed majority 	status. 	This was 	a 	restatement of 	the 	rule
enunciated 	in RCA del Caribe 	(1982) 	262 NLRB No. 	116 	[110 	LRRM
1369], wherein the NLRB stated 	(at 110 LRRM 1370),
while 	the 	filing 	of 	a valid
(decertification) 	petition may 	raise a doubt
as 	to majority status, 	the 	filing, 	in and of
itself, 	should 	not overcome 	the 	strong
presumption 	in 	favor 	of 	the 	continuing
majority 	status 	of 	the 	incumbent 	and 	should
not 	serve 	to strip it 	of 	the 	advantages 	and
authority 	it 	could 	otherwise 	legitimately
claim.
Regardless 	of 	the change 	in NLRB precedent, 	the District's
reliance 	upon 	the 	then-existent 	Telautograph 	rule 	was
reasonable.7
7AS 	noted 	above, 	CSEA did 	not 	except 	to 	the 	finding 	of
the ALJ 	that 	the District 	had 	a 	good 	faith 	doubt 	as 	to CSEA's
majority 	status, 	and 	that 	it 	therefore 	had 	no obligation 	to
negotiate 	with CSEA and 	did 	not violate 	subsection 	3543.5(c).
That 	finding 	is 	thus 	binding 	upon 	the parties. 	Even 	under
Dresser 	and RCA del Caribe, 	employers 	who have 	a 	good 	faith
doubt 	as 	to majority 	status 	are 	required 	to maintain 	neutrality
and 	refrain 	from 	engaging 	in 	collective 	bargaining.
23

It 	is clear 	that 	the District 	had 	no obligation 	to
negotiate with CSEA, 	due 	to 	the pendency 	of a QCR and due 	to
its 	reasonable 	good 	faith doubt 	as 	to majority 	status.
However, 	such 	good 	faith doubt does 	not 	necessarily 	render 	an
employer 	free 	to make 	unilateral 	changes 	in 	scope matters.
The 	NLRB has 	decided 	several 	cases 	in which 	employers 	faced
with 	a QCR and 	a 	good 	faith 	doubt 	as 	to majority 	status
increased 	benefit 	levels 	or 	wages 	following 	expiration 	of
collective 	bargaining 	agreements. 	In 	such circumstances 	the
NLRB trend 	is 	that 	benefit 	or 	wage 	increases consistent 	with
the 	dynamic 	status 	quo 	are 	not violative 	of 	the 	employer's
obligation 	of 	strict 	neutrality 	or 	otherwise 	unlawful.
In Stoner Rubber Company, 	Inc. 	(1959) 	123 NLRB 1440, 	the
employer 	unilaterally granted 	a 	5.5 	percent 	wage 	increase 	at 	a
time when 	it 	had a 	reasonable 	good 	faith doubt. 	The 	two-member
plurality of 	a divided NLRB held 	that, 	absent proof 	that 	the
union enjoyed majority 	support 	at 	the 	time of 	the 	change, 	the
employer 	was 	free 	to grant 	the wage 	increase. 	The 	third
concurring member 	held 	that 	under 	the circumstances, 	absent 	a
showing 	of 	employer 	bad 	faith, 	the 	employer 	was 	free 	to
" . . . 	take unilateral action of 	the type 	taken here. 	. 	." 	(a
wage 	increase). 	The dissenting members drew an analogy 	to
other 	situations 	in which 	there was 	an 	unresolved 	doubt 	as 	to a
union's 	status, 	such 	as 	the period prior 	to certification but
following 	a claim 	for 	recognition, 	the 	filing 	of 	a
representation petition, 	or 	the 	beginnings of 	an organizational
24

campaign. 	In 	those circumstances, 	the NLRB had ruled 	in many
cases 	that 	unilateral changes were 	violative. 	According 	to 	the
dissent, 	the 	rationale 	for 	said decisions 	and 	the 	basis 	for
their 	applicability 	to 	the 	instant 	case 	is 	that 	" . . . 	the
natural 	effect of 	unilateral 	(wage) 	action was 	to 	undermine 	the
(incumbent) 	union 	. 	. 	." at a time when the union's status 	is
in doubt. 	The dissent 	notes 	that 	such 	unilateral 	action
materially prejudices 	the 	union 	and 	precludes 	a 	fair 	test 	of
its strength.
In NLRB v. 	Minute Maid Corp. 	(5th Cir. 	1960) 	283 P.2d 705
[47 LRRM 2072], 	the Court overruled 	the NLRB's determination
that 	the 	employer's 	refusal 	to discuss 	economic 	issues 	with 	the
union was 	an 	unlawful 	refusal 	to 	bargain. 	The 	employer 	refused
to discuss 	economics with 	the 	union 	because 	its 	citrus 	crop 	had
been 	struck 	by 	severe 	frost 	and 	it 	needed 	time 	to 	evaluate 	its
crop 	losses. 	The 	Court 	found 	that 	these 	dire 	economic
circumstances 	constituted 	a 	defense 	to 	the 	employer's 	refusal
to discuss 	economic matters. 	It 	further 	found 	that 	the
existence 	of 	a 	good 	faith 	doubt 	as 	to majority 	status
constituted 	a defense 	to 	the 	allegation 	that 	the 	unilateral
grant 	of 	bonuses 	violated 	8(a)(1) 	and 	(5).8
8We 	disavow 	the ALJ's 	basis 	for 	distinguishing 	Minute
-Maid, 	supra. 	The ALJ 	found Minute Maid 	distinguishable 	on 	the
ground 	that 	in the 	instant case, 	unlike Minute Maid, 	no dire
economic circumstances 	existed. 	However, 	we 	note 	that 	the dire
economic circumstances 	presented 	in Minute Maid did 	not 	affect
the 	holding 	regarding 	the 	unilateral 	grant 	of 	benefits; 	rather,
it was 	held 	a defense 	to 	the 	refusal 	to 	negotiate 	allegation,
which 	is 	not relevant 	to 	the 	instant 	case.
25

In 	accord 	with 	the 	general 	rule 	that 	unilateral 	wage 	and
benefit 	increases 	may be granted 	where 	the 	employer 	has 	a
reasonable 	good 	faith 	doubt 	of 	majority 	status 	are Union
Carbide 	& Carbon Corp. 	(National Carbon Division) 	(1953) 	105
NLRB 441 	and American Laundry Machinery Co. 	(1954) 	107 NLRB
1574.9 In Union Carbide, 	the 	NLRB 	found 	unilateral 	changes
in wages, 	insurance benefits, 	and pensions to be permissible,
in 	accordance 	with
. 	. 	. 	the Board's settled rule that after
the 	end 	of 	the 	certification year 	an
employer 	may 	with 	impunity 	refuse 	to
continue 	recognition 	of 	a 	certified 	union
where 	there 	exists 	a good 	faith 	doubt 	as 	to
its 	continued majority 	status. 	National
Carbon, supra, at 443.
In Upper 	Mississippi Towing Corp. 	(1979) 	246 NLRB 262 	[102
LRRM 1536] 	(new health plan) 	and The Freeman Co. 	(1971) 	194
NLRB 595 	[79 	LRRM 1019] 	(wage 	increase), 	the NLRB found 	such
unilateral 	increases 	in 	benefits 	and wages 	not 	to violate 	the
bargaining 	obligation where 	a good 	faith doubt, 	but 	not 	a real
QCR, existed.
9Other 	cases 	in which 	the 	NLRB 	ratified 	the 	legality 	of
unilateral 	benefit 	increases 	in 	the 	face 	of 	a QCR are Ellex
Transportation, 	Inc. 	(1975) 	217 NLRB 750 	[89 LRRM 1335]
(implementation 	of 	a 	new 	health plan after 	expiration of 	the
union plan); 	Morse Electro Products 	(1974) 	210 NLRB 1075 	[86
LRRM 1559] 	(unilateral wage 	increase); 	and Vernon Manufacturing
Company 	(1974) 	214 NLRB 282 	[87 	LRRM 1516] 	(unilateral 	increase
in wages and 	insurance benefits).
26

The 	above-described NLRB cases 	establish 	the 	rule 	that 	an
employer 	does 	not 	violate 	its 	obligations when, 	in the pendency
of 	a QCR and a good 	faith doubt 	as 	to majority 	status, 	it
unilaterally maintains 	or 	increases 	the 	level 	of 	benefits 	which
was 	established 	by 	contract 	or 	practice 	during 	its 	relationship
with 	the 	union.
In the 	instant case, 	however, 	the employer 	drastically
altered 	the 	past 	practice 	and 	the 	level 	of 	benefits 	previously
enjoyed 	by 	clerical employees. 	The 	reduction 	in 	their 	work
year 	deprived 	them of 	wages 	and 	hours. 	Such 	employer 	action 	is
not 	equivalent 	to 	the maintenance 	or 	increase 	of 	benefits
undertaken by 	the 	employer 	in 	the 	above cited 	cases.
In Turbodyne Corp. 	(1976) 	226 NLRB 522 	[93 LRRM 1379], 	two
decertification petitions 	were 	filed 	and 	an 	election 	held 	just
prior 	to 	the 	expiration 	of 	the 	employer's 	contract 	with 	an
incumbent 	union. 	The 	incumbent 	union was 	soundly 	defeated 	in
the 	election, 	but 	filed objections 	to 	the conduct of 	the
election and, 	by stipulation of 	the 	two petitioners, 	secured 	a
new 	election. 	In the period 	between elections, 	the contract
expired. 	Upon 	the 	expiration of 	that contract, 	the 	employer
immediately distributed 	to 	all 	employees 	a 	shop manual which
set forth new wages, 	hours, 	and working conditions, 	including a
grievance 	procedure 	which 	did 	away 	with 	the 	right 	of 	union
representation on grievances. 	It 	further 	announced 	its
intention 	to 	cease 	contributing 	to 	the 	incumbent 	union's
pension plan.
27

The 	administrative law 	judge 	in Turbodyne, 	with NLRB
approval, 	acknowledged 	that 	an 	employer 	faced with 	a real QCR
must 	remain 	neutral 	vis-a-vis 	the 	competing 	labor
organizations. 	He 	stated 	that 	the 	essential question posed 	by
the 	case 	was 	" . . . 	what 	constitutes 	'remaining 	neutral'
. 	. 	. where one of the vying 	labor organizations 	is an
incumbent 	union 	whose 	collective 	bargaining 	agreement 	with
Respondent has expired." 	(Turbodyne, 	supra, 	at 524). 	The
administrative 	law 	judge 	held 	that 	whether 	the 	employer 	had 	a
good 	faith 	doubt was 	"essentially 	beside 	the 	point." 	He 	held
that 	the 	legal 	obligation of 	the 	employer 	was 	to 	await
resolution of 	the QCR by 	the NLRB 	(in other 	words, 	to maintain
existing 	benefit 	levels 	until 	the 	NLRB 	resolved 	the 	objection
to 	the 	second 	decertification 	election 	and, 	by means 	of 	a 	new
election 	or 	some 	other 	method, 	ultimately 	certified 	the 	results
of 	the decertification effort). 	He 	found 	that 	the 	new
grievance 	procedure 	and 	the 	cessation 	of 	payments 	to 	the
pension 	funds 	thus 	constituted 	unlawful 	unilateral changes.
Apparently 	because 	they 	constituted 	maintenance 	of 	existing
benefit 	levels, 	he did 	not 	find 	the provisions 	for 	wages 	and
benefits 	in 	the 	shop manual 	to 	constitute 	unlawful 	unilateral
changes.10
10 The 	District 	characterizes 	Turbodyne 	as 	a departure
from 	a 	long-standing 	rule 	permitting 	unilateral 	changes 	once 	an
employer 	has 	a good 	faith doubt 	as 	to a 	union's majority
status. 	The Board 	finds Turbodyne 	to be 	consistent with most
28

Cases 	applying 	the Turbodyne 	rule 	are 	in accord with 	the
holding 	that 	an 	employer 	faced 	with 	an 	unresolved 	QCR may 	not
reduce 	established 	benefit 	levels.
of 	the 	cases 	cited 	by 	the 	District. 	While 	it 	holds 	that
unilateral 	changes 	which 	reduce 	employee 	benefits 	are 	violative
of 	the 	employer's obligation 	of 	neutrality 	if made 	during 	the
pendency of QRC, 	regardless of good faith doubt, 	it 	implicitly
holds 	that 	unilateral 	changes 	which 	essentially maintain
benefit 	levels 	are 	not violative 	of 	the 	obligation.
In Mervyn's 	(1979) 	240 	NLRB 	54,11 the 	employer 	and 	union
had 	a 	collective 	bargaining 	agreement 	which 	expired 	on
March 31, 	1978. 	On March 10, 	1978, 	the union lost a
decertification election, 	the 	results 	of which were 	not
certified due 	to 	the 	union's 	timely objections 	thereto. 	On
April 1, 	1978, 	at a 	time when 	the election objections were
still pending 	and 	thus 	a QCR still 	existed, 	the 	employer
instituted 	its 	own 	health plan 	and 	ceased 	contributions 	to 	the
union health plan. 	The 	administrative 	law 	judge, 	with NLRB
approval, 	found 	that 	the 	unilateral 	change 	in 	benefits was 	a
violation, 	citing 	Turbodyne 	for 	the 	proposition 	that
" . . . 	any 	doubt 	as 	to 	the 	Union's
11 The 	decision 	in Mervyn's may 	be 	factually 	distinguished
from the 	instant case because, 	in Mervyn's, 	the employer was
found 	to 	have 	committed 	numerous 	8(a)(1) 	violations 	and 	its
motive 	for 	instituting 	the 	new 	health plan was 	independently
suspect 	in 	that 	it may 	have 	been 	linked 	to 	the 	decertification
campaign being waged by 	the employer. 	Nonetheless, 	it does
stand 	for 	the proposition 	that, 	in the pendency of a QCR, 	the
existing 	level 	of 	benefits must 	be maintained. 	The NLRB
supplemented 	the 	administrative 	law 	judge's order, 	providing
for 	make-whole 	relief 	if 	it 	could 	be 	shown 	in compliance 	that
any 	employee 	suffered 	a 	loss 	by 	virtue 	of 	the 	change 	in
benefits.
29

majority 	status 	is 	irrelevant, 	and 	the presumption of 	majority
flowing 	from 	the 	recently 	expired 	contract 	continues 	. . . "
until 	the 	board 	officially 	resolves 	the 	QCR.
The 	NLRB 	further 	strengthened 	the 	doctrine 	that 	neutrality
is 	required 	in 	the pendency 	of 	a QCR 	in Dow Chemical Co. 	(1980)
250 NLRB 	748, 	finding 	even 	a wage 	and 	benefit 	increase 	to
violate 	the 	obligation of 	neutrality. 	In accord 	is Grede
Plastics 	(1976) 	24 NLRB 1312, 	wherein a unilateral grant of
benefits 	during 	the 	pendency 	of 	objections 	to a decertification
election was 	found 	to be 	unlawful 	interference 	with 	employee
rights. 	See also Associated Grocers 	(1980) 	253 NLRB 3 1 . 1 2
The 	weight 	of 	NLRB authority persuades 	the Board 	that, 	as
the ALJ 	held, 	the 	District 	herein had 	an obligation 	to 	remain
strictly 	neutral 	vis-a-vis 	the 	competing 	employee
organizations. 	The 	District 	had 	this 	obligation of 	strict
neutrality 	even 	though 	it 	also 	had 	a 	good 	faith 	doubt 	as 	to
CSEA's majority 	status. 	It 	is 	clear 	that 	an employer 	faced
with 	a QCR violates 	its 	obligation of 	neutrality 	when 	it
reduces 	the 	level 	of 	benefits 	and 	working 	conditions
12	l2The	The 	weight 	of 	authority would 	seem 	to 	indicate 	that
employers may 	increase 	or 	maintain 	the 	level 	of 	benefits 	after
contract expiration, 	so long 	as 	there 	is 	no other 	evidence 	of
overt 	favoritism on 	the 	part 	of 	the 	employer 	and 	thus 	the
action 	is 	consistent 	with 	the 	"dynamic 	status quo." 	In any
event, 	we 	need 	not ultimately 	rule 	on 	the 	legality 	of 	an
increase 	in benefits 	here, 	since 	the 	instant case 	clearly
involved 	a decrease.
30
I

established 	pursuant 	to 	its 	relationship 	with 	an 	employee
organization by policy, practice, or contract.
The 	change 	in work 	year 	at 	issue 	herein was 	a 	unilateral
reduction 	in 	benefit 	levels 	undertaken 	in 	the 	pendency 	of 	a
QCR. 	Consistent with 	the 	analysis 	of 	the ALJ, 	we 	find 	that
such 	unilateral 	change 	violated 	the 	District's 	obligation 	of
strict neutrality 	and hence violated 	subsections 	3543.5(a), 	(b)
and 	(d) 	of EERA.
REMEDY
PERB has 	the 	statutory 	authority 	to 	fashion 	appropriate
remedies. 	In this 	regard, 	subsection 3541.5(c) 	provides as
follows:
The 	board 	shall 	have 	the power 	to 	issue 	a
decision 	and 	order 	directing 	an 	offending
party 	to cease 	and 	desist 	from 	the 	unfair
practice 	and 	to 	take 	such 	affirmative
action, 	including 	but 	not 	limited 	to 	the
reinstatement 	of 	employees 	with 	or 	without
back pay, 	as will 	effectuate 	the policies of
this chapter.
As 	noted 	above, 	the ALJ ordered 	the 	District 	to 	restore 	the
12-month work year, 	to make 	employees whole 	for 	any loss 	of
earnings 	they 	suffered 	by 	virtue 	of 	the 	reduction 	in work year,
to post 	an appropriate 	notice, 	and 	to negotiate 	over 	the work
year 	issue 	with 	CSEA upon demand.
While 	not 	specifically 	excepting 	to 	any 	other 	portion 	of
the proposed 	remedy, 	the 	District 	excepts 	to 	the 	requirement
that 	it make 	the 	affected 	employees 	whole 	for 	any 	earnings
31

which may 	have 	been 	lost 	by 	them. 	The 	District 	contends 	that
back 	pay 	is 	not 	generally 	the 	appropriate 	remedy 	for 	an
economically motivated 	unilateral 	change 	unless 	it 	is 	further
proven 	that 	the 	employer 	had 	a discriminatory motive. 	It
further 	contends 	that 	in many 	unilateral 	change 	cases 	back pay
has 	not 	been 	awarded. 	The ALJ ordered 	reinstatement 	of 	hours
lost 	and 	full 	back 	pay 	on 	the 	premise 	that
. 	. 	. 	PERB's usual remedy 	in a case
involving 	the 	unilateral 	change 	of
employment 	terms 	and 	conditions 	is
to 	. . . 	require 	reinstatement 	of 	employment
positions, benefits and back pay. 	. 	. 	.
Beyond 	the 	need 	to protect 	the 	integrity 	of 	the 	election,
the 	circumstances 	of 	this 	case 	warrant 	granting 	the ALJ's
proposed make-whole 	remedy. 	First, 	after 	PERB 	resolved 	the
question concerning 	representation, 	the 	District maintained
that 	a 	10-month work 	year 	was 	the 	status 	quo 	even 	though 	the
reduction 	from 	a 	12-month work year 	was 	unilaterally
implemented 	by 	the 	District 	during 	the 	pendency 	of 	the 	QCR.
Second, 	the 	employer 	maintained 	this 	position 	even 	after 	the
Board dismissed 	the decertification petitions. 	Thus, 	the
District 	failed 	to meet 	its 	negotiating 	obligation 	even 	after
the 	good 	faith doubt 	as 	to CSEA's majority 	status 	was
resolved. 	Third, 	unlike 	some PERB cases 	which have 	employed 	a
Transmarine 	type 	remedy, 	the District's 	action 	in 	reducing
32

hours 	concerned 	a 	subject 	that 	required 	negotiations 	as 	to 	the
decision 	itself. 	Fourth, 	the District's 	"Padilla Report,"
recommending 	clerical work 	year 	reductions, 	had 	been 	received
by 	the District 	in October, 	1977, yet 	the District never
provided 	CSEA with 	notice 	or 	the 	opportunity 	to 	negotiate 	the
report's 	recommendations 	but 	unilaterally 	implemented 	the 	same
only 	after 	the QCR had 	arisen. 	Finally, 	we 	find 	no 	basis 	for
the 	distinction which Member 	Burt makes 	between 	violations 	of
duty 	to negotiate 	and violations 	of 	the 	obligation 	to 	remain
neutral 	and 	refrain 	from 	interfering 	with 	the 	selection 	of 	a
representative 	during 	an 	election.
Thus, 	for 	the 	aforementioned 	reasons 	we 	find 	the ALJ's
proposed 	remedy 	appropriate. 	The 	Board's 	general policy 	is 	to
attempt 	to 	restore 	the 	status quo 	ante 	in cases 	involving
unilateral 	changes. 	Reinstatement 	of 	employment 	positions,
benefits 	and 	back 	pay 	is 	appropriate. 	San Mateo County
Community College District 	(6/8/79) 	PERB Decision No. 	94; 	San
Francisco Community College 	District 	(10/12/79) 	PERB Decision
No. 	105; 	and Davis Unified School District et al. 	(2/22/80)
PERB Decision No. 	116.
ORDER
Based 	upon 	the 	foregoing 	findings 	of 	fact 	and 	conclusions
of 	law and 	the 	entire 	record 	in 	this 	case, 	and pursuant 	to
Government Code 	subsection 	3541.5(c), 	it 	is hereby ORDERED that
33

the 	Pittsburg 	Unified 	School 	District, 	board 	of 	trustees,
superintendent, 	and 	their 	respective 	agents 	shall:
1. 	CEASE AND DESIST FROM:
(a) 	Interfering 	with 	employees 	because 	of 	the
exercise 	of 	their 	right 	to 	freely 	select 	an 	exclusive
representative 	to 	meet 	and 	negotiate 	with 	the 	employer 	by
failing 	to 	maintain 	the 	established 	work 	year 	of 	clerical
employees 	while 	a question 	of 	representation 	is 	pending
involving 	employees 	in 	the 	negotiating 	unit;
(b) 	Denying 	the 	California 	School Employees
Association 	its 	right 	to 	represent 	unit 	members 	free 	from
employer 	interference 	by 	failing 	to 	maintain 	the 	established
work 	year 	of 	clerical 	employees 	while 	a 	question 	of
representation 	is 	pending 	involving 	employees 	in 	the
negotiating 	unit; 	and,
(c) 	Encouraging 	employees 	to 	join 	any 	organization 	in
preference 	to 	another 	by 	failing 	to 	maintain 	the 	established
work 	year 	of 	clerical 	employees 	while 	a 	question 	of
representation 	is 	pending 	involving 	employees 	in 	the
negotiating 	unit.
2. 	TAKE 	THE 	FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE 	ACTION:
(a) 	Reinstate 	the 	12-month 	work 	year 	effective 	the
beginning 	of 	the 	1983-84 	school y e a r , 	and 	make 	whole 	the
affected 	clerical 	employees 	in 	the 	operations 	and 	support 	unit
whose 	work 	year , 	pay 	and 	benefits 	were 	reduced 	from 	their
34

established 	12-month 	work 	year 	for 	any 	and 	all 	losses 	they 	have
suffered;
(b) 	Upon request, 	meet 	and 	negotiate 	with 	the
exclusive 	representative 	regarding 	any 	proposed 	new 	work 	year
reductions 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	representation, 	and 	meet 	and
negotiate 	over 	the 	effects 	of 	any 	such 	new 	proposed 	reductions;
(c) 	Mail 	copies 	of 	the 	attached 	Notice 	to 	the
employees 	affected 	by 	the 	District's 	conduct 	within 	ten 	(10)
calendar 	days 	after 	service 	of 	this 	Decision. 	The 	mailing
should 	inform 	employees 	of 	reinstatement 	and 	reimbursement
procedures; 	and,
(d) 	Within 	five 	(5) 	workdays 	after 	the 	date 	of 	service
of 	this 	Decision, 	prepare 	and 	post 	copies 	of 	the 	Notice 	To
Employees 	attached 	as 	an 	appendix 	hereto, 	signed 	by 	an
authorized 	agent 	of 	the 	employer. 	Such 	posting 	shall 	be
maintained 	for 	at 	least 	thirty 	(30) 	consecutive 	workdays 	at
District's 	headquarters 	office 	and 	at 	all 	locations 	where
notices 	to 	classified 	employees 	are 	customarily posted. 	Such
Notices 	must 	not 	be 	reduced 	in 	size 	and 	reasonable 	steps 	shall
be 	taken 	to 	ensure 	that 	they 	are 	not 	defaced, 	altered 	or
covered 	by 	any 	material;
(e) 	Within 	twenty 	(20) 	calendar 	days 	from service 	of
this 	Decision, 	notify 	the 	San Francisco 	Regional 	Director 	of
the 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board, 	in writing, 	of 	the 	steps
the 	employer 	has 	taken 	to 	comply 	with 	the 	terms 	of 	this 	Order.
35

Continue 	to report 	in writing 	to 	the 	regional director
periodically thereafter 	as directed. 	All 	reports 	to 	the
regional director 	shall 	be 	served 	concurrently 	on 	the 	charging
party 	herein.
3. 	It 	is 	further 	ORDERED 	that 	the 	allegation 	that 	the
Pittsburg 	Unified 	School 	District 	violated 	Government 	Code
subsection 	3543.5(c) 	by 	the 	conduct at 	issue 	in the 	instant
case 	is 	DISMISSED.
4. 	At 	a compliance 	hearing 	in this case, 	the compliance
officer 	shall 	attempt 	to 	accommodate 	any 	reasonable 	proposal
regarding 	the 	method 	of 	payment 	for 	the 	monetary 	award 	ordered
by 	the Board.
Member 	Jaeger 	joined 	in 	this 	Decision.
Member Burt's 	concurrence 	and dissent begins 	on page 	37 .
36

BURT, Member, 	concurring 	and dissenting.
I 	concur 	in 	the 	finding 	that 	by 	unilaterally 	reducing 	the
work year 	the 	District 	failed 	to 	abide 	by 	its 	obligation 	of
strict 	neutrality 	and 	thus 	violated EERA subsections 	3543.5(a),
(b) and (d) .
For 	the 	reasons 	set 	forth 	below, 	I 	disagree 	that 	back 	pay
is 	appropriate 	herein.
Each 	case 	cited 	by 	the ALJ 	for 	the 	general proposition 	that
back 	pay 	is 	appropriate 	involved 	a 	unilateral 	change 	undertaken
at 	a 	time when 	the 	employer 	had 	a negotiating 	obligation. 	See
San Mateo County Community 	College 	District 	(6/8/79) 	PERB
Decision No. 	94; 	San Francisco Community College District
(10/12/79) 	PERB Decision No. 	105; 	and Davis Unified School
District et al. 	(2/22/80) 	PERB Decision No. 	116. 	None of those
cases 	involved 	a 	unilateral 	change 	which violated 	only 	an
employer's obligation of 	neutrality. 	The 	employers 	in those
cases 	had 	no 	defense 	to 	their 	negotiating 	obligation 	such 	as
the 	good 	faith 	doubt as 	to majority 	status present 	in 	the
instant 	case. 	Each violated 	subsection 	3543.5(c) 	by making
unilateral changes. 	Such 	conduct 	has 	been 	held 	to 	be 	an
unlawful 	refusal 	to 	negotiate 	in 	good 	faith 	even 	absent 	proof
that 	the 	employer 	lacked 	a general desire 	to reach 	agreement 	or
was otherwise acting 	in bad faith. 	NLRB v. 	Katz 	(1962) 	369
U.S. 	736b 	[50 LRRM 2177].
37

The 	gravamen 	of 	employer 	misconduct 	in 	the 	instant 	case 	is
far 	different. 	The District 	herein did 	not violate 	a
negotiating 	obligation, 	for 	it 	had 	no 	such 	obligation due 	to
its 	good 	faith 	doubt 	as 	to CSEA's majority 	status. 	It violated
only 	its 	obligation 	of 	neutrality 	in violation 	of 	subsection
3543.5(d), 	thus derivatively violating employees' 	right to
select 	their 	exclusive 	representative, 	and 	CSEA's 	right 	to
preserve 	its majority, 	free of 	employer 	interference.
The 	rationale 	for 	finding 	such 	conduct 	to be 	a violation 	is
that 	it 	tends 	to 	undermine 	the 	representative 	status 	of 	one 	of
the 	competing 	employee 	organizations, 	or 	to 	lend 	employer
support 	to another 	of 	the 	competitors.
Cases 	in which 	such 	violations 	have 	been 	found
characteristically 	arise 	in 	situations 	in which 	the 	incumbent
has 	lost 	a decertification 	election 	and 	alleges 	that 	a 	breach
of 	neutrality 	by 	the 	employer 	resulted 	in 	loss 	of 	employee
support. 	Teledyne, 	Dow, 	supra. 	Establishment of such a
violation does 	not 	require direct 	evidence 	of 	loss 	of 	support.
However, 	in assessing 	the 	seriousness 	of 	the 	violation herein,
it 	is 	appropriate 	to consider 	the 	overwhelming 	majority
retained 	by 	CSEA once 	the 	decertification 	election 	was 	held,
following 	the 	breach 	of 	neutrality.
PERB 	has 	issued 	modified 	remedial orders 	in 	unilateral
change 	cases 	even 	when 	a 	negotiating 	obligation was 	violated.
For 	example, 	in Solano County Community College 	District
38

(6/30/82) 	PERB Decision No. 	219, 	the Board declined to order
reinstatement 	or 	back 	pay 	to 	employees 	whose 	positions 	were
eliminated 	unilaterally. 	Instead, 	it 	imposed 	a 	remedy 	such 	as
the 	one 	devised 	by 	the 	NLRB 	in Transmarine 	Navigation
Corporation 	(1968) 	170 NLRB 	389, 	whereby 	the district was
required 	to 	pay 	back 	pay 	commencing 	five 	days 	from 	issuance 	of
its decision, 	to run until 	1) 	the district 	and 	the employee
organization reached 	agreement; 	2) 	the parties 	reached 	impasse
over 	the 	issue; 	3) 	the 	employee organization waived 	its 	right
to bargain; 	or 	4) 	the employee 	organization 	failed 	to negotiate
in good 	faith. 	Similarly, 	in Delano Union Elementary School
District 	(10/15/82) 	PERB Decision No. 	213a, 	PERB modified 	its
initial 	full 	back 	pay order, 	requiring 	that 	the 	district pay
back 	pay 	only until 	the 	date 	that 	it 	had 	reached 	a new
agreement 	with 	the 	employee 	organization 	over 	working 	hours.
The 	Board 	held 	that 	it 	would 	be punitive 	in 	the 	circumstances
of 	that 	case 	to require 	payment 	for 	hours 	not worked 	or 	to
reinstate 	longer 	working 	hours, 	absent 	evidence 	that 	those
extra 	hours 	were 	required.
Under 	the 	circumstances 	of 	the 	instant 	case, 	I would 	find
that 	it would 	be 	unduly punitive 	to order 	back 	pay. 	I 	note
that 	the 	District's 	culpability 	resulted 	from 	its 	failure 	to
abide by 	its 	obligation of 	strict 	neutrality, 	and 	not 	by a
failure 	to negotiate. 	Further, 	the 	facts 	indicate 	that CSEA
was 	amply 	able 	to combat 	whatever 	impact 	the 	unilateral
39

reduction 	in work 	year 	may 	have 	had 	on 	its 	majority 	status 	and
that, 	aside 	from the work year 	change, 	the District apparently
attempted 	to 	remain 	strictly 	neutral 	vis-a-vis 	the 	competing
employee 	organizations 	during 	the 	pendency 	of 	the 	QCR herein.
I would, 	however, 	retain 	the other 	aspects of 	the ALJ's
proposed 	remedy 	herein, 	including 	restoration of 	the 	12-month
work 	year 	as 	the 	status quo.
40

APPENDIX
NOTICE 	TO 	EMPLOYEES
POSTED 	BY 	ORDER OT 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
An Agency 	of 	the 	State 	of 	California
After 	a hearing 	in Unfair 	Practice 	Case N o . 	SF-CE-235, 	in
which 	all 	parties 	had 	the 	right 	to 	participate, 	it 	has 	been
found 	that 	the 	District 	violated 	Government 	Code 	subsections
3 5 4 3 . 5 ( a ) , 	3543.5(b) 	and 3543.5(d). 	Specifically, 	the District
was 	found 	to 	have 	unlawfully 	reduced 	the 	established 	work 	year
of 	certain clerical 	employees, 	a 	subject 	within 	the 	scope 	of
representation, 	while 	a 	question 	of 	representation 	was 	pending
in 	their 	negotiating 	unit. 	(A charge 	that 	the 	District
violated 	section 	3543.5(c) 	by 	refusing 	to meet 	and 	negotiate
over 	the 	work 	year 	reduction 	was 	dismissed 	because 	the 	District
had 	no 	duty 	to 	negotiate 	while 	a 	question 	concerning
representation 	was 	pending.)
As 	a 	result 	of 	this 	conduct 	we 	have 	been 	ordered 	to 	post
this 	Notice, 	and 	will 	abide 	by 	the 	following. 	We 	will:
1. 	CEASE 	AND 	DESIST 	FROM:
(a) 	Interfering 	with 	employees 	because 	of 	the
exercise 	of 	their 	right 	to 	freely 	select 	an 	exclusive
representative 	to 	meet 	and 	negotiate 	with 	the 	employer 	by
failing 	to 	maintain 	the 	established 	work 	year 	of 	clerical
employees 	while 	a 	question 	of 	representation 	is 	pending
involving 	employees 	in 	the 	negotiating 	unit.
(b) 	Denying 	the 	California 	School 	Employees
Association 	its 	right 	to 	represent 	unit 	members 	free 	from
employer 	interference 	by 	failing 	to 	maintain 	the 	established
work 	year 	of 	clerical 	employees 	while 	a 	question 	of
representation 	is 	pending 	involving 	employees 	in 	the
negotiating 	unit.
(c) 	Encouraging 	employees 	to 	join 	any 	organization 	in
preference 	to 	another 	by 	failing 	to 	maintain 	the 	established
work 	year 	of 	clerical 	employees 	while 	a 	question 	of
representation 	is 	pending 	involving 	employees 	in 	the
negotiating 	unit.
2. 	TAKE 	THE 	FOLLOWING AFFIRMATIVE 	ACTIONS 	DESIGNED TO
EFFECTUATE 	THE 	POLICIES 	OF 	THE 	ACT
(a) 	Reinstate 	the 	12-month 	work 	year 	effective 	the
beginning 	of 	the 	1983-1984 	school 	year, 	and 	make 	whole 	the

affected 	clerical 	employees 	in 	the 	operations 	and 	support 	unit
whose 	work 	year, 	pay 	and 	benefits 	were 	reduced 	from 	their
established 	12-month 	work 	year 	for 	any 	and 	all 	losses 	they 	have
suffered.
(b) 	Upon 	request, 	meet 	and 	negotiate 	with 	the
exclusive 	representative 	regarding 	any 	new proposed 	work 	year
reductions 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	representation, 	and 	meet 	and
negotiate 	over 	the 	effects 	of 	any 	such 	new proposed 	reductions.
(c) 	Mail 	copies 	of 	this 	Notice 	to 	clerical employees
affected 	by 	the District's 	conduct, 	within 	ten 	(10) 	calendar
days of 	service of PERB Decision No. 	318, 	informing 	them of
reinstatement 	and 	reimbursement 	procedures.
Dated: 	PITTSBURG 	UNIFIED 	SCHOOL 	DISTRICT
By Authorized 	Agent
THIS 	IS 	AN 	OFFICIAL 	NOTICE. 	IT 	MUST 	REMAIN 	POSTED 	FOR AT 	LEAST
THIRTY 	(30) 	CALENDAR DAYS 	FROM THE 	DATE 	OF 	POSTING AND MUST 	NOT
BE REDUCED 	IN 	SIZE, 	DEFACED, 	ALTERED OR COVERED BY ANY MATERIAL.