Sacramento City Unified School District (PERB 0100E)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA	
STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA
DECISION
	OF THE
PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL	SERVICE
	EMPLOYEES
	INTERNATIONAL
UNION,
	LOCAL
	22,
Charging
	Party,
and
SACRAMENTO
	CITY UNIFIED
	SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Respondent.
Case No. S-CE-121	Case 	No. 	S-CE-121
PERB
	Decision
	No. 	100
August 	14,
	1979
Appearances: R	
Ap2earances: 	Robert	ert J. Bezemek, Attorney (Van Bourg, Allen,	
J.
	Bezemek,
	Attorney
	(Van
	Bourg,
	Allen,
Weinberg & Roger) for Service Employees International Union,	
Weinberg	
&	
Roger)
	for 	Service
	Employees
	International
	Union,
Local 22; William E. Brown, Attorney (Brown & Conradi) for	
Local
	22r 	William
	E. 	Brown,
	Attorney
	(Brown 	&	
Conradi)
	for
Sacramento City Unified School District.	
Sacramento
	City
	Unified
	School
	District.
ob
Before Gluck, Chairperson; Gonzales and Moore, Members.	
Before 	Gluck,
	Chairperson;
	Gonzales
	and 	Moore,
	Members.
DECISION	DECISION
Service Employees International Union, Local 22 (hereafter	
Service
	Employees
	International
	Union, 	Local
	22
	(hereafter
Local
	22)
	appeals
	from 	a
	Public
	Employment
	Relations
	Board
(hereafter
	PERB
	or
	Board)
	hearing
	officer's
	order 	dismissing
its
	unfair 	practice
	charge
	against
	the 	Sacramento
	Unified
School
	District
	(hereafter
	District).
	For
	the 	reasons
discussed
	below,
	the
	Board
	itself
	reverses
	the 	hearing
	officer
and
	orders 	that 	this
	matter
	be 	remanded
	to 	the 	General 	Counsel
for 	settlement
	or
	hearing.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
DECISION OF THE
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD
UNION, LOCAL 22,
Charging Party,
and
SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL
DISTRICT,
Respondent.
PERB Decision No. 100
August 14, 1979
Local 22) appeals from a Public Employment Relations Board
(hereafter PERB or Board) hearing officer's order dismissing
its unfair practice charge against the Sacramento Unified
School District (hereafter District) . For the reasons
discussed below, the Board itself reverses the hearing officer
and orders that this matter be remanded to the General Counsel
for settlement or hearing.

FACTS	
FACTS
For
	the
	purposes
	of
	this
	appeal,
	the
	facts
	alleged 	in
	Local
22's
	amended
	charge
	are
	deemed
	to
	be
	true.
	(San
	Juan
	Unified
School
	District
	(3/10/77)
	EERB
	Decision
	No.
	12.)
2
S
On May 15, 1978, Local 22 filed an unfair practice charge	
On
	May
	15,
	1978, 	Local
	22
	filed
	an
	unfair
	practice
	charge
alleging 	that
	the
	District
	had
	violated 	section
	3543.S(a)
	of
	the
Educational
	Employment
	Relations
	Act
	(hereafter
	EERA
	or
	Act)l
by refusing to pay personal business necessity leave benefits	
by
	refusing 	to
	pay
	personal 	business
	necessity
	leave
	benefits
to
	employees
	"because 	they
	were
	allegedly
	absent
	from
	work
	in
support 	of
	Local
	22."
	The
	employee
	organization 	also 	alleged
that
	the
	District
	had
	violated 	section
	3543.S(c)	
by
unilaterally
	promulgating
	and
	retroactively
	applying
	emergency
regulations 	affecting
	its
	business
	and
	necessity
	leave
policy. 2	
policy. T	
2	
The
	District
	denied
	that
	its
	conduct
	violated
	the
EERA is codified at Govenment Code section 3540 et seq.	1EERA
	is
	codified
	at
	Govenment 	Code
	section
	3540
	et
	seq.
Section
	3543.S(a)
	provides:
l
It shall be unlawful for a public school	
It
	shall
	be 	unlawful 	for
	a
	public
	school
employer
	to:	employer to:
(a) Impose or threaten to impose reprisals
on employees, to discriminate or threaten to
discriminate against employees, or otherwise
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce
employees because of their exercise of
rights guaranteed by this chapter.
(a) 	Impose
	or
	threaten 	to
	impose
	reprisals
on
	employees,
	to 	discriminate
	or
	threaten 	to
discriminate 	against
	employees,
	or 	otherwise
to
	interfere
	with,
	restrain,
	or 	coerce
employees 	because 	of
	their
	exercise 	of
rights
	guaranteed
	by
	this
	chapter.
2
All section references herein are to the Government Code unless	
All 	section 	references 	herein 	are 	to 	the
	Government 	Code
	unlessotherwise 	noted.
2Section 3543.5(c)	
section 	3543.5(c)makes it unlawful for a public school	
it	
a	
lie
employer to:
to:
alleging that the District had violated section 3543.5 (a) of the
Educational Employment Relations Act (hereafter EERA or Act) 1
to employees "because they were allegedly absent from work in
support of Local 22. " The employee organization also alleged
that the District had violated section 3543.5 (c) by
unilaterally promulgateng and retroactively applying emergency
regulations affecting its business and necessity leave
he District denied that its conduct violated the
Section 3543.5 (a) provides:
For the purposes of this appeal, the facts alleged in Local
22's amended charge are deemed to be true. (San Juan Unified
chool District (3/10/77) EERB Decision No. 12.)
otherwise noted.
2

Act. In essence, the District takes the position that work	Act. 	In 	essence, 	the 	District 	takes 	the 	position 	that 	work
stoppages 	are 	not 	protected 	by 	EERA, 	and 	that 	conduct 	taken 	in
response 	to 	work 	stoppages 	is 	immune 	from 	PERB's 	unfair
practice procedures.	practice 	procedures.
Refuse 	or 	fail 	to 	meet 	and 	negotiate 	in 	good
faith 	with 	an 	exclusive 	representative.
Twice the hearing officer ordered Local 22 to particularize	Twice 	the 	hearing 	officer 	ordered 	Local 	22 	to 	particularize
its 	charge, 	and 	twice 	the 	employee 	organization 	filed
supplementary 	information 	before 	the 	charge 	in 	its 	entirety 	was
dismissed 	(with 	leave 	to 	amend) 	on 	July 	17, 	1978, 	for 	failure
to 	state 	a 	prima 	facie 	case. 	At 	Local 	22's 	request, 	the
hearing 	officer 	construed 	an 	untimely 	filed 	third 	supplement 	to
the 	charge 	as 	an 	amendment 	in 	response 	to 	the 	July 	17
dismissal, 	and, 	incorporating 	the 	first 	dismissal 	by 	reference,
again 	dismissed 	the 	charge 	for 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	cause 	of
action. 	According 	to 	the 	hearing 	officer, 	no 	basis 	for 	a
section 	3543.5(a) 	violation 	was 	stated 	because 	"a 	work 	stoppage
is 	not 	a 	right 	guaranteed 	by 	the 	EERA. 11 	The 	section 	3543.S(c)
charge 	was 	dismissed 	because 	"the 	adoption 	of 	the 	emergency
policies, 	even 	if 	there 	was 	no 	notice 	to 	the 	charging 	party,
did 	not 	cause 	the 	harm 	complained 	of 	.• 	. "II
(Footnote 2 cont. )	(Footnote 	2 	cont.)
Refuse or fail to meet and negotiate in good
W3
stoppages are not protected by EERA, and that conduct taken in
response to work stoppages is immune from PERB's unfair
its charge, and twice the employee organization filed
supplementary information before the charge in its entirety was
dismissed (with leave to amend) on July 17, 1978, for failure
to state a prima facie case. At Local 22's request, the
hearing officer construed an untimely filed third supplement to
the charge as an amendment in response to the July 17
dismissal, and, incorporating the first dismissal by reference,
again dismissed the charge for failure to state a cause of
action. According to the hearing officer, no basis for a
section 3543.5(a) violation was stated because "a work stoppage
is not a right guaranteed by the EERA. " 	The section 3543.5 (c)
charge was dismissed because "the adoption of the emergency
policies, even if there was no notice to the charging party,
did not cause the harm complained of . . II
faith with an exclusive representative.

DISCUSSION	DISCUSSION
The section 3543.5 (a) allegation	The 	section 	3543.S{a) 	allegation
The hearing officer's orders to particularize asked
Section 3543 of the Act provides employees the right to	Section 	3543 	of 	the 	Act 	provides 	employees 	the 	right 	to
"form, 	join, 	and 	participate 	in 	the 	activities 	of 	employee
organizations 	of 	their 	own 	choosing 	for 	the 	purpose 	of
representation 	on 	all 	matters 	of 	employer-employee 	relations."
Section 	3543.S(a) 	forbids 	employers 	from 	engaging 	in 	conduct
that 	impinges 	upon 	or 	penalizes 	employees 	for 	the 	exercise 	of
these 	rights. 	A prima 	facie 	violation 	of 	section 	3543.S(a) 	is
stated 	when 	an 	employee 	organization 	alleges--as 	Local 	22
alleged 	here--that 	a 	District 	has 	taken 	action 	against
employees 	that 	it 	would 	not 	have 	taken 	but 	for 	their 	actual 	or
presumed 	connection 	with 	the 	employee 	organization, 	since
organizational participation 	is 	a 	fundamental 	right 	under 	the
Act. 	(See 	Carlsbad 	Unified 	School 	District 	(1/30/79) 	PERB
Decision 	No. 	89.) 	While 	the 	District's 	answer 	is 	irrelevant 	to
our 	evaluation 	of 	Local 	22's 	charge, 	it 	is 	noteworthy 	that 	the
District 	did 	not 	refute 	the 	facts 	Local 	22 	alleged: 	rather, 	it
admitted 	denying 	support 	services 	employees 	personal 	necessity
leaves 	but 	defended 	this 	action 	because 	it 	was 	taken 	"because
[their] 	participation 	in 	the 	work 	stoppage."
The 	hearing 	officer's 	orders 	to particularize 	asked
Local 	22 	to 	state 	whether 	the 	unit 	members 	who 	were 	denied
r 	necessity 	leave 	were 	in 	fact 	engag 	in 	a 	work
stoppage. 	Local 	22 	responded 	that 	some 	unit 	members 	had
of [their] participation in the work stoppage."
4
Local 22 to state whether the unit members who were denied
personal necessity leave were in fact engaged in a work
stoppage. Local 22 responded that some unit members had
"form, join, and participate in the activities of employee
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of
representation on all matters of employer-employee relations."
Section 3543.5(a) forbids employers from engaging in conduct
that impinges upon or penalizes employees for the exercise of
these rights. A prima facie violation of section 3543.5(a) is
stated when an employee organization alleges--as Local 22
alleged here--that a District has taken action against
employees that it would not have taken but for their actual or
presumed connection with the employee organization, since
organizational participation is a fundamental right under the
Act. (See Carlsbad Unified School District (1/30/79) PERB
Decision No. 89.) While the District's answer is irrelevant to
our evaluation of Local 22's charge, it is noteworthy that the
District did not refute the facts Local 22 alleged; rather, it
admitted denying support services employees personal necessity
leaves but defended this action because it was taken "because

withheld 	their 	services 	because 	they 	were 	frustrated 	"over 	the
Employer's 	continued 	unfair 	practices." 	The 	employee
organization 	went 	on 	to 	disavow 	knowledge 	of 	"the 	motivation 	of
each 	and 	every 	employee 	who 	was 	denied 	personal 	business 	leave
because 	of 	absence 	from 	work 	on 	April 	26, 	1978."
withheld their services because they were frustrated "over the
o
The 	hearing 	officer 	erred 	in 	concluding 	without 	an
evidentiary 	hearing 	that 	every 	employee 	who 	was 	absent 	from
work 	on 	April 	26 	was 	absent 	because 	of 	participation 	in 	a 	work
stoppage.
The hearing officer erred in concluding without an
The 	hearing 	officer's 	order 	issued 	before 	the 	California
Supreme 	Court 	decided 	San 	Diego 	Teachers 	Assn. 	v. 	Superior
Court 	(1979) 	24 	C.3d 	1. 	That 	case 	did 	not 	decide 	that 	public
school 	employee 	work 	stoppages 	are 	illegal 	as 	a 	matter 	of 	law.
Rather, 	the 	Court 	apparently 	adopted 	the 	argument 	that 	the
utlaw school	Legislature 	intended 	section 	3549
The hearing officer's order issued before the California
3 	not 	to 	outlaw 	school
33section 	3549 	provides:	Section 3549 provides:
The enactment of this chapter shall not be	The 	enactment 	of 	this 	chapter 	shall 	not 	be
construed 	as 	making 	the 	provisions 	of
section 	923 	of 	the 	Labor 	Code 	applicable 	to
public 	school 	employees 	and 	shall 	not 	be
construed 	as 	prohibiting 	to 	all 	matters
specifi 	in 	section 	3543.2.
Nothing in this section shall cause any	Nothing 	in 	this 	section 	shall 	cause
court or the board to hold invalid any	court 	or 	the 	board 	to 	hold 	invalid 	any
exclusive representative entered into in	exclusive 	representative 	entered 	into 	in
accordance with the provisions of this	accordance 	wlth 	the 	provisions 	of 	this
chapter.	chapter.
55
Employer's continued unfair practices." The employee
organization went on to disavow knowledge of "the motivation of
each and every employee who was denied personal business leave
because of absence from work on April 26, 1978."
evidentiary hearing that every employee who was absent from
work on April 26 was absent because of participation in a work
stoppage .
Supreme Court decided San Diego Teachers Assn. v. Superior
Court (1979) 24 C. 3d 1. 	That case did not decide that public
school employee work stoppages are illegal as a matter of law.
Rather, the Court apparently adopted the argument that the
Legislature intended section 35493 not to
construed as making the provisions of
section 923 of the Labor Code applicable to
public school employees and shall not be
construed as prohibiting to all matters
specified in section 3543.2.

employee 	strikes, 	but 	to 	exempt 	them 	from 	the 	protection 	Labor
Code 	section 	923 ff
employee strikes, but to exempt them from the protection Labor
Code section 9234 a ords work stoppages in the private	4 	affords 	work 	stoppages 	in 	the 	private
sector. 	This 	Board 	has 	not 	yet 	considered 	the 	status 	of 	work
stoppages 	under 	EERA, 	and 	the 	recent 	Supreme Court 	decision 	in
San 	Diego, 	supra, 	injects 	new 	considerations 	into 	this 	issue.
sector . 	This Board has not yet considered the status of work
For 	these 	reasons, 	we 	reverse 	the 	hearing 	officer's
dismissal 	of 	Local 	22's 	section 	3543.S(a) 	charge.
The 	section 	3543.S(c) 	violation
For these reasons, we reverse the hearing officer's
Local 22 was certified as the exclusive representative of	Local 	22 	was 	certified 	as 	the 	exclusive 	representative 	of
District 	operations-support 	services 	personnel 	on
4	4Labor 	Code 	section 	923 	provides:	Labor Code section 923 provides:
In 	the 	interpretation 	and 	application 	of
this 	chapter, 	the 	public 	policy 	of 	this
State 	is 	declared 	as 	follows: 	Negotiation
of 	terms 	and 	conditions 	of 	labor 	should
result 	from 	voluntary 	agreement 	between
employer 	and 	employees. 	Governmental
authority 	has 	permitted 	and 	encouraged
employers 	to 	organize 	in 	the 	corporate 	and
other 	forms 	of 	capital 	control. 	In 	dealing
with 	such 	employers, 	the 	individual
unorganized 	worker 	is 	helpless 	to 	exercise
actual 	liberty 	of 	contract 	and 	to 	protect
his 	freedom 	of 	labor, 	and 	thereby 	to 	obtain
acceptable 	terms 	and 	conditions 	of
employment. 	Therefore 	it 	is 	necessary 	that
the 	individual 	workman 	have 	full 	freedom 	of
association, 	self-organization, 	and
designation 	of 	representatives 	of 	his 	own
choosing, 	to 	negotiate 	the 	terms 	and
conditions 	of 	his 	employment, 	and 	that 	he
shall 	be 	free 	from 	the 	interference,
restraint, 	or 	coercion 	employers
labor, 	or 	their 	agents, 	in 	the 	ignation
resentatives 	or 	in
self-organization 	or 	in 	other 	concerted
66
In the interpretation and application of
stoppages under EERA, and the recent Supreme Court decision in
San Diego, supra, injects new considerations into this issue.
dismissal of Local 22's section 3543.5 (a) charge.
The section 3543.5 (c) violation
District operations-support services personnel on
this chapter, the public policy of this
State is declared as follows: Negotiation
of terms and conditions of labor should
result from voluntary agreement between
employer and employees. Governmental
authority has permitted and encouraged
employers to organize in the corporate and
other forms of capital control. In dealing
with such employers, the individual
unorganized worker is helpless to exercise
actual liberty of contract and to protect
his freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain
acceptable terms and conditions of
employment. Therefore it is necessary that
the individual workman have full freedom of
association, self-organization, and
designation of representatives of his own
choosing, to negotiate the terms and
conditions of his employment, and that he
shall be free from the interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers of
labor, or their agents, in the designation
of such representatives or in
self-organization or in other concerted

November 18, 1977.5 	ccordingly, it has the right to meet	November
	18,
	1977.5A
Accordingly,
	it
	has
	the
	right
	to
	meet
and
	negotiate
	with
	the
	District
	over
	matters 	within 	the
	scope
of
	representation
	(sec.
	3543.l(a)),
	and
	it
	is
	unlawful
	for 	the
District
	to
	fail
	to
	do
	so.
	(Sec.
	3543.S(c)
.)
	The
	scope
	of
representation
	specifically
	includes 	leave
	policies
	as
	a
	term
and
	condition 	of
	employment.
	(Sec.
	3543.2.)
activities
	for 	the 	purpose 	of
	collective
bargaining 	or
	other
	mutual
	aid
	or
	protection.
and negotiate with the District over matters within the scope
The
	hearing
	officer
	found
	that
	no
	prima
	facie 	violation
	of
section
	3543.S(c)
	was
	stated
	because
	the
	District's
	failure
	to
meet
	and
	negotiate
	with 	Local
	22
	did
	not 	cause 	the
	injury
complained
	of.
	Yet
	the
	failure
	and
	refusal
	to
	meet
	and
negotiate
	is
	itself
	the
	evil
	the
	statute
	seeks
	to 	prevent. 	A
refusal
	to
	meet
	and
	negotiate
	charge
	may
	be
	based
	upon 	an
employer's
	unilateral
	change
	of
	wages,
	hours, 	or
	other
	terms
and
	conditions 	of
	employment.
	(San Mateo County
	Community
College
	District
	(6/8/79)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	94;
	Pajaro Valley
(Footnote 4 cont. )	
(Footnote
	4
	cont.)
The hearing officer found that no prima facie violation of
activities for the purpose of collective
5An
	administrative 	tribunal
	may
	take
	official
	notice 	of
information 	in
	its
	own
	files.
	See
	California Administrative
Agency
	Practice
	(1970)
	at
	p. 	167,
	citing
	Broyles
	v.
	Mahon
(1925) 	72
	Cal.App. 	484,
	491 	[237
	p.
	763] 	and 	Anderson 	v. 	Board
of
	Dental 	Examiners
	(1915) 	27
	Cal.App. 	336,
	338 	(149
	p. 	1006].Also
	see
	NLRB
	v.
	Seven-Up
	Bottling
	Co. (1953) 	344
	U.S. 	344, 	348.
77
of representation (sec. 3543.1(a) ), and it is unlawful for the
District to fail to do so. (Sec. 3543.5 (c) .) The scope of
representation specifically includes leave policies as a term
and condition of employment. (Sec. 3543.2.)
section 3543.5(c) was stated because the District's failure to
meet and negotiate with Local 22 did not cause the injury
complained of. Yet the failure and refusal to meet and
negotiate is itself the evil the statute seeks to prevent. 	A
refusal to meet and negotiate charge may be based upon an
employer's unilateral change of wages, hours, or other terms
and conditions of employment. 	(San Mateo County Community
College District (6/8/79) PERB Decision No. 94; Pajaro Valley
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
5An administrative tribunal may take official notice of	An administrative tribunal may take official notice of
information in its own files. See California Administrative
Agency Practice (1970) at p. 167, citing Broyles v. Mahon
(1925) 72 Cal . App. 484, 491 [237 p. 763] and Anderson v. Board
of Dental Examiners (1915) 27 Cal. App. 336, 338 [149 p. 1006].
Also see NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. (1953) 344 U.S. 344, 348.

emergency regulations.
reversed.
Unified
	School
	District
	{5/22/78)
	PERB
	Decision
	No.
	51.
	And
see
	N.L.R.B. 	v.
	Katz
	(1962) 	369
	U.S.
	736 	[8
	L.Ed.2d 	230,
82
	s.
	Ct.
	1107,
	50
	LRRM
	2177}.) 	Local
	22
	charges
	and
	the
District
	admits
	that
	it
	unilaterally
	adopted
	and
	implemented
emergency
	regulations.
	Since
	a
	prima
	facie
	case
	is 	stated,
	the
hearing
	officer's
	dismissal 	of 	the
	section
	3543.S(c)
	charge
	is
reversed.
ORDER	
ORDER
Unified School District (5/22/78) PERB Decision No. 51. And
The
	Public
	Employment
	Relation
	Board
	ORDERS
	that
	the
hearing
	officer's
	dismissal 	of
	the
	unfair
	practice
	charge
	in
this
	case
	is
	reversed.
	The
	unfair
	practice
	charge
	is
	remanded
to
	the 	General
	Counsel
	for
	settlement
	or
	hearing.
ber
The Public Employment Relation Board ORDERS that the
Raymond J. Gonzales, Member, dissenting in part:
By Barbara D. Moore, MemBy: D. 	Moore, 	Member 	Har
rf"ffiuck, 	Chairperson
Raymond
	J.
	Gonzales,
	Member,
	dissenting
	in
	part:
I
	concur
	in 	the
	majority's
	decision 	to 	reverse 	the 	hearing
officer's
	dismissal 	of 	the
	section
	3543.S(c) 	charge
	and
	in 	the
discussion 	supporting
	it.
	I
	dissent
	from
	the 	decision 	to
reverse 	the 	dismissal 	of
	Local
	22 1 s
	charge
	that
	the
	District
violated 	section
	3543.3(a)
	by
	its
	refusal 	to 	grant 	personal
necessity 	leave 	to
	employees
	who 	were
	"absent
	from 	work
	in
support 	of
	Local 	22." 	Local
	22 1 s
	allegations
	simply 	do
	not
state
	a 	prima 	facie 	violation 	of 	section 	3543.S(a).
.
8
see N.L. R.B. v. Katz (1962) 369 U.S. 736 [8 L. Ed. 2d 230,
82 S. Ct. 1107, 50 LRRM 2177].) Local 22 charges and the
District admits that it unilaterally adopted and implemented
Since a prima facie case is stated, the
hearing officer's dismissal of the section 3543.5(c) charge is
hearing officer's dismissal of the unfair practice charge in
this case is reversed. The unfair practice charge is remanded
to the General Counsel for settlement or hearing.
Harry Gluck, Chairperson
I concur in the majority's decision to reverse the hearing
~~arDara
officer's dismissal of the section 3543.5 (c) charge and in the
discussion supporting it. I dissent from the decision to
reverse the dismissal of Local 22's charge that the District
violated section 3543.3(a) by its refusal to grant personal
necessity leave to employees who were "absent from work in
support of Local 22." Local 22's allegations simply do not
state a prima facie violation of section 3543.5(a) .

For 	a 	violation 	of 	section 	3543.S(a) 	to 	exist, 	the
employer's 	conduct 	must 	at 	a 	minimum 	tend 	to 	or 	actually 	result
1
For a violation of section 3543.5 (a) to exist, the
in 	some 	harm 	to 	employee 	rights 	granted 	under 	the 	EERA.
Therefore, 	in 	order 	to 	find 	that 	Local 	22 	has 	stated 	a 	prima
facie 	case, 	we 	must 	find 	that 	the 	alleged 	employer 	conduct, 	if
deemed 	true, 	would 	tend 	to 	or 	actually 	harm 	employee 	rights.
Local 	22 	has 	alleged 	the 	following 	in 	its 	unfair 	practice
charge 	and 	three 	particularizations 	of 	that 	charge.
in some harm to employee rights granted under the EERA.
1. 	Employees 	in 	the 	negotiating 	unit 	"withheld 	their
services 	on 	April 	26, 	1978." 	(Third 	Supplement 	to 	the
Charge. )	Charge.)
1.
2. 	These 	employees 	were 	denied 	personal 	necessity 	leave
for 	that 	day 	by 	the 	District. 	(Original 	Unfair 	Practice
Charge, 	p. 	2.)
3. 	Each 	of 	the 	employees 	who 	was 	absent 	from 	work 	on
April 	26, 	1978, 	would 	have 	qualified 	for 	personal 	necessity
leave. 	(Third 	Supplement 	to 	Charge, 	p. 	2.)
4. 	Some 	employees 	were 	absent 	from 	work 	because 	they 	were
disturbed 	about 	the 	employer's 	continued 	unfair 	labor
practices 	towards 	the 	employees, 	but 	Local 	22 	does 	not 	know
the 	motivat 	of 	every 	employee 	who 	was 	absent 	andnotd 	not
3.
2.
Carlsbad Unified School District (1/30/79) PERB1carlsbad 	Unified 	School 	District 	(1/30/79) 	PERB
Decision 	No. 	89, 	majority 	opinion 	at 	p. 	10, 	concurring 	opinion
at 	p. 	21. 	As 	I 	argued 	in 	my 	concurring 	op 	ion 	that 	case, 	I
would 	also 	consider 	intent 	to 	be 	an 	essential 	element 	of 	a
violation 	of 	section 	3543.5(a). 	But 	even 	under 	the 	majority's
test 	in 	Carlsbad, 	Local 	22 	has 	not 	stated 	a 	prima 	facie 	case.
99
employer's conduct must at a minimum tend to or actually result
Therefore, in order to find that Local 22 has stated a prima
facie case, we must find that the alleged employer conduct, if
deemed true, would tend to or actually harm employee rights.
Local 22 has alleged the following in its unfair practice
charge and three particularizations of that charge.
Employees in the negotiating unit "withheld their
services on April 26, 1978. " (Third Supplement to the
These employees were denied personal necessity leave
for that day by the District. (Original Unfair Practice
Charge , p. 2.)
Each of the employees who was absent from work on
April 26, 1978, would have qualified for personal necessity
leave. (Third Supplement to Charge, p. 2.)
4. Some employees were absent from work because they were
disturbed about the employer's continued unfair labor
practices towards the employees, but Local 22 does not know
the motivation of every employee who was absent and did
Decision No. 89, majority opinion at p. 10, concurring opinion
at p. 21. As I argued in my concurring opinion in that case, I
would also consider intent to be an essential element of a
violation of section 3543.5 (a) . But even under the majority's
test in Carlsbad, Local 22 has not stated a prima facie case.

receive personal necessity leave. (Third Supplement to	receive 	personal 	necessity 	leave. 	(Third 	Supplement 	to
Charge, p. 2.)	Charge, 	p. 	2.)
5.	5. 	The 	District's 	regulations 	governing 	personal 	necessity
leave, 	in 	effect 	on 	April 	26, 	1978, 	provide 	that 	personal
necessity 	leave 	may 	be 	used 	for 	six 	specified 	activities,
and 	that 	such 	leave 	"may 	not 	be 	used 	for 	any 	of 	the
following : .	following: 	... 	engaging 	in 	a 	strike, 	demonstration,
picketing, 	lobbying, 	rally, 	march, 	campaign 	meeting, 	or 	any
other 	activities 	related 	to 	work 	stoppage 	or 	political
campaigning." 	(Supplement 	and 	Particularization 	to 	the
Charge, Exhibit "B, " p. 3.)	Charge, 	Exhibit 	"B," 	p. 	3.}
6.	6. 	The 	employees 	were 	denied 	personal 	necessity 	leave
"because 	they 	were 	allegedly 	absent 	from 	work 	in 	support 	of
Local 	22." 	(Original 	Unfair 	Practice 	Charge, 	p. 	2.)
I 	fail 	to 	see 	how 	the 	alleged 	District 	conduct 	has 	harmed
any 	employee 	rights. 	Under 	section 	3543, 	public 	school
employees 	have 	the 	right 	to 	form, 	join, 	and 	participate 	in 	the
activities 	of 	employee 	organizations. 	They 	do 	not 	have 	a
protected 	right 	to 	engage 	in 	work 	stoppages. 	Conspicuously
absent 	from 	section 	3543 	is 	any 	mention 	of 	a 	right 	to 	engage 	in
Conspicuously
2	2
I fail to see how the alleged District conduct has harmed
concerted 	activ 	ies; 	this 	absence 	is 	underscored 	by
2
concerted activities;
The 	term 	"concerted 	activities" 	is 	commonly 	used 	by
courts 	and 	legis 	tive 	bodies 	to 	refer 	to 	strikes. 	Los 	Angeles
Met. 	Transit 	Authority 	v. 	Brotherhood 	of 	Railroad 	Trainmen
(1960) 	54 	Cal.2d 	684, 	689. 	In 	that 	case, 	the 	Court 	found 	that
in 	the 	absence 	of 	legislative 	authorization 	public 	employees 	do
"The term "concerted activities" is commonly used by
courts and legislative bodies to refer to strikes. Los Angeles
10	10
The District's regulations governing personal necessity
leave, in effect on April 26, 1978, provide that personal
necessity leave may be used for six specified activities,
and that such leave "may not be used for any of the
engaging in a strike, demonstration,
picketing, lobbying, rally, march, campaign meeting, or any
other activities related to work stoppage or political
campaigning. " (Supplement and Particularization to the
The employees were denied personal necessity leave
"because they were allegedly absent from work in support of
Local 22. " (Original Unfair Practice Charge, p. 2.)
any employee rights. Under section 3543, public school
employees have the right to form, join, and participate in the
activities of employee organizations. They do not have a
protected right to engage in work stoppages.
absent from section 3543 is any mention of a right to engage in
this absence is underscored by
Met. Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
(1960) 54 cal. 2d 684, 689. In that case, the Court found that
in the absence of legislative authorization public employees do

section 3549, which states that the provisions of Labor Code	
section
	3549,
	which
	states
	that
	the
	provisions
	of
	Labor
	Code
section
	923
3
are
	not
	applicable 	to
	public
	school
employees.
	Read
	together,
	these
	two
	sections
	clearly
	reflect
the
	Legislature's
	intention 	that
	strikes
	not
	be
	protected
	by
the
	EERA.
	As
	the
	California
	Supreme
	Court
	stated 	in
	San
	Diego
Teachers
	Assn. 	v.
	Superior
	Court
	(1979)
	24
	Cal.3d
	1, 	section
3549
	"excludes 	the
	applicability
	of
	Labor
	Code
	section 	923's
protection
	of 	concerted
	activities."
	Thus,
	while
	work
stoppages	
by	
public
	school
	employees
	may
	not
	be
	illegal,
	a
question
	left
	open
	in
	San
	Diego,
	they 	are
	clearly
	not
	protected
activities,
	and
	employees
	have
	no
	statutorily
	guaranteed
	right
to engage in them.	
to
	engage
	in
	them.
not
	have
	the
	right 	to
	strike.
	The
	statute
	involved 	in 	thatcase,
	however, 	gave
	transit
	employees
	the 	right 	to
	"engage
	inother 	concerted
	activities
	for 	the 	purpose 	of 	mutual 	aid 	or
protection."
	The
	Court 	thus
	found
	Ehai
	the 	Legislature
	hadg
	the 	loyees 	in 	question 	the 	right 	to 	strike.
section 923
It
	is 	clear,
	then,
	that
	the
	District's
	refusal
	to 	grant
personal 	necessity
	leave
	to
	employees
	who
	were 	engaged
	in
	a
work
	stoppage
	was
	not 	connected 	with
	"their
	exercise 	of
	rights
guaranteed
	by
	[
the
	EERA]
•
	(Sec.
	3
543.
5 (
a)
• ) 	The
	employees'
conduct 	involved
	no
	protected
	right,
	so 	the
	District's
	conduct,
which
	was
	admittedly
	based
	on
	the
	employees'
	work
	stoppage, 	did
not
	interfere
	with
	employees
	because 	of
	their
	exercise 	of
	a
protected right.	
protected 	right.
It is clear, then, that the District's refusal to grant
not have the right to strike. The statute involved in that
3Labor 	Code
	tion
	923
	is
	quoted 	in
	full 	at
	note
	4
	of
the majority 	decis 	on.
Labor Code section 923 is quoted in full at note 4 of	3
11	
11
are not applicable to public school
employees. Read together, these two sections clearly reflect
the Legislature's intention that strikes not be protected by
the EERA. As the California Supreme Court stated in San Diego
Teachers Assn. v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 1, section
3549 "excludes the applicability of Labor Code section 923's
protection of concerted activities. " Thus, while work
stoppages by public school employees may not be illegal, a
question left open in San Diego, they are clearly not protected
activities, and employees have no statutorily guaranteed right
personal necessity leave to employees who were engaged in a
work stoppage was not connected with "their exercise of rights
guaranteed by [the EERA] . (Sec. 3543.5 (a) .) The employees'
conduct involved no protected right, so the District's conduct,
which was admittedly based on the employees' work stoppage, did
not interfere with employees because of their exercise of a
case, however, gave transit employees the right to "engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of mutual aid or
protection." The Court thus found that the Legislature had
granted the employees in question the right to strike.
the majority decision.

The
	absurdity of
	Local
	22's
	claim
	becomes
	clear
	when
	one
realizes 	that,
	as
	a
	bottom
	line,
	Local
	22
	is
	demanding
	that
	the
District
	pay 	employees
	for
	engaging
	in
	a
	work
	stoppage. 	II
cannot
	believe
	that
	the
	EERA
	requires
	or
	that
	the
	majority
	of
the
	Board
	should
	accept
	such
	a
	result.
The absurdity of Local 22's claim becomes clear when one
The
	majority
	seems
	to 	find
	it
	significant 	that
	Local
	22
denied
	knowledge
	of 	"the 	motivation 	of
	each
	and
	every
	employee
who
	was
	denied
	personal 	business 	leave
	because
	of
	absence
	from
work 	on
	April
	26,
	1978.
11
	Yet
	Local
	22's 	unfair
	practice
	charge
is
	not 	based
	on
	a
	claim
	that
	employees
	who
	were
	absent 	for
	some
reason
	other
	than
	work
	stoppage
	were
	denied
	personal
	necessity
leave
	because
	of
	their
	purported 	connection
	with
	the
	employee
organization.	
organization.
	If
	the
	charge
	were
	based
	on
	such
	a
	claim,
Local
	22
	should
	have
	alleged 	facts
	in 	support.
	It
	had
	at 	least
two
	opportunities
	to
	do
	so
	in
	response 	to
	PERB
	orders 	to
particularize.
	In 	the
	second
	order 	to
	particularize,
	Local
	22
was
	asked
	to
	state:
	(1)
	whether
	every
	employee
	who
	was
	denied
personal 	necessity 	leave
	was
	in
	fact
	absent
	on
	April
	26, 	1978,
due
	to
	participation
	in
	a
	concerted
	activity;
	(2)
	the
identities
	of
	employees
	who
	were
	absent 	for 	reasons 	other 	than
the
	participation
	in 	the 	concerted
	activity;
	and
	(3)
	the
reasons 	for 	the 	absences. 	Local
	22
	at
	first
	refused 	to
respond,
	and
	later
	denied
	knowledge
	of
	each 	employee's
motivation.
	Such
	responses 	indicate 	to
	me
	that
	Local
	22 1 s
The majority seems to find it significant that Local 22
12	12
realizes that, as a bottom line, Local 22 is demanding that the
District pay employees for engaging in a work stoppage.
cannot believe that the EERA requires or that the majority of
the Board should accept such a result.
denied knowledge of "the motivation of each and every employee
who was denied personal business leave because of absence from
work on April 26, 1978." Yet Local 22's unfair practice charge
is not based on a claim that employees who were absent for some
reason other than work stoppage were denied personal necessity
leave because of their purported connection with the employee
If the charge were based on such a claim,
Local 22 should have alleged facts in support. It had at least
two opportunities to do so in response to PERB orders to
particularize. In the second order to particularize, Local 22
was asked to state: (1) whether every employee who was denied
personal necessity leave was in fact absent on April 26, 1978,
due to participation in a concerted activity; (2) the
identities of employees who were absent for reasons other than
the participation in the concerted activity; and (3) the
reasons for their absences. Local 22 at first refused to
respond, and later denied knowledge of each employee's
motivation. Such responses indicate to me that Local 22's

charge
	is
	not
	based
	on
	any
	alleged
	harm
	to
	the
	EERA
	rights
	of
employees
	who
	did
	not
	participate
	in
	a 	work
	stoppage, 	but
rather
	on
	the
	District's
	denial
	of 	leave 	to
	employees
	who
	did
participate
	in
	a 	work
	stoppage.
	Such 	a
	charge
	simply 	does
	not
state
	a
	prima
	facie
	case; 	the
	District's
	refusal
	to
	pay
employees
	for
	engaging
	in
	a 	work
	stoppage
	harmed 	no
	right
guaranteed
	by
	the
	EERA.
	It
	seems
	that
	the 	majority
	in
	this
decision
	is
	making
	another
	effort
	to
	condone
	work
	stoppages
albeit
	through
	a
	back
	door
	approach.
charge is not based on any alleged harm to the EERA rights of
Raymond J Gonzales, Member'
13
-
13
employees who did not participate in a work stoppage, but
rather on the District's denial of leave to employees who did
participate in a work stoppage. Such a charge simply does not
state a prima facie case; the District's refusal to pay
employees for engaging in a work stoppage harmed no right
guaranteed by the EERA. 	It seems that the majority in this
decision is making another effort to condone work stoppages
albeit through a back door approach.

PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD	PUBLIC
	EMPLOYMENT
	RELATIONS
	BOARD
OF
	THE
	STATE
	OF
	CALIFORNIA
SERVICE
	EMPLOYEES
	INTERNATIONAL 	UNION,
LOCAL
	22/SACRAMENTO ASSOCIATION
	OF
CLASSIFIED
	EDUCATIONAL 	EMPLOYEES,
Charging
	Party,
V.
SACRAMENTO
	CITY UNIFIED
	SCHOOL
	DISTRICT,
Respondent.
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION,
Case
	No.
	S-CE-121
NOTICE
	OF
	DISMISSAL
l'1ITH LEA
VE
	TO AMEND
Case No. S-CE-121
~fotice
	is
	hereby 	given
	that
	the 	above-captioned
	unfair
practice
	charge
	is
	dismissed with 	leave 	to
	amend
	within
twenty 	(20)
	calendar
	days
	after
	service 	of 	this
	Notice.
Notice is hereby given that the above-captioned unfair
DISCUSSION	DISCUSSION
The	
This
	is
	the 	second
	dismissal 	issued 	in
	this
	case.
	The
first
	dismissal 	with 	leave
	to
	amend was
	issued
	on
	July
	17, 	1978.
That
	dismissal
	took
	into 	consideration
	the 	responses
	by
	thecharging
	party 	to
	two
	orders 	to
	particularize.
	On
	July
	18,
1978,
	the
	Sacramento 	Regional 	Office 	received
	a
	"Third 	Supple-
ment
	to 	the 	Charge,"
	which
	ostensibly
	was
	responsive 	to 	the
second
	order 	to
	particularize
	but
	which
	was
	not 	timely
	filed.
By
	a
	letter
	dated
	August 	2, 	1978,
	the 	charging 	party
	has
requested 	that
	the 	Third
	Supplement
	to 	the
	Charge
	be
	considered
an 	amendment
	response 	to 	the
	July
	17
	dismissal.
	It 	is
concluded
	that
	as 	amended
	the 	charge
	still
	fails
	to
	state
	a
prima facie case.	
prima
	facie 	case.
This is the second dismissal issued in this case.
The
	charge 	alleges 	that
	the 	adoption
	by
	the 	respondent
school 	board
	of 	cert
	emergency
	policies
	on
	April
	27, 	1978,
and 	the 	denial 	to 	employees
	of 	rsonal 	business
	and
	necessi
leave 	for 	absences 	on
April
	26, 	1978,
	constituted 	violations
of
	Government 	Code
	sections 	3543.S(a) 	and
	(c). 	It
	was
	alleged
that 	the 	actions
	were 	taken 	because 	the 	respondent 	believed
that 	the 	employees 	had been 	"absent 	from work
	in 	support 	of
Local 22."	
Local 	22." 	The
	original 	dismissal, 	which
	is 	incorporated
herein, 	concluded 	that 	there
	was 	no
	allegation 	of
	a
	subsection
The charge alleges that the adoption by the respondent
-1-
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
_____________________
)
-1-
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
LOCAL 22/ SACRAMENTO ASSOCIATION OF
CLASSIFIED EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYEES,
Charging Party,
V .
SACRAMENTO CITY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT
Respondent.
NOTICE OF DISMISSAL
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
practice charge is dismissed with leave to amend within
twenty (20) calendar days after service of this Notice.
first dismissal with leave to amend was issued on July 17, 1978.
That dismissal took into consideration the responses by the
charging party to two orders to particularize. On July 18,
1978, the Sacramento Regional Office received a "Third Supple-
ment to the Charge, " which ostensibly was responsive to the
second order to particularize but which was not timely filed.
By a letter dated August 2, 1978, the charging party has
requested that the Third Supplement to the Charge be considered
an amendment in response to the July 17 dismissal. It is
concluded that as amended the charge still fails to state a
school board of certain emergency policies on April 27, 1978,
and the denial to employees of personal business and necessity
leave for absences on April 26, 1978, constituted violations
of Government Code sections 3543.5 (a) and (c) . It was alleged
that the actions were taken because the respondent believed
that the employees had been "absent from work in support of
The original dismissal, which is incorporated
herein, concluded that there was no allegation of a subsection

(a) 	violation 	because 	the 	facts 	alleged, 	if 	assumed 	to 	ae 	true,
did 	not 	demonstrate 	interference 	with 	activity 	protected 	by
the 	EERA; 	and 	it 	concluded 	further 	that 	there 	was 	no 	allegation
of 	a 	subsection 	(c) 	violation 	because 	the 	adoption 	of 	the
emergency 	policies, 	even 	if 	there 	was 	no 	notice 	to 	the 	charging
party, 	did 	not 	cause 	the 	harm 	complained 	of, 	i.e. 	the .denial 	of
personal 	business 	and 	necessity 	leave 	for 	the 	April 	26 	absences.
(a)
As 	subsequently 	amended, 	the 	charge 	alleges 	that 	the
employees 	in 	the 	bargaining 	unit 	withheld 	their 	services 	on
April 	26 	because 	of 	their 	frustration 	with 	the 	respondent's
unfair practices.	unfair 	practices. 	Those 	alleged 	unfair 	practices 	were 	the
subject 	of 	a 	previous 	charge 	(case 	number 	S-CE-109) 	in 	which
it 	was 	alleged 	that 	the 	school 	district 	was 	negotiating 	in
bad faith.	bad 	faith. 	That 	charge 	was 	withdrawn 	on May 	12, 	1978.
As subsequently amended, the charge alleges that the
Therefore, the
The 	ZERA 	does 	not 	generally 	authorize 	concerted work
stoppages 	by 	school 	district 	employees. 	Gov. 	Code 	sec 	3549;
and 	see 	Pasadena 	Uni£. 	Sch. 	Dist. 	v. 	Pasadena 	Fed. 	of Teachers
(1977) 	72 	C.A.3d 	100. 	Government 	Code 	section 	3543, 	which 	is
the 	basic 	statement 	of 	employee 	rights 	protected by 	the 	EERA
makes 	no 	mention 	of 	the 	right 	to 	engage 	in 	concerted 	activity.
Compare 	NLRA 	sec. 	7; 	Labor 	Code 	sec. 	923. 	Therefore, 	the
participation by 	employees 	in 	a 	work 	stoppage 	is 	not 	a 	right
guaranteed by 	the 	EERA.
The EERA does not generally authorize concerted work
In 	the 	present 	case, 	the 	harm 	complained 	of 	is 	that
employees 	were 	denied 	leave 	benefits 	on 	an 	occasion when 	they
withheld 	their 	services 	allegedly 	out 	of 	frustration 	with 	what
they 	perceived 	as 	unlawful 	bargaining 	tactics 	by 	the 	employer.
In 	the 	absence 	of 	authorization 	by 	administrative 	regulation,
contract, 	or 	Education 	Code 	provision, 	school 	district 	employees
simply 	are 	not 	entitled 	to 	receive 	leave 	benefits. 	As 	set 	forth
more 	fully 	in 	the 	original 	dismissal, 	neither 	the 	respondent's
normal 	administrative 	regulations 	nor 	the 	emergency 	policies
adopted 	on 	April 	27 	on 	their 	face 	provide 	for 	the 	payment 	of
leave 	benefits 	to 	employees 	engaged 	in 	a 	work 	stoppage. 	The
charging 	party 	alleges 	no 	other 	basis 	upon 	which 	leave 	benefits
could 	be 	authorized. 	The 	denial 	of 	leave 	benefits 	consistent
with 	existing 	school 	board 	regulations 	and 	for 	an 	absence 	from
work 	to 	participate 	in 	activity 	unprotected 	by 	the 	EERA 	does
not 	constitute 	a 	reprisal 	or 	discrimination 	within 	the 	meaning
of 	section 	3543.S(a).
could be authorized.
of section 3543.5(a).
The
In the present case, the harm complained of is that
For 	the 	above 	reasons, 	the 	section 	3543.S(a) 	charge 	is
dismissed.	dismissed.
For the above reasons, the section 3543.5(a) charge is
It 	is 	noted 	that 	the 	denial 	of 	leave 	benefits 	where 	none
are 	authorized 	is 	totally 	distinguishable 	from 	disciplinary
action 	or 	discharge 	for 	participation 	in 	a 	strike 	carried 	out
in 	response 	to 	an 	employer's 	unfair 	practices. 	See 	Rockwell 	v.
-2-	-2-
It is noted that the denial of leave benefits where none
violation because the facts alleged, if assumed to be true,
did not demonstrate interference with activity protected by
the EERA; and it concluded further that there was no allegation
of a subsection (c) violation because the adoption of the
emergency policies, even if there was no notice to the charging
party, did not cause the harm complained of, i. e. the .denial of
personal business and necessity leave for the April 26 absences.
employees in the bargaining unit withheld their services on
April 26 because of their frustration with the respondent's
Those alleged unfair practices were the
subject of a previous charge (case number S-CE-109) in which
it was alleged that the school district was negotiating in
That charge was withdrawn on May 12, 1978.
stoppages by school district employees. Gov. Code sec 3549;
and see Pasadena Unif. Sch. Dist. v. Pasadena Fed. of Teachers
(1977) 72 C. A. 3d 100. Government Code section 3543, which is
the basic statement of employee rights protected by the EERA
makes no mention of the right to engage in concerted activity.
Compare NLRA sec. 7; Labor Code sec. 923.
participation by employees in a work stoppage is not a right
guaranteed by the EERA.
employees were denied leave benefits on an occasion when they
withheld their services allegedly out of frustration with what
they perceived as unlawful bargaining tactics by the employer.
In the absence of authorization by administrative regulation,
contract, or Education Code provision, school district employees
simply are not entitled to receive leave benefits. As set forth
more fully in the original dismissal, neither the respondent's
normal administrative regulations nor the emergency policies
adopted on April 27 on their face provide for the payment of
leave benefits to employees engaged in a work stoppage.
charging party alleges no other basis upon which leave benefits
The denial of leave benefits consistent
with existing school board regulations and for an absence from
work to participate in activity unprotected by the EERA does
not constitute a reprisal or discrimination within the meaning
are authorized is totally distinguishable from disciplinary
action or discharge for participation in a strike carried out
in response to an employer's unfair practices. See Rockwell v.

Crestwood 	School
	District
	Board
of
Education
	(Mich.S.Ct.,
1975)
	227 	N.W.2d 	736, 	89
	LRRM
	2017.
Crestwood School District Board of Education (Mich. S. Ct. ,
Therefore, it
No
	new
	facts
	are
	alleged
which 	would
	alter
	the
	basis 	for
the
	dismissal 	of
	the
	section
	3543.S(c) 	charge.
	Therefore,
	it
is
	dismissed
	on
	the
	groi.mds
	previously
	stated.
The
	action
	is
	taken 	pursuant 	to
	PERB
	Regulation 	32630(a),
formerly
	PERB
	Regulation 	35007(a).
No new facts are alleged which would alter the basis for
If
	the
	charging
	party
	chooses
	to
	amend,
	the
	amended
	charge
must
	be
	filed
	with 	the
	Sacramento
	Regional
	Office
	of
	the
	PERB
within
	twenty
	(20)
	calendar
	days.
	(PERB
	Regulation
	32630(b)
.)
Such 	amendment
	must 	be
	actually
	received
	at
	the
	Sacramento
Regional
	Office 	of
	the
	PERB
	before 	the 	close 	of business
(5:00	
(5:00 	p.m.)
	on
	September 	11,
	1978
	in 	order 	to
	be
	timely
	filed.
(PERB
	Regulation
	32135.)
If the charging party chooses to amend, the amended charge
If
	the 	charging
	party
	chooses
	not 	to
	amend
	the 	charge,
	it
may
	obtain
	review
	of 	the 	dismissal
	by
	filing
	an
	appeal
	to 	the
Board
	itself
within
	twenty
	(20)
	calendar
	days
	after
	service
	of
this
	Notice.
	(PERB
	Regulation
	32630(b)
.)
	Such
	appeal
	must
	be
actually
	received
	by
	the
	Executive
	Assistant 	to 	the
	Board
before 	the 	close 	of
	business
	(5:00 	p.m.)
	on
	September 	11,
	1978
in 	order 	to
	be
	timely
	filed.
	(PE~B
	Regulation
	32135.)
	Such
appeal
	must
	be
	in writing,
	must
	be
	signed
	by
	the 	charging
	partyor
	its
	agent,
	and 	must
	contain
	the
	facts
	and
	arguments 	upon
which
	the
	appeal
	is
	based.
	(PERB
	Regulation
	32530
(b).)
	The
appeal
	must 	be 	accompanied 	by
	proof 	of 	service
	upon
	all
	parties.
(PERB
	Regulations
	32135, 	32142
	and 	32630(b)
.)
The
If the charging party chooses not to amend the charge, it
Dated: 	August 	22, 	1978	Dated: August 22, 1978 
WILLIAM
	P .
	SM
ITH
General
	Coi.mse 1
WILLIAM P. SMITH
By
Franklin 	Silver
Hearing
	Officer
By
- 3-
The action is taken pursuant to PERB Regulation 32630 (a),
-3-
1975) 227 N. W. 2d 736, 89 LRRM 2017.
the dismissal of the section 3543.5 (c) charge.
is dismissed on the grounds previously stated.
must be filed with the Sacramento Regional Office of the PERB
within twenty (20) calendar days. (PERB Regulation 32630 (b).)
Such amendment must be actually received at the Sacramento
Regional Office of the PERB before the close of business
p.m.) on September 11, 1978 in order to be timely filed.
(PERB Regulation 32135.)
may obtain review of the dismissal by filing an appeal to the
Board itself within twenty (20) calendar days after service of
this Notice. (PERB Regulation 32630 (b) .) Such appeal must be
actually received by the Executive Assistant to the Board
before the close of business (5:00 p. m. ) on September 11, 1978
in order to be timely filed. (PERB Regulation 32135.) Such
appeal must be in writing, must be signed by the charging party
or its agent, and must contain the facts and arguments upon
which the appeal is based. (PERB Regulation 32530 (b) .)
appeal must be accompanied by proof of service upon all parties.
(PERB Regulations 32135, 32142 and 32630 (b) .)
·
General Counsel
Franklin Silver
Hearing Officer
formerly PERB Regulation 35007(a) .