Amador Valley Joint Union High School District (PERB 0074E)

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STATE 	OF 	CALIFORNIA
DECISION 	OF 	THE
PUBLIC 	EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
AMADOR VALLEY 	SECONDARY 	EDUCATORS
ASSOCIATION,
Charging 	Party,
APPELLANT,
v.
AMADOR VALLEY 	JOINT 	UNION
HIGH 	SCHOOL 	DISTRICT,
Respondent.
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) 	Case 	No. 	SF-CE-49
PERB 	Decision 	No. 74
October 	2, 	1978
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Appearances; 	Joseph G. 	Schumb, 	Attorney 	(La Croix 	& Schumb)
for 	Amador 	Valley 	Secondary 	Educators 	Association;
Jon A. 	Hudak, 	Attorney 	(Breon, 	Galgani 	& Godino) 	for Amador
Valley 	Joint 	Union 	High 	School 	District.
Before Gluck, 	Chairperson; 	Gonzales 	and Cossack Twohey, 	Members,
DECISION
The 	Amador 	Valley 	Secondary 	Educators 	Association
(hereafter 	Association) 	appeals 	the 	dismissal 	by 	a hearing
officer 	for 	the 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board 	(hereafter
PERB or 	Board) 	of 	its 	unfair 	practice 	charge 	against 	the Amador
Valley Joint 	Union High 	School 	District 	(hereafter 	District).
FACTS
Since 	the 	charge 	was 	dismissed 	without 	a 	hearing 	on 	the
merits, 	the 	facts 	alleged 	therein are 	deemed 	true 	for 	the
purpose 	of 	this 	appeal.1
1San 	Juan 	Unified 	School 	District 	(3/10/77) 	EERB 	Decision
No. 12.

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The Association 	was 	certified 	as 	the 	exclusive
representative 	of 	a 	unit 	of 	certificated 	employees 	in
April 	1976. 	After 	the opening of 	negotiations, 	the District on
July 	19, 	1976, 	unilaterally 	froze certain certificated
employees' 	salaries. 	These 	were 	so-called 	column and 	step
increases, 	based 	on 	acquisition 	of additional 	education 	and
experience, 	bonuses 	for 	the 	attainment of masters 	degrees 	and
longevity pay 	increments. 	The 	Association 	alleges 	that 	this
action 	was 	taken 	to 	decrease 	anticipated 	employee 	income 	and
put 	pressure 	on 	the 	employee 	bargaining 	committee.
On December 	10, 	1976, 	the District, 	through 	the
superintendent, 	wrote 	each 	employee 	in 	the 	unit 	incorrectly
stating 	that 	the 	District 	had 	accepted 	the 	Association's
proposals 	even 	though 	the 	superintendent 	knew 	this 	statement 	to
be 	untrue.
On December 	17, 	1976, 	immediately prior 	to 	the Christmas
vacation 	recess, 	the District 	again wrote 	to each 	employee 	in
the 	unit 	setting 	forth 	what 	purported 	to 	be 	the 	District's
proposals 	to the Association. 	On January 	4, 	1977, 	immediately
upon 	return 	from 	the 	vacation 	period, 	the Association
representatives 	met 	with 	the 	District 	representatives 	and
accepted 	the 	proposals 	as 	set 	forth 	in 	the 	District's
December 	17th 	letter 	to 	the employees. 	Thereupon, 	the District
"reinstated" proposals 	it made on December 	13, 	1976, 	and
"withdrew" 	the 	proposals 	ostensibly presented 	in 	its 	letter 	of
December 	17.

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On January 14, 	1977, 	the Association 	filed 	the 	instant
unfair 	practice 	charge.
Negotiations 	between 	the 	parties 	nevertheless 	continued 	and
on April 	26, 	1977, 	agreement was 	finally 	reached. 	The written
agreement 	included 	the 	following 	two 	pertinent 	provisions:
V. 	SALARIES
C. 	All personnel 	covered 	under 	this
agreement 	are 	to 	be 	placed 	on 	the
appropriate 	current 	salary 	schedule
according 	to provisions 	in effect 	at 	the
time of placement, 	their 	training,
experience 	and 	length 	of 	service.
D. 	Employees 	shall 	be 	paid 	in 	accordance
with 	their 	placement 	on 	the 	District's
salary 	schedule.
XII. 	COMPLETION OF AGREEMENT
A. 	This 	document 	comprises 	the 	entire
AGREEMENT 	between 	the 	District 	and 	the
Association 	on 	the matters 	within 	the 	lawful
scope of 	negotiation. 	District 	shall 	have
no 	further 	obligation 	to meet 	and 	negotiate,
during 	the 	term of 	this Agreement, 	on 	any
subject whether 	or 	not 	said 	subject 	is
covered 	by 	this Agreement, 	even 	though 	such
subject 	was 	not 	known 	nor 	considered 	at 	the
time 	of 	the 	negotiations 	leading 	to 	the
execution 	of 	this Agreement.
At 	some 	time 	after July 19, 	1976, 	the Association 	filed 	an
action 	in 	the 	Superior 	Court 	to 	compel 	payment 	of 	the 	withheld
salary 	increases. 	Following 	a decision 	favorable 	to 	the
Association, 	the 	District made 	retroactive 	restoration of 	the
withheld 	increases.
The 	hearing 	officer 	opened 	the 	unfair 	practice 	hearing 	on
August 	2, 	1977, 	at which 	time 	he 	indicated 	that 	he 	intended 	to
dismiss 	the 	charge 	as 	moot 	and 	would 	take 	evidence 	only on 	that

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specific question. 	Following 	the 	taking 	of 	testimony, 	the
hearing officer 	did dismiss 	the 	charge. 	In essence, 	the
proposed 	decision 	reasoned 	as 	follows:
1. 	In 	reaching 	agreement 	on April 	27, 	the parties 	reached
a 	settlement 	on 	the 	wage 	issue. 	They 	"surpassed 	any
obstacles 	which 	may 	have 	inhibited 	such 	agreement." 	An
unfair 	practice 	charge 	is 	moot, 	the 	recommended 	decision
continues, 	where 	there 	is 	"a clear 	settlement of 	the 	issues
embodied 	in an 	agreement 	reached 	by 	the 	parties." 	For 	that
reason, 	the 	issue of 	the 	withheld 	wages 	was 	deemed moot 	by
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the 	hearing 	officer.
2. 	The 	same 	agreement 	rendered 	the 	District's
communications 	to 	the 	employees 	a moot 	issue 	since 	such
conduct 	"no 	longer 	is 	relevant."
3. 	The Association's 	fear 	that 	the 	District's 	conduct may
be 	repeated 	in 	the 	future 	is 	"too 	speculative" 	a basis 	upon
which 	to grant 	relief.
4. 	In any event, 	PERB could 	accomplish nothing more 	by
order 	than 	the 	parties 	have 	accomplished 	by 	themselves.
DISCUSSION
The 	hearing 	officer 	has 	misunderstood 	the 	nature 	of 	the
allegations 	contained 	in 	the 	unfair 	practice 	charge. 	Both
allegations 	assert 	violations 	of 	the 	Educational 	Employment
hearing 	officer 	reasoned 	that 	the 	absence 	of 	a
reference 	in 	the 	agreement 	to 	the 	retroactive 	pay 	increase 	and
the 	"zipper 	clause" 	constituted 	settlement 	of 	the 	issue 	in
dispute.

Relations Act 	(hereafter 	EERA) 3 in 	that 	the 	District 	engaged
in 	unlawful 	conduct 	during 	collective 	negotiations. 	The 	first
allegation 	claims 	that 	the 	District 	negotiated 	in 	bad 	faith 	by
unilaterally 	withholding 	due 	and 	owing 	salary 	increases 	in
order 	to 	improperly pressure 	the 	employee 	negotiating
committee. 	The 	second 	allegation 	alleges 	misrepresentations 	by
the 	District 	in direct communications 	with 	the 	employees,
impliedly 	to 	discredit 	the 	Association with 	the 	employees 	by
making 	it 	appear 	that 	the 	employee 	committee 	was 	reneging 	on
its proposals 	to the District, 	and, 	by falsifying 	its own
offers 	to 	the 	employees, 	making 	it 	appear 	that 	the 	committee
was 	not 	accepting 	reasonable 	offers.
Mootness. 	A case 	in controversy 	becomes moot 	when 	the
essential 	nature of 	the 	complaint 	is 	lost 	because 	of 	some
superseding 	act or 	acts 	of 	the 	parties.4 Mere 	discontinuance
of 	wrongful 	conduct 	does 	not 	ordinarily 	end 	the 	underlying
controversy. 	There 	must 	be 	evidence 	that 	the 	party acting
wrongfully has 	lost 	its power 	to 	renew 	its 	conduct. 5. 	In
cases 	clarifying 	parties' 	rights 	and 	obligations 	under 	a 	new
law, 	the 	public 	interest 	is 	served 	by 	deciding 	the 	underlying
issue.6 Where 	a public 	employee 	was 	denied 	the 	right 	to 	take
5
3Government 	Code 	section 	3540 	et 	seq.
4 Witkin, 	California Procedure 	(2nd 	ed. 	1972)
pp 	4010 	- 	4428.
5Pittenger 	v. 	Home Savings & Loan Assoc. 	(1958) 	166
Cal.App.2d 	32.
6 United States v. W. 	T. 	Grant Co. 	(1953) 	345 U.S. 	629,

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a civil 	service 	examination, 	filed 	an 	action 	in mandamus, 	was
given 	tentative 	permission 	to 	take 	the 	test 	and 	failed 	that
test, 	a motion 	to dismiss 	the mandamus action was 	denied. 	The
underlying 	legal 	issue 	was 	the 	right of 	the 	employee 	to 	take
the 	examination. 	This 	issue 	was 	not 	mooted 	by 	the 	fact 	that 	he
had 	taken 	and 	failed 	the 	exam.7 	If 	any material 	question
remains 	to be 	answered, 	the 	case 	is 	not moot 	and 	an appeal will
not 	be dismissed.
Whenever 	the 	judgment, 	if 	left 	unreversed,
will preclude 	the party 	against whom 	it 	is
rendered 	as 	to 	a 	fact vital 	to 	his
rights...it 	cannot 	be 	said 	that 	there 	is
left 	before 	the 	appellate 	court 	but a moot
question, 	even 	though 	on 	account of changed
conditions 	the 	relief originally 	sought 	by
appellant 	cannot 	be 	granted...8
The question 	in this case, 	therefore, 	is whether 	the
underlying 	issues 	of 	alleged 	unlawful 	conduct 	survived 	the
retroactive 	increase 	or 	the 	execution of 	the 	negotiated
agreement.
The 	agreement 	as 	a 	settlement. 	The 	negotiated 	agreement
was prospective. 	That 	is 	to say, 	it 	included a 	salary
provision 	to 	be 	effective 	for 	the 	ensuing 	term of 	that 	newly
executed 	agreement. 	Its 	silence 	on 	the question of 	the 	salary
increases 	which 	had 	been 	withheld 	by 	the 	District 	is 	explained
by 	the 	fact 	that 	the 	Association 	had 	already 	recovered 	that
claim 	in 	its 	Superior 	Court 	action. 	As 	the 	hearing 	officer
7 Terry v. 	Civil Service Comm. 	(1952) 	108 Cal.App.2d 861.
8 Hartke v. 	Abbott 	(1930) 	106 Cal.App. 	388.

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himself 	acknowledged 	in 	the 	footnote 	to 	his 	proposed 	dismissal
order:
This 	concession 	by 	the Association 	is 	not
surprising 	in 	light 	of 	the 	previous 	Superior
Court 	Decision 	invalidating 	the 	previous
salary 	freeze.
While 	the 	use 	of 	the 	term 	"concession" 	in 	reference 	to 	the
fact 	that 	no 	retroactive 	salary provision 	existed 	in 	the
agreement 	is 	baffling, 	it 	is 	evident 	that 	there 	was no need 	for
reference 	to 	the 	retroactive 	increases 	in 	the 	agreement 	since
those 	had 	already 	been 	recovered 	pursuant 	to 	court 	order.
Beyond that, 	however, 	the 	salary settlement 	in court, 	based
on 	an 	employment 	contract obligation 	was 	just 	that 	and 	nothing
more. 	It did 	not 	refer 	to or 	impliedly 	settle 	a 	charge 	that
the 	District 	had 	acted 	unlawfully 	by 	taking 	unilateral 	action
on 	a 	negotiable matter. 	The 	monetary effect of 	that 	action was
remedied 	by 	the 	court 	order, 	but 	that 	order 	did 	not 	deal with
the nature 	of 	the 	District's 	conduct 	which 	was 	a matter 	not 	in
issue 	in the 	civil 	suit.
Nor 	does 	the 	"zipper 	clause" 	bar 	the 	processing 	of 	the
unfair 	charge. 	That 	clause merely 	seeks 	to 	define 	the
limitations 	on 	the 	District's 	future 	obligation 	to 	engage 	in
collective 	negotiations 	during 	the 	contract 	term. 	It 	is
totally 	irrelevant, 	therefore, 	to 	the 	issue 	at hand which 	is
the 	behavior 	of 	the District 	in 	the 	course 	of previous
negotiations 	with 	the 	Association.
It 	is 	apparently 	the 	hearing officer's 	view 	that 	the
District's 	communications 	to 	the 	employees, 	which 	could 	have

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inhibited 	negotiations, 	were 	rendered 	irrelevant 	by 	the
ultimate 	reaching 	of 	an 	agreement. 	This 	train of 	thought 	is
difficult 	to 	follow. 	It 	is 	not 	clear 	whether 	the 	rationale 	is
that conduct 	is 	unlawful 	only 	if 	it proves 	to be 	ultimately
successful 	or 	that 	a charging 	party 	is 	required 	to 	forego
continued 	negotiations 	pending 	the 	processing 	of 	an 	unfair
practice 	charge, 	thus 	incidentally 	assuring 	that 	such 	conduct
will 	actually 	inhibit 	negotiations. 	At 	any 	rate 	we 	do 	not 	find
the 	conclusion 	of 	negotiations 	to 	have 	exonerated 	any 	unlawful
conduct 	which 	may 	have 	occurred 	during 	the 	course 	of
negotiations.
Waiver. 	While 	the 	term 	is 	not 	used 	therein, 	the 	proposed
decision 	seems 	to 	indicate 	that 	the Association waived 	its
statutory 	rights 	by 	the 	execution 	of 	the 	collective 	agreement,
even 	though 	that 	agreement 	is 	silent 	on 	the 	issues 	raised 	in
the 	unfair 	charge. 	Waiver 	is 	frequently 	raised 	as 	a defense
against 	a charge 	of 	unilateral 	action.
g
But generally,
waiver 	must 	be 	established 	by 	clear 	and 	unmistakable
language,
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and 	particularly 	where 	waiver 	of 	a 	statutory
right 	is 	asserted.
11
Thus, 	even 	a 	zipper 	clause 	does 	not,
alone, 	constitute 	a clear 	and 	unmistakable waiver 	as 	to a
9 Morris, 	The 	Developing 	Labor 	Law 	(1971) 	p. 	332 	et 	seq.
10 NLRB v. 	Perkins Machine Co. 	(1st Cir. 	1964) 	326 F.2d
488 	[55 	LRRM 	2204].
llTimkin 	Roller Bearing v. 	NLRB 	(6th Cir. 	1963) 	325 	F.2d
746 	[54 	LRRM 2785].

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specific 	item. 12 Surely, 	silence 	does 	not 	constitute 	clear
and 	unmistakable 	waiver.
PERB's 	role 	in 	this proceeding. 	Finally, 	the hearing
officer 	indicates 	that 	PERB 	can 	accomplish 	no more 	than 	the
parties 	have 	accomplished 	for 	themselves. 	What 	the 	parties
have 	not 	accomplished 	is 	clarification of 	their 	mutual 	legal
rights 	and 	obligations 	under 	EERA. 	PERB 	can 	certainly 	do 	that
and 	should. 	If 	violations 	of 	EERA 	are 	eventually proven 	to
have 	occurred 	in 	this 	case, 	the 	Board 	can 	issue 	an 	appropriate
remedial 	order. 	The 	hearing officer's 	view 	that 	the
Association's 	fear 	that 	future 	repetitions 	of 	the 	District's
allegedly 	unlawful 	conduct will 	occur 	is 	"too 	speculative" 	a
basis 	for 	relief, 	may be of 	small 	comfort 	to 	the Association
if, 	indeed, 	its 	rights 	have 	already been 	infringed 	and 	the
District 	is 	neither 	so 	informed 	nor 	given 	appropriate 	direction
by 	this Board 	as 	to 	its 	future conduct.
1 2 New York Mirror 	(1965) 	151 NLRB 834 	[58 	LRRM 1465].

ORDER
On 	the 	foregoing 	decision 	and 	the 	entire 	record 	in 	this
case, 	the 	Public 	Employment 	Relations 	Board ORDERS 	that :
The 	proposed 	order 	dismissing 	the 	unfair 	practice 	charge
filed 	by 	the 	Amador 	Valley 	Educators 	Association 	against 	the
Amador 	Valley Joint 	Union 	High 	School 	District 	is 	reversed .
The 	said 	unfair 	practice 	charge 	is 	re manded 	to 	the 	general
counsel 	for 	a 	hearing 	on 	its 	merits .
B y :/ 	H a r ry Gluck , 	C h a irper so n 	R aymond 	J . 	G o nz a le s 	- Memb.f
•
'ie / ilou Cossack 	Twohey, 	Membef
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_,
STATE 	OF CALIFORNIA
EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT 	RELATIONS 	BOARD
In 	the matter of:
AMADOR VALLEY SECONDARY
EDUCATORS ASSOCIATION,
Charging Party,
vs.
AMADOR VALLEY JOINT UNION
HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Respondent.
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) 	Case No. 	SF-CE-49
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Appearances: 	Joseph G. 	Schumb, 	Attorney 	(La Croix and Schumb)
for Amador Valley Secondary Educators Association; 	Jon A. 	Hudak,
Attorney 	(Breon, 	Galgani 	& Godino) 	for Amador Valley Joint Union
High School 	District.
Before Gerald A. 	Becker, 	Hearing Officer
PROCEDURAL HISTORY 	- 	• 	.
The Amador 	Valley Secondary 	Educators 	Association 	(Association)
filed an 	unfair practice 	charge 	against 	the Amador Valley 	Joint
Union High School District 	(District) 	on January 14, 	1977. 	The
Association alleged in its 	charge 	that during negotiations 	the
District unilaterally 	froze employee 	salaries. 	The Association
further alleged that the 	District negotiated 	in bad 	faith 	"by
direct communications 	to members of the Bargaining Unit."
In its Answer, 	the District 	denied the charges.
A 	formal 	hearing on 	the 	unfair practice charge was 	scheduled
on August 	2, 	1977. 	On motion of the hearing officer 	it was
indicated 	that the charge would be dismissed as 	moot 	in view of
the 	fact that the 	parties 	had entered 	into 	a collective 	negotiations
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agreement. 	Evidence was 	taken solely on the question of the
mootness of the charge.
FINDINGS OF FACT
On April 	26, 	1977 	the parties entered into a collective
negotiations agreement covering matters within the 	scope of
negotiation.
The term of the agreement is 	from April 26, 	1977 	until
June 30, 	1978. 	It contains the following pertinent clauses:
V. 	SALARIES
********
C. 	All personnel 	covered under 	this 	agreement
are 	to be placed on 	the appropriate 	current
salary schedule 	according to provisions 	in
effect at the time of placement, 	their train-
ing, 	experience and length of service.
D. 	Employees 	shall 	be paid in accordance with 	their
placement on the 	District's 	salary 	schedule.
XII. 	COMPLETION OF AGREEMENT
A. 	This document comprises 	the entire AGREEMENT between
the District and the Association on 	the matters with-
in the lawful 	scope of negotiation. 	District shall have
no further obligation to meet and negotiate, 	during the
term of this Agreement, 	on any subject whether or not
said subject is covered by this Agreement, 	even though
such subject was 	not known nor considered at the 	time
of 	the negotiations 	leading to 	the execution of 	this
Agreement.
David A. 	Woolworth, 	president of the Association at the time the
unfair practice charge was 	filed, 	testified that the 	leadership
of 	the Association believed 	ratification of 	the 	agreement would
not affect the unfair charge. 	However, 	the Association made no
express 	reservation of 	any legal 	rights 	related 	to 	the charge 	at
the time 	the agreement was 	signed.
* * * *
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Mr. 	Woolworth 	further 	testified 	that 	the Association 	fears 	the
District will 	continue 	to 	communicate 	directly with members 	of 	the
unit during 	future 	negotiations.
The Association brought 	suit 	in Alameda County 	Superior 	Court
over 	the 	frozen salary 	increments 	and obtained 	a decision 	in 	its
favor. 	The 	District 	then 	retroactively paid 	the 	previously 	frozen
salary 	increments.1
ISSUE
Does 	the 	signing of 	the 	collective negotiations 	agreement by
the parties 	subsequent to 	filing an unfair practice charge 	alleg-
ing 	unilateral 	action and bad 	faith negotiating on 	the part of
the 	employer, 	render the charge moot?
CONCLUSIONS 	OF 	LAW
The 	parties 	to 	this 	proceeding have 	executed an agreement
purporting 	to cover all matters within the 	scope of representa-
tion. 	In reaching 	this 	agreement 	the parties 	apparently have
negotiated and 	reached a 	settlement regarding wages. 	The exis-
tence of 	the 	signed agreement indicates 	that 	the 	parties 	have
surpassed 	any 	obstacles 	which may 	have 	inhibited 	reaching 	such
agreement.
The 	National 	Labor 	Relations 	Board has 	held unfair 	labor
practice charges 	moot where 	there 	has been a 	clear 	settlement
of 	the 	issues 	embodied 	in an agreement between 	the parties.
Raybestos-Manhattan, 	Inc., 	168 NLRB 396, 	405-406, 	67 LRRM
1
This 	payment did not 	include 	interest.
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1012 	(1967); 	Puerto Rican American Sugar Refinery, 	136 NLRB 428,
49 LRRM 1811(1962).
Here, 	the parties 	settled 	their differences 	regarding wages
for the 	1976-77 and 1977-78 	school years. 	Although the agree-
ment provides 	for a salary increase only from April 	26, 	1977
onward, 	absent evidence 	to the contrary it must be presumed 	that
the 	lack of a provision 	for retroactive 	salary is 	a 	result of 	the
mutual 	concessions 	and compromises which are the 	heart of 	the
collective negotiations process. 2 See Medical Manors 	Inc. 	(1973)
201 NLRB 188, 	192, 	82 LRRM 1222.
The Association, 	by the agreement, 	has 	traded certain rights
in exchange for others. 	NLRB v. 	Auto Crane Co. 	(10th Cir. 	1976)
536 	F.2d 	310,92 LRRM 2363. 	Despite its belief that there would
be no effect on the unfair practice charge, 	there is no evidence
that the Association made an express 	reservation of 	its 	legal
rights 	regarding the unfair practice charge at the time of 	the
agreement. 	As to wages, 	therefore, 	the issue is mooted by the
parties' agreement.
The 	second allegation by 	the Association is 	that 	the 	District
communicated directly with members 	of 	the 	negotiating unit during
negotiations. 	Even if true, 	the parties 	subsequently reached a
mutual 	agreement, 	and any conduct 	on the District's part which
could have 	inhibited such mutual 	agreement no 	longer 	is 	relevant.
Therefore, 	this allegation also is moot. 	The Association's 	fear
of 	similar behavior by 	the District 	in 	future negotiations 	is 	too
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2This 	concession by the Association is not surprising 	in 	light of
the previous 	Superior 	Court decision 	invalidating 	the 	previous
salary 	freeze.

speculative 	a 	basis 	upon which 	to 	grant 	relief 	since 	the
negotiations 	presently at 	issue 	have 	been 	successfully 	concluded.
California Administrative 	Code, 	Title 	8, 	Section 35001 provides
that:
It 	is 	the 	policy of 	the 	Board 	to 	encourage
-parties 	to 	resolve 	among 	themselves 	any
unfair practice 	disputes 	provided 	such 	re
solution 	is 	not 	inconsistent with 	the
purposes 	and 	policies 	of 	the Act.
In 	the 	present 	case 	no 	order of 	the 	Board could now accomplish
more 	than 	the 	parties 	already have 	accomplished on 	their 	own.
Under 	these 	circumstances, 	the 	hearing officer 	finds 	that
no 	issues 	are 	presented 	the 	resolution of which would 	further
the 	policies 	of 	the 	EERA., 	and 	therefore 	concludes 	that 	the 	issues
in 	the 	present 	unfair practice 	c4arge 	are moot.
RECOMMENDED 	ORDER
It 	is 	the 	Recommended Decision based on 	the 	foregoing 	findings
of 	fact, 	conclusions 	of 	law, 	and the 	entire 	record 	in 	this 	case
that 	the 	instant 	charge 	be 	dismissed.
Pursuant 	to 	California Administrative 	Code, 	Title 	8, 	35029,
this 	Recommended Decision 	and Order 	shall 	become 	final 	on
November 	2, 	1977 	unless 	a 	party 	files 	a 	timely 	statement 	of
exceptions. 	See 	California Administrative 	Code, 	Title 	8,
Section 35030 .
Dated October 21, 	1977.
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GERALD A. 	BECKER
Hearing Officer