People v. Bucaro CA4/1

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Filed 7/10/24 P. v. Bucaro CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082227

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF2001042)

JUAN ALBERTO BUCARO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Timothy F. Freer, Judge. Affirmed.
Spolin & Dukes, Aaron Spolin, Caitlin Dukes, and Jeremy M. Cutcher
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Warren J. Williams, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
After discovering that his wife was having an affair with her coworker,
appellant Juan Alberto Bucaro drove to her workplace, waited for her lover to
arrive, then shot him several times in front of multiple witnesses. A jury
convicted Bucaro of special circumstance murder, among other offenses.
On appeal, he contends the trial court made two errors in instructing the
jury, wrongly refusing his pinpoint instruction relating infidelity to
provocation and giving an incorrect instruction on flight (CALCRIM No. 372).
We reject both claims and affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Bucaro and Victoria G. started dating shortly after they graduated
from high school. Eventually, they got married and had one child. At the
time of the shooting, in March 2020, Bucaro was not regularly employed.
Victoria supported the family by working at a wholesale bakery.
Earlier that year, their relationship had become strained. They started
arguing about a variety of issues, including finances. Then, about a month
before the shooting, Bucaro grew suspicious of Victoria. She started spending
more time with her coworkers instead of him, and she became protective of
her phone.
Around 2:00 a.m. one morning in March, Bucaro took Victoria’s cell
phone from beneath her pillow and went through her text messages. He
discovered that Victoria was having an affair with E. Pirtle, one of her
coworkers at the bakery. The messages, dating back to December 2019,
were intimate. Bucaro read dozens of messages recounting the sexual
activity between them.
Victoria woke up and tried taking her phone back. They began arguing
and struggling over the phone. He turned away or pushed her away when

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she went for the phone, causing her to fall down. She sustained bruises and
scrapes on her face, arms, and legs. All the while, Bucaro continued scrolling
through the messages. At one point, he told her she would never see him or
Pirtle again. They fought on and off for about two hours, until Victoria and
their child retreated to her parents’ house, which was on the same property.
Bucaro was heartbroken and completely devastated. He destroyed
wedding photographs and other items in their home that belonged to
Victoria. Then, contemplating suicide, he grabbed his shotgun and six or
seven shells and left in Victoria’s BMW.
By this time, it was nearly 5:00 in the morning. Bucaro drove to an
ATM on the other side of town and tried to take money from Victoria’s bank
account, but he was thwarted by the withdrawal limit. He drove back
towards home, parked down the street from their house, and remained in the
BMW while he questioned Victoria over the phone and continued reading her
messages. Although it was painful, he “couldn’t stop reading them.”
At the end of their call, Bucaro asked Victoria what time Pirtle was
scheduled to work that day. She claimed it was Pirtle’s day off, but Bucaro
nonetheless went to the bakery to confront him. He told Victoria not to
intervene, or else he would “pop” her, which she understood to mean he would
shoot her. Around 7:30 a.m., Bucaro parked down the street from the bakery
and waited in the BMW, reading the rest of the messages. He debated
whether to shoot himself or Pirtle.
A coworker, Julio D., drove Pirtle to work that morning. When they
arrived shortly before their 8:00 a.m. shift, they parked in front of the bakery.
They noticed Victoria’s BMW was already there. Julio and Pirtle were
surprised because they did not think she was scheduled to work that day.

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A third coworker joined Julio and Pirtle at their vehicle. They chatted
briefly, then the three of them started walking into work together.
When Bucaro saw Pirtle arrive, he thought: “ ‘If he goes on this side,
I’m going to shoot out of my vehicle. If he goes on this side, I’m going to get
out of my vehicle and shoot.’ ” Ultimately, he drove the BMW beside the
group of men, rolled down the window, and stuck his shotgun out of the
window. He said nothing. Julio and the coworker ran, but Pirtle froze.
At close range, Bucaro shot Pirtle once, fixed a jam in the shotgun, then shot
three more times as he lay on the ground.
Julio called 911 and tried to help Pirtle, but it was too late. Pirtle died
at the scene of multiple shotgun wounds to the front and back of his torso.
The shooting was captured on a nearby surveillance camera and witnessed
by several bakery employees.
After leaving the bakery, Bucaro drove to his mother’s house, where his
aunt had spent the night. He told his aunt that he was going to move her
car, then took off in it, leaving the BMW, Victoria’s phone, and the shotgun
behind. Bucaro was scared and wanted to flee. He headed towards Mexico,
but stopped in the desert to think. He decided to turn himself in. He
returned home to see his child one last time. When he arrived, the police
were already there. He exited his aunt’s car with his hands up.
The next morning, Bucaro called his mother from jail. He expressed
how he felt betrayed and heartbroken by the affair. He had been feeling so
jealous and depressed and could not figure out why, until now. When his
mother said he should have called her so she could talk him out of it, he
disagreed. “If I wouldn’t have shot him right there in front of everybody,
I would have shot him where nobody could see.” He realized he would be
imprisoned “for years” because of his actions, but “ ‘[a]t least that

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motherfucker’s dead,’ ” he said. When his mother admonished him that no
one deserves to be killed, he suggested it was “not fair” that Pirtle had
relations with his wife, so now he “doesn’t have nothing no more.” At trial,
however, Bucaro testified that he felt remorse and shame over what he had
done.

The prosecution charged Bucaro with murdering Pirtle (Pen. Code,1
§ 187, subd. (a); count 1); discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle
(§ 26100, subd. (c); count 2); inflicting corporal injury upon Victoria resulting
in a traumatic condition (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 3); and making a criminal
threat (§ 422; count 4). As to count 1, the prosecution alleged two special
circumstances: Bucaro intentionally killed Pirtle by lying in wait and by
shooting from a motor vehicle (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15) & (a)(21)). Regarding
counts 1 and 2, the prosecution further asserted that he personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and death
(§§ 12022.53, subd. (d), 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)).
A jury convicted Bucaro of first degree murder, discharging a firearm
from a motor vehicle, and making a criminal threat (counts 1, 2, and 4).
The jury found both special circumstances and the firearm allegations true.
It could not reach a verdict on whether he inflicted corporal injury (count 3),
so the court declared a mistrial on that count.
Bucaro was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole
for the special circumstance murder (count 1), plus a concurrent term of two
years for making a criminal threat (count 4). The court imposed but stayed
(pursuant to section 654) a five-year term for shooting from a motor vehicle
(count 2), as well as two terms of 25 years to life for the firearm

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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enhancements. It dismissed the charge of inflicting corporal injury (count 3)
on the prosecution’s motion.

DISCUSSION

A. The trial court properly refused to give the proposed pinpoint
instruction.

Bucaro contends the trial court erred by declining to give a requested
pinpoint instruction relating infidelity to provocation and heat of passion.
We see no such error, as the proposed language was legally incorrect,
confusing, and argumentative. Moreover, any assumed error was
undoubtedly harmless.
Murder is an unlawful killing with malice. (§ 187, subd. (a).) Murder
that is perpetrated by lying in wait, by shooting from a motor vehicle, or with
premeditation and deliberation, is murder in the first degree. (§ 189, subd.
(a).) “All other kinds of murders are of the second degree.” (Id., subd. (b).)
When a killing that would otherwise be considered murder occurs
“upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion” (§ 192, subd. (a)), the malice
required for murder is negated or disregarded and the offense is reduced or
mitigated to voluntary manslaughter. (People v. Bryant (2013) 56 Cal.4th
959, 968, 970; People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1306 (Carasi).)
Heat of passion “is a state of mind caused by legally sufficient
provocation that causes a person to act, not out of rational thought but out of
unconsidered reaction to the provocation.” (People v. Beltran (2013) 56
Cal.4th 935, 942 (Beltran).) No specific type of provocation is required.
(People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515.) “ ‘The provocative conduct may
be physical or verbal, and it may comprise a single incident or numerous
incidents over a period of time.’ ” (People v. Wright (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th
1461, 1481 (Jennell Wright).) “The passion aroused can be anger, rage, or

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any violent, intense, highly wrought or enthusiastic emotion, except revenge.”
(Ibid.) “[W]hether adequate provocation and heat of passion have been
shown are fundamentally jury questions . . . .” (Id. at p. 1482.)
Heat of passion can reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter when,
“at the time of the killing, defendant’s reason was (1) actually obscured as a
result of a strong passion; (2) the passion was provoked by the victim’s
conduct; and (3) the provocation was sufficient to cause an ordinary person of
average disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection,
and from this passion rather than from due deliberation or reflection.”
(Jennell Wright, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1481; accord, Carasi, supra,
44 Cal.4th at p. 1306.) Accordingly, “both subjectively felt heat of passion
and objectively reasonable provocation are needed to negate malice and
reduce a murder to” voluntary manslaughter. (Jennell Wright, at p. 1481.)
Provocation that is insufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter may
nevertheless reduce first degree murder to second degree by negating
premeditation and deliberation. (People v. Hernandez (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th
1327, 1332.) “If the provocation would not cause an average person to
experience deadly passion but it precludes the defendant from subjectively
deliberating or premeditating, the crime is second degree murder.” (Ibid.)
First degree premeditated murder “involves a cold, calculated judgment,
including one arrived at quickly [ ], and is evidenced by planning activity,
a motive to kill, or an exacting manner of death. [ ] Such state of mind ‘is
manifestly inconsistent with having acted under the heat of passion—even
if that state of mind was achieved after a considerable period of provocatory
conduct.’ ” (Carasi, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1306, citations omitted.)
“Pinpoint instructions relate particular facts to a legal issue or pinpoint
the crux of a defendant’s case. [ ] ‘Parties are entitled to legally correct and

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factually warranted pinpoint instructions, should they request such
additional instruction.’ [ ] But a trial court may ‘refuse an instruction offered
by the defendant if it incorrectly states the law, is argumentative,
duplicative, or potentially confusing [ ], or if it is not supported by substantial
evidence.’ [ ] We review claims of instructional error de novo.” (People v.
Zemek (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 313, 346 (Zemek), citations omitted.)
At the jury instruction conference, citing People v. Borchers (1958) 50
Cal.2d 321 (Borchers) defense counsel requested the following pinpoint
instruction:

“As a matter of law, infidelity by a spouse, partner, or lover
is sufficient evidence of provocation. Whether infidelity in
this case was sufficient provocation is a determination you
must make under the totality of the circumstances.”

Defense counsel represented that Borchers stood for “the legal principle
that infidelity can be – is something that’s recognized as provocation.”
Counsel wanted the jury to understand “that the defense’s argument that
infidelity is sufficient for provocation is not something that . . . defense
lawyers come up with.” Rather, “it is recognized by the courts and by the
CALCRIMs as a form of provocation.” The prosecutor countered that the
instruction was “wholly inappropriate” because whether infidelity constitutes
provocation is a question of fact for the jury.
The trial court declined to give the requested pinpoint instruction,
agreeing with the prosecutor that it is up to the jury to decide whether there
is sufficient provocation. The court also found Borchers to be factually and
procedurally distinguishable from this case.
We agree with the trial court’s reasoning. To the extent the proposed
instruction stated that infidelity is always sufficient evidence of provocation
as a matter of law, it was incorrect and argumentative. While infidelity may

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give rise to heat of passion, it does not do so in every case. Whether adequate
provocation and heat of passion have been shown are fundamentally
questions of fact for the jury. (Jennell Wright, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1482.) Instructing the jury as Bucaro suggested would effectively create a
presumption that infidelity is objectively reasonable provocation under any
circumstance, which would improperly remove that element from the jury’s
consideration. (See People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1067–1068 [an
argumentative instruction “ ‘invite[s] the jury to draw inferences favorable to
one of the parties from specified items of evidence’ ”].) To be sure, the second
sentence of the proposed instruction correctly states that “[w]hether infidelity
in this case was sufficient provocation is a determination you must make
under the totality of the circumstances.” However, paired with the first
sentence, this only rendered the instruction as a whole confusing as to how
the jury could consider the evidence of infidelity and the issue of provocation.
Borchers, supra, 50 Cal.2d 321—which Bucaro continues to rely on—
does not say otherwise. In Borchers, the trial court reduced a conviction from
second degree murder to voluntary manslaughter under section 1181,

subdivision (6),2 and the People appealed. (Borchers, at p. 323.) The
Supreme Court affirmed, opining that “the trial judge could well have
concluded that defendant was roused to a heat of ‘passion’ by a series of
events over a considerable period of time: [his fiancée’s] admitted infidelity,
her statements that she wished she were dead, her attempt to jump from the
car on the trip to San Diego, her repeated urging that defendant shoot her,
[her son], and himself on the night of the homicide, and her taunt, ‘are you

2 Under this provision, “[I]f the evidence shows the defendant to be not
guilty of the degree of the crime of which he was convicted, but guilty of a
lesser degree thereof, or of a lesser crime included therein, the court may
modify the verdict” accordingly. (§ 1181, subd. (6).)
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chicken.’ ” (Id. at pp. 328–329.) Borchers held that the evidence presented in
that case, which included infidelity among other conduct, was sufficient to
support the trial court’s finding that the defendant committed voluntary
manslaughter, not murder. (Id. at pp. 329–330.) Under a fair reading of
Borchers, a factfinder may consider infidelity as evidence of provocation in
deciding whether a defendant killed in the heat of passion. Borchers does
not stand for the proposition that infidelity always constitutes sufficient
provocation.
Even assuming the trial court erred in refusing to give the pinpoint
instruction, we would deem the error harmless. The failure to instruct the
jury on an appropriate pinpoint instruction is reviewed for harmless error
pursuant to People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (Zemek, supra, 93
Cal.App.5th at p. 347.) “The denial of a pinpoint instruction is harmless
under Watson where the instructions that were given do not preclude
findings consistent with the proposed pinpoint instruction’s theory and where
the defense counsel fully argued the point to the jury.” (Zemek, at p. 347.)
Here, the trial court gave the standard instructions on provocation and
heat of passion. In relevant part, CALCRIM No. 522 told the jury that “[t]he
weight and significance of the provocation, if any, are for you to decide.”
And CALCRIM No. 570 elaborated:

“While no specific type of provocation is required, slight or
remote provocation is not sufficient. Sufficient provocation
may occur over a short or long period of time. [¶] It is not
enough that the defendant simply was provoked. The
defendant is not allowed to set up his own standard of
conduct. You must decide whether the defendant was
provoked and whether the provocation was sufficient.
In deciding whether the provocation was sufficient,
consider whether a person of average disposition, in the
same situation and knowing the same facts, would have
reacted from passion rather than from judgment.”
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These instructions provided the jury with the legal principles necessary
to decide the factual issue of whether the affair between Victoria and Pirtle
was sufficiently provocative. They did not preclude the jury from making
that finding, nor did they undermine defense counsel’s closing argument.
Indeed, defense counsel immediately focused the jury on the heat-of-
passion issue. Counsel advised the jury that “one of our oldest legal
principles” is that infidelity is a provocative act that can create heat of
passion. He asserted that the infidelity and “vulgar” text messages between
Victoria and Pirtle were the “catalyst” in this case, and the provocation lasted
as long as Bucaro read the messages, which was continuously throughout the
morning until moments before the shooting. As Bucaro testified, he could not
stop reading them. Counsel argued that the cooling-off period did not begin
until Bucaro left Victoria’s phone in the BMW and drove into the desert.
(See People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 550 [“ ‘ “if sufficient time has
elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and
reason to return, the killing is not voluntary manslaughter” ’ ”].) Without the
text messages, he regained reason and decided to surrender.
For his part, the prosecutor did not tell the jury that infidelity could
never constitute provocation as a matter of law. He acknowledged that the
text messages were heartbreaking and devastating for Bucaro. Nevertheless,
the prosecutor suggested that Pirtle was not the source of the provocation.
Rather, Bucaro provoked himself by choosing to read the messages. (See
People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 59 [the provocation inciting the heat of
passion “must be caused by the victim [ ], or be conduct reasonably believed
by the defendant to have been engaged in by the victim” (citation omitted)].)

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The thrust of the prosecutor’s argument was that, even assuming that
discovering the affair constituted provocation, the murder was “at least five
hours later, with multiple steps and plans in between.” In other words,
Bucaro acted thoughtfully and deliberately in the hours following his
discovery; he did not shoot Pirtle under the influence of intense emotion.
To that point, the prosecutor highlighted that Bucaro’s initial reaction was
not violence; it was to spend hours digging deeper into the text messages.
He went on to destroy Victoria’s property in the home, while avoiding his
own. Then, he carefully got dressed, grabbed her debit card, drove to the
bank, entered her code, and tried three times to withdraw cash. When this
failed, he returned home and “refin[ed] his plan” to kill Pirtle, inquiring what
time Pirtle started work. He then drove to the bakery and waited for at least
25 minutes. When Pirtle arrived, Bucaro exercised “clear judgment” and
“executive function[ ]” to create a plan: if Pirtle passed by one side of the car,
Bucaro would shoot from the car, but if he passed on the other side, he would
get out of the car and shoot. The shooting itself also demonstrated “executive
functioning,” as Bucaro loaded the shotgun, fired once, fixed a jam, then
continued firing until Pirtle was surely dead. Finally, the prosecutor pointed
out that his behavior after the shooting—fleeing, changing cars, driving
toward Mexico, and the callous jail call with his mother—was also
inconsistent with someone who simply snapped and was shocked at what
they had done.
In sum, we conclude the trial court appropriately rejected the pinpoint
instruction requested by the defense. And, even assuming error, it was
certainly harmless because the standard instructions and closing arguments
of counsel fairly placed the relevant factual question before the jury.

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B. There is no error in the flight instruction (CALCRIM No. 372).

Bucaro also contends the trial court erred and violated his rights to due
process and a fair trial when it gave the jury the standard instruction on

flight (CALCRIM No. 372). That instruction provided as follows:3

“If the defendant fled immediately after the crime was
committed, that conduct may show that he was aware of
his guilt. If you conclude that the defendant fled, it is up to
you to decide the meaning and importance of that conduct.
However, evidence that the defendant fled cannot prove
guilt by itself.”

Bucaro specifically claims that this language conflicted with section
1127c and was impermissibly argumentative. He suggests the instruction
improperly allowed the jury to find guilt based on flight alone. These
arguments, and others like them, have been repeatedly rejected by the
courts. (People v. Pettigrew (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 477, 500–502; People v.
Price (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 409, 454–458 (Price); People v. Paysinger (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 26, 29–32 (Paysinger); People v. Hernández Ríos (2007) 151
Cal.App.4th 1154, 1157–1159.) Most relevant here are Paysinger and Price.
The court in Paysinger rejected the argument that Bucaro makes
regarding section 1127c. That statute dictates that, in any criminal trial
“where evidence of flight of a defendant is relied upon as tending to show
guilt, the court shall instruct the jury substantially as follows:

3 The Attorney General accurately points out that Bucaro did not object
to this instruction in the trial court. However, since Bucaro’s contention, if
true, would affect his substantial rights, we decide this issue on the merits.
(See § 1259; People v. Mitchell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579–580.)
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“The flight of a person immediately after the commission of
a crime, or after he is accused of a crime that has been
committed, is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt,
but is a fact which, if proved, the jury may consider in
deciding his guilt or innocence. The weight to which such
circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to
determine.” (Paysinger, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 31.)

Like Bucaro, the defendant in Paysinger argued that CALCRIM
No. 372 was inconsistent with section 1127c because the instruction “tells the
jury that flight may show awareness of guilt before telling the jury that flight
alone is not sufficient to prove guilt, while . . . section 1127c communicates
those ideas in the opposite order.” (Paysinger, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at
p. 31.) Insofar as the defendant asserted this difference made the flight
instruction “constitutionally deficient because the first sentence of the
instruction ‘strongly suggests . . . that evidence of flight is in fact sufficient to
show guilt,’ ” the Paysinger court was not persuaded. (Ibid.) As the court
reasoned, the first sentence of CALCRIM No. 372—“[i]f the defendant fled
immediately after the crime was committed, that conduct may show that he
was aware of his guilt”—suggests no such thing, and in any event the final
sentence of the instruction—“[e]vidence that the defendant fled cannot prove
guilt by itself”—positively refutes any such suggestion. (Paysinger, at p. 29.)
To the extent Bucaro claims the flight instruction was argumentative,
Price is instructive. Both the defendants in Price and Bucaro relied on People
v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126 (Carl Wright). (Price, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th
at p. 458.) In Carl Wright, the defense requested a special instruction that
listed five pieces of evidence and told “the jury that it may ‘consider’ such
evidence in determining whether defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ ” (Carl Wright, at p. 1135 & fn. 5.) The Supreme Court held the trial
court correctly “refused to give this instruction because it is argumentative,

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i.e., it would invite the jury to draw inferences favorable to the defendant
from specified items of evidence on a disputed question of fact, and therefore
properly belongs not in instructions, but in the arguments of counsel to the
jury.” (Id. at p. 1135.) Discussing a previous opinion, the Supreme Court
reiterated that it is improper to select certain facts and endeavor “ ‘to force
the court to indicate an opinion favorable to the defendant as to the effect of
such facts, by incorporating them into instructions’ . . . .” (Ibid.) “ ‘An
instruction should contain a principle of law applicable to the case, expressed
in plain language, indicating no opinion of the court as to any fact in issue.’ ”
(Ibid.)
The Price court deftly distinguished Carl Wright: “[U]nlike the
instruction the defendant requested in [Carl] Wright, which sought to focus
the jury’s attention on a list of items of evidence that favored the defendant,
the instruction here focuses solely on one factor, evidence of flight, and not on
a laundry list of evidence favoring the prosecution, and there is a statute—
section 1127c—that requires an instruction on flight if there is evidence of
flight. (§ 1127c.)” (Price, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 458.) More broadly, Price
concluded that CALCRIM No. 372 was not argumentative since it “does not
focus on certain evidence and direct the jury how to consider the evidence.”
(Price, at p. 458.) Rather, while informing the jury that it can but need not
infer guilt from flight, the instruction leaves it up to the jury to decide the
meaning and importance of that conduct. (Ibid.) The instruction further
limits the use of flight evidence by providing that it is not alone sufficient to
prove guilt. (Ibid.)
Finally, upon considering the instructions as a whole, both Paysinger
and Price discerned no reasonable likelihood that a jury would understand
the flight instruction as vitiating the presumption of innocence, as the juries

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in those cases were give many instructions regarding their factfinding duties,
the presumption of innocence, and the prosecution’s burden to prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Paysinger, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 30;
Price, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 456.) The jury in this case was given the
same essential instructions (see, e.g., CALCRIM Nos. 200 & 220), and we
likewise we see no reasonable possibility that it would have interpreted and
applied the flight instruction in the way Bucaro suggests on appeal.
We find these cases persuasive, and adopt their reasoning here.
Thus, we conclude the flight instruction was legally and constitutionally
sound.
DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

RUBIN, J.

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