People v. Rojas CA2/3

CourtListener 9998156Calctapp8 de jul. de 2024

Abrir fonte

Texto completo

Filed 7/8/24 P. v. Rojas CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE, B324221

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA158438)
v.

RANDALL LEE ROJAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lisa B. Lench, Judge. Affirmed.
Emry J. Allen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Ryan M.
Smith, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗

Defendant and appellant Randall Lee Rojas was convicted
of first degree murder in 1999. Rojas now appeals from an order
denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1170.95.1 The trial court concluded Rojas did not make a
prima facie showing of eligibility for resentencing because he was
convicted as the actual killer. Rojas contends the trial court
erred because he may have been able to present new evidence
demonstrating that he was not the actual killer, or that he did
not act with intent to kill. We affirm the order denying Rojas’s
petition for resentencing.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The underlying offense
We take our statement of the facts underlying Rojas’s crime
from the Court of Appeal opinion affirming the judgment of
conviction. (People v. Briant, et al. (Sept. 26, 2001, B137306)
[nonpub. opn.] (Briant).)2

1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered to
section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
We refer to the law as section 1172.6 for the remainder of this
opinion.

2 We refer to the Court of Appeal opinion affirming the
judgment of Rojas’s conviction only “for background purposes and
to provide context for the parties’ arguments.” (People v. Flores
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 978, fn. 2.) We do not rely on the facts
in Briant to review the trial court’s determination of his
eligibility for resentencing at the prima facie stage. (Id. at
p. 988.)

2
Rojas and Ritch Briant “were members of a white-
supremacist skinhead gang in Lancaster known as the Nazi Low
Riders. Defendant Jessica Colwell was a Nazi Low Rider
associate. Gangmembers [sic] hated black people and wanted to
live in an all-white Lancaster and, ultimately, an all-white
United States.”
One evening in November 1995, Rojas, Briant, and another
Nazi Low Rider associate, Michael Thornton, went to a
McDonald’s in Lancaster. They encountered a homeless white
woman who told them Milton Walker, a homeless Black man, had
kicked her in the back. “She indicated that the man who had
assaulted her was in the vacant lot. Either Briant or Rojas said,
‘Let’s go get that nigger.’ ” One of them “was carrying a stick that
looked like a three or four foot length of two-by-four.”
Rojas and Thornton assaulted Walker. Thornton testified
that Rojas hit Walker multiple times with the two-by-four and
kicked him in the head, while Briant was “ ‘[e]gging [Rojas] on
with racial slurs . . . .’ ” At some point during the assault, Walker
lost consciousness. Eventually, Rojas, Thornton, and Briant left
the scene, leaving Walker “lying on his back with his arms spread
out . . . .” Briant and Colwell told others that they had returned
to the scene later the same night without Rojas and Thornton.
Colwell told a witness they found Walker “lying on the ground
and not moving.” Briant beat Walker again with “ ‘a stick, a
board,’ ” and Colwell “had ‘poked [Walker] in the eyeball with a
metal conduit thing or a pipe or something.’ ”
The paramedics who pronounced Walker dead found a
wooden board and a metal pipe at the scene stained with his
blood. The medical examiner who performed the autopsy
“determined Walker had died from blunt force head trauma and

3
resulting brain injury.” He suffered nine to 13 blows to the head,
two or three of which were inflicted with the board, and the
remainder caused by either the wooden board, the metal pipe, or
a kick to the head. The medical examiner concluded that all of
Walker’s injuries contributed to his death. The deputy medical
examiner, a neuropathologist, opined that Walker had died
“ ‘very soon’ ” after sustaining head injuries, although the exact
time of death could not be determined.
The underlying proceedings
The People charged Rojas, Briant, and Colwell with
Walker’s murder. (§ 187, subd. (a).) The information further
alleged Rojas and Briant personally used a deadly and dangerous
weapon, specifically a “wood stick,” to commit the offense
(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)); that all three defendants voluntarily acted
in concert with others (§ 422.75, subd. (b)); and all three
defendants intentionally killed Walker because of race (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(16)).
At the conclusion of the September 1999 trial, the trial
court instructed the jury on murder and manslaughter. The trial
court instructed that to convict Rojas of first degree murder, the
jury had to find he killed Walker with express malice
aforethought (CALJIC Nos. 8.10, 8.20). The trial court further
instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 8.11, which stated: “malice
is express when there is manifested an intention unlawfully to
kill a human being.” The court also instructed the jury that a
person who “unlawfully inflicts a physical injury upon another
person” causing their death is liable for homicide even if the
injury was not the only cause of death (CALJIC No. 8.58).
However, the court instructed the jury that if it believed an
independent intervening action of some other person caused

4
Walker’s death, or if it had a reasonable doubt that any of Rojas’s
acts caused Walker’s death, it could not find Rojas guilty of
unlawfully killing Walker.
Regarding the weapons use allegation, the court instructed
the jury that it must find Rojas intentionally displayed a weapon
“in a menacing manner,” or intentionally struck or hit a human
being with the weapon, to find that Rojas personally used a
deadly or dangerous weapon in the commission of the offense
(CALJIC No. 17.16). Finally, the court instructed the jury that to
find true the special circumstance that Rojas intentionally killed
Walker because of his race, the jury had to find that Rojas (1) was
the actual killer or (2) that he aided and abetted first degree
murder with the intent to kill (CALJIC No. 8.80.1). The trial
court did not instruct the jury on accomplice liability, the felony
murder rule, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or
any other theory allowing the jury to impute malice to Rojas
solely based on his participation in Walker’s murder.
The jury convicted Rojas of first degree murder. It further
found true that he intentionally killed Walker because of race, he
committed the offense voluntarily and in concert with others, and
he personally used the “ ‘wood stick’ ” as a deadly and dangerous
weapon in committing the murder. The trial court sentenced
Rojas to life without the possibility of parole.
Resentencing proceedings
In April 2022, Rojas filed a petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6. He indicated that he had been prosecuted under
a theory of imputed malice and could not presently be convicted
of murder because of changes Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) made to sections 188 and 189. The trial court
appointed counsel and ordered the People to file a response. The

5
People opposed the petition on the ground that Rojas was
prosecuted as a perpetrator acting with actual malice.
In August 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the
petition under section 1172.6, subdivision (c). Both the People
and defense counsel submitted without argument. The trial court
found Rojas failed to make a prima facie case for eligibility
because the record reflected the jury was not instructed on any
theories of imputed malice and the jury’s finding that Rojas
personally used the weapon established he was convicted as the
actual killer. The court denied the petition. Rojas timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6
In 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 “to
amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f);
see also People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708 (Strong);
People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis); People v.
Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile).) The bill
amended section 188 by adding the requirement that, except as
stated in section 189, subdivision (e), “in order to be convicted of
murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice aforethought.
Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
Senate Bill No. 1437 created a procedure, now codified at
section 1172.6, in which a person convicted of a qualifying offense

6
under the former law may seek resentencing if he or she could no
longer be convicted of those offenses under amended section 188.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at
p. 847.) A defendant commences the procedure by filing a
petition containing a declaration that, among other things, he or
she could not presently be convicted of murder under the current
law. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) In relevant part, the
statute requires the court, “[a]fter the parties have had an
opportunity to submit briefings,” to “hold a hearing to determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief. If
the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the petitioner is
entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause. If
the court declines to make an order to show cause, it shall
provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons for doing so.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
II. Prima Facie Stage and Standard of Review
At the prima facie stage, “ ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s
factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
or her factual allegations were proved.” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.) “While the trial court may look at the record
of conviction . . . to determine whether a petitioner has made a
prima facie case for section [1172.6] relief, the prima facie inquiry
under subdivision (c) is limited.” (Ibid.) Courts may not engage
in “ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise
of discretion.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 972.) Rather, “[t]he record
should be consulted at the prima facie stage only to determine
‘readily ascertainable facts,’ such as the crime of conviction and
findings on enhancements.” (People v. Duchine (2021) 60
Cal.App.5th 798, 815; see, e.g., People v. Harden (2022) 81

7
Cal.App.5th 45, 54–56 [considering jury instructions and verdicts
to determine whether defendant made prima facie showing of
eligibility]; People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 106 (Ervin)
[considering sentencing enhancements, jury instructions, closing
arguments, and verdicts at prima facie stage].) The court may
make credibility determinations adverse to a petitioner only if
the record of conviction “ ‘ “contain[s] facts refuting the
allegations made in the petition” . . . .’ ” (Lewis, at p. 971.)
As relevant here, a petitioner fails to make a prima facie
showing for relief “if the record of conviction conclusively
establishes . . . that . . . the petitioner was the actual killer, or . . .
the petitioner acted with malice aforethought that was not
imputed based solely on participation in a crime.” (People v.
Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14 (Lopez).) The trial court’s
denial of a resentencing petition at the prima facie stage “ ‘is a
purely legal conclusion,’ ” which appellate courts review de novo.
(Ervin, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 101.)
III. The Record of Conviction Conclusively Establishes
Rojas is Ineligible for Relief
Rojas contends the trial court erred by finding his petition
did not establish a prima facie case for resentencing eligibility.
We disagree.
A. The jury instructions and verdict show the jury
found Rojas was the actual killer and acted
with express malice
In Rojas’s underlying trial, the court did not instruct the
jury on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, felony
murder, or any theory permitting the jury to impute malice to
Rojas based solely on his participation in the crime. The trial
court also did not instruct the jury on aiding and abetting. The

8
jury instructions did not leave open the possibility that the jury
convicted Rojas on an invalid theory of liability.
Indeed, the jury’s findings conclusively establish that it
found Rojas was the actual killer. The jury concluded that Rojas
personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon in the
commission of the first degree murder, establishing that it found
Rojas personally killed Walker. (People v. Bodely (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1193, 1202 (Bodely) [jury’s finding that defendant
personally used a weapon in committing murder established
defendant personally killed the victim].) The jury was also
instructed that it could not find Walker was intentionally killed
because of race unless it found Rojas was (1) the actual killer or
(2) an aider and abettor who acted with the intent to kill.
(CALJIC No. 8.80.1.) The jury found this allegation true in the
absence of any aiding and abetting instruction, indicating it
found Rojas was the actual killer.
Thus, to reach its verdict, the jury had to find Rojas
personally killed Walker. (Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 17–19 [“actual killer” for purposes of resentencing means
someone who personally killed the victim].) On this basis alone,
he is ineligible for resentencing relief as a matter of law. (Id. at
p. 14; People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1166 [actual
killer theories are still valid after Senate Bill No. 1437’s
amendments to the Penal Code], review granted May 1, 2024,
S284232 (Mares); People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956, 967
[Senate Bill No. 1437 imposed heightened mens rea requirement
only for persons who were not actual killers].)
Further, the record of conviction also irrefutably
demonstrates that the jury found Rojas acted with express
malice. The court instructed the jury that first degree murder

9
required a finding that Rojas acted with express malice, which
the instructions defined as the intent to kill. The jury’s first
degree murder verdict therefore necessarily found Rojas
personally harbored the intent to kill. Moreover, by finding true
that Walker was killed because of his race, the jury necessarily
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Rojas intended to kill.
(People v. Talamantez (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 443, 468
[instruction that required jury to find victim was intentionally
killed because of his race required jury to find defendant
intended to kill].)
Rojas does not dispute that the record of conviction
excludes the possibility that the jury convicted him of first degree
murder under a theory no longer viable under Senate Bill
No. 1437’s amendments to the Penal Code. Instead, he contends
that at an evidentiary hearing, he may have been able to present
new evidence that would show he was not the actual killer, or
that he did not act with intent to kill.
These arguments fundamentally misunderstand the scope
of section 1172.6.3 Section 1172.6 does not afford a petitioner an
opportunity to establish that, given the chance to present new
evidence, the petitioner might be able to undermine the factual
basis for a conviction that is otherwise legally valid under the
amended law. Instead, the law is limited to providing relief only
to those individuals who could no longer be convicted of murder
because of the changes to the malice requirement reflected in
amended sections 188 and 189. (Mares, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at

3 Because we address the merits of Rojas’s argument, we
need not resolve whether Rojas forfeited the issues on appeal by
failing to raise them at the hearing on his petition, or whether
this failure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

10
p. 1166, review granted [petitioner failed to show he could not be
convicted today “ ‘because of’ ” changes to malice requirement in
§ 188 and § 189].) Rojas has advanced no theory that would bring
his contentions within the scope of section 1172.6.
Indeed, as our high court has explained, section 1172.6
“strongly suggests” the Legislature intended trial courts to
consider “many, and perhaps most,” prior jury findings on
resentencing, whether adverse or favorable to a defendant.
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 715; cf. People v. Curiel (2023) 15
Cal.5th 433, 465 [a court giving effect to preclusive jury findings
does not engage in factfinding].) The statute does not reflect a
legislative intent “to permit wholesale relitigation of findings
supporting murder convictions” in resentencing proceedings.
(Strong, at p. 715; People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 549
[“[A] section [1172.6] petition is not a means by which a
[petitioner] can relitigate issues already decided”].) The trial
court therefore properly gave effect to the jury’s findings that
Rojas was the actual killer and acted with specific intent to kill to
conclude he did not make a prima facie case for relief.
Rojas cites the Lewis decision’s reliance on People v.
Drayton (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 965 (Drayton), a habeas case, to
argue that the trial court should have evaluated his prima facie
case “notwithstanding” factual issues resolved against him by the
jury. Rojas misinterprets the case law. The Lewis court cited
Drayton for the proposition that courts must take a petitioner’s
factual allegations as true at the prima facie stage. But the
Lewis court also adopted from Drayton the qualifier that when
the record of conviction “ ‘ “contain[s] facts refuting the
allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in
making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ”

11
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971, citing Drayton, at p. 979.)
Lewis therefore confirms that the trial court may find a petition’s
allegations not credible at the prima facie stage when facts
conclusively established by the record of conviction contradict
those allegations.
The jury’s verdict conclusively established that the jury
found Rojas was the actual killer and that he acted with the
specific intent to kill. The trial court properly gave effect to these
findings to conclude Rojas failed to establish prima facie
eligibility for resentencing relief.
C. Questions of causation did not establish a
prima facie case
Rojas appears to argue that he made out a prima facie case
because there was “a credible argument” that Briant and
Colwell’s conduct actually caused Walker’s death. As explained
above, the jury’s verdict resolved this issue by finding he
personally killed Walker. (Bodely, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1202.)
Moreover, the jury also found Rojas acted with express
malice. Causation theories are immaterial to questions of malice.
(People v. Carney (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1130, 1145, 1147 [proximate
cause “deals with the actus reus of a crime” and “does not
implicate concerns regarding imputed mens rea and vicarious
liability identified in . . . Senate Bill No. 1437”]; see Bodely,
supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1204 [causation instruction was
unrelated to theories of imputed malice].) Whether the jury
found Rojas’s conduct to be the exclusive, primary, or direct cause
of Walker’s death has no bearing on his eligibility for
resentencing under the amended statutes.

12
IV. Rojas Has Not Established a Violation of His
Constitutional Rights
Finally, Rojas argues that the trial court’s denial of his
petition at the prima facie stage violated his federal and state
rights to equal protection and due process, and federal and state
prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. These
arguments are unavailing.
A petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if
undisputed facts contained in the record of conviction do not
demonstrate the petitioner’s ineligibility for relief as a matter of
law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c); see Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971–
972.) We have concluded the record of conviction conclusively
establishes Rojas is ineligible for resentencing under
section 1172.6. Therefore, he is not similarly situated to other
petitioners who are entitled to an evidentiary hearing under the
statute. (People v. Barrera (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1555, 1565
[“only those persons who are similarly situated are protected
from invidiously disparate treatment” under equal protection
clause].) Rojas states no other basis for his argument that the
denial of his petition violated his substantive due process rights
or the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
Additionally, Rojas’s only procedural due process argument
is that the trial court unlawfully deprived him of his liberty
interest in resentencing relief by erroneously denying his petition
before a hearing. As explained above, we find no error in the trial
court’s conclusion that Rojas failed to make the requisite prima
facie showing of eligibility for resentencing. Rojas does not
challenge the constitutionality of the procedures in section 1172.6
or state any other basis for his procedural due process claim.

13
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying the petition is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

ADAMS, J.

We concur:

EDMON, P. J.

EGERTON, J.

14

Continue sua pesquisa no ChatGPT ou Claude

Conecte o Omnilex para pesquisar o corpus jurídico pelo seu assistente de IA.