CourtListener 9997921•People v. Jones CA2/4
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Filed 7/5/24 P. v. Jones CA2/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B328751
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA292350)
v.
JOSEPH WAYNE JONES
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, H. Clay Jacke II, Judge. Affirmed.
G. Martin Velez, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster and Amanda V.
Lopez, Deputies Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2011, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Joseph
Wayne Jones of one count of first degree murder (Pen. Code,
§ 187, subd. (a)), four counts of attempted willful, premeditated
murder (id., §§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), and one count of shooting at
an inhabited dwelling (id., § 246). In 2019, defendant filed a
petition to vacate his murder conviction and resentence on any
remaining counts under former Penal Code section 1170.95 (now
§ 1172.6).1 The trial court summarily denied the petition.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court erred by
denying his petition without issuing an order to show cause. The
People contend, and we agree, that defendant is ineligible for
relief as a matter of law. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background2
1. The Shootings on 84th Street and South Halldale
Avenue
Lester Turner and Andre Turner lived in a home on 84th
Street in the City of Los Angeles with their grandfather, John
Turner.3 Lester and Andre were members of the Eight Trey
Gangster Crips gang.
1 Subsequent references to statutes are to the Penal Code.
Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was renumbered
1172.6 without substantive change. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
2 The following summary is taken from our prior opinion resolving
defendant’s direct appeal to provide context.
3 For ease of reading, we use the first names of the Turner family
members and other individuals sharing the same last name. We
intend no disrespect.
2
In the evening of October 20, 2005, John was sitting in a
room inside the home facing the street. Lester, Andre, and a
friend, Kevin Ingram, were in the driveway working on Lester’s
car.
Three African American men in their early 20’s and
wearing hoodies drove a grey pickup truck down the street, got
out of the truck, and walked toward the Turner residence.
Unable to see the men’s faces, Andre said, “What’s up?,” and the
men replied, “What’s up?,” before shooting at the house. One of
the men used a rifle and the others used handguns. Numerous
shots were fired, but no one was hit. After the shooting, the three
men ran back to their truck and drove away.
Around five minutes later, another shooting occurred over a
mile away at the home of Robin Sanders on Halldale Avenue.
Robin was inside her home with her nephew, Thomas Maleik
Sanders. Thomas’s friend, Paul Fry, had driven Thomas to
Robin’s house and was waiting in his car in the driveway. Fry
was a member of the Bounty Hunter Bloods gang. Thomas was
not a gang member.
After finishing his laundry, Thomas got into Fry’s car with
the windows rolled down. When Fry started the car, an African
American man ran up to Fry’s window and pointed a handgun at
him. Fry heard two or three clicks, but the gun did not fire. The
man ran away toward the street.
As Fry tried to back his car out of the driveway, he looked
through the passenger-side window and saw a different man
several houses down, wearing a hoodie and holding an AK-47
rifle. The man fired the rifle several times. Fry tried to drive
away but was shot three times. His car spun out of control and
ended in a nearby yard. A grey pickup truck stopped near Fry’s
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car. Several occupants looked at Fry and Thomas and drove
away. Thomas was shot numerous times and died as a result.
2. Police Investigation and Defendant’s Interviews
On October 23, 2005, two detectives went to the Turner
residence to interview Andre. As they passed through the living
room, one detective saw a young Black man motion to Andre not
to say anything to the police. Andre identified Damien Watts
(also known as “Chopper”) in a six-pack photographic lineup as a
Rollin’ 60’s Neighborhood gang member he knew from jail. Andre
did not identify the shooter.4 In a follow-up interview later that
evening, Andre said he knew “Chopper from 60’s” shot at his
house, but stated he would not testify because he was not a
snitch. Andre denied saying this at trial.
Defendant was also interviewed on October 23, 2005. He
identified Watts and Jason Weldon from six-pack photographic
lineups and stated Watts and Weldon had told him Watts fired
an AK-47 at Eight Trey Gangster Crips and at the Turner
residence. Defendant stated that Weldon had borrowed his
pickup truck and drove or rode in it as a passenger on October 20,
2005. Defendant identified Anthony Padilla as the driver or
additional passenger in the truck.
In a subsequent interview, defendant admitted he was a
passenger in the truck during both shootings. He reported that
Weldon came to pick him up at his house because “one of the
homies had got shot.” During their conversation, another man,
Derek Brown, called defendant to report someone had threatened
4 Fred Johnson lived across the street from the Turners and
witnessed the shooting. During a live lineup in December 2005 and
later at trial, Johnson identified Watts as the man who shot the rifle.
4
his father. Defendant and Weldon picked up Brown and Watts
and decided to get an AK-47 rifle.
Brown, Weldon, and Watts told another gang member they
were going to “put in work” by robbing someone and “shoot[ing]
up something.” Defendant drove them to pick up Padilla, who
then drove the group to the Turner residence where Watts,
Weldon, and Brown shot at the house. Padilla had difficulty
driving the truck. Defendant took the wheel and drove. After the
Turner shooting, defendant thought they would go home but
“they don’t want to listen.”
When the men drove by the Sanders residence, defendant
and Brown told the others that Sanders and Fry were not gang
bangers. Watts insisted on stopping and getting out of the truck.
Defendant stated, “I told them, . . . that dude [Sanders] is
innocent. I knew them dudes were no gang bangers.”
3. Gang Evidence
Detective David Ross testified about the use of gang
monikers, how to join a gang, and the importance of territory to a
gang. He also explained the concept of putting in work, the best
example of which was shooting at rival gang members.
Detective Ross knew that defendant (“Capo”) and Watts
(“Chopper”) were members of the Rollin’ 60’s Neighborhood Crips
gang. One of the gang’s rivals was the Eight Trey Gangster
Crips. Both shootings in this case occurred in Eight Trey
Gangster Crips territory. Based on a hypothetical mirroring the
facts of both shootings, Detective Ross opined both were
committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association
with the Rollin’ 60’s Neighborhood Crips gang to promote or
further its criminal conduct.
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B. Procedural Background
Defendant was tried alone in August 2011. A jury
convicted him of one count of first degree murder (§ 187,
subd. (a)), four counts of willful, deliberate, and premeditated
attempted murder (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a)), and one count of
shooting at an inhabited dwelling (§ 246). The jury found true
the allegations each charged offense was committed for the
benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(A)). On
the murder and attempted murder counts, the jury found true the
allegations a principal personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). In addition, the jury found
defendant intentionally murdered Thomas while being an active
participant in a criminal street gang (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). The
trial court sentenced defendant to an overall term of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus four life
terms and a consecutive term of 110 years to life.
A panel of this court affirmed defendant’s convictions in
People v. Jones (Mar. 29, 2013, B236850) [nonpub. opn.]. This
court rejected defendant’s challenge to the sufficiency of evidence
supporting the gang-murder special circumstance finding
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22)). (Id. at p. 12.) “Viewing, as we must, the
evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment,” this court
found “sufficient evidence to support the jury’s special
circumstance findings.” (Ibid.)
In February 2022, defendant filed a resentencing petition
under former section 1170.95, seeking resentencing on his
murder conviction. The trial court appointed counsel and
received additional briefing by the parties. Following a prima
facie hearing, the court summarily denied the petition, relying on
the court file (including the jury instructions and verdicts) and
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finding defendant ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law: Section 1172.6
Through Senate Bill No. 1437 (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1)
(S.B. 1437), the Legislature clarified the felony murder rule and
eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine to
ensure any murder conviction and attached sentence is
commensurate with individual culpability. (People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843; People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 957, 971 (Lewis); accord, § 189, subd. (e).) The Legislature
also added former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6), pursuant
to which individuals convicted of felony murder or murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine may petition for
vacatur of their convictions and resentencing. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a).)
Within 60 days after service of a facially compliant petition,
the prosecutor must file and serve a response, to which the
petitioner may file and serve a reply. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)
Following this briefing period, the court “shall hold a hearing to
determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for
relief.” (Ibid.) If the petition and record in the case establish
conclusively the petitioner’s ineligibility for relief as a matter of
law, the trial court may summarily deny the petition. (See People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 970–972; § 1172.6, subd. (c).)
Persons liable for murder under current law include actual
killers, aiders and abettors who act with intent to kill, or major
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participants in the underlying felony who act with reckless
indifference to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).)
We review de novo whether the trial court properly denied
a section 1172.6 petition without issuing an order to show cause.
(People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251.)
B. Defendant Was Ineligible for Relief as a Matter of
Law
Defendant contends the trial court erred by summarily
denying his petition. His contention is premised on the jury
instructions at trial and whether they permitted his conviction
for murder on an imputed malice theory of liability. We conclude
they did not.
The record of conviction demonstrates defendant was
convicted of murder as either a direct perpetrator or an aider and
abettor to that crime. The jury instructions and verdict prove
this conviction as a matter of law.
The jury was instructed on the elements of murder under
CALCRIM No. 520, which required the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that “1. The defendant committed an
act that caused the death of another person; [¶] AND [¶] 2. When
the defendant acted, he had a state of mind called malice
aforethought.” CALCRIM No. 520 defined both “kinds of malice
aforethought, express malice and implied malice,” while
CALCRIM No. 521 further instructed the jury to “decide whether
the murder [is] of the first or second degree.” The instructions
clarified defendant was “prosecuted for first degree murder under
the theory the murder was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.
The defendant is guilty of first degree murder if the People have
proved that he acted willfully, deliberately, and with
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premeditation.” The instructions defined “willfully” to mean
defendant “intended to kill” and placed on the People “the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was first
degree murder rather than a lesser crime.”
The jury also received instruction on the special
circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(22); CALCRIM
Nos. 700, 702) that defendant intentionally murdered Thomas
while being an active participant in a criminal street gang. The
instruction informed the jury that if it found defendant “guilty of
first degree murder,” it had to decide whether the People met
their burden of proving the special circumstance allegation true
beyond a reasonable doubt. To prove this allegation if defendant
was “not the actual killer” but was “guilty of first degree murder
as an aider and abettor,” the People had to prove “that the
defendant acted with the intent to kill.”
The jury also received instruction on the general principles
of aiding and abetting (CALCRIM No. 400), which informed the
jury a person may be guilty of a crime by either personally
committing the crime (defined as “a perpetrator”) or aiding and
abetting the perpetrator of the crime. As to the theory of aiding
and abetting, specifically, the jury was instructed with CALCRIM
No. 401, which provided in relevant part:
“To prove that [the] defendant is guilty of a
crime based on aiding and abetting that crime, the
People must prove that:
“1. The perpetrator committed the crime;
“2. The defendant knew that the perpetrator
intended to commit the crime;
“3. Before or during the commission of the
crime, the defendant intended to aid and abet the
perpetrator in committing the crime; [¶] AND [¶]
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“4. The defendant’s words or conduct did in fact
aid and abet the perpetrator’s commission of the
crime.
“Someone aids and abets a crime if he knows of
the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and he specifically
intends to, and does in fact, aid, facilitate, promote,
encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission
of that crime.”
By convicting defendant of first degree murder, the jury
necessarily found him guilty as the perpetrator or as an aider and
abettor to first degree murder. To find defendant guilty under
the latter theory of liability, the instructions required the jury to
find defendant knew the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and
specifically intended to “aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or
instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that crime.” In
applying these instructions to the count of murder, the jury could
only have understood “the crime” as used in the instruction to
mean murder. By finding defendant guilty of first degree
murder, the jury must also have found defendant intended to kill
and, by words or conduct, did in fact aid and abet the commission
of murder.
These necessary findings meet the standard of direct aiding
and abetting murder under current law. (See People v. Pacheco
(2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 118, 124 (Pacheco) [“Under a direct aider
and abettor liability theory, the prosecution must prove the
person who is not the actual killer ‘engaged in the requisite acts
[actus reus] and had the requisite intent [mens rea]’ to aid and
abet the target crime of murder”].)5
5 Our Supreme Court dismissed review in Pacheco following its
decision in People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433. In light of our
10
As defendant has acknowledged, the jury never received an
instruction on felony murder, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or any target crime on which that doctrine
could be based. (See, e.g., CALCRIM Nos. 401–402, 540A–540C,
548.) Having received none of these instructions and finding
defendant guilty of first degree murder as a perpetrator or direct
aider and abettor, the jury necessarily found defendant was the
actual killer or acted with malice aforethought and engaged in
conduct that did in fact aid and abet the perpetrator’s
commission of murder. (Accord, People v. Cortes (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 198, 205–206 (Cortes); People v. Harden (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 45, 52–53; People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
941, 946.)
Defendant relies on People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th
972 (Langi), for the proposition the jury could have imputed
malice on him based entirely on his participation in the shooting
culminating in Thomas’s death. Defendant’s reliance is
misplaced. In Langi, a jury convicted the defendant of second
degree murder in connection with the beating death of a robbery
victim. (Id. at p. 976.) The robbery victim fell and struck his
head after someone in a group that included the defendant
punched the victim “directly in the face.” (Ibid., original italics.)
“As the case was tried, the jury could have found [Langi]
guilty as an aider and abettor even if it found that someone else
threw the fatal punch. The jury was not required to find, and did
not necessarily find, that it was [Langi] who threw that punch.
Read with the caution dictated by Lewis, the prior opinion [and
conclusion above, we need not (and do not) consider defendant’s
alternative argument under Pacheco concerning the jury’s true finding
under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(22).
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jury instructions do] not conclusively establish that [Langi] was
convicted as the actual killer.” (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
p. 980.)
Absent any finding by the jury that Langi was the actual
killer, the Langi court reviewed the jury instructions comprising
part of Langi’s record of conviction. (Langi, supra, 73
Cal.App.5th at pp. 980–981.) In its review, the court found
Langi’s conviction was based on two instructions “of central
significance” to its analysis: (1) a second degree murder
instruction (CALJIC No. 8.31), and (2) general principles of
aiding and abetting (CALJIC No. 3.01). (Id. at p. 981.) As
Langi’s conviction was for second degree murder, the court found
CALJIC No. 8.31 permitted a conviction insofar the perpetrator
deliberately performed a fatal act (a punch) “with knowledge of
the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life,” and
did not require finding the perpetrator’s purpose was to kill the
victim. (Id. at pp. 981–982.) For the jury to convict the
defendant as an aider and abettor of second degree murder, it
could have found Langi “need only have intended to encourage
the perpetrator’s intentional act—in this case, punching [the
victim]—whether or not [Langi] intended to aid or encourage
[the] killing, and whether or not he personally knew of and
disregarded the risk of such a killing.” (Id. at p. 983, fn. omitted.)
Unlike the defendant in Langi, defendant in this case was
convicted of first degree murder. The instructions on this theory
of liability required the finding of express malice as either the
perpetrator (the actual killer) or as an aider and abettor. As
such, the instructional ambiguities in Langi permitting the jury
to impute implied malice do not exist in this case. (Accord,
Cortes, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th 198, 205–206 [“Nothing in the
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charges, the instructions, or the balance of the trial permitted the
jury to find Cortes guilty on a theory other than direct aiding and
abetting or liability as a perpetrator of murder and attempted
murder”].)
DISPOSITION
The order summarily denying defendant’s petition for
resentencing is affirmed.
MORI, J
We concur:
COLLINS, Acting P. J.
ZUKIN, J.
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