CourtListener 9987744•People v. Alfaro CA2/1
Texto completo
Filed 7/2/24 P. v. Alfaro CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B331840
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA044147)
v.
MIGUEL ALFARO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Daniel Feldstern, Judge. Affirmed.
Cynthia L. Barnes, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Lauren N. Guber, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
In 2022, while Miguel Alfaro was serving a long prison
sentence, the Secretary of the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) requested that the court
recall Alfaro’s sentence in light of a recent amendment to Penal
Code section 1385 and resentence him in accordance with now
Penal Code section 1172.1.1 After briefing and a hearing, the
court denied the request on the ground that Alfaro presented an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.
Alfaro contends the trial court abused its discretion, as the
finding that he remained an unreasonable risk of danger was
speculative and unsupported by the record. We disagree, and
thus affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
Alfaro has an extensive criminal history comprising 16
strike convictions in 11 separate felony cases between 1984 and
2004 and has been incarcerated for 40 of his 60 years, during
which he attempted to escape twice. He was involved in
approximately eight fights from 1989 to 2000 while incarcerated
and was placed in a single-occupancy cell from 2009 to 2022 for
the safety of the prison population.
In 2003, Alfaro pleaded no contest to three counts of
residential burglary and one each of grand theft and receiving
stolen property, and admitted five prior convictions within the
meaning of the “Three Strikes” law. The trial court sentenced
him to 40 years to life in prison, and we affirmed the conviction.
(People v. Alfaro (Dec. 27, 2005, B174698) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2004, Alfaro was removed from prison and transported
to Men’s Central Jail in Los Angeles County to be prosecuted for
1 Undesignated statutory references will be to the Penal
Code.
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a residential robbery. A report detailed the facts of the robbery:
In 2003, when he was 40 years old, Alfaro broke into the victim’s
home and encountered her in a bedroom, where he pushed her
face down onto a bed and grabbed the waistband of her
sweatpants. The victim begged Alfaro not to hurt her and led
him to an envelope containing cash. Unhappy with the amount
of cash in the envelope, Alfaro threw the victim to the ground and
“hogtied” her on the kitchen floor with a telephone cord. He then
ransacked the home, taking $500 cash and two expensive
watches.
While in the Men’s Central Jail, Alfaro obtained an assault
rifle from someone outside the jail and attempted to escape,
physically assaulting a custodial officer in the process. He was
charged with escape from custody with the use of violence and a
firearm. Pursuant to a negotiated plea, the court dismissed the
residential robbery charge and sentenced Alfaro to 25 years to life
for the aggravated escape, consecutive to the burglary sentence
he was already serving.
On January 6, 2022, the CDCR Secretary Kathleen Allison
requested that the court recall the 59-year-old Alfaro’s sentence
and resentence him in accordance with section 1172.1.
Allison stated: “[A]fter personally reviewing inmate
Alfaro’s commitment offense and in-prison conduct, I recommend
that inmate Alfaro’s sentence be recalled and that he be
resentenced in accordance with PC section 1170, subdivision
(d)(1).”
In support, Secretary Allison attached a report from a
corrections counselor concerning Alfaro’s conduct in prison. It
indicated that Alfaro tested negative for drugs five times and had
no pending disciplinary actions. He received his GED while in
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Soledad State Prison on November 12, 1986, and received
satisfactory marks in computer and office worker vocational
training and for his service as a dining room worker, and
exceptional marks for his performance as a yard worker. He was
commended twice for his progress in anger management
counseling.
However, in 2006 and 2009, Alfaro received three rules
violation reports for fighting, battery on an inmate with serious
bodily injury, and “mutual combat resulting in use of force.” In
2005 and 2010, Alfaro was counseled three times regarding theft
of state property, disobeying orders, and consuming medication
at the medication window rather than placing it in his pocket.
After briefing by the parties, the trial court held a hearing
on the CDCR’s request. At the hearing, the court observed that
although Alfaro committed several crimes during much of his
adult life, his most recent crimes occurred in his mature years,
and escalated significantly. He broke into a woman’s home and
bound her wrists and ankles with a telephone cord when the
victim did not produce enough cash in response to his demands.
He then conspired to escape from custody, and physically
assaulted and threatened to kill a custodial officer while armed
with an assault weapon. The court reasoned that although Alfaro
was not convicted of a “super strike,” his “willingness to kill
somebody in an attempt to escape” demonstrated he was
“someone who could reasonably commit one,” and he thus posed
an ongoing danger to society. Accordingly, the court denied the
CDCR’s request that Alfaro be resentenced.
DISCUSSION
Alfaro contends the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his motion for resentencing. We disagree.
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A. Law Governing a Request for Resentencing
“When a defendant, upon conviction for a felony offense,
has been committed to the custody of the Secretary of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation . . . , the court
may, . . . at any time upon the recommendation of the
secretary . . . , recall the sentence and commitment previously
ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if
they had not previously been sentenced, . . . provided the new
sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.”
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).)
Should the trial court decide to recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant, it must “apply the sentencing rules of
the Judicial Council and apply any changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing”
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(2)) and “may, in the interest of justice . . .
[¶] . . . [r]educe a defendant’s term of imprisonment by modifying
the sentence.” (Id. at subd. (a)(3)(A).)
“In recalling and resentencing pursuant to this provision,
the court may consider postconviction factors, including, but not
limited to, the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of
the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether
age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have
reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence
that reflects that circumstances have changed since the original
sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(4).)
If a resentencing request is from the Secretary of the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, “[t]here shall be a
presumption favoring recall and resentencing of the defendant,
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which may only be overcome if a court finds the defendant is an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in
subdivision (c) of Section 1170.18.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2).)
Subdivision (c) of section 1170.18 defines “unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety” as “an unreasonable risk that the
petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of
clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e)
of Section 667.” Section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv) lists several
violent felonies, including “[a] ‘sexually violent offense,’ ” “[a]ny
homicide offense, including any attempted homicide offense,”
“[a]ssault with a machinegun on a peace officer or firefighter,”
and “[a]ny serious or violent felony offense punishable in
California by life imprisonment or death.”
We review denial of recall for an abuse of discretion.
(People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1082.) In doing so,
we presume the ruling is correct, indulging all intendments and
presumptions in favor of its correctness; the appellant bears the
burden of providing an adequate record affirmatively proving
error. (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.)
B. Alfaro’s Claims of Error Do Not Warrant Reversal
Alfaro aptly observes that under the statutory scheme
outlined above, a resentencing request from the Secretary of the
CDCR raises a presumption favoring resentencing which may
only be overcome if the court finds the defendant currently poses
an unreasonable risk of committing a new violent felony such as
a homicide offense or assault on a peace officer with a machine
gun.
The trial court’s finding that Alfaro posed such a risk was
supported by several facts: Alfaro committed more than a dozen
strike offenses over the course of 20 years, during most of which
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time he was incarcerated. His last three offenses occurred not in
his distant youth but when he was 40 years old, and were
progressively more violent, culminating in an assault on a peace
officer with an assault weapon and a death threat in an
attempted prison escape.
This record readily supports the court’s finding that
Alfaro’s willingness to kill someone in an attempt to escape
prison could reasonably find its outlet the next time he robbed a
house and faced apprehension by police, both of which
circumstances the record demonstrates are reasonably likely to
occur.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
CHANEY, J.
We concur:
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
WEINGART, J.
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