CourtListener 9987320•Alvidrez v. Castillo CA4/3
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Filed 7/1/24 Alvidrez v. Castillo CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ALICE ALVIDREZ,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G062421
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2019-01105688)
MEREDITH ANNE CASTILLO, OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Theodore R. Howard, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Richard A. Jones, Richard A. Jones, Jarrick S.
Goldhamer; and Kristen Martin for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Roy L. Comer; SKB Law and Susan Knock Beck for Defendant
and Respondent.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
In March 1994, Lamberto Castillo shot and killed Kenny Sommer
and Chen Blanchard in downtown Huntington Beach. Lamberto was not
arrested and charged until April 2017 and, in November 2019 he pleaded
guilty to two counts of voluntary manslaughter.
In 2019, Sommer’s mother, plaintiff Alice Alvidrez, sued
Lamberto Castillo and his wife Meredith Castillo under several theories for
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the wrongful death of Sommer. Alvidrez alleged that Meredith had a duty to
protect Sommer by virtue of her ability to control Lamberto and had aided
and abetted, and conspired with, Lamberto to kill Sommer.
The trial court granted Meredith’s motion for summary judgment
on the grounds of lack of evidence sufficient to establish a duty of care and to
support allegations that Meredith had aided and abetted and conspired with
Lamberto. We affirm the judgment but on a different ground raised by
Meredith’s motion for summary judgment: We conclude the undisputed facts
establish the claims against Meredith are time-barred under Code of Civil
Procedure section 335.1.
FACTS
On March 31, 1994, as Lamberto and Meredith were walking
through downtown Huntington Beach, they saw two men (Sommer and
Blanchard) openly urinating in the street. Lamberto verbally confronted
Sommer and Blanchard. Meredith said nothing to either man. Either
Sommer or Blanchard pushed Lamberto. Meredith had no physical contact
1
For convenience, we refer to Lamberto Castillo as Lamberto and
Meredith Castillo as Meredith.
2
with Sommer or Chen. Meredith led Lamberto away from the encounter, and
they walked directly home.
Once home, Lamberto took a gun, which he owned but was
registered under Meredith’s maiden name, and some ammunition. Meredith
did not retrieve the gun or the ammunition for Lamberto. He then drove
himself back to where he had seen Sommer and Blanchard, parked, walked a
short distance, and shot and killed both Sommer and Blanchard. Lamberto
immediately drove home. Only Meredith was home when he arrived.
About four days after killing Sommer and Blanchard, Lamberto
got rid of the gun by placing it in a dumpster behind a store in Costa Mesa or
Santa Ana.
After killing Sommer and Blanchard, Lamberto changed his
appearance by cutting his hair, shaving his face, and periodically thereafter
continued to change his appearance. Lamberto and Meredith lived in their
home in Huntington Beach until 1997, and Lamberto continued to work as a
teacher at a local public school until 1999. Lamberto and Meredith moved to
Colorado sometime between 2004 and 2007.
In April 2017, Lamberto was arrested and charged in the
murders of Sommer and Blanchard. In November 2018, Lamberto pleaded
guilty to two counts of voluntary manslaughter with enhancements for use of
a firearm. He was sentenced to 19 years 4 months in prison. Although
Lamberto pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter, the factual basis offered
for his plea was: “[O]n 3/31/94, I unlawfully and with malice aforethought
killed Kenny Sommer and Chen Cosmo Maui Blanchard, human beings. I
committed these killings with a firearm.” (Italics added.)
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PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Alvidrez initiated this lawsuit in October 2019 by filing a
complaint asserting a negligence cause of action against Meredith and an
intentional tort cause of action against Lamberto. The operative complaint is
the second amended complaint, filed in May 2022, which asserted a general
negligence cause of action against Meredith and an intentional tort cause of
action against both Meredith and Lamberto.
As to the events on March 31, 1994, Alvidrez alleged Meredith
was negligent in failing to prevent Lamberto from killing Sommer for these
reasons: (1) Meredith knew or should have known of Lamberto’s “aggressive
nature, poor decision-making, and the dangerous consequences of his
decisions,” which “involved public confrontations and disputes”; (2) despite
knowledge of Lamberto’s “aggressive nature and prior criminal actions,”
Meredith purchased a handgun, registered it in her own name, and
“negligently entrusted” the handgun to Lamberto; (3) although Meredith
knew how to secure the handgun and make it inaccessible to Lamberto, she
failed to safely and lawfully secure the handgun; (4) Meredith knew how to
steer Lamberto away “from pursuing his dangerous activities and had
successfully intervened in the prior altercation”; (5) Meredith “facilitate[d]
and tacitly encourage[d Lamberto] to proceed with his known and obvious
murderous intentions”; (6) Meredith was present when Lamberto retrieved
her handgun and “negligently and carelessly” failed to take any action to
prevent Lamberto from taking it, even though she knew he intended to use it
to kill Sommer and Blanchard; and (7) Meredith knew or should have known
that Lamberto left their home with her handgun with the intent to kill
Sommer and Blanchard.
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The second amended complaint alleged that Meredith was liable
for intentional tort under the theory that she aided and conspired with
Lamberto to kill Sommer and Blanchard. The complaint alleged that in
furtherance of the conspiracy, or to aid and abet Lamberto, Meredith helped
him change his appearance to avoid detection, “hid her knowledge of the
crime and involvement in procurement of the handgun used in the crime,”
and failed to report the handgun as lost or missing.
In September 2022, Meredith filed a motion for summary
judgment or, in the alternative, for summary adjudication. The motion for
summary judgment raised five issues.2 Meredith’s separate statement of
undisputed facts (separate statement) was based on 13 undisputed material
facts divided among those five issues. The motion for summary judgment,
broadly speaking, asserted judgment in Meredith’s favor was warranted
because (1) Alvidrez’s insufficient discovery responses showed that she did
not have evidence to support her claims, (2) the evidence submitted by
Meredith negated elements of the negligence and intentional tort causes of
action, and (3) the complaint was time-barred as a matter of law under Code
of Civil Procedure section 335.1.
2
The five issues were: (1) “As to the first cause of action for
general negligence, Meredith Castillo owed no duty to control her husband or
to protect his victims”; (2) “There is no merit to the claim against Meredith
Castillo for damages for negligent entrustment of the gun”; (3) “There is no
merit to the claim against Meredith Castillo for damages for not reporting
the disposition of the gun”; (4) There is no merit to the claim against
Meredith Castillo for damages for intentional tort; (5) “Neither cause of
action against Meredith Castillo has merit because [Code of Civil Procedure
section] 335.1 bars it and Meredith did not actively conceal her identity or
that of her husband.”
5
In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Alvidrez
argued the motion was “procedurally deficient,” Meredith had failed to
support her contentions with reasoned arguments and citation to authority,
and the evidence submitted by Meredith was deficient and failed to show that
she was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
In January 2023, the trial court granted the motion for summary
judgment. As to the negligence cause of action, the court found that Meredith
had “met her burden to show a lack of evidence sufficient to establish a
cognizable duty of care which would extend from Meredith to [Alvidrez’s] son,
as she has presented evidence to show that she had no prior knowledge of
and played no part in the criminal acts committed by Lamberto.” The burden
shifted to Alvidrez, and the court found she had failed to meet her burden to
show a triable issue existed and had presented no evidence of any
circumstance that would render Meredith liable for negligence.
The trial court found that Meredith had met her burden to show
lack of evidence sufficient to support the intentional tort cause of action, the
burden of production shifted to Alvidrez, and she had failed to meet her
burden of raising a triable issue. The court did not address Meredith’s
contention that Alvidrez’s claims against her were barred by the statute of
limitations of Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1. Judgment was entered,
and Alvidrez timely appealed from it.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We review orders granting summary judgment de novo. (Shin v.
Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 499.) Summary judgment is warranted if the
moving papers establish there is no triable issue of material fact and the
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moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 437c, subd. (c); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843
(Aguilar).)
We consider all the evidence presented by the parties (except for
evidence which the trial court properly excluded), liberally construe the
evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve all
doubts about the evidence in that party’s favor. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46
Cal.4th 1035, 1039.) We draw from the evidence all reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. (Aguilar,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.) Although we cannot weigh the plaintiff’s
evidence and inferences from that evidence against those of the defendant,
we “must nevertheless determine what any evidence or inference could show
or imply to a reasonable trier of fact.” (Id. at p. 856, italics omitted.)
We may affirm summary judgment on any ground which appears
in the record and which the opposing party had an adequate opportunity to
address. (Angelica Textile Services, Inc. v. Park (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 495,
508-509.)
II. Meredith’s Separate Statement Supported the Motion for Summary
Judgment
Alvidrez argues Meredith did not meet her burden on a summary
judgment motion because her separate statement of undisputed material
facts failed to comply with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule
3.1350 (d) and (h). Specifically, Alvidrez asserts that only two of the five
issues (issues Nos. 1 & 5) in the separate statement “articulate a valid basis
for potential adjudication,” and issues Nos. 2, 3, and 4 are ambiguous and did
not properly identify an issue for adjudication.
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The trial court agreed that Meredith’s separate statement did not
comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350 with respect to the
alternate request for summary adjudication of issues. The court concluded,
and we agree, the separate statement “adequately support[ed], in the
aggregate, the motion for summary judgment.” Meredith’s separate
statement is based on 13 undisputed material facts divided among five issue
headings. If the issue headings were removed, the separate statement would
comport with the format required by rule 3.1350 for a motion for summary
judgment.
Further, “[t]he court’s power to deny summary judgment on the
basis of failure to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350 is
discretionary, not mandatory.” (Truong v. Glasser (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th
102, 118.) The trial court exercised its discretion to grant the motion for
summary judgment notwithstanding defects in the separate statement and
exercised its discretion to deny summary adjudication due to those defects in
the separate statement. We find no abuse of discretion.
III. Under the Undisputed Facts, Alvidrez’s Claims Are Time-barred
Both of Alvidrez’s causes of action against Meredith were subject
to a two-year statute of limitations. (Code Civ. Proc., § 335.1.)3 Those causes
3
Meredith’s causes of action against Lamberto are subject to
Code of Civil Procedure section 340.3, subdivision (a), which states: “Unless
a longer period is prescribed for a specific action, in any action for damages
against a defendant based upon the defendant’s commission of a felony
offense for which the defendant has been convicted, the time for
commencement of the action shall be within one year after judgment is
pronounced.”
Code of Civil Procedure section 335.1 was added by Statutes
2002, chapter 448, section 2, and became effective on January 1, 2003. (See
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of action accrued on the date of injury, which was the date that Sommers was
killed. (Kleefeld v. Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1684 [“The
4
date of injury in a wrongful death cause of action is the date of death”].)
Lamberto killed Sommers on March 31, 1994. Alvidrez filed her
complaint in October 2019. Alvidrez’s causes of action are therefore
time-barred unless accrual is delayed or the statute of limitations is tolled.
Accrual of Alvidrez’s causes of action is not delayed under the
discovery rule. Inasmuch as Sommers was a homicide victim, a reasonable
person would suspect on the date he was killed his death was caused by
wrongdoing. (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1110.)
Failure to discover or have reason to discover the identity of the
defendant does not delay accrual of the cause of action. (Norgart v. Upjohn
Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 399.) Nevertheless, “a defendant may be equitably
estopped from asserting the statute of limitations when, as a result of
intentional concealment, the plaintiff is unable to discover the defendant’s
actual identity.” (Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries (1994) 7 Cal.4th
926, 936.) Under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, an action filed after the
Historical and Statutory Notes, 13B West’s Ann. Code Civ. Proc. (2023 ed.)
foll. § 335.1, p. 179.) Before that date, wrongful death actions were subject to
a one-year limitations period. (Former Code Civ. Proc., § 340.) When
Alvidrez’s cause of action accrued, it was subject to the one-year statute of
limitations. We use the two-year statute of limitations period because
Meredith has never argued the shorter period applies to Alvidrez’s wrongful
death causes of actions.
4
Meredith asserted the statute of limitations defense to the
complaint and demurred to the first amended complaint on that ground.
When Meredith filed her motion for summary judgment, she had not yet
answered the second amended complaint and was simultaneously bringing a
demurrer.
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limitations period has expired may proceed if “‘the plaintiff is unaware of the
identity of the wrongdoer and this is due to fraudulent concealment by the
defendant.’” (Prudential-LMI Com. Insurance v. Superior Court (1990) 51
Cal.3d 674, 690.)
Alvidrez alleged in her second amended complaint that Meredith
helped Lamberto change his appearance to avoid detection, “hid her
knowledge of the crime and involvement in the procurement of the handgun
used in the crime,” and failed to report the handgun as lost or missing.
With the motion for summary judgment, Meredith submitted a
declaration from Lamberto in which he declared: (1) “About four days after
March 31, 1994, I disposed of the gun I had used to shoot the two men by
leaving it in a dumpster behind a store in Costa Mesa or Santa Ana”; (2) “I
did not change my appearance after the killings by changing the style of my
hair, the hats I wore, or otherwise,” (3) “Meredith never did anything that
assisted me to change my appearance, hair style, clothing or hats, or helped
me to conceal or disguise my identity after the killings,” (4) after killing
Sommer, he and Meredith continued to live at the same home in Huntington
Beach California until 1997 and, until 1999, he continued working as a
teacher at the same school; and (5) “It is inaccurate to say that after the
killings I stopped going for walks where the killings occurred or visiting Main
Street in Huntington Beach because I generally did not go there before the
killings.”
Meredith also submitted excerpts from Lamberto’s deposition
transcript at which Lamberto testified he disposed of the gun by placing it in
a dumpster, did not tell his wife about it, and “never spoke with her about
anything that had to do with that.” Lamberto testified that Meredith did not
assist him in killing Sommer: She did not bring Lamberto the gun,
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ammunition, or car keys, did not help him plan the killing, and did not assist
him in changing his appearance.
Lamberto’s declaration and deposition transcript excerpts
satisfied Meredith’s initial burden of production to make a prima facie
showing of the nonexistence of a triable issue regarding concealment.
(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) The burden of production shifted to
Alvidrez. (Ibid.) To meet that burden, Alvidrez submitted a declaration from
her counsel, excerpts from Lamberto’s deposition transcript, her initial
complaint and second amended complaint, an objection to the notice of
deposition of Meredith, a page from a police report, and the felony guilty plea
form signed by Lamberto.
Counsel’s declaration sought to relate information counsel had
obtained from the criminal investigation of Sommer’s murder. The trial court
sustained Meredith’s objections to those parts of counsel’s declaration, and
Alvidrez does not challenge that ruling. The initial complaint and second
amended complaint are not evidence. In the excerpts from Lamberto’s
deposition transcript, Lamberto testified he told Meredith which gun to
purchase, she purchased the gun and registered it in her name and gave him
the gun as a birthday gift. He testified it was not possible that Meredith
purchased the ammunition because “[s]he doesn’t know anything about
guns.” He also testified that Meredith did not assist him in killing Sommer.
Meredith appeared at her deposition but asserted the spousal
testimonial privilege and privilege against self-incrimination to nearly every
question. Alvidrez never moved to compel Meredith to answer any questions.
In civil proceedings, adverse inferences may not be drawn from the exercise
of a privilege, including the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
11
incrimination. (Evid. Code, § 913, subd. (a); People v. Holloway (2004) 33
Cal.4th 96, 131.)
In the police report dated May 11, 2017, it is reported that
Meredith told a police investigator that on the date of the murder Lamberto’s
hair had been in a ponytail, but Lamberto shaved it off and became clean
shaven. Meredith was reported to say that Lamberto had started to change
his appearance and looked like “a shape-shifter, a ‘Bob Dylan type’” and that
“sometimes he would let his hair grow past his shoulders, and then he’d
shave it all off [o]r he’d grow a beard and then shave that off too.”
The police report, even if accepted as admissible evidence,5 did
not create a triable issue as to whether Lamberto and Meredith concealed
their identities to avoid detection. Alvidrez presented no evidence to counter
Lamberto’s declaration that Meredith did not assist him in changing his
appearance or to conceal his identity, that Lamberto disposed of the gun and
never spoke to Meredith about it, that he and Meredith continued to reside in
the same home for several years after the murders, that Lamberto continued
in his position as a school teacher, or that he and Meredith did not change
the places they frequented. Nor did Alvidrez produce evidence, such as her
own declaration, to establish that her inability to identify the wrongdoers
was due to fraudulent concealment by Lamberto or Meredith. Finally,
Alvidrez filed her complaint more than two years after the May 2017 police
report implicating Lamberto in killing Sommer.
5
The contents of the police report, including statements made
by Meredith, were inadmissible because they constituted double hearsay.
(Jane IL Doe v. Brightstar Residential Inc. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 171, 178.)
The trial court overruled Meredith’s objection to the report, but she does not
challenge the court’s ruling.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Meredith is entitled to costs on appeal.
SANCHEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’LEARY, P. J.
GOODING, J.
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