CourtListener 9986863•People v. Ruiz CA2/1
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Filed 6/28/24 P. v. Ruiz CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B332630
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA052592)
v.
LAURO DAVID RUIZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Daniel B. Feldstern, Judge. Affirmed.
Deborah L. Hawkins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jonathan Kline and Kristen J. Inberg, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
In 2006, a jury convicted Lauro David Ruiz (Ruiz) of
attempted murder after he attacked E.C. with a meat cleaver.
The trial court sentenced Ruiz to life in prison with the possibility
of parole, plus six years.
Ruiz now asks us to reverse the trial court’s order summarily
denying his petition filed pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6
(formerly section 1170.95).1 That section permits inter alia a
person convicted of “attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine” to challenge the conviction and
seek resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
We conclude, however, that the record of conviction here
establishes that the jury did not convict Ruiz pursuant to the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. To the contrary, the
jury found that Ruiz personally attacked E.C. with the intent to
kill. We therefore affirm.
FACTUAL SUMMARY AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY2
A. Overview of the Crime and Ruiz’s Trial
In July 2005, Los Angeles Police Department officers
witnessed Ruiz strike E.C. in the throat with a meat cleaver that
had been taped to the head of a golf club. Although injured, E.C.
survived the incident. The Los Angeles County District Attorney’s
Office charged Ruiz with one count of attempted premeditated
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664) and one count of assault with a
deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)).
The case proceeded to a jury trial in July 2006. As relevant
here, the trial court instructed the jury that it could convict Ruiz of
1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We summarize here only the facts and procedural history
relevant to our resolution of this appeal.
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attempted murder only if it determined that he “intended to kill”
E.C. The court did not instruct on the felony murder rule, the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any other theory of
liability involving imputed malice.
The jury convicted Ruiz on both counts. With respect to the
attempted murder charge, the jury found that Ruiz had acted
“willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation.” In addition, the
jury found that Ruiz had “personally used a deadly and dangerous
weapon, . . . [a] meat cleaver,” in committing the offense. The trial
court sentenced Ruiz to life in prison with the possibility of parole,
plus six years.
B. Subsequent Changes to the Law of Murder and
Attempted Murder
Effective January 1, 2019, approximately 12 years after
Ruiz’s conviction, “the Legislature passed Senate Bill [No.] 1437
‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual
killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major
participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).)
The bill accomplished this objective by, among other
changes, amending section 188 to provide that “[m]alice shall not
be imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a
crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).) The bill also amended section 189 by
“limit[ing] the felony-murder rule to cases where the defendant was
the actual killer, acted with an intent to kill, or acted as a ‘major
participant’ in the underlying felony and with ‘reckless indifference
to human life.’ ” (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 543
(Coley).) “In addition to substantively amending sections 188
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and 189,” the bill added section 1172.6, which provides a procedure
whereby “convicted murderers who could not be convicted under the
law as amended” may petition to have their conviction vacated and
be resentenced on any remaining counts. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 959.)
Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature enacted Senate
Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), which expanded the scope
of section 1172.6’s relief to defendants (1) convicted of murder
based on any “other theory under which malice is imputed to a
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime,” and
(2) convicted of “attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1); Coley, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at p. 548.)
If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, including “[a] declaration by the petitioner that the
petitioner is eligible for relief,” the trial court must appoint counsel,
if requested (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A) & (b)(3)); the prosecutor
must file and serve a response to the petition, to which the
petitioner may reply (§ 1172.6, subd. (c)); and “[a]fter the parties
have had an opportunity to submit briefings, the court shall hold a
hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie
case for relief.” (Ibid.)
In assessing eligibility at the prima facie stage, the court
“ ‘ “takes petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a
preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be
entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.” ’ ”
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) “ ‘[A] court should not reject
the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without
first conducting an evidentiary hearing.’ [Citations.]” (Ibid.) The
court may summarily deny the petition, however, if the record of
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conviction demonstrates that the petitioner is ineligible for relief as
a matter of law. (Id. at pp. 970–972.)
Where a trial court denies a section 1172.6 petition based
on the failure to make a prima facie case for relief, our review is
de novo. (See Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 545.)
C. Ruiz’s Section 1172.6 Petition
On May 27, 2022, Ruiz filed a pro se petition pursuant to
section 1172.6 challenging his conviction for attempted murder.
The District Attorney’s Office filed an opposition to the petition,
arguing that Ruiz was ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter
of law. The trial court appointed counsel for Ruiz, who filed a reply
in support of his petition. At the July 27, 2023 hearing on the
petition, the court heard argument from both parties concerning
whether Ruiz had established a prima facie case for relief. The
court concluded that Ruiz had failed to do so, explaining: “So I
did review the verdict forms . . . . I did review carefully the jury
instructions that were provided to [Ruiz’s] jury. And what can be
derived from that is that when they were instructed on the crime
of attempted murder, the only mental state that was provided to
the jury was an intent to kill.”
Ruiz timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Ruiz is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law
because the record of conviction establishes that the jury did not
convict him pursuant to the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.
The prosecution alleged that Ruiz, acting alone, committed
attempted murder by striking E.C. in the throat with a meat
cleaver. The trial court instructed the jury that, to find Ruiz guilty
of attempted murder, it must conclude that he “intended to kill.”
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The court did not instruct the jury on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. In addition, the jury determined that Ruiz
committed the attempted murder willfully, and with deliberation
and premeditation—findings that the court instructed the jurors
they could make only if they concluded that Ruiz “intended to kill
when he acted,” and that he “decided to kill before acting” after
“carefully weigh[ing] the considerations for and against his choice.”
We therefore conclude that Ruiz is ineligible for section 1172.6
relief as a matter of law.
Ruiz’s conclusory argument in opposition does not persuade
us otherwise. He insists—without further elaboration—that the
trial court erred in denying his petition without first conducting an
evidentiary hearing because “[Senate Bill No.] 775 added language
to section 1172.6 that no longer restricts relief to defendants
convicted under theories of felony murder or natural and probable
consequences.”
But section 1172.6 “applies by its terms only to attempted
murders based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.”
(Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 548; accord, People v. Lovejoy
(2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860, 865, petn. for review filed June 11,
2024, S285447.) Accordingly, the court properly denied Ruiz’s
petition at the prima facie stage. (See People v. Curiel (2023) 15
Cal.5th 433, 463 [prima facie showing is not made where record
conclusively establishes every element of the offense]; People v.
Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887, 893 [“[t]he record supports the
trial court’s decision to deny the petition because [the defendant]
was not eligible for relief ”].)
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DISPOSITION
The July 27, 2023 order denying Ruiz’s section 1172.6 petition
is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
CHANEY, J.
WEINGART, J.
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