CourtListener 9986757•People v. Perez CA5
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Filed 6/28/24 P. v. Perez CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F086417
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. F23900058)
v.
MARCOS PEREZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Alvin M.
Harrell, III, Judge.
Vicki Highwater, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Sally Espinoza,
Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
On January 3, 2023, defendant Marco Perez stole a moped-style scooter from J.M.
On April 5, 2023, Perez was convicted by a jury of second degree robbery. Perez was
sentenced to an aggregate term of nine years. Perez argues that the conviction was not
supported by substantial evidence and that the trial court abused its discretion by
declining to strike the prior serious felony conviction enhancement. The People disagree.
We affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 30, 2023, the Fresno County District Attorney filed a first amended
information charging Perez with second degree robbery (Penal Code,1 § 211; count 1).
The first amended information also alleged that Perez had suffered a prior strike
conviction within the meaning of the “Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12,
subds. (a)-(d)), and that Perez had suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)). Finally, the first amended information alleged three aggravating factors.
On April 5, 2023, Perez was found guilty by a jury on count 1. At a bifurcated
court trial on that same day, the trial court found true the prior strike allegation, the prior
serious felony allegation, and all three aggravating factors.
Perez was sentenced on May 10, 2023. The trial court imposed an aggregate term
of nine years (the mitigated term of two years, doubled to four years due to the prior
strike conviction, as well as five years for the prior serious felony enhancement).
On June 12, 2023, Perez filed a notice of appeal.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
The Prosecution’s Case
J.M., who was 11 years old at the time of trial, got a red moped-style scooter for
Christmas. On January 3, 2023, J.M. and a few of his friends were taking turns riding the
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2.
scooter. One of J.M.’s friends, N.R., was on the scooter when Perez approached on a
bicycle.
Perez asked J.M. how fast the scooter went, asked to test drive it, and offered to
buy it for $500 or $700. J.M. and N.R. did not allow Perez to test drive it, and J.M. stated
that he would not sell it for that amount but would sell it for $1,000. Perez said that was
too much, rode approximately eight yards away, and then came back.
When Perez came back, J.M. was on the scooter. Perez told J.M. to get off the
scooter. One of Perez’s hands was in his pocket, and J.M. thought Perez had a knife
because he saw a sharp object bulging out of Perez’s pocket. The object was shaped like
a triangle at the top, was slanted, and was pointed at J.M. However, J.M. was not able to
see exactly what Perez was holding, and it could have been a wallet or keys.
At this point, J.M. was scared. He gave Perez his scooter, even though he did not
want to. Perez dropped his bike and rode off on the scooter. N.R. watched Perez leave.
J.M. and his friends looked for Perez for approximately 10 to 15 minutes and then
went to get J.M.’s dad. J.M.’s dad called the police, and Fresno Police officers were
dispatched.
Officer Nicholas Quisenberry searched the area. Approximately 20 minutes after
the initial call, Quisenberry located Perez, who was operating a bright red moped-style
scooter. Perez was a couple of blocks away from where the incident occurred.
Quisenberry detained Perez. Quisenberry conducted a cursory patdown search of
Perez for weapons, but he did not find any. The police took J.M. and N.R. to the place
Perez was detained. J.M. and N.R. saw the man who took the scooter (Perez), as well as
the scooter.
Perez’s Case
Perez called H.F., J.M.’s father, as a witness. On January 3, 2023, J.M. came
home and told H.F. that someone just stole his scooter. Both N.R. and J.M. told H.F. that
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someone pulled a knife on them and took the scooter. J.M. also told H.F. that he did not
see the knife, but the “indentment” in the man’s pocket looked like a knife.
Perez also called Officer Alan Soghoian as a witness. Soghoian located Perez’s
bicycle near the area where the incident occurred.
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Conviction
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“Robbery is the taking of ‘personal property in the possession of another against
the will and from the person or immediate presence of that person accomplished by
means of force or fear and with the specific intent permanently to deprive such person of
such property.’ ” (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 234.) “If the defendant does
not harbor the intent to take property from the possessor at the time he applies force or
fear, the taking is … not a robbery.” (People v. Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 562;
accord, People v. Wallace (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1032, 1077 [“The intent to steal must be
formed either before or during the commission of the act of force”].)
When evaluating a sufficiency of evidence claim, “ ‘we review the whole record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
(People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507.) “The test for evaluating a sufficiency of
evidence claim is deferential.” (People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 411.) “We must
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact that the trier of fact could
reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919.)
“We must also ‘accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the
circumstantial evidence.’ ” (People v. Flores, supra, at p. 411.) “The conviction shall
stand ‘unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial
evidence to support [the conviction].” ’ ” (People v. Cravens, supra, at p. 508.)
4.
B. Analysis
Perez argues there was insufficient evidence to show that J.M. gave Perez the
scooter as a result of fear or that Perez intended to permanently deprive J.M. of the
scooter. The People disagree.
Perez’s arguments are not persuasive. J.M. testified that Perez told him to get off
the scooter while Perez pointed a sharp object at J.M. through his pocket. While J.M. did
not see the object, which was shaped like a triangle at the top and slanted, he thought it
was a knife. J.M. further testified that he did not want to give Perez his scooter and only
did so because he was scared. While N.R. testified that he was not scared and he did not
believe J.M. was scared, N.R. also testified that he was worried for J.M. and that J.M.
gave Perez the scooter because J.M. did not want anything to happen to J.M. Finally,
both J.M. and N.R. testified that Perez then left on the scooter and they could not find
him after searching for approximately 10 to 15 minutes.
This is substantial evidence from which a reasonable trial of fact could find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that J.M. gave Perez the scooter as a result of fear. (People v.
Collins (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 333, 340 [“In this context, fear means ‘ “sufficient fear to
cause the victim to comply with the unlawful demand for his property” ’ ”].) This is also
substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Perez intended to permanently deprive J.M. of his scooter. (People v.
Morales (1993) 19 Cal App.4th 1383, 1391 [“an intent to permanently deprive someone
of his or her property may be inferred when one unlawfully takes the property of
another”]; People v. Poindexter (1967) 255 Cal.App.2d 566, 569 [“In a robbery case, the
state has the burden of proving felonious intent, and that intent may be inferred when one
takes the property from another by force or fear”].)
And even if Perez is correct that there is some evidence in the record from which
the jury could have reasonably concluded that J.M. was not actually afraid or that Perez
intended to return the scooter, reversal is not warranted. (People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th
5.
620, 632 [“ ‘Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not
justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury
to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a
determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary
conflicts; we look for substantial evidence’ ”]; People v. Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p.
411 [“We must … ‘accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the
circumstantial evidence’ ”].)
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports Perez’s conviction and his claim fails.
II. Perez’s Claim of Error Under Section 1385
A. Additional Background
On May 10, 2023, the trial court held Perez’s sentencing hearing. The trial court
denied Perez’s request to strike the prior strike conviction and the prior serious felony
conviction enhancement, stating:
“[The] Court took a hard long look at this case to determine whether
or not it would be appropriate to strike the strikes in this case. The Court,
after considering everything, [Perez’s] prior criminal history, the nature of
the strike, the age of the strike, and the current offense, the Court is going
to respectfully deny the request to strike the strike.
“This is [Perez’s] eighth felony conviction, he was on a grant of
PRCS [post-release community supervision] when the crime was
committed. His past performance on probation and on parole, PRCS has
been less than stellar. There have been no less than -- so it’s three prior
parole violations, there have been multiple post community supervision
release violations, he’s had opportunities with flash incarceration on a
number of occasions, and it simply has not worked.”
The trial court then noted that it could impose the aggravated term, but instead
chose the mitigated term of two years. Given the prior strike and the prior serious felony
conviction enhancement, Perez was sentenced to an aggregate term of nine years.
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B. Analysis
Perez argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Perez’s
request to strike the prior serious felony enhancement pursuant to section 1385.
Specifically, Perez argues that the trial court failed to give great weight to two mitigating
factors and “failed to articulate findings as to how public safety would be negatively
impacted should the court fail to impose the serious felony enhancement.” The People
argue that Perez forfeited this claim, and even if he did not, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion. We agree with the People.
i. Defendant Forfeited This Claim
“ ‘A party in a criminal case may not, on appeal, raise “claims involving the trial
court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices” if the
party did not object to the sentence at trial. [Citation.] The rule applies to “cases in
which the stated reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which
the court purportedly erred because it double-counted a particular sentencing factor,
misweighed the various factors, or failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number
of valid reasons.” ’ ” (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 406.) “Strong policy
reasons support this rule: ‘It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on
appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easily
corrected or avoided. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘ “The law casts upon the party the
duty of looking after his legal rights and of calling the judge’s attention to any
infringement of them. If any other rule were to obtain, the party would in most cases be
careful to be silent as to his objections until it would be too late to obviate them, and the
result would be that few judgments would stand the test of an appeal.” ’ ” [Citation.]’ ”
(People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114; accord, People v. Salazar (2016) 63
Cal.4th 214, 239-240; People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 46.)
Perez is correct that the trial court did not specifically state that it gave great
weight to any mitigating factor or make a finding on the record that dismissal of the
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enhancement would endanger public safety. However, the reason appears to be because
it was not asked to. As admitted by Perez, “defense counsel did not explicitly argue that
the court must give great weight to dismissal of the enhancement due to the presence of
two mitigating factors, unless and until the court found that dismissal would endanger
public safety.” Moreover, Perez did not object that the trial court failed to make an
express finding that relief would endanger public safety or otherwise call the trial court’s
attention to what he now characterizes as errors entitling him to relief from the trial
court’s ruling, and there is no indication that he did not have an opportunity to do so.
Had Perez objected or otherwise alerted the trial court to the errors he now
complains of, the errors could have been corrected or the record otherwise developed as
to the issues. “[A] party cannot argue on appeal that the trial court erred in failing to
conduct an analysis it was not asked to conduct” (People v. Fruits (2016) 247
Cal.App.4th 188, 208, fn. omitted), and strong policy reasons support application of the
rule in the situation presented in this case (People v. Stowell, supra, 31 Cal.4th at
p. 1114).
ii. Perez’s Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Argument Fails
Perez, for the first time in his reply brief, argues that if the claim was forfeited,
defense counsel provided ineffective assistance and we should consider the section 1385
claim even if it was forfeited. This argument fails.
Perez has the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Pope
(1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425, overruled on other grounds in People v. Berryman
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081, fn. 10.) To establish such a claim, a defendant must show
(1) his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
(2) prejudice, that is, but for counsel’s unprofessional error a different result would have
been reasonably probable. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694
(Strickland); People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218.) “A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
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(Strickland, at p. 694.) “Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation [of
counsel’s performance], a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant
must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” (Id. at p. 689.)
“It is … particularly difficult to establish ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal, where we are limited to evaluating the appellate record. If the record does
not shed light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the challenged manner, we must
reject the claim on appeal unless counsel was asked for and failed to provide a
satisfactory explanation, or there simply can be no satisfactory explanation.” (People v.
Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1212.)
Here, the record does not shed light on the reason defense counsel did not object to
the trial court’s ruling on the grounds that the trial court did not provide great weight to
factors in mitigation or make a finding of dangerousness, defense counsel was not asked
why he failed to act, and there is a satisfactory explanation for the failure.
Counsel is presumed competent and to be familiar with the relevant law.
(Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 690; People v. Barrett (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1081, 1105).
Additionally, in the sentencing memorandum in mitigation, defense counsel argued that
the strike prior should be dismissed; cited to section 1385, subdivision (c), for the
proposition that there is a presumption of dismissal when the prior conviction is more
than five years old; and argued that the middle term was appropriate. Thus, defense
counsel directed the trial court’s attention to the presumption of dismissal in section
1385, subdivision (c), and nothing in the record shows that defense counsel did not know
the relevant law or that defense counsel failed to advocate for his client. While Perez is
correct that defense counsel could have “more fully argue[d] the application of section
1385,” Perez has not shown that the failure to do so fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness.
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Moreover, there can be a satisfactory explanation for defense counsel’s failure to
object or make further arguments regarding section 1385, subdivision (c). After the trial
court denied Perez’s request without stating that it gave great weight to any mitigating
factor or making a finding on the record that dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety, the trial court stated that it could impose the upper term but
would instead impose the mitigated term. While defense counsel could have objected on
the ground that the trial court failed to properly apply section 1385 and/or asked the trial
court to make findings on the record, imposition of the mitigated term of four years
instead of the upper term of 10 years resulted in a reduced sentence of six years. This
was a better outcome than if the trial court struck the five-year prior serious felony
enhancement but imposed the upper term (which the trial court twice said was justified).
It also went against the 15-year recommendation from the People, and not even defense
counsel had argued that imposition of the mitigated term was appropriate.
As the People did not object or otherwise respond to the trial court’s ruling, and as
the trial court imposed the mitigated term even though defense counsel had argued for
imposition of the middle term, defense counsel may have made the strategic decision to
accept the leniency that was provided and not invite further argument regarding the
sentence.
Accordingly, Perez’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument fails, and we need
not address the forfeited issue to foreclose an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
iii. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying
Defendant’s Request to Strike the Prior Serious Felony Conviction
Enhancement Pursuant to Section 1385
Even if Perez’s claim of error was not forfeited, his argument fails.
On January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No.
81) went into effect (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1), amending section 1385 “to specify factors
that the trial court must consider when deciding whether to strike enhancements from a
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defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice.” (People v. Sek (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th
657, 674.)
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1), provides: “Notwithstanding any other law, the
court shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if
dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” Section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), provides: “In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court
shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that
any of the mitigating circumstances in subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the
presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of
the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.”
Two of the mitigating circumstances are applicable here. Perez was a juvenile
when he committed the prior serious violent felony (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(G)), and the
conviction is over five years old (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(H)).
A trial court’s decision not to dismiss an enhancement pursuant to section 1385,
subdivision (c), is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 287, 298.) “[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is
so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377.) Additionally, “[w]hen being sentenced, a
defendant is entitled to decisions made by a court exercising informed discretion.
[Citation.] A court acting while unaware of the scope of its discretion is understood to
have abused it.” (People v. Tirado (2022) 12 Cal.5th 688, 694.)
Perez argues that the trial court “did not give great weight to the presence of two
section 1385 mitigating circumstances” and did not make an explicit finding that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. Perez asks us to remand the
case to the trial court for resentencing.
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Courts of Appeal are split regarding how to construe and apply section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), when mitigating circumstances are present. (Compare People v.
Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 398, review granted Mar. 22, 2023, S278309
[“[T]rial courts are to rebuttably presume that dismissal of an enhancement is in the
furtherance of justice (and that its dismissal is required) unless the court makes a finding
that the resultingly shorter sentence due to dismissal ‘would endanger public safety’ ”]
with People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1098, review granted Apr. 12, 2023,
S278894 [While the enumerated mitigating circumstances are to be provided great
weight, “the ultimate question before the trial court remains whether it is in the
furtherance of justice to dismiss an enhancement”].) We do not address this split because
even if Perez is correct that a trial court must dismiss an enhancement unless it makes a
finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, on this record we presume that the
trial court made the required findings. Moreover, it was not an abuse of discretion to
make this finding.
As discussed above, Perez is correct that the trial court did not state on the record
that it gave great weight to any mitigating factor or make a finding that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. However, “ ‘[t]he trial court [was] not
required to state reasons for declining to exercise its discretion under section 1385’
[citations], and ‘is presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors in the absence
of an affirmative record to the contrary.’ ” (People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th
608, 637; see also People v. Weddington (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 468, 492 [“On appeal,
we presume that the trial court followed established law and thus properly exercised its
discretion in sentencing a criminal defendant”]; People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336,
361 [“In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court ‘knows and
applies the correct statutory and case law’ ”].)
And here, there is no evidence that the trial court did not know of the amendments
to section 1385 or that the trial court did not apply section 1385 correctly. Instead, it
12.
appears that the trial court did not make any findings on the record pursuant to section
1385 because it was not asked to do so. Like defense counsel’s sentencing memorandum
in mitigation, the trial court focused on whether the prior strike conviction should be
dismissed. Moreover, the sentencing hearing was held on May 10, 2023, which was
more than 16 months after Senate Bill No. 81 went into effect, and both the sentencing
memorandum in mitigation and the probation report mentioned the presumption of
dismissal pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c). Additionally, we find no evidence in
the record to rebut the presumption.2
Accordingly, we presume that the trial court knew the relevant law and applied it
correctly.
Perez makes several other arguments as to why the case should be remanded for
resentencing, but none are persuasive.
Perez argues that substantial evidence does not support a finding that dismissal of
the enhancement would endanger public safety.3 We disagree. There is evidence that in
1985, Perez was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, with a great bodily injury
enhancement. From that time to the time of the current offense, Perez was convicted of
numerous felonies. And in this case, Perez was convicted of second degree robbery,
which is classified as a violent felony. (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(9).) While Perez did not injure
anyone, at the age of 56 he stole a scooter from a child who was found to be a particularly
2 We also note that the record highlights how the trial court balanced various
factors and did not simply impose a sentence without thought. The trial court noted
Perez’s lengthy criminal history, parole violations, PRCS violations, and stated that the
upper term was appropriate, yet it resisted imposing the maximum sentence available,
demonstrating it engaged in an exercise of discretion.
3 Abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court’s findings of fact are not
supported by substantial evidence. (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706,
711.) Substantial evidence is “ ‘evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value.’ ” (People v. Cravens, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 507; People v. Reyes (2023) 14
Cal.5th 981, 988.)
13.
vulnerable victim. Additionally, that child testified that, based on Perez’s actions, he
believed Perez had a knife and only gave Perez his scooter because he was afraid.
Finally, Perez was on a grant of PRCS when he committed the current offense, and he has
a history of PRCS and parole violations. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the
facts necessary for a finding that there is a likelihood that dismissal of the enhancement
would result in “physical injury or other serious danger to others” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)),
and this presumed finding was not an abuse of discretion.
Relying on Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, Perez also
argues that as “[t]he trial court made no assessment of [Perez’s] risk to public safety upon
release if the enhancement was dismissed … it acknowledged that there was none.” In
Sarmiento, the defendant requested mental health diversion pursuant to section 1001.36.
(Sarmiento, at p. 886.) The trial court denied the request, in part because it found that the
defendant “ ‘ pose[d] an unreasonable risk of danger to the public.’ ” (Id. at p. 890.)
While the trial court acknowledged that section 1001.36 provided a specific definition of
the term “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,” the trial court did not make its
finding pursuant to that definition but instead pursuant to its “ ‘residual’ discretion.”
(Sarmiento, at p. 886.) Given the trial court’s choice to reference the residual clause
instead of making a finding pursuant to the statutory definition, the Sarmiento court
found that the trial court “impliedly acknowledg[ed]” that the defendant did not pose a
risk of danger to public safety as defined by the statute. (Id. at p. 895.)
Sarmiento is readily distinguishable. Here, the trial court did not make any
specific rulings regarding section 1385 or its presumptions. Accordingly, we cannot say
that the trial court impliedly acknowledged that Perez did not pose a danger pursuant to
the statutory definition. Moreover, as discussed above, we presume that the trial court
knew and followed the law. Accordingly, this argument fails.
Perez also argues that “it is impossible to review the court’s exercise of discretion
here, because the court did not articulate any facts or reasoning for how failing to dismiss
14.
the enhancement would endanger public safety,” and asks us to reverse on this basis.
However, as discussed above, it appears that the trial court did not provide its reasoning
on the record because Perez did not ask it to do so, and this is a reason to treat the
argument as forfeited, not to remand for resentencing. Accordingly, this argument fails
as well.
Based on the foregoing, even if Perez did not forfeit his claim of error under
section 1385, it fails on the merits.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SMITH, J.
WE CONCUR:
POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J.
DE SANTOS, J.
15.
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