CourtListener 9972100•People v. Reed
Texto completo
Filed 6/27/24
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168358, A168368
v. (San Francisco City & County
JOSEPH PATRICK REED, Super. Ct. Nos. CT22000854,
CRI2527813)
Defendant and Appellant.
Joseph Patrick Reed challenges the trial court’s orders revoking his
three-year term of parole and remanding him to the custody of the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR).
Reed raises two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by
finding he violated the conditions of his parole; and (2) whether it erred by
remanding him to CDCR custody pursuant to Penal Code section 3000.08,
subdivision (h), a mandatory remand provision applicable to, as relevant
here, parolees subject to a lifetime period of parole under section 3000.1.1 We
conclude there was no abuse of discretion in finding Reed violated his parole.
However, we find the trial court erred in remanding Reed to CDCR custody
* Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this
opinion is certified for publication with the exception of section I. Substantial
Evidence Supports the Parole Violation Findings.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
as his parole term had been reduced to three years prior to the parole
revocation and, therefore, he was not subject to section 3000.1.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 1992, Reed was convicted of second degree murder (§§ 187, 189,
subd. (b)) and sentenced to 16 years to life with the possibility of parole. In
2016, Reed was released on parole for the first time. He absconded
supervision and his parole was revoked in 2017.
On June 16, 2021, Reed was released on parole for a period of three
years. While Reed was previously subject to lifetime parole under section
3000.1, the maximum period of parole for his parole term that began in 2021
was reduced to three years by the 2020 enactment of section 3000.01,
subdivision (b)(2).
In September 2021, CDCR filed a petition to revoke Reed’s parole (2021
petition), alleging he both committed felony reckless evading and traveled
more than 50 miles from his residence without the prior approval of his
parole agent. In January 2022, and while the 2021 petition was still pending,
CDCR filed an additional petition to revoke Reed’s parole (2022 petition)
based on his voluntary admission to using cocaine.
In December 2022 and June 2023, the trial court held revocation
hearings on the two petitions where the following testimony was proffered.
2021 Petition
California Highway Patrol Officer Brian Evans testified he observed
Reed’s car speeding on a highway in Humboldt County on September 1, 2021
at approximately 1:15 a.m. Evans confirmed by radar the car was traveling
at 89 miles per hour and activated his emergency lights. After the car
stopped, Evans instructed the driver over the loudspeaker to pull over in a
safer location. Instead, the car accelerated to 90 miles per hour and Evans
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pursued, chasing the car for 25 minutes as it reached speeds of up to 124
miles per hour. Evans called for backup and a roadblock was staged; upon
approaching the roadblock, Reed jumped out of the driver’s seat while the car
he exited was still moving. Evans did not observe any movement in the car
or anyone inside switch places before Reed jumped out. Reed attempted to
escape on foot but was ultimately arrested. In a post-Miranda statement,
Reed told Evans he engaged in the chase and ran because he was on parole
and outside of his 50-mile radius. (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.)
Eddy Yee, Reed’s parole agent, testified that Reed is from Humboldt
County and a member of the Yurok Tribe, but he was paroled to San
Francisco to participate in a transitional housing program. A condition of
Reed’s parole barred him from traveling outside of a 50-mile radius of his
residence without prior approval.
Yee further testified that Reed had obtained approval to spend the
night of August 31-September 1, 2021, the night of the chase, in Santa Rosa
(not in the transitional housing location) with his wife. He did not request or
receive approval to go to Humboldt. The day after the car chase, Reed told
Yee his wife had been driving the car and they were in the Humboldt area
attempting to locate a missing granddaughter. Parole policy provides an
exception to the requirement for prior approval to travel when “ ‘exigent
circumstances exist.’ ”
The Honorable Abby Abinanti, Chief Judge of the Yurok Tribe, testified
as an expert on the issue of missing and murdered indigenous people
(MMIP). Judge Abinanti explained indigenous people are disproportionately
murdered and California is fifth in the nation for murdered and missing
native women. Among the Yurok Tribe, there is a longstanding mistrust for
law enforcement and a belief they will not help find missing family members.
3
Therefore, Yurok families regularly search for their own missing persons
rather than report it to law enforcement and it would not surprise her if one
would violate parole to search for a missing family member.
Reed’s wife, Krista Reed, stated she is a member of the Tule River
Yokut Tribe.2 She testified their teenaged granddaughter had a history of
running away. A report was filed after one such instance, but the police did
not investigate and instead blamed the family. On August 31, 2021, Krista
picked up Reed as he had a pass to spend one night with her in San Rafael.
At that time, their granddaughter had again run away but she did not call
the police for help because law enforcement had threatened to take her
grandchildren away from her daughter after her granddaughter was
previously reported missing, and because of Krista’s experience with police
inaction when Native Americans go missing.
Reed was in the backseat of the car and Krista was driving when she
got a call that their granddaughter was seen in Eureka. Krista decided to
find her and began driving to Humboldt County; she did not tell Reed
because he was tired, and she did not think about the 50-mile radius. She
testified she had not been speeding when she saw a police car activate its
lights and pull behind her car. She pulled over, then the police told her
(through a speaker) to pull over to a safer spot. Krista panicked because she
did not have a driver’s license, did not want Reed to get in trouble for being
outside of the radius when it was her fault, and wanted to look for her
granddaughter. Instead of pulling over as directed by the police, she drove
away and kept driving, despite Reed asking her to pull over. Krista slowed
2 For ease of comprehension and meaning no disrespect, we refer to
Krista Reed by her first name.
4
down as they approached the roadblock, at which point Reed jumped over
her, the door opened, and he fell out of the car.
2022 Petition
Yee, the parole agent, testified Reed had a history of substance abuse
and was therefore required to participate in narcotics testing as a condition of
parole. On January 20, 2022, after receiving a report from the transitional
housing program that Reed had refused to take an antinarcotics test, Yee and
two other parole agents went to the transitional housing location to conduct a
contraband search of Reed’s room and administer an antinarcotics test on
Reed. That test was presumptively positive for cocaine. Reed then signed a
voluntary statement of admission stating he had used cocaine, and explained
to Yee he had taken a drag from a co-worker’s cigarette that was apparently
laced with cocaine.
On cross-examination, Yee stated he filled out the voluntary statement
of admission form and Reed signed it. Although Reed had told Yee he did not
know the cigarette contained cocaine and did not intend to ingest it, Yee did
not include that information on the form. Reed had been successful in his
transitional housing program in the months leading up to the cocaine
incident, and all his drug tests during that period had been negative.
Trial Court’s Ruling
After the hearings on both petitions, on June 30, 2023, the trial court
found the violations of parole in both petitions had been proven by a
preponderance of the evidence. The court revoked Reed’s parole and
remanded him to the custody of CDCR.
As to the 2021 petition, the court noted it was undisputed that Reed
was outside of his 50-mile radius and that, even if Reed believed there was an
exigent circumstance, he made no effort to contact parole. The court found
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Evans’s testimony credible as to the driver’s reckless driving during the
chase. The court noted Evans did not know who was driving the car during
the first part of the chase, but it credited Evans’s account that, at least by the
end, Reed was driving the car based on his jumping from the driver’s door. It
did not find credible Krista’s testimony that Reed jumped over her out of the
car. While crediting Krista’s concern for and desire to locate her
granddaughter, as well as the lack of faith among indigenous people that
police would help, the court found Reed’s actions amounted to a violation of
parole. Regarding the 2022 petition, the court found that Reed had ingested
and used cocaine based upon the testimony that Reed tested positive for
cocaine and the testimony overall.
The court found Reed violated his parole and ordered him remanded to
CDCR custody and the jurisdiction of the Board of Parole Hearings (BPH) for
purposes of future parole consideration pursuant to section 3000.08,
subdivision (h). Reed appealed.
DISCUSSION
Reed challenges the revocation of his parole on two grounds. First, he
argues the court’s findings that he violated the conditions of his parole are
not supported by substantial evidence. Second, he contends that the trial
court erred in remanding him to the custody of CDCR pursuant to section
3000.08, subdivision (h). We address each issue in turn.
I. Substantial Evidence Supports the Parole Violation Findings
Reed contends insufficient evidence supports the court’s findings that
he violated the conditions of his parole as to both the 2021 and 2022
petitions. We conclude the court did not err as to either petition.
A parole violation must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
(§ 3044, subd. (a)(5); see In re Miller (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1234–
6
1235.) We review an order revoking parole for abuse of discretion and review
the court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. (See People v. Butcher
(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 310, 318; see also In re Miller, at p. 1235 [“Parole
revocation and probation revocation after the imposition of a sentence are
constitutionally indistinguishable.”].) “[O]ur review is limited to the
determination of whether, upon review of the entire record, there is
substantial evidence of solid value, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will
support the trial court’s decision. In that regard, we give great deference to
the trial court and resolve all inferences and intendments in favor of the
judgment. Similarly, all conflicting evidence will be resolved in favor of the
decision.” (People v. Kurey (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 840, 848–849.) We do not
reweigh credibility as it is the exclusive province of the trier of fact to
determine witness credibility and resolve conflicting evidence. (People v.
Mumin (2023) 15 Cal.5th 176, 202 (Mumin).)
To revoke parole, the evidence must support the conclusion the
violation of the terms of parole was willful. (See People v. Galvan (2007) 155
Cal.App.4th 978, 982 [evidence of willful violation of terms of probation
required for probation revocation].) “The word ‘willfully,’ when applied to the
intent with which an act is done or omitted, implies simply a purpose or
willingness to commit the act . . . . It does not require any intent to violate
law.” (§ 7, subd. (1).)
A. 2021 Petition
Reed does not contest he was outside the permissible 50-mile radius or
that there was reckless driving. Instead, he grounds his appeal on whether
there was sufficient evidence for the court to find no exigent circumstances
excused his actions. We are not persuaded.
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The trial court’s findings were largely based upon its determination of
the credibility of the witnesses before it. (See Mumin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 202 [it was up to the trial court to weigh conflicting evidence].) While the
court did not determine who was driving before the car was first pulled over,
the court credited the testimony that it was Reed who got out of the driver’s
door after the second part of the chase ending with the roadblock. And the
court did not find exigent circumstances. As the court noted, Reed made no
effort to contact parole to explain why he was outside of the 50-mile radius.
And Evans testified that—immediately after the incident—the sole reason
Reed provided for attempting to evade the police was that he was outside of
his permissible 50-mile radius, with no mention of the search for his
granddaughter. While the court found credible Krista’s concern for her
granddaughter and her lack of faith in law enforcement, the record supports
its finding that her testimony did not justify Reed’s reckless driving or his
being outside the 50-mile radius limit.
Hence, there was clearly substantial evidence to support the court’s
finding. (People v. Kurey, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at pp. 848–849.)
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to find that
exigent circumstances excused Reed’s undisputed violations of parole.
B. 2022 Petition
Reed asserts there is insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding
that he violated parole by using cocaine because the was no evidence that his
cocaine use was willful. We disagree.
While Reed asserts the “only evidence presented” that he willfully
ingested cocaine was his statement that he did not intend to do so, the court
specifically relied on Yee’s testimony that Reed tested positive for cocaine and
admitted to ingesting it. The court was also presented with evidence that
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Reed signed a voluntary statement of admission stating he had used cocaine.
It was for the court as the trier to fact to choose whether to credit Reed’s
statement, made to Yee and testified to by Yee, that Reed did not know the
cigarette he smoked had been laced with cocaine. We defer to the court’s
assessment. (See Mumin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 202.)
We therefore conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that Reed willfully committed the act of ingesting cocaine (see § 7, subd. (1))
and revoking Reed’s parole.
II. The Trial Court Erred by Remanding Reed to CDCR Custody
Section 3000.08, subdivision (h) provides for mandatory remand to
CDCR custody when, as relevant here, a person on lifetime parole under
section 3000.1 is found to have violated parole. The parties agree that,
although Reed was previously subject to lifetime parole under section 3000.1,
the maximum period of parole for his second parole term that began in 2021
was reduced to three years by the 2020 enactment of section 3000.01,
subdivision (b)(2). As his parole term was limited to three years by section
3000.01 when the court found him in violation of parole, Reed contends the
court erred in remanding him to the custody of CDCR pursuant to section
3000.08, subdivision (h) given that he was no longer subject to lifetime parole
under section 3000.1. Reviewing this issue of statutory interpretation de
novo (People v. Wilson (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 874, 878 (Wilson)), we agree.
“ ‘Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine
the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do
not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory
framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to
harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts
9
must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would
result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory
language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may
consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and
public policy.’ ” (Wilson, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 878.)
A. Legal Framework
Historically, responsibility for parole revocation rested with the BPH.
(People v. DeLeon (2017) 3 Cal.5th 640, 647.) In 2012, the Legislature
amended section 1203.2 to incorporate parole into the statutes governing
revocation of other types of statutory supervision, shifting jurisdiction over
most parole revocation petitions to the superior courts. (Ibid.) “Currently,
sections 1203.2 and 3000.08 establish the statutory framework for parole
revocation proceedings.” (Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation v.
Superior Court (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1036.)
Upon a finding that a parolee has violated the conditions of parole, a
trial court generally has the discretion to modify or revoke parole, including
the authority to sentence the person to county jail for up to 180 days, or refer
the person to a reentry court or other evidence-based program. (§ 3000.08,
subds. (f) & (g).) However, “once a court finds that a lifetime parolee has
violated conditions of parole or the law, a special rule applies” and those
options “ ‘do not exist.’ ” (Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation v.
Superior Court, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1036–1037, some italics added.)
In such cases (lifetime parole), section 3000.08, subdivision (h) is
triggered, which requires the court to revoke parole and remand the parolee
to CDCR custody: “Notwithstanding any other law, if Section 3000.1 . . .
applies to a person who is on parole and the court determines that the person
has committed a violation of law or violated his or her conditions of parole,
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the person on parole shall be remanded to the custody of [CDCR] and the
jurisdiction of the [BPH] for the purpose of future parole consideration.”3
(§ 3000.08, subd. (h); see People v. Williams (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1029,
1040, 1042.)
Section 3000.1, in turn, sets out a term of lifetime parole for two groups
of inmates: (1) those “sentenced under Section 1168 for any offense of first or
second degree murder with a maximum term of life imprisonment”; and
(2) certain sex offenders sentenced to a life term. (§ 3000.1, subd. (a).)
Section 3000.1 was last amended in 2014. (Assem. Bill No. 1438, Stats. 2014,
ch. 280, § 2.)
In 2020, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 118, which
implemented section 3000.01. (Sen. Bill No. 118, Stats. 2020, ch. 29, § 18
(S.B. 118).) Section 3000.01 governs the periods of parole for persons who are
subject to supervision under section 3000.08 and were released from state
prison on or after July 1, 2020. (§ 3000.01, subd. (a); People v. Tilley (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 772, 779 (Tilley).)
As relevant here, section 3000.01—“[e]xcept as provided in subdivision
(d) and notwithstanding any other law”—limits parole terms to three years
for inmates serving a life sentence. (§ 3000.01, subd. (b).) Subdivision (d)
sets out only two exceptions, neither of which are applicable to the case
before us: (1) if the underlying offense requires registration as a sex offender;
and (2) if the parole term at the time of the commission of the offense was
shorter than the terms in subdivision (b). (§ 3000.01, subd. (d).)
3 The mandatory remand-to-CDCR-custody provision also extends to
certain sex offenders subject to a parole term of 20 years and six months.
(§ 3000.08, subd. (h); see § 3000, subd. (b), par. (4).)
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With this legal framework in mind, we turn to the merits of Reed’s
claim.
B. Section 3000.01 Renders the Mandatory Remand-to-CDCR-
Custody Provision Inapplicable to Reed
The question we must answer is whether section 3000.1 applies to Reed
after the enactment of section 3000.01; if the answer is no, the mandatory
remand-to-CDCR-custody provision in section 3000.08, subdivision (h) is also
inapplicable.
Section 3000.01 states that it applies “notwithstanding any other law,”
which suggests the Legislature intended this section to take precedence over
any conflicting provisions. (§ 3000.01, subd. (b); see In re Greg F. (2012) 55
Cal.4th 393, 406.) It is true that, “despite adding section 3000.01 limiting the
parole term for those released from prison on or after July 1, 2020, the
Legislature did not amend the relevant provisions” of statutes that provide
for longer parole terms, such as sections 3000, 3000.08, and 3000.1. (See
Tilley, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 779–780.) But while “[t]hese statutory
inconsistencies put trial courts in a bit of a conundrum when advising of the
parole term,” every appellate court to consider the issue has concluded the
term limits in section 3000.01 override conflicting preexisting provisions.
(See Tilley, at pp. 779–780; People v. Tan (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1, 4–6
[modifying judgment to reduce parole term of appellant to the permissible
maximum “under the plain language of section 3000.01”].) We therefore find
that section 3000.01 applies to Reed notwithstanding the contrary provisions
in section 3000.1.
The Attorney General concedes that section 3000.01 operated to reduce
the length of Reed’s parole term to three years but argues that “does not
change whether section 3000.1 applies to [Reed] for purposes of statutory
12
remand.” We disagree and reject the Attorney General’s suggestion that
section 3000.01 does not conflict with section 3000.1 for parolees like Reed,
i.e., those sentenced to life for murder who were released on parole on or after
July 1, 2020. For such persons, the two statutes impose conflicting terms of
parole. (Compare § 3000.1, subd. (a)(1) [lifetime term] with § 3000.01,
subd. (b)(2) [three-year term].) Hence, only one of the two statutes can
control, and the Legislature signaled its intent for the later-enacted statute—
section 3000.01—to preempt the conflicting, preexisting statute by including
“notwithstanding any other law” in section 3000.01, subdivision (b). (See In
re Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 406.) Accordingly, we conclude section
3000.1 does not apply to Reed.4
Importantly, the Legislature created two express exemptions to the
provisions of section 3000.01, for registered sex offenders and those with
shorter parole terms.5 (§ 3000.01, subd. (d).) If the Legislature intended to
create an additional exemption for those convicted of murder with a
maximum term of life imprisonment, like Reed, it could have done so. (See
Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 627, 635–636 (Lopez)
[“ ‘Under the maxim of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, if exemptions are specified in a statute, we may not imply additional
exemptions unless there is a clear legislative intent to the contrary.’ ”]; see
4 Contrary to the Attorney General’s assertion that embracing this
reading of section 3000.01 would render the other provisions of section 3000.1
“a nullity,” those provisions continue to apply to those with lifetime parole (to
the extent provided by the statute) who are exempt from section 3000.01, or
whose parole terms began before July 1, 2020. (See § 3000.1, subds. (b), (c), &
(d)); § 3000.01, subds. (a) & (d)(1).)
5 The exemption for registered sex offenders overlaps in part with one of
the two groups covered by section 3000.1, subdivision (a). (§ 3000.1,
subd. (a)(2); § 3000.01, subd. (d)(1).)
13
also People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618, 634 [“[W]e are mindful that the
Legislature ‘is deemed to be aware of existing laws and judicial constructions
in effect at the time legislation is enacted.’ ”].) While “the expressio unius
inference properly arises only when there is reason to believe a legislative
omission was intentional, such as when the statute contains a ‘specific list,’ ”
the Legislature created such a list here by specifically excluding registered
sex offenders and those with shorter parole terms. (See Lopez, at p. 636;
§ 3000.01, subd. (d).)
We note that the legislative history of S.B. 118 shines little light on the
intended effects of section 3000.01 other than to highlight that the statutory
changes do not apply to those required to register as a sex offender.6 (Sen.
Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Unfinished Business Analysis of
S.B. 118, as amended Jul. 29, 2020, pp. 3–4.) This further supports our
reading that the Legislature was aware of its power to carve out exceptions
but limited its exercise of that power. Without any clear legislative intent
contradicting the plain language of the statute, “[w]e will not create an
exception the Legislature did not enact.” (See Lopez, supra, 5 Cal.5th at
p. 636.) Nor does the Attorney General offer any argument that giving effect
to the plain terms of the statute would result in absurd consequences.
(Wilson, supra, 66 Cal.App.5th at p. 878.) If the Legislature did not intend
this result, it has the power to amend the relevant statutes accordingly.
We therefore conclude that, in light of section 3000.01, the provisions of
section 3000.1 do not apply to Reed. Given that, by its plain language, the
mandatory remand-to-CDCR-custody provision (§ 3000.08, subd. (h)) is
6 The parties did not provide the legislative history. On our own motion,
we take judicial notice of the legislative history of S.B. 118 (see Gananian v.
Wagstaffe (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1542, fn. 9), specifically all versions
of the bill and the Committee and Floor Analyses.
14
triggered “if Section 3000.1 . . . applies,” we further conclude section 3000.08,
subdivision (h) does not apply to Reed. Therefore, the trial court erred by
remanding Reed to the custody of CDCR and the jurisdiction of the BPH
pursuant to section 3000.08, subdivision (h). Since section 3000.08,
subdivision (h) was not applicable to Reed, once he was found in violation of
parole it was for the trial court to modify or revoke parole pursuant to its
authority as set forth in subdivisions (f) and (g).
In closing, we note that while a parolee who is no longer subject to
mandatory remand under section 3000.08, subdivision (h) may be punished
only as provided in subdivisions (f) and (g) for any parole violation, the
legislation discussed in our opinion in no way alters or limits the ability of
the appropriate prosecuting agency to seek new criminal charges predicated
upon the conduct that led to the violation of parole.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s findings that Reed violated parole but
reverse the court’s orders remanding Reed to the custody of CDCR and the
jurisdiction of the BPH. We remand for further proceedings for the court to
determine what penalties to impose for Reed’s violations of parole, as
provided by section 3000.08, subdivisions (f) and (g).
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_________________________
Petrou, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Fujisaki, Acting P. J.
_________________________
Rodríguez, J.
A168358/A168368 – People v. Reed
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Trial Court: San Francisco County Superior Court
Trial Judge: Hon. Russ Roeca
Counsel: Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Jeffrey M. Laurence, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Seth K. Schalit, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Matthew J. Eitelberg,
Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
First District Appellate Project, Kaiya R. Pirolo, for
Defendant and Appellant.
17
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