CourtListener 9965199•People v. Gonzalez
Texto completo
Filed 6/27/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D082058
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. RIF1404885)
DAVID GONZALEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
John D. Molloy, Judge. Sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing.
Johanna Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Collette C. Cavalier and Ksenia Gracheva, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
After being convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to a term of
75 years to life, David Gonzalez is before us for a third time on appeal after
we twice remanded to the trial court to consider certain sentencing issues in
light of newly enacted statutory provisions.1 In this appeal, Gonzalez
contends that the trial court erred because it applied an improper legal
standard in declining to dismiss the firearm enhancement imposed pursuant
to Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d),2 which added a term of 25
years to life to Gonzalez’s sentence. We conclude that the trial court applied
an erroneous legal standard in determining whether dismissal of the
enhancement would “endanger public safety” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)), and it
thereby prejudicially abused its discretion. We accordingly vacate the
sentence and remand for resentencing.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The issues presented in this appeal do not require a repetition of the
factual detail set forth in our first opinion, and we accordingly present a
truncated discussion.
A jury found that Gonzalez shot and killed a man in April 2014 by
personally using a firearm. Specifically, the conviction was for first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)), with the additional finding that Gonzalez
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in the course of committing
the murder (§ 12022.53, subd. (d).) The trial court subsequently made a true
finding regarding Gonzalez’s prior serious felony conviction and prior strike
(§§ 667, subds. (a), (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1)), which was based on
Gonzalez's juvenile adjudication for robbery involving personal use of a
1 (People v. Lopez (Feb. 21, 2018, D072636) [nonpub. opn.]; People v.
Gonzalez (May 1, 2019, D074726) [nonpub. opn.].) On October 9, 2023, we
granted Gonzalez’s request to take judicial notice of our prior opinions.
2 All subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise noted.
2
firearm (§§ 211, 12022.53, subd. (b)). The trial court denied Gonzalez’s
motion to strike his prior strike and sentenced Gonzalez to prison for an
indeterminate term of 75 years to life, which included a term of 50 years to
life term for the murder (which included doubling in light of the prior strike),
a term of 25 years to life for the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)),3 and a consecutive determinate term of five years for the prior
serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
In deciding Gonzalez’s first appeal, we remanded so that the trial court
could choose whether or not to dismiss the firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53,
subd. (d)) based on the statutory amendment that conferred such discretion
as of January 1, 2018 (Stats. 2017, ch. 682, § 2). (People v. Lopez, supra,
D072636.) On remand, the trial court declined to exercise its discretion to
dismiss that enhancement.
In his second appeal, Gonzalez sought a remand so that the trial court
could apply a statutory amendment that went into effect on January 1, 2019,
after he was resentenced. Specifically, Senate Bill No. 1393 (Stats. 2018, ch.
1013 (§§ 1, 2)) amended sections 667 and 1385 to allow a court to exercise its
discretion to strike or dismiss a prior serious felony conviction for sentencing
purposes. We remanded for resentencing in light of Senate Bill No. 1393,
with instructions that the trial court consider whether to exercise its
discretion to strike or dismiss Gonzalez’s five-year enhancement for his prior
3 The firearm enhancement in section 12022.53, subdivision (d),
provides, “Notwithstanding any other law, a person who, in the commission
of a felony specified in subdivision (a), Section 246, or subdivision (c) or (d) of
Section 26100, personally and intentionally discharges a firearm and
proximately causes great bodily injury, as defined in Section 12022.7, or
death, to a person other than an accomplice, shall be punished by an
additional and consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for 25
years to life.”
3
serious felony conviction. (People v. Gonzalez (May 1, 2019, D074726)
[nonpub. opn.].)4
After multiple continuances during the pandemic, the trial court
resentenced Gonzalez on April 7, 2023. By that time, the Legislature had
enacted Senate Bill No. 81, effective January 1, 2022 (Stats. 2021, ch. 721
§ 1), which amended section 1385 to include subdivision (c). Under
subdivision (c)(1), the court “shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the
furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that enhancement is
prohibited by any initiative statute.” Under subdivision (c)(2), in exercising
its discretion, “the court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence
offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating circumstances in
subparagraphs (A) to (I) are present. Proof of the presence of one or more of
these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement,
unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).)5 The statute specifically provides that
“ ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of
4 Gonzalez also argued that the trial court violated his state and federal
due process rights by imposing certain fines and assessments without
considering his ability to pay. We declined to decide that issue, as Gonzalez
would be able to raise it on remand. At the resentencing hearing, the trial
court subsequently granted Gonzalez relief based on his inability to pay.
5 Case law has disagreed on whether the presence of a mitigating
circumstance creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal, and our
Supreme Court has granted review to resolve the issue. (Compare People v.
Walker (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 386, 398–399, review granted Mar. 22, 2023,
S278309 [“the additional phrase ‘great weight’ . . . erects a presumption in
favor of the dismissal of the enhancement”] with People v. Ortiz (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 1087, 1098, review granted Apr. 12, 2023, S278894 [“we
respectfully decline to follow Walker in its more formalistic reading of the
provision”].) We need not, and do not, address that issue to resolve this
appeal.
4
the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to
others.” (Ibid.)
In advance of the resentencing hearing, Gonzalez filed a sentencing
position memorandum. Gonzalez argued that pursuant to section 1385,
subdivision (c), the trial court should dismiss (1) the five-year enhancement
for his prior serious felony conviction imposed pursuant to section 667,
subdivision (a); and (2) the 25-years-to-life firearm enhancement imposed
pursuant to section 12022.53, subdivision (d). Gonzalez contended that
dismissal of the enhancements was warranted because (1) more than one of
the mitigating circumstances identified in subparagraphs (A) to (I) of section
1385, subdivision (c)(2) were present,6 and (2) dismissal would not
“[e]ndanger public safety” within the meaning of section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2).7
6 Specifically, Gonzalez relied on the following mitigating circumstances
set forth in the subparagraphs of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2):
subparagraph (B) [“Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In
this instance, all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be
dismissed”]; subparagraph (C) [“The application of an enhancement could
result in a sentence of over 20 years. In this instance, the enhancement shall
be dismissed.]”; subparagraph (E) [“The current offense is connected to prior
victimization or childhood trauma.”]; subparagraph (G) [“The defendant was
a juvenile when they committed the current offense or any prior offenses,
including criminal convictions and juvenile adjudications, that trigger the
enhancement or enhancements applied in the current case.”]; and
subparagraph (H) [“The enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is
over five years old.”].
7 In his sentencing position memorandum, Gonzalez also sought an order
striking his prior strike. The trial court declined to grant such relief, and
that ruling is not at issue in this appeal. As a result of the trial court’s denial
of the request to strike the prior strike, the term for the first degree murder
conviction remains 50 years to life.
5
In arguing that dismissal of the enhancements would not endanger
public safety, Gonzalez’s memorandum contained the following footnote,
supported by a citation to People v. Williams (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 1057,
1063–1064 (Williams): “In re-sentencing a defendant, and in determining
whether he poses an unreasonable risk of danger, the trial court must look to
when he would be released if a modification is granted. This applies with
even greater force when he is serving a sentence greater than a human life
span. As such, the court must consider when the defendant might be
released if his sentence is modified, and the consideration of public safety
following his release under the modified sentence.”
In the People’s response, they did not attempt to dispute that at least
some of mitigating factors in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) applied.8 The
People stated, “The real issue is whether or not dismissing the enhancement
would endanger public safety. Factually, the People would like the court to
consider the facts in this case which do indicate that the defendant is a
danger to public safety . . .” The People then went on to discuss the
particular circumstances of the murder and Gonzalez’s criminal history.
At the resentencing hearing, defense counsel took issue with the
People’s focus, in their memorandum, on Gonzalez’s criminal history and the
circumstances of the murder when they argued that dismissing the
enhancements would endanger public safety. Defense counsel stated, “The
8 Although the People did not make the distinction, we note that some of
the mitigating circumstances appear to be applicable only to the
enhancement for the prior serious felony conviction. (§ 1385, subds. (c)(2)(G)
[“The defendant was a juvenile when they committed the current offense or
any prior offenses, including criminal convictions and juvenile adjudications,
that trigger the enhancement or enhancements applied in the current case.”];
(c)(2)(H) [“The enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is over five
years old.”].)
6
other thing that I would like to repoint out is it appears as though, in
assessing Mr. Gonzalez’s future dangerousness, the People are looking
backwards at his history, which certainly can be done, but as set forth in the
Williams case, the court specifically said it’s a forward-looking inquiry,
especially when the defendant would not be immediately released. [¶] So
Mr. Gonzalez is obviously going to do a minimum of 25 to life. Regardless of
what this Court does, he’s not going to be released forthwith or anytime in
the near future. And if he is sentenced to—since he is under an
indeterminate sentence, a parole board is going to be re-reviewing everything
else as well as the governor.”
In ruling on whether it would dismiss the 25-years-to-life firearm
enhancement, the trial court first explained that if section 1385,
subdivision (c) did not exist, it would not exercise its discretion to dismiss the
enhancement. “[T]his is a poster child fact pattern for the imposition of the
additional time considered by 12022.53. . . . He is the person holding the
firearm. He used it to deadly impact. So if we’re just considering normal
12022.53(h) discretion, I would not exercise my discretion for his benefit.”
However, in light of section 1385, subdivision (c), the trial court stated, “So
then the next question is under 1385. Do I consider him to be a danger to
society?” The trial court asked defense counsel for clarification about how to
approach that analysis, leading to the following exchange:
“THE COURT: . . . And I’m not sure, [defense counsel], how
exactly to—I think—I’m not sure that when I’m sentencing and
finding someone is a danger that I have to consider each and
every charge that I’m sentencing on to say, well, but now it’s
going to be 75 years before he’s out, so in 75 years he’s not going
to be a danger. [¶] Isn’t it—when you’re considering the time of
sentencing, does he currently at the time of sentencing represent
a danger to society? That’s how I read the law. [¶] Do you have a
case that says I’m wrong about that?
7
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I believe the Williams
case . . . cited in a footnote talks about a forward-looking inquiry
whether he’s a risk of danger.
“THE COURT: And this is forward looking. It’s from this point
forward—
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right.
“THE COURT:—based on what I’ve seen. And so from this point
forward, I would conclude he is a danger. What I was saying is,
I’m not sure that Williams obliges me to say, well, he’s already
been sentenced to 50 years to life, so the Court has to say in 50
years he’s still going to be a danger in order to impose the other
enhancements. I think it’s forward looking from today, not
forward looking from 50 years from now.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, I agree, because the rest of that
statement says, ‘And when the defendant would be released if the
recommendation is granted and defendant is resentenced,’ so it’s
would he be released.
“THE COURT: Okay. A tougher one, as I said before, I think
presently he does represent a danger to society, and for that
reason, while I am mindful of the prohibition set forth in 1385, I
do think it is appropriate for the Court to impose an additional 25
years to life for the gun use enhancement for what amounts to
now a total aggregate term of 75 years to life . . . .”
The trial court therefore declined to exercise its discretion to dismiss
the 25-year-to-life firearm enhancement based on its finding that Gonzalez
“presently. . . does represent a danger to society.” It then turned to the five-
year enhancement for Gonzalez’s prior serious felony conviction, deciding to
dismiss that enhancement. The trial court explained, “I think that at this
point, especially given the 75 years to life that I’m imposing, that the [five-
8
year enhancement] . . . serves no useful purpose, because it is highly unlikely
that the gentleman will ever be released . . . .”
Gonzalez appeals from the judgment.
II.
DISCUSSION
Gonzalez contends that the trial court erred in its analysis of whether
to dismiss the 25-years-to-life firearm enhancement imposed pursuant to
section 12022.53 because it misunderstood the inquiry that it was supposed
to conduct in determining whether “dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety” within the meaning of section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2). Gonzalez contends that the trial court erred in focusing on whether he
“presently” and “currently” endangered public safety rather than assessing
whether, looking forward, public safety would be endangered due to an
earlier release from prison (i.e., in 50 years to life rather than in 75 years to
life) if the enhancement was dismissed.
A. Standard of Review
In reviewing the trial court’s determination that dismissal of
Gonzalez’s firearm enhancement would endanger public safety, we apply an
abuse of discretion standard of review. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88
Cal.App.5th 287, 298 (Mendoza).) As relevant here, “an abuse of discretion
arises if the trial court based its decision on impermissible factors . . . or on
an incorrect legal standard.” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156
(Knoller); see also Conservatorship of Bower (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 495, 506
[“Case law is clear . . . that getting the legal standard wrong means that a
subsequent decision becomes itself a per se abuse of discretion”].)
9
B. Gonzalez Did Not Forfeit His Argument That the Trial Court Applied
an Improper Legal Standard
As an initial matter, we must address the People’s argument that
Gonzalez has forfeited his appellate challenge because defense counsel, at the
resentencing hearing, purportedly “agreed with the trial court’s
interpretation of section 1385.”
The applicable forfeiture rule is set forth in People v. Scott (1994)
9 Cal.4th 331, under which “complaints about the manner in which the trial
court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting
reasons cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” (Id. at p. 356.)
“Although the court is required to impose sentence in a lawful manner,
counsel is charged with understanding, advocating, and clarifying
permissible sentencing choices at the hearing.” (Id. at p. 353.) Further,
although not specifically advanced by the People, the doctrine of invited error
is also relevant here, as the People contend that defense counsel agreed with
the trial court’s interpretation of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) that
Gonzalez now challenges on appeal. “ ‘The doctrine of invited error is
designed to prevent an accused from gaining a reversal on appeal because of
an error made by the trial court at his behest.’ ” (People v. Coffman and
Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 49.) However, for the doctrine to apply, it “must
be clear that counsel acted for tactical reasons and not out of ignorance or
mistake.” (Ibid.)
Turning to the question of whether Gonzalez has preserved his
appellate challenge, it is centrally relevant that, both in the sentencing
position memorandum and during the resentencing hearing, defense counsel
advocated for the same legal standard that Gonzalez now advances on
appeal. First, the sentencing position memorandum included a footnote,
citing Williams, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th 1057, which Gonzalez continues to
10
rely upon in this appeal. Specifically, the memorandum explained that in
assessing whether dismissing the enhancements would endanger public
safety, “the trial court must look to when [Gonzalez] would be released if a
modification is granted” and focus on the “consideration of public safety
following his release.” Next, at the resentencing hearing defense counsel
cited Williams to explain that “it’s a forward-looking inquiry, especially when
the defendant would not be immediately released.” Defense counsel observed
that Gonzalez “is obviously going to do a minimum of 25 to life,” so that he
was “not going to be released forthwith or anytime in the near future,” and
that, moreover, Gonzalez’s release would be contingent on review by the
Board of Parole Hearings and the Governor. When, later in the resentencing
hearing, the trial court asked for clarification about the proper analysis,
defense counsel referred to the sentencing position memorandum’s discussion
of Williams, explaining that it is “a forward-looking inquiry.”
The People’s forfeiture argument depends on the final part of the
exchange between the trial court and defense counsel, which occurred after
defense counsel clarified that it is “a forward-looking inquiry.” Specifically,
the trial court stated, “I think it’s forward looking from today, not forward
looking from 50 years from now,” referring to a date 50 years in the future
when Gonzalez might be released from prison if the enhancements were
dismissed. Defense counsel, replied, “Yes, I agree, because the rest of that
statement says, ‘And when the defendant would be released if the
recommendation is granted and defendant is resentenced,’ so it’s would he be
released.”
Although, as the People point out, during that exchange, defense
counsel replied, “Yes, I agree,” when the trial court stated the inquiry was
“forward looking from today,” it is evident, based on the context of the entire
11
exchange, that the trial court and defense counsel misunderstood each other.
Defense counsel seems not to have understood that the trial court was saying
anything different from what defense counsel had already advocated by citing
the Williams case, namely that the inquiry focuses on danger to the public at
the time of defendant’s eventual release. This is shown by defense counsel’s
final explanation to the trial court, after saying “Yes, I agree,” that the focus
should be on “when the defendant would be released.”
In sum, we conclude that defense counsel simply misunderstood the
trial court’s statement rather than agreeing with it. We accordingly reject
the People’s contention that defense counsel agreed that the trial court should
apply the interpretation of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) that Gonzalez now
challenges on appeal. Gonzalez has consistently taken the position that, in
assessing whether dismissal of the firearm enhancement would endanger
public safety, the focus must be on whether an earlier release date resulting
from a dismissal would endanger public safety. As counsel simply made a
mistake in stating, “Yes, I agree,” the argument is not forfeited; nor does the
doctrine of invited error apply.9
C. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Applying an Erroneous Legal
Standard
Turning to Gonzalez’s contention that the trial court erred in its
analysis of whether dismissing the 25-years-to-life firearm enhancement
9 Even were we to determine that forfeiture occurred, we would
nevertheless exercise our discretion to consider Gonzalez’s appeal. (In re
Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 887 fn. 7 [“an appellate court may review a
forfeited claim—and ‘[w]hether or not it should do so is entrusted to its
discretion.’ ”]; People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161 fn. 6 [stating in
the context of an error in sentencing that “[a]n appellate court is . . . not
prohibited from reaching a question that has not been preserved for review
by a party” and “[i]ndeed, it has the authority to do so.”].)
12
would “endanger public safety,” we begin with the relevant statutory
language. Under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), the trial court must give
great weight to a mitigating circumstance “unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(2).) The Legislature specifically defined “[e]ndanger public safety” to
mean “there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would
result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (Ibid.)
As one court has observed, section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) “does not
require the trial court to consider any particular factors in determining
whether ‘there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would
result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.’ ” (Mendoza,
supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 299, italics added.) The question before us,
however, is whether the trial court erred in interpreting the statute in a
specific manner. The trial court believed that it was required to decide
whether the defendant “currently at the time of sentencing represent[s] a
danger to society.” Premised on its understanding of the proper inquiry, the
trial court imposed the firearm enhancement based on its conclusion that
Gonzalez “presently . . . does represent a danger to society.”
“The proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law we review de
novo.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 961.) “ ‘ “ ‘When we interpret a
statute, “[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent
so as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory
language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine
that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a
whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the
various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must
generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result
13
in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.’ ” ’ ” (Los Angeles
Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 758, 767–768.)
The plain words of the statute do not support the trial court’s singular
focus on whether the defendant currently poses a danger. Notably, section
1385, subdivision (c)(2) focuses on the danger associated with the dismissal of
an enhancement, phrasing the inquiry as whether “dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety,” and whether “there is a
likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would result in physical
injury or other serious danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2).) Although the
current dangerousness of the defendant is an appropriate factor to consider,
as it will have some bearing on whether dismissing the enhancement would
endanger the public, a crucial part of the inquiry is how the dismissal of the
enhancement will impact the length of the defendant’s sentence. A currently
dangerous defendant who will be released from prison within a short time
frame might be found by the trial court to pose a greater danger to the public
than a defendant who is currently dangerous but who has no prospect of
release from prison until he is elderly. (See Mendoza, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th
at p. 299 [affirming the trial court’s finding of a danger to the public under
§ 1385, subd. (c)(2) where “dismissal of the enhancement would result in a
sentence of less than six years in prison, which would require [the
defendant’s] immediate release”].) Further, an inquiry into whether public
safety will be endangered by the dismissal of an enhancement for a defendant
serving a lengthy indeterminate sentence should also take into account that
the defendant’s release from prison is contingent on review by the Board of
Parole Hearings (and for murder convictions, by the Governor), who will have
the opportunity to assess the defendant’s dangerousness at that time.
(§§ 3041, 3041.2; Cal. Const., art. V, § 8.) That future review will act as a
14
safety valve against a release that would endanger the public and is relevant
to a trial court’s analysis of whether the dismissal of an enhancement
imposed on a defendant serving an indeterminate prison term will endanger
public safety.10
The analysis in Williams, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th 1057, although arising
under a different sentencing statute, supports our interpretation of the plain
meaning of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). In Williams, the defendant, who
was serving a term of 193 years to life, filed a section 1170.126 petition for
resentencing, which directed the trial court to consider “whether a new
sentence would result in an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”
(Williams, at pp. 1060–1062, quoting § 1170.126, subd. (f).) The defendant
represented to the trial court that “if his petition was granted the earliest he
could be considered for parole would be in 2039, when he would be 77.” (Id.
at p. 1060.) The trial court relied on the defendant’s criminal history and
prison disciplinary record to conclude that resentencing the defendant posed
an unreasonable risk to public safety, and it accordingly denied his petition.
(Id. at p. 1061.) On appeal, the defendant argued that “resentencing him
would not present a danger to public safety because granting the petition
would, at best, give him the possibility of obtaining parole when he was 77,”
and “resentencing him ‘would not threaten public safety because he still
would remain imprisoned until his reform and rehabilitation showed that he
could be safely released,’ which would happen no sooner than 24 years from
now and only if the ‘parole board found that his release would not pose an
unreasonable risk to public safety.’ ” (Id. at p. 1062.)
10 We do not suggest that a trial court is permitted to delegate its
judgment regarding a defendant’s future threat to public safety to the Board
of Parole Hearings.
15
Williams held that “[t]he trial court’s failure to consider when, if ever,
defendant would be released if the petition was granted was an abuse of
discretion.” (Williams, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at p. 1064.) As Williams
explained, “[d]etermining whether resentencing a defendant poses an
unreasonable risk of danger to society is necessarily a forward-looking
inquiry. When determining whether resentencing poses an unreasonable
risk of danger, the trial court must look to when a defendant would be
released if the petition is granted and the defendant is resentenced. A
defendant who would obtain immediate release if the petition is granted
poses a different potential danger to society than a defendant who could be
released only in his or her 70’s.” (Id. at p. 1063.) Further, pointing out that
the defendant was serving an indeterminate sentence, which required the
Board of Parole Hearings to approve his release from prison, Williams
explained that “[r]esentencing poses significantly less danger to society if it is
contingent on a finding at some future date that the defendant no longer
poses a threat to society.” (Id. at pp. 1063–1064.)
We find Williams’s discussion to be instructive here because the
relevant language of section 1170.126, subdivision (f), which focuses on
“whether a new sentence would result in an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety” is similar in design to the language of section 1385, subdivision
(c)(2), which focuses on whether “dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety.” Both provisions direct the trial court to consider the
impact to public safety if the defendant was granted sentencing relief. As
Williams persuasively explains, such a provision requires the trial court to
consider, among other things, the date on which the defendant would be
released under the revised sentence, and, in the case of an indeterminate
16
sentence, the safety valve that exists due to the review by the Board of Parole
Hearings.
The People present two unconvincing arguments in an attempt to
defend the trial court’s interpretation of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2),
neither of which grapple with the plain language of the statute.
First, the People point out that in a death penalty trial, juries must not
be instructed that a defendant serving a life sentence might nevertheless be
released from prison at some point in the future based on the Governor’s
commutation because “it invites the jury to consider speculative and
impermissible factors in reaching its decision.” (People v. Ramos (1984)
37 Cal.3d 136, 159.) The People contend that if speculation about future
events is not permitted in the context presented in Ramos, we should not
require the trial court to speculate about a defendant’s future dangerousness
when applying section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). We reject the argument,
which is entirely unmoored from the text of the statute. Ramos has no
applicability here because we are deciding the very specific question of what
the Legislature intended by including particular statutory language in
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). That question has no overlap with the proper
scope of issues that a jury may be instructed to consider when deciding
whether to return a death verdict.
Next, the People argue that when a defendant like Gonzalez is serving
an indeterminate sentence, the Board of Parole Hearings “is best suited to
assess [a defendant’s] dangerousness once he completes his indeterminate
term.” According to the People, the trial court should not “usurp the [Board
of Parole Hearings’] role by guessing 50 years or more into the future.” We
find no merit to the People’s argument, which once again is unmoored from
the statutory language. For one thing, the relief afforded by section 1385,
17
subdivision (c)(2) is also available to defendants sentenced to determinate
terms of imprisonment. In those cases, there will be no decision by the Board
of Parole Hearings to determine a defendant’s future dangerousness that the
trial court could “usurp” by considering future dangerousness as part of its
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) analysis. More importantly, the People’s
argument overlooks that, for defendants sentenced to indeterminate terms, it
is easily possible to harmonize the language of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)
with the fact that the Board of Parole Hearings will eventually consider
whether public safety would be endangered by defendant’s release from
prison. Specifically, as Williams explains, the trial court should acknowledge
the role of the Board of Parole Hearings by taking into account that a reduced
sentence will “pose[ ] significantly less danger to society if it is contingent on
a finding at some future date that the defendant no longer poses a threat to
society.” (Williams, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1063–1064.)
In sum, we conclude that based on the plain language of section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2), the trial court erred because it considered only whether
Gonzalez currently posed a danger to the public when assessing if a dismissal
of the firearm enhancement would “endanger public safety.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2).) In light of Gonzalez’s sentence of 50 years to life for the murder
conviction, the trial court also should have considered the date on which
Gonzalez could be released if the firearm enhancement was dismissed and
the fact that the release would be subject to a review by the Board of Parole
Hearings and the Governor. The trial court’s application of an erroneous
legal standard constitutes an abuse of discretion. (Knoller, supra, 41 Cal.4th
at p. 156.)
18
D. The Error Was Prejudicial
The People argue that even if the trial court erred in limiting its
analysis to Gonzalez’s current dangerousness, reversal for resentencing is not
warranted because the error was not prejudicial.
The People rely on the principle that when a trial court misapprehends
the scope of its sentencing discretion, a remand is not warranted if “the
record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court would have reached the same
conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it had such discretion.’ ” (People v.
Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391.) The People contend that “as the
trial court would not exercise its discretion differently if [Gonzalez] were
sentenced a fourth time, remand would be futile.”
We reject the People’s contention because we find no clear indication in
the record that the trial court would have declined to dismiss the firearm
enhancement if, rather than limiting its inquiry to Gonzalez’s current
dangerousness, it had analyzed whether public safety would be endangered
by the sentence of 50 years to life that would result from dismissing the
firearm enhancement.
In making its ruling, the trial court specifically explained, “I think
presently [Gonzalez] does represent a danger to society, and for that
reason . . . I do think it is appropriate for the Court to impose an additional
25 years to life for the gun use enhancement.” (Italics added.) The trial court
gave no indication of how it would rule if it did not limit its inquiry to
Gonzalez’s current dangerousness. Indeed, because a sentence of 50 years to
life would result in a potential release from prison far into the future when
Gonzalez is elderly, and because a review by the Board of Parole Hearings
and the Governor will take place before Gonzalez is released, it is conceivable
that, if the trial court holds a new sentencing hearing in which it does not
19
limit its inquiry to Gonzalez’s current dangerousness, it will decide to
exercise its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) in a different
manner.11
We therefore conclude that the trial court’s error was prejudicial and
requires a remand for resentencing so that the trial court may apply the
interpretation of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) set forth in this opinion. The
trial court shall consider, among other factors it finds relevant, whether the
reduction of the sentence, from a term of 75 years to life to a term of 50 years
to life resulting from a dismissal of the firearm enhancement, would
endanger public safety. We express no view on how the trial court should
exercise its discretion on remand.
11 Because we are reversing and remanding for resentencing, we need not,
and do not, consider Gonzalez’s argument that the trial court should have
considered imposing a lesser firearm enhancement.
20
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated, and this matter is remanded for the trial court
to conduct a resentencing proceeding consistent with this opinion.
IRION, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, J.
KELETY, J.
21
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