People v. Ciceu CA3

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Filed 6/27/24 P. v. Ciceu CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
----

THE PEOPLE, C097900

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 22F1165)

v.

BRYON DAVID CICEU,

Defendant and Appellant.

A jury convicted defendant Bryon David Ciceu of multiple acts of domestic violence
that occurred over the course of two days. At sentencing, the trial court imposed an
aggregate term of 17 years 4 months for charges including first degree burglary, corporal
injury, criminal threats, assault with a deadly weapon, false imprisonment, and
misdemeanor vandalism. The trial court stayed three prior serious felony conviction
enhancements.

1
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court was required to stay some of the
terms pursuant to Penal Code1 section 654. Defendant further argues that the trial court was
permitted to impose or strike the punishment for the enhancements but could not stay them.
We agree that the trial court should have stayed either the term for first degree burglary or
the term for corporal injury that occurred on the first day. We also agree, as the People
concede, that the trial court was required to either strike or impose the enhancements.
Consistent with these conclusions, we will vacate the sentence and remand for a full
resentencing hearing. To assist the trial court and the parties, we shall address the
remaining sentencing issues.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant and K.O. were in an off-and-on relationship for over 10 years, which K.O.
described as “toxic.” On July 1, 2022, defendant’s truck broke down at K.O.’s house and
she wanted him to leave, so she planned to take him to the auto parts store so he could
charge his car battery. K.O. did not feel comfortable letting defendant stay in her home
while she was not there, as he had damaged some of K.O.’s things in the past. While they
were putting defendant’s car battery into K.O.’s car to take to the store, K.O. noticed that
some of her pictures had been moved. When K.O. asked defendant about the pictures, he
became agitated and angry and called her a “bitch.” K.O. told defendant that if he was
going to call her a “bitch,” she was not going to take him to the auto parts store.
Hoping to give defendant a chance to calm down and change his attitude, K.O. went
to her porch and sat down. But defendant stayed angry and called her derogatory names for
approximately 15 to 20 minutes. At some point, K.O. did not want to listen to him anymore
so she went into her house through the front door and locked it. Then, defendant broke
down the back door and came into the house. K.O. was sitting on the couch, and defendant
immediately walked up to her, leaned over her, grabbed her by her hair and throat, and

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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shook her head. K.O. tried to stay calm so that defendant would calm down. Eventually, he
let go of her. But, when K.O. tried to leave, defendant took her purse and blocked her path.
Defendant is approximately six inches taller than K.O.
K.O. repeatedly asked defendant to leave but he did not. When defendant put the
purse back on the couch and walked into the kitchen, K.O. grabbed her purse and got into
her car that was parked on the driveway. Defendant followed her, yelled at her, and called
her derogatory names. She locked the door and fell asleep for a while. K.O. woke up again
when defendant walked up to the car and yelled at her to come back into the house. While
defendant was yelling, he broke a car mirror off her car. Defendant told K.O. that he would
stab her in the throat. K.O. did not believe that he would stab her because there was a glass
window between them and he did not have a knife in his hand. Because K.O. did not want
to stay and listen to defendant yelling at her anymore, she drove to her friend’s house and
spent the rest of the night there.
The next morning, K.O. drove back to her house. When K.O. came into the house,
defendant sat on the couch in the living room. He had a knife in his hand and stabbed her
couch once and rug twice with it. K.O. told defendant that she would give him another
chance and take him to the auto parts store before she went to work in the afternoon.
Defendant refused her offer. K.O. told defendant that he had to figure out what to do
because she was going to work that day. This made defendant very angry. Defendant stood
up, walked up to K.O., and held the knife to her throat. K.O. testified that defendant told
her, “[Y]ou don’t need to tell me what I need to do. You need to figure out what you’re
going to do.” In an interview with a police officer, K.O. reported that defendant told her,
“You’re done bitch. I’m going to fuck you up.”
K.O. felt a prick from the knife, which left a mark in her neck. She stood still and
defendant stopped holding the knife to her throat. K.O. sat down and waited until defendant
seemed calm. After defendant appeared to have calmed down for a while, K.O. tried to
walk toward the door but defendant stepped in front of her. K.O. asked defendant to move.

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Defendant was still very angry, stood over her with a “puffed-out chest,” and refused to let
her pass. Before she sat back down, K.O. asked defendant to move again but defendant
once again refused. When defendant walked toward the kitchen, K.O. left the house as
quickly as she could. Then, K.O. went to work and called the police.
At trial, the People presented evidence that defendant committed five prior acts of
domestic violence against K.O. In December 2014, K.O. and defendant were in a “heated
argument.” Defendant tried to stop K.O. from leaving. When she tried to rush past him,
defendant grabbed her by the neck and said he was trying to talk to her. In December 2015,
defendant burst into her bedroom, accused her of putting glass in his food, and grabbed her
by the throat. In May 2018, defendant and K.O. got into another argument. Defendant
stood over her and moved like he was going to stomp on her or kick her. In October 2018,
defendant was suspicious that K.O. was texting someone else. Defendant held her cellphone
over his head, and K.O. tried to take it back. During the struggle, defendant struck K.O.
under her left eye and scraped her leg with pliers. In September 2021, K.O. came home and
saw defendant inside. K.O. told him to leave but he refused and called her derogatory
names. Then, he threw something at her, stabbed her bed with a knife, and jumped on top of
her and held the knife to her neck.
A jury found defendant guilty of committing first degree burglary by entering K.O.’s
house (§§ 459/460, subd. (a); count 1), corporal injury to a cohabitant or person in a dating
relationship (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 2), and misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd.
(b)(2)(A); count 8) on or about July 1, 2022; making criminal threats (§ 422, count 3) and
false imprisonment by violence or menace (§ 236, count 6) sometime between July 1, 2022,
and July 2, 20222; and assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 4) and

2 The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 3500 as to both the charges for
criminal threats (count 3) and false imprisonment (count 6). In relevant part, the
instructions stated, “The People have presented evidence of more than one act to prove that
the defendant committed this offense. You must not find the defendant guilty of this

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corporal injury to a cohabitant or person in a dating relationship (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count
5). A jury also found true the following special allegations as to all the counts except
misdemeanor vandalism (count 8): the crime involved great violence (Cal. Rules of Court,3
rule 4.421(a)(1)); the victim was vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)); and defendant took
advantage of a position of trust (rule 4.421(a)(11)). A jury found true the special allegation
that defendant was armed with or used a weapon as to the count for criminal threats (count
3) and the count for corporal injury (count 5).
During bifurcated proceedings, the jury found true that defendant suffered a prior
strike (§ 1170.12) for assault with a deadly weapon in February 2003 as to all felony counts.
The jury found true that defendant suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd.
(a)(1)) for the same assault as to the counts for first degree burglary, criminal threats, and
assault with a deadly weapon. The jury also found true the following special allegations as
to all felony counts: defendant’s prior convictions as an adult are numerous and of
increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)), defendant served a prior prison term (rule
4.421(b)(3)), and defendant performed unsatisfactorily on probation or parole (rule
4.421(b)(5)).
In its sentencing brief, the People argued that only the term for count 5 (corporal
injury occurring on or about July 2, 2022), should be stayed pursuant to section 654. The
People asserted that there were “six distinct stages” of defendant’s attack on K.O. Further,
each was a “separate and distinct act with a separate and distinct objective.” First, defendant
committed first degree burglary with the intent to assault her on July 1. Second, he
assaulted her on July 1. Third, he tried to stop K.O. from leaving on July 1. Fourth, his

offense, or the lesser included offense . . . unless you all agree that the People have proved
that the defendant committed at least one of these acts and you all agree on which act he
committed.” The verdict forms did not indicate that the jury was required to specify on
which day it unanimously found defendant committed either charge.
3 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

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statement to her on July 1 that he was going to put a knife to her throat or his statement to
her on July 2, “We’re done bitch, I’m gonna fuck you up, bitch!” Fifth, he held a knife to
her throat on July 2. Sixth, he stopped her when she tried to leave the house on July 2. The
objective of the false imprisonment was to prevent K.O. from leaving, while the objective of
the other acts was to terrorize, assault, and punish her. The People argued that the only two
offenses that arose from the same act, at the same time, and with the same intent were the
corporal injury and the assault with a deadly weapon that occurred on July 2. Both acts
arose from defendant grabbing K.O. by the hair and holding a knife to her throat.
Defendant filed a Romero4 motion inviting the trial court to strike his prior strike
conviction and to dismiss the prior serious felony conviction enhancements. Specifically,
defendant argued that his prior strike conviction was remote in time and that his
background, character, and prospects placed him outside the spirit of the three strikes law.
Defendant further asserted that three mitigating factors pursuant to section 1385 weighed in
favor of dismissing the enhancements: 1) multiple enhancements were alleged in a single
case (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)); 2) imposition of the enhancements could result in a sentence
of over 20 years (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C)); and 3) the enhancements were based on a prior
conviction that was over five years old (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(H)).
At sentencing, the trial court declined to strike the prior strike conviction. The trial
court reasoned that since “the enhancements under [section 667] are also based on the same
conviction which is the subject of the [prior strike],” it would stay the prior serious felony
conviction enhancements. The trial court also explained, “this wasn’t one set of operative
facts or one course of conduct. There were significant breaks in time between the acts that -
- that were the basis of the offenses, including where the victim stayed in her car for a
considerable time period, and then another considerable time period where she left and went
to sleep at a friend’s house.”

4 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.

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The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of 17 years 4 months,
comprised of: the upper term of six years for first degree burglary (count 1), doubled to 12
years for the prior strike; a consecutive term of one year (one-third the midterm) for
corporal injury on or about July 1, 2022, (count 2) doubled to two years for the prior strike;
a concurrent term of the midterm of two years for criminal threats (count 3), doubled to four
years; a consecutive term of one year (one-third the midterm) for assault with a deadly
weapon (count 4), doubled to two years for the prior strike; a consecutive term of eight
months (one-third the midterm) for false imprisonment by violence or menace (count 6),
doubled to 16 months for the prior strike; and a concurrent term of six months for
misdemeanor vandalism (count 8). Pursuant to section 654, the trial court stayed the
sentence for corporal injury on or about July 2, 2022 (count 5).
DISCUSSION
I
Section 654
Defendant contends that the trial court was required to stay the following terms
pursuant to section 654: corporal injury that occurred on or about July 1 (count 2) because
of the burglary (count 1) term; criminal threats that occurred on or about July 2 (count 3)
because of the assault with a deadly weapon (count 4) term; and false imprisonment that
occurred on or about July 2 (count 6) because of the assault with a deadly weapon term
(count 4).
A. Legal Background and Standard of Review
“Section 654 precludes multiple punishments for a single act or indivisible course of
conduct.” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 294.) A course of conduct is indivisible
“where the defendant ‘ “harbored a single intent.” ’ ” (People v. Mesa (2012) 54 Cal.4th
191, 199.) So “if all of the offenses were merely incidental to, or were the means of
accomplishing or facilitating one objective, [the] defendant may be found to have harbored a
single intent and therefore may be punished only once.” (People v. Harrison (1989) 48

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Cal.3d 321, 335.) But if the “defendant harbored ‘multiple criminal objectives,’ which were
independent of and not merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for each
statutory violation committed in pursuit of each objective, ‘even though the violations
shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of conduct.’ ” (Ibid.)
Further, “a course of conduct divisible in time, although directed to one objective, may give
rise to multiple violations and punishment.” (People v. Beamon (1973) 8 Cal.3d 625, 639,
fn. 11.) “This is particularly so where the offenses are temporally separated in such a way
as to afford the defendant opportunity to reflect and to renew his or her intent before
committing the next one, thereby aggravating the violation of public security or policy
already undertaken.” (People v. Gaio (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 919, 935; People v. Kwok
(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1255.) Moreover, “[w]hen a trial court sentences a defendant
to separate terms without making an express finding the defendant entertained separate
objectives, the trial court is deemed to have made an implied finding each offense had a
separate objective.” (People v. Islas (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 116, 129 (Islas).)
The law gives the trial court “broad latitude” in determining whether section 654
prevents multiple punishment. (People v. DeVaughn (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1092, 1113.)
We review the trial court’s findings for substantial evidence “ ‘in a light most favorable to
the judgment,’ ” meaning we “ ‘presume in support of the court’s conclusion the existence
of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” (People v.
Andra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 638, 640-641.)
B. Burglary and Corporal Injury
Defendant asserts that because the conviction for burglary (count 1) relied on the
intent to commit corporal injury on July 1 (count 2), he could not be sentenced for both
convictions. The People respond that the trial court instructed the jury that other offenses
could have been the intent underlying the burglary. The People alternatively argue that
because there was time for defendant to reflect between the burglary and corporal injury,
punishments for both burglary and corporal injury were appropriate.

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1. Additional Background
The trial court instructed the jury that to find defendant guilty of first degree
burglary, it must find that he entered K.O.’s house with the intent to commit either corporal
injury, assault with a deadly weapon, or criminal threats. During closing argument, the
People argued that the jury should find the intent underlying the burglary was to commit the
corporal injury. The People contended that it was “easiest” for the jury to find corporal
injury was the intent, because defendant “busted through her door, and then he went straight
to her, and he grabbed her by the hair and the throat.” The prosecutor argued the intent of
the burglary “was to attack her. It was to do what he did. To grab her by the hair and
throat, shake her, force her to comply.” The prosecutor did not argue that any other felony
was the intent underlying the burglary. The jury verdict did not specify which felony it
found was the underlying intent of the burglary.
2. Analysis
As an initial matter, we disagree with the People’s argument that the jury could have
found defendant committed burglary on July 1 with the intent of committing either corporal
injury, assault with a deadly weapon, or criminal threats. Both the criminal threats and
assault with a deadly weapon occurred a considerable time after he committed burglary and
corporal injury on July 1. Defendant made the July 1 criminal threats after K.O. left the
house and fell asleep in her car, and he assaulted her with a deadly weapon the following
morning on July 2. Corporal injury is the only felony that occurred soon after defendant
broke into the house and before any significant break in time. In fact, after defendant broke
into the house through the back door, he immediately walked up to K.O. and grabbed her by
her hair and throat. This likely is why the prosecutor specifically argued that defendant
broke in to “attack” K.O. Thus, corporal injury is the only offense that could underlie the
burglary.
Generally, “[w]hen a defendant is convicted of burglary and the intended felony
underlying the burglary, section 654 prohibits punishment for both crimes.” (Islas, supra,

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210 Cal.App.4th at 130.) The People do not cite to any authority that states defendant may
be punished for both the burglary and the intended felony underlying that burglary if the
defendant had the opportunity to reflect between the two offenses. We therefore apply the
general rule that the trial court cannot impose punishment for both the burglary and the
felony underlying the intent of the burglary. Thus, the trial court erred in failing to apply
section 654 to stay either the term for burglary or the term for corporal injury.
Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 518 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended
section 654, subdivision (a) to permit an act or omission punishable under two or more
provisions of law to “be punished under either of such provisions.” (§ 654, subd. (a); Stats.
2021, ch. 441, § 1.) Thus, under amended section 654, a trial court now has the discretion to
punish the defendant under any of the applicable laws. Consequently, we remand the matter
for a full resentencing hearing. (See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) In doing
so, we express no opinion about how the trial court should exercise its discretion. To assist
the trial court and the parties on remand, we shall address the remaining sentencing issues.
C. Criminal Threats and Assault with a Deadly Weapon
Next, defendant argues that the offenses alleging criminal threats (count 3) and
assault with a deadly weapon (count 4) were part of a continuous course of conduct of
domestic violence and shared the same objective of defendant controlling and intimidating
K.O. Initially, we observe that defendant’s actions on either July 1 or July 2 arguably could
have served as the basis of the criminal threats conviction, and the jury was not required to
specify on the verdict form the actions that it agreed formed the basis for that count. (See
CALCRIM No. 3500.) However, defendant did not have a knife in his hand when he
threatened to stab K.O. in the throat on July 1. By contrast, on July 2, defendant held a
knife to K.O.’s throat while threatening, “You’re done bitch. I’m going to fuck you up.” As
a result, the jury necessarily found that defendant committed criminal threats on July 2
because it found true the aggravating circumstance that defendant was armed with or used a
weapon during the commission of the criminal threats.

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When viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, “[s]ubstantial evidence
supports the [trial] court’s implicit finding that [defendant] acted with separate objectives
when he assaulted and then threatened [K.O].” (In re Raymundo M. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th
78, 95.) “That is, the [trial] court could reasonably have found that [defendant] committed
the assault with the objective of inflicting physical harm on [K.O.], whereas [defendant]
criminally threatened [K.O.] with the separate objective of inflicting mental or emotional
harm.” (Ibid.) Defendant demonstrated an intent to physically harm K.O. when he pressed
his knife into her neck hard enough to leave a mark. Just because defendant did not gravely
injure K.O. does not mean he did not intend to physically harm her. Then, defendant
inflicted emotional harm by telling K.O. that he was going to “fuck [her] up.” Because the
trial court could reasonably conclude defendant carried out two separate acts with two
separate objectives, we conclude the trial court did not err in finding multiple punishments
were appropriate.
D. False Imprisonment and Assault with a Deadly Weapon
Defendant further argues that because the use of a knife established both the assault
with a deadly weapon (count 4) and the element of menace for false imprisonment on July 2
(count 6), the trial court could not impose two punishments for the same act. The People
respond that the jury could have “reasonably concluded” that defendant committed false
imprisonment on July 1, but that even if the jury found defendant committed false
imprisonment on July 2, he still had an opportunity to reflect between the two offenses.
During closing argument, the People argued that there was evidence defendant
committed false imprisonment by stopping K.O. from leaving her house on both July 1 and
July 2. The People asserted that the jury could find defendant guilty of false imprisonment
by concluding he committed false imprisonment on either or both days. The prosecutor then
said, “I'm asking you to find him guilty of him doing this on July 2nd. Because on July 2nd,
all of the events that had happened on July 1st and July 2nd came into play to be called

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menace.” The jury’s verdict did not indicate the day on which it found defendant committed
false imprisonment.
To find defendant guilty of false imprisonment by violence or menace, the jury
needed to find that: 1) defendant intentionally confined or detained K.O. or caused K.O. to
be confined or detained by violence or menace; and 2) defendant made K.O. stay or go
somewhere against her will. (CALCRIM No. 1240.) The jury instructions defined
“menace” as “a verbal or physical threat of harm, including use of a deadly weapon.”
(Ibid.) Further, “the threat of harm may be express or implied.” (Ibid.)
A finding of false imprisonment by menace does not require “[a]n express threat or
use of a deadly weapon.” (Islas, supra, 210 Cal.App.4th at p. 125.) “Threats can be
exhibited in a myriad number of ways, verbally and by conduct.” (Id. at p. 126.) Further, “a
jury properly may consider a victim’s fear in determining whether the defendant expressly
or impliedly threatened harm.” (Id. at p. 127.)
When K.O. first tried to leave her house on July 1, defendant took her purse and
blocked her path. After defendant held a knife to her throat on July 2, K.O. tried to leave
again. Defendant stepped in front of her, stood over her with a “puffed-out chest,” and
refused to let her pass. While there were two acts, on two different dates, that could have
served as the basis for the false imprisonment conviction, the prosecutor elected the July 2
date and defendant’s briefing seems to agree that July 2 is the relevant date. Had the jury
found that defendant committed false imprisonment the day before he held a knife to K.O.’s
throat, i.e. July 1, defendant’s argument that his use of a knife also established the menace
element for false imprisonment would fail. And even if the jury found defendant committed
false imprisonment on July 2, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied finding
that defendant’s actions, other than holding a knife to K.O.’s throat, satisfied the menace
element of false imprisonment. When K.O. returned to her house, defendant stabbed her rug
and couch with a knife. In addition, defendant was approximately six inches taller than
K.O. and stood over her with his chest “puffed” when she tried to leave. K.O. repeatedly

12
asked defendant to let her leave and he refused. Afraid that defendant’s behavior would
escalate, and he would become more violent, K.O. did not insist on leaving. The trial court
could have reasonably concluded that the acts of stabbing her household items, standing
over her, puffing out his chest, and refusing to step aside implied the threat of harm. As a
result, the trial court did not necessarily rely on defendant holding the knife to K.O’s throat
to satisfy the menace element.
Further, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied finding that defendant
harbored different objectives when he committed assault with a deadly weapon and false
imprisonment. As we have already discussed, defendant committed assault with a deadly
weapon with the intent to cause physical harm to K.O. Viewed in the light most favorable
to the judgment, the record reflects that defendant falsely imprisoned K.O. to exercise
control over her. Defendant became enraged again when K.O. told him that she was going
to work. K.O. had successfully fled the house the night before, and defendant apparently
did not want her to feel empowered to leave again. After defendant stopped holding the
knife to K.O.’s throat, she sat down and waited for him to calm down. When she felt he had
calmed down, she stood up again and walked toward the door. Defendant had the
opportunity to reflect and let her leave. Instead, he chose to confront K.O. again and
stepped in front of her. Based on these facts, we conclude there is substantial evidence that
defendant had the opportunity to reflect in between committing assault with a deadly
weapon and false imprisonment. As a result, the trial court did not err in imposing
punishments for both the assault and the false imprisonment.
II
Prior Serious Felony Conviction Enhancements
Defendant contends that the trial court was authorized to strike or dismiss but could
not stay the three prior serious felony conviction enhancements. The People concede that
the trial court had discretion to strike the enhancements, but not to impose and stay them.
We agree that striking or imposing the enhancement is the extent of the trial court’s

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discretion. (People v. Langston (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1237, 1241; People v. Haykel (2002) 96
Cal.App.4th 146, 151; People v. Eberhardt (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1112, 1122-1124.)
Failing “to impose or strike an enhancement is a legally unauthorized sentence subject to
correction for the first time on appeal.” (People v. Bradley (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 386,
391.) Given that we are remanding for a full resentencing hearing under section 654, we
leave it to the trial court to decide whether to strike or impose the three prior serious felony
conviction enhancements.
DISPOSITION
The convictions are affirmed. The sentence is vacated, and the matter is remanded
for a full resentencing hearing consistent with section 654.

/s/
Wiseman, J.*

We concur:

/s/
Duarte, Acting P. J.

/s/
Mesiwala, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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