CourtListener 9885678•Nelson v. Bannon CA2/5
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Filed 6/26/24 Nelson v. Bannon CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
CHRIS NELSON, B319433
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super.
Ct. No. 20STCV48295)
v.
EMILY BANNON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Robert B. Broadbelt, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
Matthew Strugar for Defendant and Appellant.
Clark Hill, Bradford G. Hughes, Richard H. Nakamura,
and Tiffany B. Hunter for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________
A self-described “well-established record producer” and
seller of collectible musical instruments sued his ex-girlfriend, a
voice actress, for posting a story on Instagram recounting various
instances of him mistreating others, ranging from romantic
partners (including herself) to customers, to individuals he
targeted based on their race.
He sued her for defamation and related claims, and she
filed an anti-SLAPP motion. The trial court denied the motion on
the sole ground that the Instagram story did not qualify as a
“protected activity” under the anti-SLAPP statute, and the ex-
girlfriend appealed. We agree that the court’s conclusion was
error, and reverse and remand for it to determine the music
producer’s probability of prevailing.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I. FACTS
Plaintiff Chris Nelson is a music producer who owns a
recording studio and sells collectible musical instruments.
Nelson has worked with “[n]umerous well-known artists and
musicians.” He has also sold “over 2,000” pieces of musical
equipment online, and was a seller with “over 1,400 reviews”
from buyers. Defendant Emily Bannon—a voice actor—lived
with and dated Nelson in 2018 and 2019, when she was 23 and
he 34.
In 2020, Bannon spoke with various people who had been
acquainted with Nelson, ranging from business investors to
romantic partners, about their negative experiences with him.
Bannon then posted an Instagram story about Nelson containing
roughly 30 slides that recounted her own and others’ bad
experiences with him. Bannon’s Instagram following was about
20,000 at the time. Bannon then agreed to have musician Phoebe
2
Bridgers share the Instagram story on Bridgers’ own Instagram
account, which had about 500,000 followers.
Bannon’s Instagram story began with a slide stating, “I
stand in solidarity with those coming forward with allegations
against Chris Nelson . . . owner of Sound Space Studio . . . .”
Bannon claimed that she had “been personally contacted by such
a large quantity of women and men claiming to have either been
abused or robbed by [Nelson] that [she] felt impelled to state
what [she] know[s].”
The slides recounted some of the “diverse and numerous
accusations” about Nelson, some of which Bannon stated had
been “floating around the internet for about a decade.”
Screenshots of messages from unidentified sources showed such
allegations as Nelson selling replica items as originals,
manipulating young women into recording music with him and
then refusing to release the recordings to them, hacking romantic
partners’ accounts, and attempting to steal from someone’s
elderly father.
Bannon accused Nelson of getting her pregnant and saddling
her with $10,000 of medical debt from complications. She further
accused him of unintentionally impregnating other women on at
least four other occasions.
One slide contained a “warning” that Bannon had “heard . . .
from many people” that Nelson “conducted business under
different fake names for years.” Bannon also reported that
Nelson had robbed individuals, who she identified by first name
only.
Bannon stated that Nelson has told others that he provoked
a Latinx man with a racist slur before beating him to death.
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She invited anyone who “ha[s] information that might be useful
to survivors [to] feel free to get in touch.”
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 16, 2021, Nelson filed his operative first
amended complaint against Bannon for defamation and related
claims based on her Instagram story about him.
Bannon filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike, arguing that
Nelson’s claims “arise[] from [Bannon’s] exercise of free speech in
a public forum on a matter of public interest” (425.16, subd.
(e)(3)).
After briefing and a hearing , the trial court denied
Bannon’s motion because her statements did not qualify as
“protected activity.” The court reasoned that although the
statements were made in a “public forum,” Bannon’s purpose
was “to ostracize” and “to air grievances with [Nelson],” and her
statements were “not . . . part of a larger discussion relating to
consumer protection, the ‘#MeToo’ movement, or other issues of
public interest.” The court stated that although Bannon “may be
correct in arguing that the #MeToo movement and related
discussions of . . . men abusing their power [are] matters of public
interest, [her] statements failed to connect her allegations within
this context.” The trial court did not reach the second prong of
the anti-SLAPP analysis (probability of prevailing).
Bannon filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Bannon argues the trial court erred in concluding her
speech was not protected activity within the meaning of the anti-
SLAPP law. We review this issue de novo. (Geiser v. Kuhns
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1250 (Geiser).)
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I. PERTINENT LAW
A. Anti-SLAPP Law, Generally
The anti-SLAPP statute provides an expedited procedure to
dispose of meritless lawsuits brought to chill the valid exercise of
the constitutionally protected rights of speech or petition. (Baral
v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384; Albanese v. Menounos (2013)
218 Cal.App.4th 923, 928; see also Digerati Holdings, LLC v.
Young Money Entertainment, LLC (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 873,
883 [“purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute is to encourage
participation in matters of public significance and prevent
meritless litigation designed to chill the exercise of First
Amendment rights”].) The Legislature has declared that the
statute “shall be construed broadly” to that end. (§ 425.16, subd.
(a).)
“[A] trial court tasked with ruling on an anti-SLAPP
motion must ask two questions: (1) has the moving party ‘made a
threshold showing that the challenged cause of action arises from
protected activity’ (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048,
1065), and, if so, (2) has the nonmoving party ‘established . . . a
probability that [he] will prevail’ on the challenged cause of
action by showing that the claim has ‘minimal merit’ (§ 425.16,
subd. (b)(1); Nevallier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 93-94)?”
(Abir Cohen Treyzon Salo, LLP v. Lahiji (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th
882, 887.) For both prongs of the analysis, “‘[t]he court considers
the pleadings and evidence submitted by both sides.’” (Curtin
Maritime Corp. v. Pacific Dredge & Construction, LLC (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 651, 664.)
B. “Protected Activity” Under Anti-SLAPP
The anti-SLAPP statute defines “protected activity” to
include “any written statement . . . made in a place open to the
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public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public
interest” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3)) or “any other conduct in
furtherance of” the constitutional rights of petition or free speech
“in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest
(id., subd. (e)(4) [the “catchall provision”]). Both these categories
“are subject to the limitation that the conduct must be in
connection with an issue of public interest.” (Weinberg v. Feisel
(2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1132.)
II. ANALYSIS
Bannon’s Instagram post qualifies as a “protected activity”
under the anti-SLAPP law. The parties do not dispute that
Instagram is a “public forum” for the purpose of section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(3). (See Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10
Cal.App.5th 1240, 1252 (Jackson); Cross v. Facebook, Inc. (2017)
14 Cal.App.5th 190, 199.) This appeal turns on whether
Bannon’s Instagram post was made “in connection with an issue
of public interest.”
In FilmOn Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133
(FilmOn), our Supreme Court articulated a two-step test to
determine whether speech or conduct was made in connection
with an issue of public interest. First, we ask whether the
challenged activity, considered in its context, “may reasonably be
understood to implicate a public issue, even if it also implicates a
private dispute.” (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1253-1254; see
FilmOn at p. 149.) Second, we ask what “functional relationship”
exists between the speech or conduct and the public conversation
about some matter of public interest; “the statement must in
some manner itself contribute to the public debate.” (FilmOn, at
pp. 149-150.) Context (including “speaker, audience, and
purpose”) is an important consideration in both steps of this
6
analysis. (Id. at pp. 148, 150; Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp.
1253-1254.)
A. Bannon’s statements implicated public issues.
Regarding the first step—whether speech or conduct “may
reasonably be understood to implicate a public issue”—FilmOn
observed that defendants “virtually always” “succeed in drawing
a line . . . connecting their speech to an abstract issue of public
interest.” (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1253-1254; FilmOn,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 150; cf. Geiser, at p. 1250 [but “virtually
always” does not mean “always”].) Bannon is no exception. Her
Instagram story implicated the issue salient in the #MeToo era of
men, particularly men in the entertainment industry, abusing
their positions of power. It also implicated consumer protection
concerns.
Both the context and the content of Bannon’s post support
these conclusions. Nelson has a public presence; he is, by his own
account, a “respected expert musical instrument collector” whose
“expertise . . . is sought by collectors . . . across the United States
and abroad. He is also a “well-established record producer” who
has worked with “[n]umerous well-known artists and
musicians.”1 (Rivero v. American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 913, 924
1 In her opening brief, Bannon cited various media
publications that concern Nelson’s defamation lawsuits against
other individuals. Because these publications were not presented
to the trial court and are not part of the record on appeal, we
decline to consider them. (See Safeco Ins. Co. of America v.
Superior Court (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 814, 834, fn. 14 [“A
reviewing court generally should not take judicial notice of
evidence that was not presented or available to the trial court”].)
7
(Rivero) [statement about person in the public eye may implicate
a “public issue”]; Jackson, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 1254
[same]; Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th
610, 621 [same]; see Sipple v. Foundation for Nat. Progress (1999)
71 Cal.App.4th 226, 230, 238 [published article about well-known
political consultant’s alleged abuse of his former wives concerned
“public issue”].) Nelson has “completed over 2,000 successful
transactions . . . with over 1,400 reviews” from buyers, and
Bannon’s post charged him with selling replica instruments as
originals and using “fake names.” (Rivero, at p. 924 [statements
that could affect large number of people beyond direct
participants involved “public issue”]; Xu v. Huang (2021) 73
Cal.App.5th 802, 814 [commercial nature is relevant “contextual
cue” in determining whether speech is protected]; Wilbanks v.
Wolk (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 883, 899 [consumer information
may be viewed as concerning matter of public interest]; Chaker v.
Mateo (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1141-1142, 1146-1147
[mother of woman who had been romantically involved with
owner of forensic business posted statements on “RipOff Report”
website calling him “a criminal and deadbeat dad” concerned
“public issue” in that the statements “warn[ed] consumers about
his trustworthiness”].)
Bannon’s Instagram post served to document and warn
others about various kinds of misconduct by Nelson in both his
romantic and business dealings and request further information
from “survivors” of his abuse. (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 140
[the audience and the purpose of the speech are pertinent
factors].) The trial court’s ruling and Nelson’s respondent’s brief
focus on characterizing Bannon’s statements as “personal
8
grievance[s]” motivated by “revenge.”2 This is precisely the mode
of analysis the Court in FilmOn intended to combat with its two-
part test. (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 149 [decisions focusing
on “discerning a single topic of speech” were “less than satisfying”
because “speech is rarely ‘about’ any single issue”].) That her
statements may have stemmed from her own resentment based
on personal experience is not relevant in determining whether
her statement implicated a public issue. (Geiser, supra, 13
Cal.5th 1238, 1254 [“FilmOn’s first step calls for an objective
inquiry, without deference to the movant’s framing or personal
motivations. A court . . . should take the position of a reasonable,
objective observer”].) Indeed, “those who speak on public issues
are often driven to do so by circumstances that affect them
personally.” (Ibid.)
B. Bannon furthered the public discussion.
“‘[I]t is not enough that the statement refer to a subject of .
. . public interest; the statement must in some manner contribute
to the public [discussion].’” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 150-
151, quoting Wilbanks, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 899.) What
it means to contribute to the public discussion may “differ based
on the state of public discourse at a given time.” (FilmOn, at pp
150-151.) “We are not concerned with the social utility of the
speech at issue, or the degree to which it propelled the
conversation in any particular direction; rather, we examine
2 In her opening brief, Bannon also refers to trial court
rulings from actions asserted by other individuals against
Nelson. Although Bannon cites a request for judicial notice, no
such request was filed in this appeal. In any case, the lower
court’s rulings in other lawsuits against Nelson are not binding
on us and we decline to consider them in conducting our analysis.
9
whether a defendant—through public or private speech or
conduct—participated in, or furthered, the discourse that makes
an issue on of public interest.” (Id. at p. 151 see Cross v. Cooper
(2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 357, 375 [defendant’s conduct “directly
related” to issue of public interest because it “served th[e]
interests” of preventing child abuse].)
Through her Instagram story, Bannon “participated in”
discourse concerning men in power taking advantage of women
and relating to consumer protection. In highlighting various
instances of Nelson’s alleged misconduct, Bannon made clear that
she was relating not only her own experiences but those of others.
(See FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 152 [content of speech may
“prove illuminating” when considering “speech and its
relationship to the matters of public interest”]; Hailstone v.
Martinez (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 728, 738 [activity occurring in
context of ongoing controversy, dispute, or discussion, may
qualify as “public issue”].) Bannon is a voice actress, and she
targeted hundreds of thousands of followers, both her own and
musician Phoebe Bridgers’. The “audience [she] sought” was thus
people involved in, or to some extent interested in, the
entertainment and music industries. Given that her posts
involved mistreatment of musicians and consumers as well as
romantic partners, this context shows the requisite “wedding of
content and context.” (FilmOn, at p. 154.) Bannon also sought
input from others, urging them to contact her with their stories,
which further supports our conclusion that her post occurred in
the context of an ongoing discussion.
The trial court did not reach the second prong of the anti-
SLAPP analysis to determine whether Nelson met his burden of
establishing a probability of prevailing on his claims.
10
We therefore remand for the trial court to conduct that analysis.
(Collier v. Harris (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 41, 58.)
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. The parties to bear their own costs
on appeal.
LEE, J. *
WE CONCUR:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
KIM, J.
Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.
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