CourtListener 9774051•People v. Dickerson CA1/2
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Filed 6/24/24 P. v. Dickerson CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A169508
v.
MATTHEW EDWARD DICKERSON, (Humboldt County
Super. Ct. No. CR2202322)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Matthew Dickerson pled guilty to three counts of unlawful
sexual intercourse with a minor under 16 years of age. The trial court denied
probation and sentenced him to four years in prison; the court also required
him to register as a sex offender for 10 years. Dickerson’s appointed counsel
has filed a brief that raises no issue for appeal and asks this court for an
independent review of the record pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25
Cal.3d 436 (Wende). We affirm.
BACKGROUND1
Between August 12 and 17, 2022, Dickerson, then 44 years old, had
sexual intercourse three times with 14-year-old Jane Doe. Dickerson had
1 The parties stipulated to the facts.
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been in a relationship with Doe’s mother for about two years and lived with
Doe and her mother at the time of the offenses.
In February 2023, Dickerson was charged by information with: (1)
three counts of lewd acts on a 14 year old who was at least 10 years younger
than him (Pen. Code,2 § 288, subd. (c)(1); counts 1, 2, 3); (2) three counts of
unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under 16 years old (§ 261.5,
subd. (d); counts 4, 5, 6); and (3) two counts of sexual penetration by foreign
object of a minor under 16 years old (§ 289, subd. (i); counts 7, 8). As to all
counts, the information also alleged: (1) the victim was particularly
vulnerable; (2) the manner in which the crimes were carried out indicated
planning, sophistication, or professionalism; and (3) Dickerson took
advantage of a position of trust or confidence.
In May 2023, the trial court granted Dickerson’s motion for mistrial
due to late discovery. In June 2023, an amended information was filed that
contained the same counts and allegations as previously charged.
On October 11, 2023, Dickerson pled guilty to counts 4, 5, and 6 as part
of an open plea in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining counts. He
further admitted the aggravating circumstance that Doe was a vulnerable
victim. Dickerson was specifically advised his open plea meant there were no
guarantees as to sentence, and he faced anything from the minimum of
probation to the maximum term of six years in prison. The parties stipulated
to a factual basis for the plea. The court determined Dickerson, who was
represented by counsel, was advised of, understood, and waived the right to
trial, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to produce evidence
2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise stated.
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and witnesses, and his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. The
court accepted the factual basis for the plea and found the plea was
knowledgeable, voluntary, and intelligently made.
At the plea hearing, Dickerson acknowledged he would be required to
register as a sex offender for 10 years. He understood that if he received
probation, the term could be up to five years, and if he received a prison
sentence, he would be sent to state prison and could be placed on parole for
up to three years. Dickerson further acknowledged that he could face an
aggregate maximum term of six years in prison.
At the November 6, 2023 sentencing hearing, the trial court denied
probation and imposed an aggregate prison term of four years comprised of:
(1) two years on count 4 (low term); (2) one year on count 5 (one-third the
midterm); and (3) one year on count 6 (one-third the midterm).
When denying probation and imposing the low term, the trial court
stated it believed “that the nature of the crime is of a very serious crime
made more so by the age disparity between Jane Doe and Mr. Dickerson. I
am balancing that this conduct, though not consensual under the law, was
not forced contact. There is no prior record. And both the Static 99 as well as
the other risk factors, Probation has found to be low risk to reoffend. So that
is balanced by the power of disparity, the fact that he was in a position of
trust and that she was vulnerable and he admitted to her vulnerability, this
occurred on multiple occasions, that he had known what he was doing was
wrong and brought that up with Jane Doe, [and] he attempted to dissuade
her from testifying . . . . The Court believes that probation would be
inappropriate in a case like this.”
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The court awarded credits totaling 477 days (239 actual time and 238
days conduct credits). The court ordered Dickerson to register as a sex
offender for 10 years. The court also ordered Dickerson to pay a restitution
fine of $1,200 (§ 1202.4) with a corresponding parole revocation fee in the
same amount (§ 1202.45), along with a $120 court operation assessment fee
(§ 1465.8), and a $90 criminal conviction assessment fee (Gov. Code, § 70373).
After the court sentenced Dickerson, the prosecution dismissed the
remaining charges. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Our review here is limited to the sentences the trial court imposed,
since Dickerson pled guilty and there is no certificate of probable cause
(§ 1237.5); the notice of appeal also states the appeal is based on sentencing
and other matters occurring after the plea that do not affect the validity of
the plea. In any event, the record reflects Dickerson’s plea was knowing and
voluntary. Dickerson entered an open plea of guilty to three counts of
unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under the age of 16, in exchange for
the dismissal of the remaining counts. He was specifically admonished that
his open plea meant there were no guarantees as to sentence, and he faced
anything from the minimum of probation to the maximum term of six years
in prison. (See, e.g. People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 156
[acknowledging effect of “ ‘open plea’ ”].) The report prepared by the
probation department in anticipation of the sentencing hearing recommended
that Dickerson be sentenced to six years in state prison (an aggravated term
of four years on count 4, plus two consecutive one-year terms, representing
one-third the midterm, on counts 5 and 6). At the time of sentencing, the
court determined Dickerson was unsuitable for probation based on the
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seriousness of the crime and other aggravating factors. The court stated its
reasons for imposing the aggregate term of four years in prison, comprised of
the low term of two years on count 4, plus two consecutive one-year terms,
representing one-third the midterm on counts 5 and 6. The sentences
imposed were within the range acknowledged by the parties at the time of
entry of plea, supported by the stipulated factual basis, and allowed by law.
(§ 261.5, subd. (d).)
Finally, we conclude that any possible claim Dickerson could have
regarding the fines and fees imposed by the court has been forfeited by failing
to raise this issue at the time of sentencing. (See, e.g., People v. Nelson
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 198, 227 [defendant’s claim that the court erroneously
failed to consider ability to pay a $10,000 restitution fine is forfeited by the
failure to object].) In any event, we join several other courts in concluding
that the principles of due process do not require determination of a
defendant’s present ability to pay before imposing the fines and assessments.
(People v. Cota (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 786, 794–795; People v. Kingston (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 272, 279; People v. Hicks (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 320, 329,
review granted Nov. 26, 2019, S258946; People v. Aviles (2019) 39
Cal.App.5th 1055, 1069; People v. Caceres (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 917, 928; but
see People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, 1164.) As such, any failure
by counsel to raise this issue did not constitute ineffective assistance. (See
People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 377 [counsel’s failure to raise meritless
position not ineffective assistance].)
Following Wende guidelines, we have conducted an independent review
of the record and conclude there are no meritorious issues to be argued on
appeal.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________
DESAUTELS, J.
We concur:
_________________________
RICHMAN, ACTING P.J.
_________________________
MILLER, J.
People v. Dickerson (A169508)
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