People v. Ackerman

CourtListener 9771350Calctapp24 de jun. de 2024

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Filed 6/24/24
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082208

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD271741)

ISRAEL ACKERMAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Polly H. Shamoon, Judge. Affirmed.
Lindsey M. Ball, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve
Oetting, and Kristen Ramirez, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
A jury convicted Israel Ackerman of attempted voluntary manslaughter

(Pen. Code, 1 §§ 664, 192, subd. (a); count 1), among other crimes, and found
true allegations that Ackerman personally inflicted great bodily injury within

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a). His sentence included a
three-year term for the enhancement.
On appeal, Ackerman contends section 12022.7 prohibits trial courts
from imposing a great bodily injury sentencing enhancement where the crime
of conviction is attempted voluntary manslaughter. We disagree and,
therefore, affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2017, Ackerman engaged in a verbal altercation with

Anthony K. and then left. 2 He later returned, climbed up a ladder to the
second-floor patio of an apartment in which Anthony was working, and made
stabbing motions with a knife at Anthony. After Anthony hit Ackerman with
a paint scraper, Ackerman stabbed Anthony four times and then pushed him
against a glass window. Anthony eventually walked to a fire station while
bleeding profusely, and police found Ackerman unconscious in the apartment.
At trial, Ackerman argued that he acted in self-defense.
A jury convicted Ackerman of attempted voluntary manslaughter as a
lesser included offense of attempted murder (§§ 664, 192, subd. (a); count 1),
making a criminal threat (§ 422; count 2), and assault with a deadly weapon
(§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 3). The jury found true as to count 1 the allegation
that Ackerman used a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)).
On counts 1 and 3, the jury found true allegations that Ackerman personally

2 By amended motion, Ackerman requests that we take judicial notice of
our unpublished decision in People v. Ackerman (Apr. 10, 2019, D073260).
Because we rely on this opinion for the factual background of this case, we
deny the request to judicially notice it and instead, on our own motion,
augment the record to include the opinion. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.155(a)(1)(A); see also People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 958, fn. 2
[relying on brief summary of facts drawn from appellate court’s prior
opinion].)
2
inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). Ackerman admitted that
he previously suffered two probation denial priors (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4)), one
prison prior (§§ 667.5, subd. (b), 668), one serious felony prior (§§ 667,
subd. (a)(1), 668, 1192.7, subd. (c)), and one strike prior (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i),
668, 1170.12).
In December 2017, the trial court sentenced Ackerman to an aggregate
term of 20 years in prison, which included a three-year term for the personal
infliction of great bodily injury enhancement attached to count 1.
While the appeal from his original sentence was pending, the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) recommended
Ackerman be resentenced, citing People v. Cook (2015) 60 Cal.4th 922

(Cook). 3 We did not address this recommendation in our prior unpublished
opinion (People v. Ackerman (Apr. 10, 2019, D073260)) in which we reversed
count 2 and remanded the matter with instructions for the trial court to
exercise its discretion to determine whether to strike the five-year prior

strike enhancement. 4
On June 23, 2022, Ackerman filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus
claiming the trial court erred by failing to resentence him pursuant to the
CDCR letter. The CDCR had explained in its letter that Ackerman was
convicted “of [murder, manslaughter, P[en.] C[ode] 451, P[en.] C[ode] 452, or

3 Ackerman also requests that we take judicial notice of the CDCR’s
letter, which was filed in the San Diego County Superior Court on
September 6, 2018, and considered by the trial court. Because we discuss
this letter in explaining the procedural background of this case, we again
deny the request for judicial notice and, on our own motion, augment the
record to include the letter. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)
4 The People subsequently moved to dismiss count 2. On remand, the
trial court dismissed count 2, declined to strike the five-year prior
enhancement, and reaffirmed the sentence.
3
other crime with [the] element of ‘infliction of great bodily injury’] (Pen. Code,
§ 664/192, subd. (a)), with an enhancement attached for infliction of great
bodily injury (Pen. Code, §12022.7, subd. (a/b/c/d/e)).” In its view, Ackerman
was entitled to resentencing in light of the Cook case because it prohibited
application of a section 12022.7 to a charge of manslaughter and any crime
where infliction of great bodily injury was an element of the offense.
During a November 2022 hearing on the petition, the trial court offered
its tentative view that Cook only applied to completed acts of manslaughter
noting, “there’s no . . . greater bodily injury than death.” When the conviction
was for attempt, however, the court implied great bodily injury was not
necessarily an element. As it explained, “you can attempt to kill somebody or
be involved in a manslaughter, not succeed and have very little damage and
injury to the person.” For this reason, the court concluded that Cook did not
apply. It instead found persuasive the reasoning of People v. Lewis (1993)
21 Cal.App.4th 243, 247 (Lewis), which determined “there is no reason to
construe section 12022.7 to exempt attempted manslaughter from the
enhancement for infliction of great bodily injury.”
The trial court then elicited argument from counsel. Defense counsel
responded, “I did have the opportunity to read both cases and I looked into
the statute as well to see if there was a different interpretation just from the
statute. [¶] I do agree with the Court that I do think [great bodily injury]
can attach to attempted voluntary but cannot to a complete voluntary.” The
prosecution also agreed, so the court ruled that the Cook case did not apply
and the great bodily injury allegation could attach. It then resentenced
Ackerman to 15 years in custody.

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DISCUSSION
Ackerman urges us to find that Lewis was wrongly decided and that
section 12022.7 does not authorize the addition of a great bodily injury
sentencing enhancement when the crime of conviction is attempted voluntary

manslaughter. We decline to do so. 5
The interpretation of a statute is a question of law subject to de novo
review. (People v. Prunty (2015) 62 Cal.4th 59, 71.) “ ‘As in any case
involving statutory interpretation, our fundamental task is to determine the
Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’ ” (People v. Cole
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 964, 974.) We first examine the statutory language and
give it a plain and commonsense meaning. (People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 961.) In so doing, we consider the “ ‘ “the entire substance of
the statute . . . in order to determine the scope and purpose of the
provision,” ’ ” and we attempt to harmonize its various parts within the
context of the statutory framework as a whole. (People v. Arroyo (2016)
62 Cal.4th 589, 595.) If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then the
plain meaning controls. (Cole, at p. 975.)

5 The People contend Ackerman forfeited any appellate objection to the
great bodily injury enhancement by agreeing with the court during the
November 2022 hearing that the enhancement “can attach to attempted
voluntary but cannot to a complete voluntary.” Ackerman counters that the
issue remains cognizable because he challenges an unauthorized sentence.
It is true we recognize a narrow exception to the forfeiture or waiver doctrine
for unauthorized sentences that “could not lawfully be imposed under any
circumstance in the particular case” because “such error is ‘clear and
correctable’ independent of any factual issues presented by the record at
sentencing.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 354.) Although it appears
defense counsel in this case stated clearly based on research and experience
that Cook did not alter the Lewis court’s correct interpretation of
section 12022.7, because Ackerman raises only a legal challenge to his
sentence, we find the exception applies. Even if we did not, we would
nonetheless exercise our discretion to address his contention on the merits.
5
Section 12022.7 provides that “[a]ny person who personally inflicts
great bodily injury on any person other than an accomplice in the commission
of a felony or attempted felony shall be punished by an additional and
consecutive term of imprisonment in the state prison for three years.” (Id.,
subd. (a).) “As used in this section, ‘great bodily injury’ means a significant or
substantial physical injury.” (Id., subd. (f).) Of particular relevance here, the
statute further provides that “[t]his section shall not apply to murder or
manslaughter or a violation of Section 451 or 452. Subdivisions (a), (b), (c),
and (d) shall not apply if infliction of great bodily injury is an element of the
offense.” (Id., subd. (g).)
In Lewis, the First Appellate District considered the exact question
presented here and concluded that the statute’s language was clear and that
attempted manslaughter was not exempted under section 12022.7,
subdivision (g). (Lewis, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 247.) It stressed that
prior courts had reached the same result in considering the analogous
question of whether enhancements could be added to the crime of attempted
murder. (Id. at pp. 247–248, citing People v. Wells (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d
497, 505 (Wells) and People v. Allen (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 616, 631 (Allen).)
The Wells court observed that whereas the first paragraph of section 12022.7
specifically stated that enhancements applied to individuals who inflicted
great bodily injury during the attempted commission of a felony, the
paragraph listing exempted crimes did not specifically include attempts.
(Wells, at p. 505.) In the Wells court’s view, “[t]his evidences an intent of the
Legislature not to exclude attempted murder from the provisions of the
section.” (Ibid.) The Allen court agreed, noting that murder and attempted
murder are separate crimes. (Allen, at p. 631.) In the face of this prior
authority, and the fact that the Legislature had not altered the relevant

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provisions of section 12022.7 following judicial construction of its provisions, 6
the Lewis court concluded there likewise was no reason to construe
section 12022.7 to exempt attempted manslaughter from the enhancement
for infliction of great bodily injury. (Lewis, at pp. 248–249.)
The question before our high court in Cook was “whether the sentence
for the gross vehicular manslaughter of one victim may be enhanced for
defendant’s infliction of great bodily injury on other victims.” (Cook, supra,
60 Cal.4th at p. 924.) In concluding it could not, our Supreme Court stated,
“[s]ubdivision (g) means what it says—great bodily injury enhancements
simply do not apply to murder or manslaughter.” (Id. at p. 935.)
Although the high court did not have occasion to evaluate whether such
enhancements could be applied to attempted versions of these crimes,
Ackerman argues the Cook decision “interpreted section 12022.7[,]
[subdivision] (g)’s exclusion very broadly” and relied on a decision in this
appellate district, which observed that section 12022.7’s legislative purpose
“ ‘ “ ‘is not to maximize punishment under every pleading artifice a prosecutor
can devise, but instead to “deter[ ] the use of excessive force and the infliction
of additional harm beyond that inherent in the crime itself.” ’ ” ’ ” (Cook,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 933, citing Hale v. Superior Court (2014)
225 Cal.App.4th 268, 275–276 (Hale).) Within this context, Ackerman
contends the fact that the crime of voluntary manslaughter was incomplete
does not negate the essential requirement that the defendant intended to use

6 As the Lewis court correctly noted, “ ‘when as here “ ‘a statute has been
construed by judicial decision, and that construction is not altered by
subsequent legislation, it must be presumed that the Legislature is aware of
the judicial construction and approves of it.’ [Citations.] ‘There is a strong
presumption that when the Legislature reenacts a statute which has been
judicially construed it adopts the construction placed on the statute by the
courts.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Favor (2012) 54 Cal.4th 868, 879.)
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excessive force against the victim. He reasons that because the Legislature
did not qualify “manslaughter” in subdivision (g) of section 12022.7 by listing
the specific penal code sections applicable to this category of crimes—as it did
with arson—it must have meant to broadly exclude all crimes involving
manslaughter, including attempted manslaughter.
We conclude this argument is akin to the overanalyzed interpretations
of the statute the Cook court expressly rejected in focusing on the “simple,
unqualified language [section 12022.7, subdivision (g)] employed.” (Cook,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 935 [noting that other courts had “criticized [People v.]
Beltran [(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 693] for relying exclusively on
section 12022.7, subdivision (g)’s language without additional substantive
reasoning, but doing so was reasonable given the simplicity and clarity of
that language”].) In other words, we take a different view of the word
“unqualified” than Ackerman and conclude that no additional reasoning is
required to understand the terms of subdivision (g). Its plain language
exempts only the completed crimes of murder and manslaughter, violations of
sections 451 and 452, and crimes where infliction of great bodily injury is an
element of the offense. (§ 12022.7, subd. (g).)
Regardless of whether a defendant intended to use excessive force, the
fact remains that actual infliction of great bodily injury is not an element of
the crime of attempted voluntary manslaughter, as it is for all other kinds of
manslaughter. Thus, the legislative purpose stated in Hale, and cited with
approval in Cook, of deterring individuals from using excessive force and
inflicting harm beyond that inherent in the crime would still be achieved by
allowing a section 12022.7 enhancement to be added to a charge of attempted
voluntary manslaughter. Stated differently, it would be in keeping with this
legislative intent to impose greater punishment upon someone who attempts

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to use deadly force (either in the unreasonable belief in the need for
self-defense or in a heat of passion) and fails to kill the person but causes
significant or substantial physical injury, than upon someone who did not
harm their victim. To exempt attempted voluntary manslaughter, on the
other hand, would fail to achieve the deterrent effect. Ackerman’s selective
reading of Hale, which ignores the second part of the sentence regarding
“the infliction of additional harm beyond that inherent in the crime itself”
(Hale, supra, 225 Cal.App.4th at pp. 275–276), does not persuade us
otherwise because, again, harm is not necessarily inherent in the crime of
attempted voluntary manslaughter.
In Ackerman’s view, reading “manslaughter” to mean only the
completed crime of manslaughter runs afoul of the canon of statutory
interpretation discouraging surplusage. Specifically, he argues such a
construction would render the term “manslaughter” superfluous in view of
the catch-all provision in the second sentence of section 12022.7,
subdivision (g) which exempts all crimes for which “infliction of great bodily
injury is an element of the offense.” Ackerman is correct that a longstanding
canon of statutory interpretation advises that “[a] construction making some
words surplusage is to be avoided.” (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment &
Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1386–1387.) We also understand the
point that the second sentence of section 12022.7, subdivision (g) renders the
portion of the first sentence excluding murder and manslaughter somewhat
redundant. That said, our high court has repeatedly and recently made clear
that “ ‘the canon against surplusage is [merely] a guide to statutory
interpretation and is not invariably controlling.’ [Citation.] We will not use
it ‘to defeat legislative intent’ as gleaned from available sources, including the
rest of the words in the statute, related statutes, the ‘legislative history and

9
the “wider historical circumstances” of the enactment.’ ” (Skidgel v.
California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 1, 21; see also
People v. Reynoza (2024) 15 Cal.5th 982.)
Here, it appears there is little question the Legislature considered
whether subdivision (g) of section 12022.7 should apply to attempt crimes
and purposefully determined it should not. This is not a situation where it is
uncertain from the context whether attempt crimes were even on the
Legislature’s radar when it drafted the statute. To the contrary, the
Legislature expressly discussed “attempted felon[ies]” in section 12022.7,
subdivisions (a) through (e). Generally, under another governing principle of
statutory construction, “ ‘the expression of one thing in a statute ordinarily
implies the exclusion of other things. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Guzman (2005)
35 Cal.4th 577, 588.) Thus, the Legislature’s inclusion of attempted felonies
in subdivisions (a) through (e) but not in subdivision (g) of section 12022.7
implies that attempted manslaughter was intentionally excluded from the
latter.
The problem Ackerman cites with adopting this reading of the statute
is that it would result in absurd consequences. Our Supreme Court has
“often said that courts will not give statutory language a literal meaning if
doing so would result in absurd consequences that the Legislature could not
have intended.” (In re J.W. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 200, 210.) Ackerman points out
that a conviction for attempted voluntary manslaughter with a
section 12022.7, subdivision (a) enhancement is subject to a six-year sentence
(§§ 664, 193, subd. (a), 12022.7, subd. (a)), which is the same term likely to be
imposed under the middle term for the completed crime of voluntary
manslaughter (§ 193, subd. (a)). If the defendant caused great bodily injury
to an individual over the age of 70 in the course of an attempted voluntary

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manslaughter, a consecutive five-year enhancement could be added
(§ 12022.7, subd. (c)), resulting in a sentence greater than that for voluntary
manslaughter. Furthermore, relying on the Lewis dissent, Ackerman argues
that authorizing courts to increase the sentence for an attempted
manslaughter conviction by adding a section 12022.7 enhancement
disregards the Legislature’s clear intention to impose lesser sentences for the
attempted versions of manslaughter crimes. (See § 664 [proscribing
punishment for most attempted felonies of one-half the term of imprisonment
required for the offense attempted] and Lewis, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at
p. 257.)
We disagree this circumstance warrants invoking the absurdity
exception of statutory construction. According to the probation report in this
case, the triad of sentencing options for the attempted manslaughter
conviction was 18 months, 3 years, or 5 years and 6 months. The addition of
a 3-year enhancement to these terms would yield options of 4 years and
6 months, 6 years, and 8 years and 6 months. Because the sentence for
voluntary manslaughter would be double the attempted voluntary
manslaughter sentence, the triad for that crime would be 3 years, 6 years, or
11 years. Thus, only the enhanced low term of 4 years and 6 months is above
the comparable sentence for voluntary manslaughter. The middle term
would be the same and the upper term of 11 years for voluntary
manslaughter exceeds the enhanced upper term for attempted voluntary
manslaughter.
We do not find this to be an absurd result the Legislature could not
have intended. Although the Legislature expressed an intent to impose
one-half of the full sentence when the defendant “attempts to commit any
crime, but fails,” (§ 664), we can reasonably infer it intended to impose a

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greater sentence where the defendant failed to kill the victim but left the
victim suffering from great bodily harm. Indeed, the Legislature expressly
authorized this result for other attempt crimes in section 12022.7,
subdivision (a). The same is true for the greater enhancements for those over
70 years of age or under five years old. (§ 12022.7, subds. (c), (d).) The latter
enhancements also demonstrate a rational legislative intent because these
victims are particularly vulnerable and may require greater care to recover
from a great bodily injury. “ ‘Moreover, our courts have wisely cautioned that
the absurdity exception to the plain meaning rule “should be used most
sparingly by the judiciary and only in extreme cases else we violate the
separation of powers principle of government. [Citation.] We do not sit as a
‘super-legislature.’ [Citation.]” ’ ” (Siry Investment, L.P. v. Farkhondehpour
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 333, 356; accord People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608,
626.) The sentencing outcomes here are not excessively disproportionate and
are in keeping with the legislative intent apparent from the language of the
statute. Accordingly, we conclude this is not the type of extreme case
warranting application of the absurdity exception.
Ackerman takes a somewhat opposite tack in his reply brief, arguing
that allowing great bodily injury enhancements to attempted voluntary
manslaughter convictions does not serve a deterrent purpose because the
prosecutor does not actually obtain increased punishment under this
sentencing scheme. He points out that if the prosecutor pursued different
charges, such as assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) plus a
great bodily injury enhancement under the elder abuse statute (§ 368,
subd. (b)(2)(B)), the court could impose the same sentence it would for an
attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction with a great bodily injury

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enhancement involving a victim over 70 years of age (§§ 664, 193, subd. (a),
12022.7, subd. (c)).
As an initial matter, this argument undercuts Ackerman’s claim that
enhanced attempted voluntary manslaughter sentences are so high as to be
absurd. Furthermore, we disagree the enhancements fail to serve a deterrent
effect simply because prosecutors could exercise their discretion to charge
under other provisions Ackerman considers more narrowly tailored to the
challenged conduct and achieve the same sentences. This case is not
analogous to Cook, where our high court found fault with a prosecutor’s
charging choice because the attorney opted to charge the defendant with
voluntary manslaughter and then tack on enhancements relevant to other
victims, instead of charging the defendant separately for each crime against
each victim. (Cf. Cook, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 936.) Here, there was one
victim, and each sentence separately punishes Ackerman for the harm caused
to that victim under the relevant statute. Within this framework, the Lewis
court’s commonsense interpretation of section 12022.7’s plain language
serves the intended deterrent effect.
Ultimately, as the Hale court explained and the Cook court
acknowledged, “it appears that no interpretation of section 12022.7,
subdivision (g), is guaranteed to eliminate all possible anomalies” (Cook,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 938, citing Hale, supra, 225 Cal. App.4th at
pp. 276–277), but that does not render the statute ambiguous or our
construction absurd. Ackerman would have us interpret section 12022.7,
subdivision (g) to read in the word “attempted” before murder and
manslaughter where the term is not present, while the Lewis court’s
construction renders the exceptions for “murder and manslaughter”
somewhat redundant in light of the second sentence of section 12022.7,

13
subdivision (g). In such situations, “[t]he intent of the law prevails over the
letter of the law, and ‘the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to
the spirit of the act. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Canty (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1266,
1276–1277.) Here, we conclude the Legislature intended to prohibit great
bodily injury enhancements only when great bodily injury is an element of
the offense. In exempting manslaughter and the other specific crimes, we
believe the Legislature intended only to emphasize these exceptions, not to
imply so broad an interpretation of manslaughter that it included the
categorically different crime of attempted manslaughter. Because
section 12022.7, subdivision (g)’s otherwise “clear reading is the unqualified
statement that the great bodily injury enhancement ‘shall not apply to
murder or manslaughter’ ” (Cook, at p. 935), we believe the Lewis court
correctly interpreted the statute.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.

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