In re T.C. CA1/5

CourtListener 9770188Calctapp24 de jun. de 2024

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Filed 6/24/24 In re T.C. CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re T.C.,
A169859
A Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law. (Sonoma County
___________________________________ Super. Ct. No. DEP6464)
SONOMA COUNTY HUMAN
SERVICES DEPARTMENT,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
P.C.,
Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant P.C. (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating his parental rights as to T.C., following a Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing.1 Father contends that the court
erred in finding that T.C. was generally adoptable and in not applying the
beneficial relationship exception. We disagree and affirm.

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions

Code unless otherwise specified.

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I. BACKGROUND
A. Detention/Jurisdiction/Disposition Proceedings
On October 12, 2021, the Sonoma County Human Services Department
(Department) filed a juvenile dependency petition under section 300 on behalf
of then five-year-old T.C. He “was found to be in filthy condition, with grease
and dirt caked onto his person, and a significant odor, as well as ingrown
toenails.” The petition alleged that father failed to protect T.C. “from
exposure to a chronic pattern of intimate partner violence against the child’s
other father,” Thomas C., who was 80 years old at the time. As a result of
father’s behavior, T.C. was alleged to be “at substantial risk of suffering
emotional damage.”
The petition also alleged that father failed to provide T.C. with a safe or
adequate living environment “due in part to [] father’s mental health
symptoms” and that T.C. “was kept ‘hidden’ in the family home, kept in
garages and in cars despite the father owning multiple properties and renting
them out.” The petition further alleged that Thomas C. was unable to
provide for T.C.’s basic needs due to his age and physical decline.
In its detention report, the Department explained that T.C. was born
via an unnamed surrogate in Nepal and that father was T.C.’s biological
father. T.C.’s birth certificate does not list his biological mother. Thomas C.
was married to father at the time of T.C.’s birth and adopted T.C. in 2016.
The report noted that “[t]he fathers have an on-going pattern of domestic
violence, and mutual allegations regarding abuse and neglect of [T.C.].” The
report further noted suspected sexual abuse of T.C. as well as hazardous
living conditions which threatened T.C.’s health and safety. The social
worker who interviewed father observed that he “exhibited paranoid and

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bizarre thoughts in discussion, and struggled to provide a linear narrative
and remain present and oriented in time and place.”
At the detention hearing, the juvenile court issued a detention order
that removed T.C. from father’s and Thomas C.’s custody. The court also
ordered DNA testing for father and a copy of T.C.’s birth certificate.
In its November 2, 2021 jurisdiction report, the Department
recommended that the juvenile court sustain the petition and order a
psychological evaluation of father pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision
(b)(2). The Department expressed concern for T.C.’s safety, noting that father
“has unaddressed mental health and/or substance abuse issues that cause
him to have paranoid thoughts, act violently towards Thomas [C.], and
engage in arguments with various others, often when caring for [T.C.].” On
December 17, 2021, Thomas C. passed away.
At the March 18, 2022 jurisdiction hearing, the juvenile court found the
allegations in the Department’s petition to be true by a preponderance of the
evidence and sustained the petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b)
and (c). The court offered reunification services to father and ordered that he
complete two psychological evaluations. It also elevated father to presumed
father status.
In its disposition report, the Department recommended that the
juvenile court declare T.C. a dependent of the court, order reunification
services, and set a six-month review hearing. It also recommended the
appointment of a Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) for T.C. The
Department noted that, pending the two court-ordered psychiatric
evaluations, it would request termination of reunification services should
father be found eligible for bypass under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(2).

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The Department further noted that in September 2021, father was arrested
for domestic violence and elder abuse.
At the April 6, 2022 disposition hearing, the juvenile court adopted the
Department’s recommended findings and declared T.C. a dependent of the
court. The court also concluded that the Indian Child Welfare Act did not
apply.
On June 23, 2022, father filed a section 388 petition, requesting that
T.C. be returned to his care and custody or, in the alternative, that his visits
with T.C. be in person instead of by Zoom. In support, father claimed that he
had completed parenting classes and tested negative for all substances.
Neither father nor his counsel appeared at the section 388 hearing. The
juvenile court found no changed circumstances and denied the petition. On
August 31, 2022, the court appointed a CASA for T.C.
B. Six-Month/12-Month/18-Month Status Reviews
On September 8, 2022, the Department submitted father’s
psychological evaluation from April 29, 2022. The evaluation concluded that
father “qualifie[d] for a bypass of services in that he has shown an inability
and unwillingness to improve the quality of his parenting.” Among other
things, the evaluation recommended that father be screened for dementia
and obtain alcohol and/or substance abuse support, individual therapy, as
well as “parenting skills training.”
In its six-month status review report, the Department recommended
that reunification services be discontinued. The Department was concerned
that father would “continue to have significant mental health and/or
substance abuse issues.” T.C. was attending individual therapy, and his
therapist reported that T.C. was “pooping in his pants during many of the
visits with his father and on zoom calls.” The therapist explained that this

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could occur when children “ ‘are feeling bigger feelings that they are not
expressing verbally’ ” such as anxiety or stress. The Department noted that
father “has made some efforts to follow some of the elements in his case plan”
and has attended parenting classes and the CPI Dad’s Group. The
Department also noted, however, that father refused to get a second
psychological evaluation and that his psychological issues prevented him
“from being capable of benefiting from services within the timelines of the
Family Reunification Program.”
T.C.’s resource parents submitted a caregiver information form which
reported that T.C. was doing great and “thriving in every aspect of his life.”
He occasionally referred to them as “ ‘mom’ ” and “ ‘dad’ ” and called himself
their son. The six-month review hearing was continued multiple times
because father wished to substitute his attorney and because he contested
the recommendations. In the interim, the Department filed a section 388
petition, requesting termination of father’s reunification services and the
setting of a section 366.26 hearing. The petition argued that father still
refused to complete a second psychological evaluation and that T.C. was
“thriving in the care of his resource parents.”
At the January 19, 2023 combined six/12-month review hearing, the
juvenile court did not find that father substantially complied with the case
plan but granted father an additional six months of services. On March 6,
2023, the court granted the resource parents’ request for de facto parent
status.
In its 18-month status review report, the Department continued to
recommend that father’s reunification services be terminated and a section
366.26 hearing be set. The report stated that “when [T.C.] was with his
father he missed a lot of school and was often exhausted, too tired to do any

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work. Since being in his foster home [T.C.] arrived on time and was prepared
to learn,” and “[t]he teacher reported that his mood improved so greatly that
he was one of the most well-adjusted children in the class.” The CASA also
reported that T.C. was “thriving in his resource home” and that he was
“experiencing safety and stability” there.
Although father attended parenting classes, the report concluded that
“he has not been able to demonstrate . . . that he has gained the insight
needed to understand and reflect how to change his behavior to address the
safety concerns in this case.” Further, though father’s weekly supervised
visits went well, T.C. was still going to the bathroom during every visit,
which appeared to be “some sort of nervous response.” During one visit,
father told T.C. that “he would be coming back home really soon and that he
would be getting tons of presents.” This was after the social worker had
asked father “to stop bringing presents to his visits for a few weeks.” T.C.
told the social worker “that he would like to keep living with his foster
parents because he felt safe there.” He also expressed that he would like to
live with father, but when asked whether he felt safe with father, T.C.
replied, “ ‘I don’t know, I don’t want to say anything bad about my dad.’ ”
At the contested 18-month review hearing, the juvenile court accepted
the Department’s reports into evidence and took judicial notice of its court
file. Father and the social worker both testified. After closing arguments,
the court adopted the Department’s proposed findings and orders and set a
section 366.26 hearing.
C. Section 366.26 Hearing
The CASA and the Department both submitted reports before the
section 366.26 hearing. The CASA received feedback from T.C.’s teacher that
the stability and support provided by his resource parents were “contributing

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very positively to his current academic success and progress.” The CASA
recommended that T.C. remain in his current placement. The Department
determined that T.C. was “likely to be adopted” and recommended
termination of father’s parental rights and adoption as T.C.’s permanent
plan. The Department evaluated T.C. to be “in good general health” and
“developmentally on track for his age.” Mentally and emotionally, T.C. was
“generally stable” but could appear “unfocused, distracted, or dysregulated on
occasion, which may be related to anxiety and his trauma history.”
With respect to whether T.C. would benefit from continuing his
relationship with father, the Department observed that T.C. appeared “non-
emotional about the relationship with his father” and “showed no concern . . .
when told his visits with his father would be decreased.” The Department
concluded that father’s actions, including “bribing [T.C.] with gifts” and his
“lack of physical boundaries [] during visits[,] . . . do not speak to a positive or
healthy relationship that benefits [T.C.].” It further concluded that
termination of father’s parental rights would not be detrimental to T.C. as he
“has thrived in one stable placement” for the past two years. Meanwhile,
father “failed to make substantial progress to ameliorate the issues that
necessitated [T.C.]’s removal” and has been “unable or unwilling to view
[T.C.]’s comfort or wishes as important or valuable.”
The Department determined that T.C. was an adoptable child with “no
known needs that cannot be met with available interventions.” T.C.
appeared “very comfortable with his caregivers and report[ed] he wants to
remain in their care permanently.” The resource parents in turn were
“committed to providing [T.C.] a permanent home with them through
adoption.”

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On November 9, 2023, the resource parents updated the juvenile court
that T.C. was “doing great” and was thriving in school. The CASA similarly
reported to the court that T.C. was “really thriving,” has a lot of friends, and
“has gained so much confidence” in the last two years.
On January 5, 2024, the juvenile court held the section 366.26 hearing.
At the hearing, the court received the Department’s section 366.26 report
(366.26 report) into evidence and took judicial notice of its court file. The
court also received into evidence a stack of photos from father, depicting
moments father shared with T.C. before his removal.
Father testified about his visits with T.C. and how T.C. looked forward
to seeing him. He further testified that it would be to T.C.’s benefit to have
continued contact with him because he is a “great dad who knows the needs
of his son” and because T.C. “trusts and looks up to and loves and wants his
dad to be around.” During closing arguments, the Department’s counsel
reiterated that T.C. did not have “a significant positive emotional
attachment” to father and that father’s testimony focused more on what was
best for him rather than T.C. T.C.’s counsel joined the Department’s
argument and emphasized that T.C. was loving, affectionate, and “very
adoptable.” Father’s counsel argued that T.C. should remain in foster care so
his beneficial relationship with father could continue to grow.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court stated that it
believed T.C.’s “long-term safety, [and] security, lies in adoption” as outlined
by the Department’s findings. The court found by clear and convincing
evidence that T.C. was likely to be adopted, terminated father’s parental
rights, and ordered adoption as T.C.’s permanent plan.
Father timely appealed.

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II. DISCUSSION
Father contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that T.C. was
generally adoptable and that the beneficial relationship exception did not
apply. We find no error.
A. Substantial Evidence Supports the Adoptability Finding
As a threshold matter, father concedes that he has forfeited any
challenge based on specific defects in the Department’s adoptability
assessment. (See also In re Mary C. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 793, 801 [“While
the parents may question whether substantial evidence supports the
juvenile court’s findings of adoptability, by failing to object in juvenile court
they have forfeited any challenge to specific defects in the report, such as
omission of required content or insufficient discussion of required topics”].)
In any case, even if there were defects in the report, which would go to the
weight of the evidence, we do not find any defect “sufficiently egregious” so
as to “impair the basis of a court’s decision to terminate parental rights.” (In
re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 413.) As a result, we only consider
whether there is sufficient evidence to support the adoptability finding and
conclude that there is.
“Before terminating parental rights, the court must find by clear and
convincing evidence that it is likely that the child will be adopted within a
reasonable amount of time.” (In re K.B. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1290.)
A finding of adoptability is “a low threshold” and is reviewed for substantial
evidence. (Id. at p. 1292.) Indeed, we “review that finding only to determine
whether there is evidence, contested or uncontested, from which a
reasonable court could reach that conclusion.” (Ibid.)
The issue of adoptability focuses on “whether the minor’s age, physical
condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to

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adopt the minor. [Citations.] Hence, it is not necessary that the minor
already be in a potential adoptive home or that there be a proposed adoptive
parent ‘waiting in the wings.’ ” (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642,
1649.) Moreover, “a prospective adoptive parent’s willingness to adopt
generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable
time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family.” (Id.
at p. 1650.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that T.C. was
likely to be adopted within a reasonable amount of time. At the time of the
section 366.26 report, T.C. was seven years old and had been living with his
resource parents for two years. The social worker observed that T.C. was “in
good general health,” “developmentally on track for his age,” and was not in
need of any special education services at school. The CASA described T.C.
as “a happy, healthy, young boy” after spending a considerable amount of
time with him. The resource parents likewise described T.C. as “ ‘smart’,
‘sweet’, and ‘charming’ ” and were committed to adopting him. This evidence
is more than sufficient to establish T.C.’s adoptability.
Father nevertheless argues that the adoptability finding is not
supported by substantial evidence. He points to a section of the 366.26
report which stated that T.C. “can appear unfocused, distracted, or
dysregulated on occasion, which may be related to anxiety and his trauma
history.” According to the report, T.C. was also “reluctant to discuss his own
feelings” and at times “demonstrate[d] a low self-concept, making negative
comments about himself when he feels he has done something wrong.” T.C.
attended weekly individual therapy to address these issues. The report then
concluded that T.C. had “no known needs that cannot be met with available
interventions.”

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Contrary to father’s argument based on T.C.’s various “behavioral
issues,” there is nothing to suggest that the juvenile court failed to consider
these issues in determining T.C.’s adoptability. The court received the
366.26 report into evidence and took judicial notice of its file in this matter.
More importantly, these behavioral issues do not negate the ample evidence
of T.C.’s adoptability.2 (In re K.B., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1292 [“It is
irrelevant that there may be evidence which would support a contrary
conclusion”].)
B. The Beneficial Relationship Exception Did Not Apply
Father next contends that the juvenile court erred in not applying the
beneficial relationship exception. We disagree.
Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) provides a number of exceptions
under which “the parent may avoid termination of parental rights in certain
circumstances defined by statute.” (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614,
629 (Caden C.).) The beneficial relationship exception is one of them.
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) This exception is “limited in scope” and requires
that the parent establish three elements: “(1) regular visitation and contact,
and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such
that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the

2 In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, a case father relies on, is

easily distinguishable. There, the court of appeal found no substantial
evidence to support the juvenile court’s adoptability finding because there
was no adoption assessment report and only conclusory statements that the
minor was “ ‘found to be a proper subject for adoption’ ” and was “adoptable.”
(Id. at p. 624.) By contrast, T.C.’s young age, the glowing statements from
the social worker and CASA about his demeanor, behavior, and ability to
thrive, and the willingness of his resource parents to adopt him provide more
than enough evidence to support the juvenile court’s adoptability finding.

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child.” (Caden C., at p. 631, italics omitted.) It is the parent’s burden to
establish these elements by a preponderance of the evidence. (Id. at p. 636.)
A finding that the beneficial relationship exception does not apply is
reviewed under a hybrid standard. “The first two elements involve factual
determinations to which the substantial evidence standard of review applies.
[Citation.] The final step, determining whether termination of parental
rights would be detrimental to the child, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”
(In re G.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 15, 26.)
1. Father Failed to Establish the Second Element
The Department concedes that father met the first element of regular
visitation and contact but argues that there is substantial evidence to
support the juvenile court’s finding that he did not meet the second element.
As to that element, the regular visits must have “continued or developed a
significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent.” (In re
Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) A positive attachment is one
that “is nurturing and provides the child with a sense of security and
stability.” (In re B.D. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1218, 1230.) It is also “one
where the child views the parent as more than a mere friend or playmate
and [whose] interactions with the parent were not ambivalent, detached, or
indifferent.” (Ibid.) In making this determination, “courts often consider
how children feel about, interact with, look to, or talk about their parents.”
(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)
We agree with the Department that there is substantial evidence that
T.C. did not have a significant, positive emotional attachment to father.
Father argues that his attachment with T.C. was “substantial and positive”
as evidenced by the photos he submitted to the juvenile court and his
testimony at the section 366.26 hearing. Specifically, father testified that

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T.C. looked forward to seeing him during their visits and that T.C. trusted
him and could tell him anything. The testimony of father alone, however, is
insufficient to establish the second element, as the inquiry focuses on the
child and not the parent. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)
Although father’s initial visits with T.C. “went fairly well,” father fails
to address several negative aspects of those visits which indicated that T.C.
did not feel secure or stable with father. For example, T.C. frequently used
the bathroom during the visits even though he was offered bathroom breaks
beforehand. This was observed as a potential “nervous response to the
visits, or an attempt to escape or take a break from the visit.” Moreover,
T.C. “separate[d] easily from [father]” and “showed no concern or emotion”
when told his visits with his father “would be decreased.” T.C. also did not
ask his resource parents about father. Further, in April 2023, T.C. and his
resource parents had an unplanned encounter with father at a community
event. After father asked T.C. for a hug, he pulled T.C. onto his lap and
asked if T.C. wanted to come home with him. T.C. pulled away and
retreated to his resource parents. This evidence is enough to support the
juvenile court’s finding that father did not meet the second element of the
beneficial relationship exception.
2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion as to the Third
Element
As to the third element—“whether ‘the termination would be
detrimental to the child due to’ the relationship—the court must decide
whether it would be harmful to the child to sever the relationship and choose
adoption.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.) The court determines
“how the child would be affected by losing the parental relationship—in
effect, what life would be like for the child in an adoptive home without the

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parent in the child’s life.” (Ibid.) The court must act in the child’s best
interest and “decide[] whether the harm of severing the relationship
outweighs ‘the security and the sense of belonging a new family would
confer.’ ” (Ibid.)
We initially note that because we find that father did not establish the
second element, we need not consider the third element. But even if we did,
we find no abuse of discretion in the juvenile court’s holding that the
termination of father’s parental rights would not be detrimental to T.C.
Again, father relies primarily on his own testimony that T.C. needed him
and that any instability T.C. endured in foster care would be outweighed by
his contact with father. These assertions are belied by the record. Not only
does father fail to show a significant, positive emotional attachment which
would benefit T.C., he also fails to acknowledge the tremendous progress
T.C. has made while living with his resource parents.
Both the social worker and the CASA observed that T.C. was thriving
in his new home. He attended school regularly, played a variety of sports,
and had a lot of friends. He “display[ed] comfort and affection” with his
resource parents and asked to stay with them permanently. He reported
feeling safe with them and said, “ ‘they take good care of me.’ ” By contrast,
when asked whether he felt safe with father, T.C. responded, “ ‘I don’t know,
I don’t want to say anything bad about my dad.’ ”
Given this evidence, the juvenile court did not err in terminating
father’s parental rights and finding that the beneficial relationship exception
did not apply.3

3 Father contends that it is “difficult to analyze the juvenile court’s

rationale” because the court did not engage in a Caden C. analysis. Father
cites to no authority and we are not aware of any which requires the juvenile
court to “recite specific findings relative to its conclusions regarding any or all

14
III. DISPOSITION
The January 5, 2024 order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

of the three elements of the exception.” (In re A.L. (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th
1131, 1156.)

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CHOU, J.
We concur.

JACKSON, P. J.
BURNS, J.

In re T.C. / A169859

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