CourtListener 9567883•People v. Ortiz CA2/6
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Filed 6/18/24 P. v. Ortiz CA2/6
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B327985
(Super. Ct. No.
Plaintiff and Respondent, F000270432003)
(San Luis Obispo County)
v.
SERGIO ORTIZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 1998 a jury convicted appellant Sergio Ortiz of second
degree murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 189.)1 We affirmed
the judgment in an unpublished opinion. (People v. Garcia et
al. (July 23, 2001, B126854) (Garcia).) In 2019 appellant filed a
petition to vacate his murder conviction and obtain resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6. Appellant claims his murder
conviction should be reduced to assault.
In a 2022 unpublished opinion, we reversed the trial court’s
order denying appellant’s petition at the prima facie stage. We
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to issue an
order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing as
required by section 1172.6, subdivision (d). (People v. Ortiz
(March 3, 2022, B300776) (Ortiz I).)
Appellant appeals the denial of his section 1172.6 petition
at the evidentiary hearing. The trial court found him guilty of
second degree murder based on the theory that he had directly
aided and abetted implied malice murder. Appellant contends:
(1) substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s
findings, (2) “the trial court misunderstood the elements of direct
aiding and abetting implied malice murder” (bold and
capitalization omitted), and (3) the trial court erroneously failed
to consider the impact of appellant’s youth on whether he had
formed the requisite mens rea.
We affirm. Appellant’s first and second contentions are
based on a misunderstanding of the life-endangering act that he
had aided and abetted. Appellant claims the life-endangering act
was the actual killer’s stabbing of the victim. In fact, the life-
endangering act was a six-against-one brutal gang beating of a
defenseless victim. Substantial evidence supports this theory of
implied malice murder.
Statement of Facts
Our summary of the facts is taken verbatim from the
statement of facts at pages 2-5 of our unpublished 2022 Ortiz I
opinion. The statement of facts in Ortiz I is taken from the
statement of facts in our 2001 Garcia opinion.
We recognize that section 1172.6 provides that, at an
evidentiary hearing, “[t]he court may . . . consider the procedural
history of the case recited in any prior appellate opinion.” (Id.,
subd. (d)(3), italics added.) It does not provide that the court may
2
consider the underlying facts recited in a prior appellate opinion.
But after the trial court stated that it had “read and considered”
the reporter’s transcript of the original jury trial, without
objection the court said, “[B]ecause the Second District Court of
Appeal[’]s statement of facts and opinions contained a summary
of the most important details for purposes of this analysis, I’m
going to be relying on that succinct summary in rendering my
decision.” We therefore set forth the relevant facts as
summarized in Ortiz I. (See People v. Vance (2023) 94
Cal.App.5th 706, 714 [“We conclude that, when an appellate
opinion is admitted at an evidentiary hearing under section
1172.6, without objection, it is substantial evidence that the trial
court can consider”].)
“Paso Robles 13 (Paso 13) is a criminal street gang. [Raul]
Mosqueda, whose moniker is ‘dreamer,’ was a past associate of
Paso 13. Mosqueda was friendly with the members of Nameless
Crew Style (NCS), a rival gang that was engaged in ‘warfare’
with Paso 13. . . . Paso 13 put out a ‘green light’ on Mosqueda,
which meant that he was ‘free game’ to kill. [David] Rey and
[Oscar] Garcia were members of Paso 13, and [appellant]
associated with the gang. [¶] . . . Rey believed that Mosqueda
had falsely accused him of vandalizing [appellant’s] car. Rey told
[appellant] that Mosqueda had committed the vandalism. Rey
said he ‘was going to take care’ of ‘dreamer.’
“[¶]
“[¶]
“During the evening of April 12, 1998, Reginald Calhoun
went to the trailer park residence of [appellant] and [Monte]
Weatherington. [Appellant and other persons were present]
3
there. Mosqueda became the subject of conversation, and
everyone was saying, ‘Hey, we want to kick dreamer’s ass.’
“Calhoun was paged by [Gregory] Vived[, Jr.]. Calhoun
telephoned Vived, who said that Mosqueda was going to be at a
party in Paso Robles. . . .
“Calhoun, [Manuel] Preciado, and [five other persons,
including appellant,] drove to the Paso Robles party in three cars.
Rey was the sole passenger in a car driven by Garcia. Rey was
armed with a knife that he displayed to Garcia inside the car.
Rey put the knife in his pocket. At the trailer park, Rey had not
displayed the knife or mentioned that he possessed it.
“After parking their cars in Paso Robles, Calhoun,
Preciado, and [the five other persons, including appellant,]
walked to the apartment where the party was occurring.
Weatherington knocked on the front door. A female opened the
door, and Weatherington asked to speak to ‘dreamer.’ Mosqueda
came to the door and said, ‘What do you guys want?’
Weatherington told him to come outside. Mosqueda said, ‘We
don’t want no problems here.’ Mosqueda closed the door, and
another person locked it.
“[¶] Calhoun picked up a potted plant and threw it through
a plate-glass window. Rey and Weatherington kicked the front
door open. Calhoun, Preciado, and [five other persons, including
appellant,] ran through the doorway into the apartment. They
were saying, ‘Get your beating like a man,’ and ‘You know what
time it is. You know it’s up.’ Everyone inside ‘just started
scattering.’ Mosqueda retreated into a bathroom and tried to
close the door. Calhoun testified that he and Rey pulled
Mosqueda out into the hallway, but other witnesses testified that
Weatherington did the pulling. Calhoun and [five other persons,
4
including appellant,] punched Mosqueda in the hallway. There
was ‘a big commotion of bodies’ and people were screaming.
“[¶]
“Mosqueda fell to the floor and was lying on his side
against a wall. Garcia said to Rey, ‘You got a knife. You got a
knife. Stick him. Stick him.’ Rey stabbed Mosqueda four times
in the chest. Mosqueda crawled out of the hallway ‘like a baby’
on his hands and knees with blood on his face, chest, and
stomach. Rey, Vived, Garcia, [appellant], and Calhoun were
‘around him’ and were punching and kicking him. People in the
background were saying, ‘Leave him alone. He’s knocked out.[’]
Mosqueda fell to his side. Rey, Vived, Garcia, [appellant], and
Calhoun continued to hit and kick him. Garcia said, ‘Now what’s
up dreamer? . . . Now you ain’t talking. You’re not saying
nothing now, are you?’ Vived stopped ‘swinging and kicking’ and
‘jumped up against the wall.’ He said, ‘Oh shit . . . What
happened? What happened?’ Vived appeared to be ‘in shock.’
Everybody except [appellant] ceased attacking Mosqueda.
[Appellant] kicked him twice in the head. . . .
“Later that night, Preciado, appellant, and Weatherington
met Garcia in a parking lot. Garcia told them that Rey had
stabbed Mosqueda ‘penitentiary style, real quick,’ and that
anyone who said ‘anything to the cops’ would ‘get bumped off’ in
prison. Garcia said that Rey ‘had got his stripes.’ This meant
that Rey had earned respect from other gang members and ‘was
up at the top with the big boys . . . .’
“When Garcia left, Preciado, appellant, and Weatherington
went to a motel. According to Preciado, at the motel they
discussed the stabbing, agreeing that Rey ‘was wrong for doing it
. . . without saying anything . . . .’ But earlier in the evening
5
[appellant] had declared, ‘We got their guy. It’s going to be a
good night.’
“An expert on criminal street gangs testified that the
killing of Mosqueda had benefited Paso 13 because it had ‘slowed
down’ the escalation in violence between Paso 13 and NCS and
had ‘put [Paso 13] back on top.’”
Section 1172.6
Section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides that “[a] person
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime . . . may file a petition with the court that
sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s murder . . .
conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining
[charges] when” certain conditions apply.
After a section 1172.6 petition is filed, “the court shall hold
a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie
showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall
issue an order to show cause.” (Id., subd. (c).)
If an order to show cause is issued, the court shall conduct
an evidentiary hearing to determine the petitioner’s eligibility for
relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) At the evidentiary hearing the
burden is on the People “to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the petitioner is guilty of murder . . . .” (Id., subd. (d)(3).)
Trial Court’s Ruling
In determining that appellant was guilty of second degree
murder as a direct aider and abettor of implied malice murder,
the trial court reasoned as follows:
6
“[Appellant] deliberately [] participated in a brutal gang
beating of a defenseless victim knowing that he had been green
lighted by the gang, and the actual consequences of his conduct
were dangerous to human life, and [appellant] knew that his
conduct endangered Mr. Mosqueda's life and acted with conscious
disregard for life.
“ [¶]
“ . . . [Appellant] forcibly invaded a home with the express
intent to, quote, ‘Kick Dreamers ass.’ . . . Reginald Calhoun,
during his testimony at trial, when asked what could happen
when seven men invade a house to kick someone’s ass, testified
that, ‘He can get hurt. Broken bones. He could die.’ . . .
“[Appellant] specifically intended that he and his
accomplices assault Mosqueda by means of force likely to produce
great bodily injury. The assault was committed on a person who
had been green lighted by a criminal street gang. The green light
meant that Mr. Mosqueda was free game to kill and increased the
risk the assault would result in his death. [Appellant] associated
[with] Paso Robles 13, and the jury found he committed the
murder for the benefit of the gang. . . .
“ [¶]
“ . . . [Appellant] knew the actual killer, David Rey,
harbored a personal grudge against Mr. Mosqueda. Rey had said
he was going to take care of Dreamer. [Appellant] and five other
individuals, including two gang members, vi[]ciously assaulted
Mr. Mosqueda, who was unarmed and on his own. After Mr. Rey
mortally wounded him, [appellant] and four others continued to
hit and kick him while he was on his hands and knees with blood
on his face, chest and stomach. And after the other assailants
7
had ceased their attack [appellant] kicked Mosqueda twice in the
head.
“After the killing, [appellant] declared, ‘We got their guy.
It’s going to be a good night.’ By using the word ‘we,’ [appellant]
took credit for Mr. Mosqueda’s murder. ‘It’s going to be a good
night’ shows he not only approved of the murder, but also
intended to celebrate it.
“Based on the totality of the evidence, . . . I do find [that]
the People have met their burden beyond a reasonable doubt that
[appellant] . . . is guilty [of] murder.”
Direct Aiding and Abetting of Implied Malice Murder
“[A] defendant may directly aid and abet an implied malice
murder.” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990.) “‘[D]irect
aiding and abetting is based on the combined actus reus of the
participants and the aider and abettor's own mens rea.
[Citation.] In the context of implied malice, the actus reus
required of the perpetrator is the commission of a life
endangering act. For the direct aider and abettor, the actus reus
includes whatever acts constitute aiding the commission of the
life-endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an implied malice
murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct,
aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of
that act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by
the direct aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator
intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the
commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to
human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.’”
(Id. at pp. 990-991, italics in first sentence added.)
8
Substantial Evidence Supports Finding that Appellant
Directly Aided and Abetted Implied Malice Murder
“To determine whether sufficient evidence supported [the
trial court’s] findings, we apply the substantial evidence standard
of review. [Citation.] [¶] The principles of substantial evidence
review are well-settled. ‘Because the sufficiency of the evidence
is ultimately a legal question, we must examine the record
independently for “‘substantial evidence—that is, evidence which
is reasonable, credible, and of solid value’” that would support a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] We must ‘review
the whole record to determine whether any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime . . . beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citation.] . . . [Citation.] In applying this test,
we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the
existence of every fact the [trier of fact] could reasonably have
deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] “Conflicts and even
testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify
the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the
trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and
the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination
depends.”’. . . ” (People v. Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245,
270-271.) “‘“A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted
unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support”’”’ the factfinder’s
decision.” (Id. at p. 271.)
Appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to show that
he directly aided and abetted implied malice murder because
“[t]here is no substantial evidence that [he] intended to aid Rey
in the stabbing.” (Bold omitted.) Appellant argues: “[I]t is
9
undisputed that the life-endangering act was the stabbing . . .
and [] [he] did not . . . know that Rey had a knife or intended to
stab Mosqueda.”
The trial court’s conclusion that appellant had directly
aided and abetted implied malice murder was not based on
speculation that he knew Rey intended to stab Mosqueda. It was
based on appellant’s knowledge that he and his accomplices were
committing a life-endangering act – a forcible home invasion
that, as the trial court said, involved “a brutal gang beating of a
defenseless victim knowing that he had been green lighted by the
gang.” For the reasons set forth in the previous section entitled
“Trial Court’s Ruling,” ante at pp. 6-8, substantial evidence
supports the court’s finding that appellant had the requisite
knowledge. (See this court’s opinion in People v. Schell (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 437, 440, 442-443 (Schell) [evidence sufficient to
support conviction of implied malice murder where defendant
“was one of at least eight gang members or gang associates who
participated in a vicious assault upon the victim,” even though,
like appellant, defendant’s participation was limited to an “attack
with his fists and feet”]; see also People v. Montes (1999) 74
Cal.App.4th 1050, 1056 [“Given the great potential for escalating
violence during gang confrontations, it is immaterial whether
Montes specifically knew Cuevas had a gun].)
Appellant argues that, as to him, the court’s “gang-related
findings are not supported by substantial evidence.” (Bold
omitted.) But a gang expert opined that appellant “associated
with Paso 13.” Officers from the gang task force had “observed
[appellant and Garcia] together on several occasions . . . over the
course of the last approximate nine months” prior to the murder.
Garcia “admitted membership in Paso Robles 13.”
10
Moreover, appellant was immersed in the gang lifestyle.
The gang expert testified that since 1992 appellant had
“appear[ed]” to claim membership in another criminal street gang
– Monte Flores. “[A] photograph was obtained of him showing
[the] Monte Flores handsign.” Appellant testified that he had
been “an associate of El Monte Flores” until 1992 or 1993, when
he left the gang. But while in jail in August 1998, appellant
wrote a letter to a gang member that, according to the gang
expert, was “pretty indicative of the gangster lifestyle, the
gangster way of thinking.” For example, appellant wrote: “‘A lot
of people try to walk like a gangster and talk like a gangster, but
a real vato’ . . . ‘will always spot the fakes.’ [¶] ‘We don’t tell
people we are the real deal, we let them see it.”
Appellant maintains that “Paso 13 is not a criminal street
gang under current law” because “there is no substantial
evidence of a pattern of criminal gang activity” and the gang
expert’s “testimony about the predicate offense is not substantial
evidence.” Appellant is referring to recent amendments of section
186.22, the gang statute. The amendments are irrelevant. We
are not concerned with whether in 1998, when the murder was
committed, Paso 13 qualified as a criminal street gang under
current law.
Appellant claims “[t]here is no evidence that [he] knew
Mosqueda had been green lighted by Paso 13.” (Bold omitted.)
Because appellant associated with Paso 13, the trial court
reasonably inferred he was aware of the “green light.” The gang
expert opined “that there was a contract that was put out on
[Mosqueda] by Paso 13.”
“Appellant’s presence at the scene, his participation in the
attack on the victim, his companionship with other perpetrators,
11
his conduct before and after the crimes, and his motive of
retaliation for disrespect all support the finding that he aided
and abetted an implied malice murder.” (Schell, supra, 84
Cal.App.5th at p. 443.) As to “his motive of retaliation for
disrespect,” evidence was presented that appellant believed
Mosqueda had vandalized appellant’s car. Manuel Preciado
testified that appellant had “said he didn’t like dreamer”
“[b]ecause of the car vandalism.” Appellant testified that, when
he kicked Mosqueda in the head, he “was upset” and “angry”
because of “the vandalism to [his] car.”
“‘[A]ppellant did not need to specifically know that someone
would strike [Mosqueda] with [a [knife]] . . . to be liable under an
implied malice theory. It suffices that he knew he was aiding in
a violent [six-against-one gang] attack . . . and intended to stop
[Mosqueda] from escaping or defending himself by helping the
perpetrators to surround and hit him.’” (Schell, supra, 84
Cal.App.5th at p. 443.) Because substantial evidence supports
the trial court’s findings, we reject appellant’s contention that he
was denied his constitutional right to due process.
The Trial Court Did Not Misunderstand the Elements
Of Directly Aiding and Abetting Implied Malice Murder
“‘[A] trial court is presumed to have been aware of and
followed the applicable law. . . .’” (People v. Stowell (2003) 31
Cal.4th 1107, 1114.) Appellant contends the trial court
“misunderstood the elements of direct aiding and abetting
implied malice murder.” (Bold omitted.) Appellant argues that
the misunderstanding arose because the court was not aware
that “the life endangering act was Rey’s act of stabbing Mosqueda
multiple times . . . . [¶] Accordingly, the trial court should have
determined whether [appellant] knew that Rey intended to stab
12
Mosqueda, intended to aid him in the stabbing, knew that the
stabbing was dangerous to life, and acted in conscious disregard
for life.”
In the previous section of this opinion, we explained that
the relevant life-endangering act was not the stabbing, but
instead was appellant’s participation in the violent gang beating
of Mosqueda. There is no suggestion that the trial court
misunderstood the law.
Trial Court’s Alleged Failure to Consider Impact of Appellant’s
Youth on Whether He Had Formed the Requisite Mens Rea
Appellant was 22 years old when he participated in the
assault upon Mosqueda. Appellant claims the trial court
erroneously failed to consider his youth in determining whether
he had formed the requisite mens rea for directly aiding and
abetting implied malice murder.
Appellant relies on People v. Pittman (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th
400 (Pittman). Pittman petitioned for section 1172.6 relief after
he had been convicted of implied malice murder. The court held
that if a defendant is 25 years old or younger, his youth “[is] a
factor in the totality of the circumstances bearing on whether [he]
acted with implied malice.” (Id. at p. 417.) The appellate court
reversed the denial of Pittman’s petition because the trial court
had not considered that he was 21 years old at the time of the
offense. It remanded the matter to the trial court with directions
“to consider how, if at all, Pittman's youth impacted his ability to
form the requisite mental state for [implied malice] second degree
murder.” (Id. at p. 418.) Appellant argues that we should
similarly reverse the denial of his petition. He asserts, “A[s] a
matter of law, at age 22, [he] was a youthful offender suffering
13
from the emotional and cognitive disabilities of his developing
brain.”
The issue of appellant’s youth was not raised in the trial
court, but the evidentiary hearing was conducted on March 29,
2023, more than six months before Pittman was decided.
Nevertheless, we agree with the People that appellant forfeited
the issue by failing to raise it at the evidentiary hearing. “All
issues . . . are subject to the rule of forfeiture, and a defendant’s
failure to raise the issue before the trial court will generally
result in the appellate court’s refusal to consider it.” (People v.
Navarro (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1347, fn. 9.)
In Pittman the petitioner had also not raised the issue of
his youth in the trial court. The appellate court concluded that a
forfeiture had not occurred because the petition was denied in
2020, and “[t]he relevant appellate cases were not decided until
2021 or later.” (Pittman, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 416.) The
court listed eight relevant cases that were decided in 2021 and
2022. (Ibid.; see, e.g., In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 439
[“a defendant’s youth at the time of the offense should be a factor
in determining whether that defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life under section 190.2, subdivision (d)”];
People v. Jones (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1093 [“it is best for
the trial court to have a meaningful opportunity to consider
Jones’s youth [Jones was 20 years old at the time of the offense]
as part of the totality of the circumstances germane to
determining whether he was a major participant who acted with
reckless indifference to human life”].) Pittman is distinguishable
because all of the eight relevant cases cited in Pittman were
decided before appellant’s March 29, 2023 evidentiary hearing.
14
Even if appellant had preserved the issue of his youth for
appellate review, no prejudicial error would have occurred. “[I]t
is [not] ‘reasonably probable that a result more favorable to
[appellant] would have been reached in the absence of the
[alleged] error.’” (People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 489,
fn. 8 (Oliver).) Appellant was not a teenager. He was a 22-year-
old adult, three months shy of his 23rd birthday. Appellant was
born on July 21, 1975. The offense was committed on April 12,
1998.
“[T]he case law discussing the differences in brain
development among youthful offenders (in contrast to their adult
counterparts) stress two areas of divergence: (1) their relative
impulsivity; and (2) their vulnerability to peer pressure.
[Citation.] There is no evidence in this case that [appellant’s]
criminal behavior was motivated by either of these two factors.”
(Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 489.) The assault upon
Mosqueda was not impulsive; it was planned in advance. “[W]e
are not here presented with a situation where a youthful offender
was swept up in circumstances beyond his or her control that led
to an unintended death.” (Ibid.) “As for peer pressure, there is
no evidence that [appellant] felt compelled to assist in” the home
invasion and assault upon Mosqueda. (Ibid.) He was a willing
participant.
Appellant’s “actions during this crime did not show ‘a
transient rashness’ or ‘inability to assess consequences.’
[Citation.] Nor do we perceive any ‘“impetuosity”’ or ‘“failure to
appreciate risks and consequences.”’” (Oliver, supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at p. 490.) Appellant “has failed to present on appeal
or in the court below any specific support for the proposition that
15
his level of maturity somehow lessened his culpability for this
murder.” (Ibid.)
Disposition
The order denying appellant’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
CODY, J.
16
Jacquelyn H. Duffy, Judge
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo
______________________________
Mi Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Gabriel Bradley, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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